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Foreword 
Tax systems and tax reforms in 
transition economies 
Vito Tanzi 
This book deals with tax reform in New EU countries. It describes the 
changes that have occurred in the tax systems of a group of countries that 
underwent a transformation, or a transition, from being centrally planned 
to becoming market economies. This has been a remarkable journey that 
has required enormous and difficult reforms. There was no road map for 
these countries to follow, because it was a journey on uncharted territory. 
No group of countries had ever traveled this territory before. However, 
there was the advantage of knowing where to go, if not how to get there. 
The destination was the creation of tax systems and tax administrations 
not too different from those of the EU countries. 
In theory, one could assume that all that these countries had to do was 
to make copies of the tax laws of some EU country and make them their 
own. This, however, would be missing completely what tax reform is and 
how tax systems must be nested in the economy of a country. They must 
reflect the structural characteristics of a country's economy if they are to 
be successful. The economies of the countries discussed in this book have 
been undergoing fundamental changes. Some of theses changes are still 
taking place. Thus, in some ways, their tax systems have been adapting 
themselves to moving targets. It is to be expected that this process will 
continue for a few more years until the economies of these countries 
become fully market oriented, with characteristics, structures, and institu-
tions similar to those of the other European countries. That this is not yet 
the case can be seen, in part, from the levels of their per capita incomes 
that are still much lower than those of the group of countries that they are 
joining. 
When the journey started, much of the wealth of these New EU coun-
tries was owned by the state. The citizens were not expected to save and 
accumulate assets because the state, often through the public enterprises 
in which most citizens worked, would take care of them in old age or in 
illness. They did not need to save as a precaution for being unemployed, 
because there was no official unemployment. The state enterprises were 
required to absorb any citizen who wanted a job. A large part of the 
income received by the workers was in kind. The part received in cash was 
xvi Vito Tanzi 
only a small fraction of the income produced by a worker and there were a 
lot of constraints, imposed by scarcity, on how this cash could be used. 
Thus, to a great extent, the state determined both the level and the pattern 
of the consumption by individuals. Individual decisions had little influence 
on the allocation of resources. This was done through state planning and 
reflected the views of the planners. 
In some ways classical central planning was an effective and esthetically 
attractive social instrument that fascinated many western social scientists. 
Unfortunately, by limiting individual liberties and by killing individual 
incentives, it carried an enormous cost in terms of economic efficiency and 
political liberty. This cost became progressively higher with the passing of 
years when the revolutionary enthusiasm, which might have existed in the 
earlier years, faded and cynicism and corruption rose. As time passed, the 
centrally planned economies became increasingly inefficient and unable to 
satisfy the consumption needs of their populations. 
In that central-planning environment, the role of the tax system was 
limited and there was hardly any need for a western-style tax administra-
tion. Taxes on labor income were collected directly from the state enter-
prises, by simply adjusting the cash transfers that they received from the 
central bank to pay the wage bill. There was no objective definition of 
enterprise income to determine precisely the taxes on profits. The 
payment from an enterprise to the state was negotiated; it was not based 
on the actual profits. The depreciation allowances for the use of capital 
assets bore little or no relation to the useful life of the real assets used. 
There were no laws that defined the turnover taxes. These were deter-
mined arbitrarily in the plan and reflected both social considerations that 
favored particular items (children's clothes, art books, etc), as well as 
supply and demand conditions. When there was excessive inventory of an 
item, the turnover tax was reduced to induce citizens to buy more of this 
item. Therefore, the turnover taxes could be in the thousands and changed 
frequently .1 
A decade ago, in an introductory chapter to a book on Transition to 
Market (1993) that I edited, I wrote that 'this was an almost idyllic situ-
ation from a tax administration's perspective. The confrontational situ-
ation that exists in the West between taxpayers and tax administrators was 
largely absent.' I cited the director of taxation of one of these countries in 
transition who had told me, somewhat nostalgically, that 'the life of a tax 
administrator was easy ( during central planning). He often had to deal 
with just one enterprise. Much revenue came from an occasional tele-
phone call. Now you have to work for every cent' (Tanzi 1993, p. 7). Thus, 
one thing that these countries had to learn was how to collect taxes from 
taxpayers that would rather evade paying them. 
The reforms introduced by the New EU countries had to cope with 
economies in which prices and wages are free to fluctuate, private sector 
activities become important, there are no controls on the output of enter-
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prises, so that their incomes are not known and payments can be made in 
various forms and no longer through just one 'monobank'. This new situ-
ation would demand both new tax systems and new tax administrations. 
Furthermore, these had to be adjusted over the years to conform with the 
changes in the structure of the economy. It would not be imprudent to say 
that the tax systems of these countries have come a long way and that from 
now on they will need more fine tuning than radical surgery. 
When we look at the current situation of the countries discussed in this 
book, we are surprised by some aspects. The first surprise is the closeness 
of their current tax burdens. In fact these tax burdens are all close to 40 
percent of GDP, having come down from higher levels. A tax burden of 40 
percent of GDP may be close to, or even lower than, the European 
average but it is very high considering these countries' still low per capita 
incomes. From an international statistical perspective, the tax burden of 
these countries could be expected to be somewhat lower. Thus, a question 
that needs to be raised is whether the current tax levels are sustainable 
overtime. 
It would be reasonable to speculate that they are likely to fall as the 
transformation of these economies continues. This fall would require a 
reduction in public spending. 
The second surprise is that, in spite of their high tax levels, all of these 
countries, with the exception of Estonia, have developed high budgetary 
deficits, which have been growing in recent years. This implies that these 
countries have not succeeded yet in reducing the role of the state to a level 
that can be financed through ordinary tax revenue. The state is still 
expected to do too much despite various reforms aimed at reducing its role 
and responsibilities. This aspect could become a problem that would 
extend beyond the need to meet the Maastricht criteria. The fiscal gap 
must be closed by reducing public spending rather than by increasing the 
high level of taxation. 
The third surprise is the extent to which labor income is taxed. This is 
partly due to the large payments for social security contributions, which in 
some of these countries, such as the Czech Republic, are among the 
highest in the world. This heavy burden on labor income must be reduced 
if the development of growing underground activities is to be prevented. 
This growth of underground economic activities is already under way in 
several of these countries and is likely to accelerate with the passing of 
time. 
The fourth surprise is the almost uniform move towards fiscal decen-
tralization. Undoubtedly this is a political reaction against the powerful 
central governments of the past. Once the communist regimes were 
replaced, the citizens of these countries were anxious to have more 'voice' 
and more control over decisions that affected their lives. However, regard-
less of its political merit, this process of decentralization is likely to con-
strain future tax reform and to affect negatively future macroeconomic 
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developments. Experience from around the world indicates that it is often 
more difficult to reduce fiscal deficits in a fiscally decentralized environ-
ment. 
A fifth and pleasant surprise is the growing use of environmental taxes 
in these countries. The centrally planned past had left these countries with 
major environmental problems that affected health and life expectancies. 
Many in these countries have low life expectancy, perhaps due to the 
quality of the environment. Thus, the attempt to reduce this problem 
through the use of tax instruments is one that deserves praise. 
After labor income, consumption is the other tax base that carries much 
of the tax burden. All these countries have introduced value added taxes, 
which with some adjustments will conform with the requirements of the 
European Union. However, there are still too many excises and other 
small taxes. Some of these will have to disappear in future years. Property 
taxes are still playing a marginal role. This is not surprising since, until a 
few years ago, there was no or little private property. However, in future 
years, it would be preferable to give a growing importance to this tax base, 
especially for financing the local governments, while reducing the reliance 
on revenue sharing arrangements that transfer to the local governments 
parts of the revenue from personal income taxes and corporate income 
taxes. 
Let me add a few comments on the income taxes. It is surprising the 
extent to which incomes from capital sources are lightly taxed. This is an 
element that will contribute to the faster growth of these countries' 
economies but at the cost of lower tax revenue and a less progressive tax 
incidence. If not-taxing capital requires overtaxing labor and, thus, giving 
a strong incentive to the shadow economy, then over the long run the stim-
ulative effect of low capital taxation on the economy will be much 
reduced. There is also evidence that Gini coefficients have been growing in 
several of these countries so that equity issues might become more import-
ant in determining tax reforms in future years. The income tax rates on 
labor income, per se, are not unusually high but when they are combined 
with high social security taxes they tend to overburden labor income. 
There is some evidence of tax experimentation in some of these coun-
tries. For example, Estonia has introduced a linear (i.e. flat rate) tax on 
labor income. The tax rate is 26 percent. Thus, it has given up the idea of 
using the income tax for redistributive purposes. This tax combined with 
the exemption from taxation of much capital income makes it almost a 
twin of the value added tax in its effects. The result is that consumption is 
taxed much more than saving. This probably promotes more saving, but at 
the cost of increasing income inequality over time. Another interesting 
innovation in the tax system of Estonia is that, for enterprises, only distrib-
uted profits are taxed (also at 26 percent) while retained profits are tax 
free. Since I made a proposal along this line three decades ago, I was 
happy to see my proposal implemented (Tanzi 1975). This feature is a 
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strong incentive to reinvest the earnings of enterprises. Thus, it promotes 
investment. 
This brings me to the question of tax incentives. In spite of attempts at 
reducing the scope of tax incentives, there is still the propensity, on the 
part of the policy-makers of these countries - certainly stimulated by their 
past experience with central planning - to try to direct or influence the 
economic decisions of enterprises or even of individuals with incentives. 
This of course reflects a lack of trust in the ability of a market economy to 
make the right choices. It is an indication that the period of transition is 
not yet complete. In future years the road chosen by Estonia - i.e. a 
simpler tax system with fewer or no tax incentives - should be the favored 
one. 
Note 
1 For a description of the tax systems under central planning, see Tanzi (1994). 
For a discussion of the difficulties in creating effective tax administrations in 
transition economies, see Tanzi (2001). 
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Preface 
The manuscript of this book was delivered at the beginning of May, 2004, 
when ten New Members were entering the European Union. This enlarge-
ment was a great historic event for the EU. The enlargement is the largest 
since the European Community was created in 1957 by the six original 
members. Moreover almost all New Members were part of the Eastern 
European communist area. Their shift towards a market economy 
required the building of a suitable tax system, as one of the main reforms. 
Actually, the last decade of these tax reforms has provided a remarkable 
laboratory in tax policy design and practice. This is particularly true for 
those countries that quite early introduced comprehensive market-
oriented tax reforms, while at the same time preserving their revenue 
raising capacity under the pressures of the existing levels of social security 
and welfare expenditure. 
At the moment, it is not at all easy to find a comprehensive picture of 
what happened, is happening and will happen in the tax systems of the 
New Members of the EU. Thus, it is difficult to have a clear and updated 
idea of the present state of the New Members' fiscal systems, presented in 
a user-friendly format. The first aim of this book is to fill such a gap. In 
order to do so, we have collected a large set of data, institutional features 
and indicators of fiscal burden from different sources. The book focuses on 
five national cases (Czech Republic, Estonia and the other Baltic states, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). These cases have been selected to include 
the main countries and give a proper sample of the variegated realities of 
the New Members. The book is an ideal companion to Tax Systems and 
Tax Reforms in Europe, edited by L. Bernardi and P. Profeta and pub-
lished by Routledge in 2004. 
As a starting point, Tanzi's Foreword reminds us that the New 
Members' journey from being centrally planned to becoming market 
economies has been a remarkable one, that has required enormous and 
difficult reforms. For these countries there was no road map to follow. 
However, the final destination was the creation of tax systems and tax 
administrations not too different from those of the EU countries. When 
the journey started, the role of the tax system in these New EU countries 
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was limited and there was hardly any need for a western-style tax adminis-
tration. Taxes on labor income were collected directly from state enter-
prises. The tax payment from an enterprise to the state was negotiated; it 
was not based on actual profits. There were no laws defining the turnover 
taxes. As Tanzi underlines, when one looks at the current situation of the 
countries covered by this book, there are some surprising aspects that 
deserve attention - first of all, the closeness of their current tax burdens to 
about 40 percent of GDP, having come down from higher levels. It would 
be reasonable to speculate that these burdens are likely to fall as the trans-
formation of these economies continues. Hence a reduction in public 
spending will be required. As a second surprising element, it turns out that 
many of these countries, in spite of their high tax levels, have developed 
high budgetary deficits which have been growing in recent years. The third 
surprise is the extent to which labor income is taxed. This is partly due to 
the large payments for social security contributions. The fourth surprise is 
the almost uniform move towards fiscal decentralization. Undoubtedly this 
is a political reaction against the powerful central governments of the past. 
A fifth and pleasant surprise is the growing use of environmental taxes. 
Coming to specific taxes, Tanzi notices that all these countries have suc-
cessfully introduced value added taxes. However, there are still too many 
excises and other small taxes. Some of these will have to disappear in the 
near future. Property taxes are still playing a marginal role. As to income 
tax, it is surprising the extent to which incomes from capital sources are 
lightly taxed. This is an element that will contribute to the faster growth 
but at the cost of lower tax revenue and a less progressive tax incidence. 
An interesting innovation in the tax system of Estonia is that only distrib-
uted profits are taxed while retained profits are tax free. This feature is a 
strong incentive to reinvest the earnings of enterprises and promote 
investment. 
An overview of tax systems in New Member countries is given in the 
Gandullia's chapter (Chapter 1). This chapter presents evidence about tax 
systems' structure and evolution; their common current features are then 
illustrated, together with quantitative indicators, aimed at evaluating their 
main equity and efficiency profiles. New Members can be considered as 
successful examples of tax reform implementation. Unlike other transition 
economies, they have been able to avoid fiscal crises and have shown a 
capacity of tax revenue collection close to the EU levels. At present, they 
show models of taxation similar to those in the EU, but in some key 
aspects there are wide discrepancies. The mix between direct and indirect 
taxes is different, with New Members relying much more than EU coun-
tries on indirect taxes; at the same time they show levels of implicit tax 
rates on consumption much lower than the European average: this is a 
symptom of tax bases being far from comprehensive. In the field of per-
sonal income taxation, the degree of statutory progressivity appears lower 
than in most EU countries. This is the result of both the frequent adoption 
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of linear tax models and the exclusion of most capital income from the tax 
base. In the field of corporate taxation, New Members apply very low 
( compared with international standards) statutory tax rates with narrow 
tax bases. On average, these countries show levels of effective taxation on 
investment lower than the European benchmarks. Finally, the tax burden 
on labor continues to be high. The tax wedges are close to the European 
average for many New Members; however, in some countries the tax 
wedge on lower-pay labor appears to be much higher than the European 
average. 
The chapter of Bernardi and Chandler (Chapter 2) discusses some 
broad issues of New Members' fiscal systems. The authors firstly remind us 
that the main purpose of taxation is to finance public spending. On this 
account, it has often been argued that governments in New Members are 
still too big. Bernardi and Chandler observe that, in fact, the particular 
situation of New Members may call for a relevant public intervention in 
the welfare area. However, in some New Members there has been a move 
towards partially funded private pension schemes and itemized social 
insurance funds targeted to single risks. Some scaling down of public 
expenditure is anyway called for: to redirect and better target social pro-
grams; to make a more efficient use of resources in education, health and 
public administration; and finally as a consequence of strengthening bud-
getary procedures. According to authoritative opinions, total fiscal pres-
sure would also be still too high in most New Members and should 
decrease by a relevant amount. Bernardi and Chandler's tentative answer 
is that total fiscal pressure may go down, even if less than the just quoted 
normative prescription. According to the structure of taxation by eco-
nomic function and to implicit rates, the trade-off between efficiency and 
equity in taxation is definitely present, and moreover appears particularly 
binding. In these circumstances, it is quite difficult to strike a welfare maxi-
mizing balance between efficiency and equity. This chapter also examines 
separately the four main categories of taxation in the New EU Members. 
The first is the personal income tax. Although some countries have clearly 
attempted to implement a uniform taxation of income, they represent a 
minority. To increase the progressivity of income taxation is a debated 
issue, and the solutions adopted by single New Members vary consider-
ably. The taxation of corporate income has also been imaginative in the 
New Members. Dynamic efficiency requires that mild taxation of corpora-
tions should be maintained. However, corporation tax should not vanish, 
especially not to allow a further diffusion of avoidance activities. The -
painfully increasing - harmonization of excises to EU standards is manda-
tory. The VAT structure hence becomes the only degree of freedom that 
can be exploited to lighten consumption taxation. Regarding the compara-
tive efficacy of VAT and personal income tax, the authors find that in the 
region the VAT tax base is at least 80 percent larger than that of personal 
income. In several New EU member states, radical changes to the social 
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security system have left the population somewhat more exposed to the 
instability of the financial markets. However, it is interesting to observe 
that the nations that are commonly held to be the most capitalism savvy, 
namely the Czech Republic and Slovenia, have retained the collective 
pooling of risks, which is common in the rest of the EU. 
Profeta's chapter (Chapter 3) analyzes several issues in taxation and tax 
reforms in New EU Members from a political economy perspective, focus-
ing both on the positive and the normative aspects thereof. Major prob-
lems in the development of a new tax policy in these countries are 
addressed, such as how to raise revenues, the definition of the role of 
government, the relations among different government tiers, the establish-
ment of new fiscal institutions, tax administration and the taxation of small 
enterprises. All these aspects have a political determinant, in the sense 
that actual policies and institutions being put in place strongly depend on 
the political process and on the political will of policy-makers, which is in 
turn based on the political support they can enjoy. Profeta argues that, in 
transition countries, this support is often based on economically and 
politically powerful interest groups, rather than on the majority of voters. 
These interest groups, together with other political constraints faced by 
policy-makers, have a strong impact on tax reforms in New EU Members. 
In their chapter (Chapter 4) de Novellis and Parlato warn us that the 
analysis of the fiscal policy framework that will prevail in an enlarged 
Europe must definitely take into account the macroeconomic and public 
finance characteristics of accession countries - their first best strategy in 
managing both the transition towards the Union and the weak points of 
fiscal rule design at present governing the EU 12 eurozone. Accession 
countries are generally small and open economies, so that most of the 
shortcomings of financial and market liberalization apply to them, i.e. a 
critical exposure to financial and currency crises. Hence an optimal policy 
should at first glance avoid a prolonged transition before the adoption of 
the euro. A non-secondary aspect in defining a fiscal rule concerns the 
public finance features of these countries, which are generally character-
ized by low debt, high deficit and high capital expenditure. As a con-
sequence, the softer is the budget constraint in the transition, the higher 
will be the risk of weak sustainability in the long run. More broadly speak-
ing, the fiscal rule should be coherent with the general macroeconomic 
strategy that will be adopted in managing the enlargement. If the enlarge-
ment is to be conducted with a strategy of long transition, then fiscal rules 
must be soft-constraining, i.e. fiscal rules based on debt should prevail. 
Conversely, with a no-transition strategy, almost by definition there is no 
need of rules softening the transitional period. Thus, a nominal ceiling to 
the deficit-to-GDP ratio could be maintained. However, given that in 2004 
half of the EU countries are expected to violate the 3 percent ceiling, the 
debate on the rewriting of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) cannot be 
deferred any longer. Furthermore, the persistence of low GDP growth in 
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Europe has given more strength to the argument about the consistency of 
the SGP with growth enhancing policies. It follows that the choice of a 
fiscal rule for accession countries is intertwined with the reform of the 
SGP. Put in these terms, de Novellis and Parlato's proposal is to internally 
revisit the SGP, by adopting a multiple target approach, which is consis-
tent with the spirit of Maastricht accession criteria. Specifically, the rule of 
3 percent should be maintained, but weighted by the level of debt-to-GDP 
ratio and, where available, by the cyclical adjusted primary balance. More-
over, the new SGP should be addressed towards a golden rule conditional 
on the debt-to-GDP ratio, in order to promote public investments without 
putting into risk the long run fiscal sustainability. 
Tax reforms require an efficient tax administration, which should be 
especially aimed at fighting against the hidden economy, which is particu-
larly widespread in New Members. In Chapter 5, Trasberg addresses these 
issues and starts by explaining the theoretical concept of tax gap and the 
reasons why it can serve as an analytical cornerstone for analyzing tax 
administration developments in the transition countries. The tax gap is 
linked to the inadequateness of tax administration and the extent of the 
shadow economy. Both those aspects lead to tax avoidance or tax erosion, 
which in turn reduce budget revenues. In fact, attempts to balance the 
budget by increasing statutory tax rates induced businesses to further 
evade taxes and leave the official economy sector. Tax administration 
developments in New Members during the years of transition are then 
focused. Gaps of tax revenues were also due to inefficient administrative 
arrangements and the outburst of the shadow economy. In most of the 
transition countries, competent and capable tax-administrating institutions 
were missing or were still in the build-up phase. Tax laws and regulations 
often changed, while law enforcement was remarkably weak. Not surpris-
ingly, such circumstances were followed by large-scale tax erosion and 
other shadow economy activities. Different studies show the significant 
increase of the unofficial economy during the early years of market 
reforms. The size of the shadow economy seems to be due to the high tax 
burden, in combination with government bureaucracy's inefficiency and 
corruption. Tax erosion was also related to the absence of tax culture in 
transition societies. The lack of tax ethics and a tradition for voluntary 
compliance increases tax evasion and ultimately the tax gap. Nevertheless, 
in all EU New Members, advancements of economic reforms and the 
strengthening of the tax administration have indeed decreased the extent 
of shadow economy activities and the tax gap itself. 
Finally, the chapter by Owens (Chapter 6) deals with competition for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and the role of taxation. It is particularly 
concerned with the case of South Eastern European (SEE) countries, but 
this experience is easy to generalize to New Members. The chapter starts 
by showing how the tax systems can influence the location decisions of 
FDI, considering different types of FDI. Then it illustrates the experience 
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of SEE countries, where until recently a number of tax impediments to 
FDI have been present, such as unstable and non-transparent tax policies, 
progressive corporate tax structures, and double or possibly multiple taxa-
tion of distributed profits. At the same time these countries have made 
and make wide use of tax incentives in the form of tax holidays, reinvest-
ment allowances, accelerated depreciation, investment tax credits and 
allowances. A key finding of the chapter is the coexistence in SEE coun-
tries of generous but largely inefficient tax incentives for domestic and 
foreign direct investment. It is shown that perhaps the most effective 
investment 'incentive' is realized addressing impediments in the basic tax 
system (i.e. simplifying tax calculations, lowering statutory tax rates on 
business where possible, using a single rather than multiple corporate tax 
structure, streamlining complex capital cost allowance systems). More 
generally, to provide a stable regime which is applied in a transparent and 
non-arbitrary fashion is essential to attract and retain investment. 
The journey of this book stops here. The journey of New Members has 
still a long way to go. We make some suggestions for the improvement of 
their tax systems. Public spending and fiscal pressure should be fairly 
reduced to improved efficiency, but without dismantling the welfare state. 
The tax mix must be changed, by increasing direct taxes and reducing both 
indirect taxes and social contributions. We warn that interest groups, 
together with other political constraints faced by policy-makers, have a 
strong impact on tax reforms. We suggest some suitable fiscal policy rules 
to manage the enlargement of the EU, which imply a deep revision of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. We notice that New Members have still to 
build an efficient tax administration. Most of all, these European countries 
should be aware that from the Magna Carta era, in the 13th century, a tax 
system is a foundation of any free democracy. 
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Part I 
A general picture of tax 
systems and tax reforms 
in New EU Members 

1 An overview of taxation 
Luca Gandullia1 
1.1 Introduction and main conclusions 
It is commonly recognized that the last decade of tax reforms in countries 
that are in transition from the previous centrally planned economies has 
provided a remarkable laboratory in tax policy design and practice. This is 
particularly true for those countries (such as Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovenia and the Baltic states) that moved rapidly and early into 
transition to introduce comprehensive tax reforms, a common objective 
being their accession to the EU. At the beginning of transition these coun-
tries had to create new fiscal institutions and new market-oriented tax 
systems, simultaneously preserving their revenue-raising capacity under the 
pressure of the existing levels of social security and welfare expenditures. 
Compared with the other transition countries, the EU's New Members 
can be considered as successful examples of tax reform implementation. 
Through early transition they have been able to avoid the fiscal crisis 
encountered by other transition economies. In New Members, the increase 
in income inequality has been generally lower than in the other transition 
countries. Moreover, they have shown a capacity in collecting tax revenues 
that is higher than in the slow transition reformer countries and close to 
the EU levels. 
In all the ex-transition, now EU member, countries, the process of tax 
reform has been significantly influenced by their histories. Instead of 
making copies of Western-type tax systems, they followed a more evolu-
tionary process that has led to the design of tax systems reflecting the 
structural characteristics of their economies. 
At present, the New Members show models of taxation that are reason-
ably close to those in the EU, but in some key aspects there are wide dif-
ferences. The following seem the most relevant. First of all, the tax mix is 
different and the distance from the EU benchmark has increased during 
the last decade; while the incidence of total taxes and social contributions 
is close to the European average, the tax mix between direct and indirect 
taxes is considerably different, with the New Members relying much more 
on indirect taxes and less on direct taxes. 
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Second, the degree of progressivity of personal income tax is lower than 
in most EU countries. The group of Baltic states applies a flat rate taxa-
tion; a linear system of personal income taxation has recently been intro-
duced (2004) in the Slovak Republic. In Poland, the effective structure of 
the personal income tax (PIT) is almost linear. It should also be noted that 
the real progressivity of the PIT is even lower as the tax bases are narrow 
due to the exclusion of most capital income. 
In the field of corporate taxation, New Members apply very low ( com-
pared with international standards) statutory tax rates with narrow tax 
bases. The most emblematic case is given by Estonia where the corpora-
tion tax on retained earnings has been completely abolished. In recent 
years, the tax bases have been partially broadened, but the reduction in 
tax rates has been considerable. On average, these countries show levels of 
effective taxation on investment much lower than the European bench-
marks. The gap increases considerably if the effects of tax incentives are 
considered. More generally, in the presence of low statutory tax rates, the 
distortions on investment decisions induced by the corporation tax appear 
lower than in the EU. Many countries give strong tax preference to 
retained earnings over distributed profits. This result, together with the 
low taxation of capital income, shows the efforts to promote savings and 
investment. 
In the field of indirect taxation, as noted above, New Member countries 
rely heavily (and more than the EU countries) on consumption-based 
taxes, but at the same time they show levels of implicit tax rates on con-
sumption much lower than the European average, meaning that the tax 
bases are far from being comprehensive. 
Finally, the tax burden on labor continues to be as high as it was in the 
early stages of transition. The tax · wedges are close to the European 
average for many New Members. However, in some countries the tax 
wedge appears to be much higher than the European average for lower-
paid labor. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 illustrates the starting 
point of tax systems and reforms at the beginning of the transition process. 
Section 1.3 presents some indicators of the macro structure and evolution 
of the tax systems over the last decade, focusing on tax ratios by legal cat-
egories and on the allocation of revenues across sectors of government. 
Section 1.4 gives a comparative analysis of direct and indirect taxation in 
the selected countries, while section 1.5 presents some indicators to 
measure and compare their main equity and efficiency profiles. 
1.2 Tax systems and reforms during transition 
The tax systems in force during the socialist command economy were not 
comparable to the Western-style ones, their role being deeply different and 
more limited (Tanzi 1992; Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000). Most tax revenue was 
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obtained from three major sources ( enterprise tax, turnover tax and payroll 
tax), while taxes on personal income accounted for a very small share of 
total revenue (Dabrowski and Tomczynska 2001; Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab 1997). Tax rates were numerous and non-parametric, tax structures 
were complex and tax liabilities were discretionary and negotiable. The 
earnings of state-owned enterprises were the main source of financing 
government spending. Not-basic consumer goods were subject to highly 
differentiated turnover taxes. Payroll taxes were collected by enterprises on 
behalf of employees. The enterprise taxes, the most important source of 
revenue, were used to centralize and regulate enterprise incomes. 
In centrally planned economies, taxes were not collected on the basis of 
codified tax laws and rules for the determination of taxable bases and 
applicable tax rates. They were collected mostly on the basis of negotia-
tions between government and enterprises. Thus, there was little need for 
a tax administration because of the presence of few taxpayers (mainly 
large enterprises) and the role of a mono-bank in processing payments. 
The impact of transition on the public finance system was radical. The 
process raised the fundamental need to create (together with economic 
reforms) necessary and well-working fiscal institutions (Tanzi and Tsi-
bouris 2000). The old tax systems could not simply be reformed at the 
margin, but completely new tax systems were needed. The basic choice 
was between the adoption of a modern market-oriented tax system with a 
'shock therapy' approach and the adoption of new tax systems following a 
more evolutionary approach (OECD 1991; Tanzi 1992). 
At that time, important economic and institutional constraints were 
present. The path of tax reform during the transition period was largely 
determined by the legacy of the past systems (Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab 1997; Stepanyan 2003): an interventionist tradition; taxes were fre-
quently negotiated; the tax systems lacked transparency and there was no 
experience with voluntary compliance; the previous tax systems were not 
designed to pursue efficiency and equity objectives; finally, the tax admin-
istration was underdeveloped. Given these constraints, there was a general 
consensus between foreign experts on the desirability of a more evolution-
ary and country-specific approach to tax reforms. Emphasis was placed on 
the need to modernize tax administration and to adopt taxes that could be 
enforced, with a stable revenue raising capacity. 
Progress in tax reform has varied across individual countries in trans-
ition. The main EU accession countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovenia and the Baltic states) rapidly moved early into transition 
to introduce comprehensive tax reform, a common objective being 
their accession to the EU. This is the main reason why, in these countries, 
tax reforms generally moved faster than in other transition countries 
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2000). Compared with the other 
countries of the former Soviet Union the specific group of Baltic states can 
be considered as successful examples of tax reform implementation 
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(Stepanyan 2003; Dabrowski and Tomczynska 2001 ). These countries 
managed to adopt, in a relatively short period, new tax systems consistent 
with the best international standards and to recover the tax revenue levels 
prevailing before transition (see also Chapter 8). 
For most transition countries, the early stages of this process led to a 
substantial decline in the traditional tax bases and to a consequent fall in 
tax revenues. However, between transition countries, those (such as the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia) that made 
the most progress in terms of market-based reforms have seen their 
revenue share in GDP maintained or sometimes increased (Tanzi and Tsi-
bouris 2000; Dobrinsky 2002). For instance, in Poland, the tax system per-
formed well during the 1990s, particularly in its revenue raising capacity 
on a continuous basis (Lenain and Bartoszuk 2000); as a consequence, 
Poland has been able to avoid the fiscal crisis encountered by other trans-
ition economies. The same countries were among the transition countries 
in which the increase in income inequality has been generally lower 
(according to the data reported by Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000). 
In all the accession countries, the process of tax reform has been 
significantly influenced by their history and their state at the starting point 
of the process. In the design of the tax systems, countries continued to 
favor an interventionist stand providing special tax treatments and incen-
tives, which in turn have led to tax erosion, economic distortions, com-
pliance costs and equity problems. This heritage from past experience with 
central planning reflected, as noted by Tanzi in the foreword, a lack of 
trust in the ability of a market economy to make the right choices. Only in 
the second half of the 1990s has this trend been partially reversed. 
During the 1990s, in most transition countries tax policy reforms were 
generally more advanced than reforms in tax administration (Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab 2000; see also Chapter 5). The experience of trans-
ition economies has shown the interrelation between tax policies and tax 
administration (Stepanyan 2003), with the reform of tax administration 
playing a crucial role in successful tax policy implementation. Even in this 
field the leading transition countries (like most New Members) have 
shown a capacity far collecting revenue from the main taxes ( corporate 
tax, VAT and social contributions) that is higher than that of the slow 
transition reformer countries and close to the EU benchmarks (Schaffer 
and Turley 2001). 
1.3 Tax systems: structure and developments 
The data made available by the EU Commission (2000) for the period 
1992-98 allow for comparisons over time and cross-sectionally to be made 
between New EU Members and existing EU members countries. Looking 
at the ratio of taxes to GDP as a signal of the country's preference for the 
size of the public sector, in the period 1992-98 (see Table 1.1) tax ratios 
Table 1.1 Structure and development of fiscal revenue in New Members and EU 15 as a percentage of GDP, 1992-98 
1992 1998 
cz EE HU PL SI NM EU NM-EU cz EE HU PL SI NM EU NM-EU 
Direct taxes, of which 10.9 13.3 10.1 12.2 7.4 10.8 13.5 -2.7 9.0 11.1 8.7 11.2 7.8 9.6 13.7 -4.1 
Personal income 3.8 8.5 7.5 7.6 6.8 6.8 9.6 -2.8 5.2 8.5 6.5 8.3 6.6 7.0 9.3 -2.3 
Corporation income 7.1 4.8 2.6 4.6 0.6 3.9 2.3 1.6 3.7 2.6 2.2 2.9 1.2 2.5 3.0 -0.5 
Indirect taxes, of which 15.4 12.3 17.9 14.6 14.5 14.9 13.4 1.5 12.4 14.3 16.3 14.4 18.9 15.3 13.9 1.4 
VAT 7.6 9.2 6.0 0.0 6.8 5.9 6.7 -0.8 6.6 8.8 7.9 7.9 9.1 8.1 7.0 1.1 
Excise duties 4.0 1.9 6.2 0.0 3.6 3.1 3.4 -0.3 3.7 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.4 4.0 3.5 0.5 
Others 3.9 1.2 5.8 14.6 4.1 5.9 3.3 2.6 2.1 1.8 4.2 2.7 5.5 3.3 3.5 -0.2 
Total tax revenue 26.3 25.6 28 26.8 21.9 25.7 26.9 -1.2 21.4 25.4 25.0 25.6 26.7 24.8 27.6 -2.8 
Social contributions 16.5 12.1 18 11.3 18.6 15.3 14.5 0.8 16.9 12.1 13.9 12.2 13.8 13.8 15.0 -1.2 
Employers 10.2 11.9 14 4.1 7.6 9.6 8.1 1.5 11.0 11.9 11.6 4.4 4.4 8.7 8.2 0.5 
Employees 3.8 0.0 3.3 4.2 10.1 4.3 4.8 -0.5 3.9 0.0 2.1 4.5 8.5 3.8 5.0 -1.2 
Self employed 2.5 0.2 0.7 3.1 0.9 1.5 1.6 -0.1 2.0 0.2 0.3 3.3 0.9 1.3 1.9 -0.6 
Total fiscal revenue 42.8 37.7 46.0 38.1 40.5 41.0 41.4 -0.4 38.3 37.5 38.9 37.8 40.5 38.6 42.6 -4.0 
Administrative level 
Central government 33.2 16.6 24.9 24.1 18.6 23.5 22.8 0.7 28.0 20.1 21.5 22.3 23.6 23.1 22.9 0.2 
Local government 3.9 9.0 3.1 2.8 3.3 4.4 3.0 1.4 4.6 5.3 3.5 3.4 3.1 4.0 4.0 0.0 
Social Security 5.8 12.1 18.0 11.3 18.6 13.2 14.5 -1.3 5.7 12.1 13.9 12.2 13.8 11.5 14.9 -3.4 
Sources: EU Commission (2000) for New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2000) for EU 15 (1997 unweighted average). 
Notes 
Czech data start from 1993 and social security is only health. 
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increased on average within the EU (going from 41.4 to 42.6 percent), 
while the same figures for the New Members show an opposite trend, with 
the average ratios decreasing from 41.0 to 38.6 percent. 
This results from the different pattern of two groups of countries: in 
some of the New Members (Estonia, Poland and Slovenia) the ratio has 
remained stable, while for those countries (Czech Republic and Hungary) 
where at the beginning the ratios where higher than the average ( and 
higher than the EU average) the reduction has been significant (from 42.8 
to 38.3 percent in the Czech Republic and from 46.0 to 38.9 percent in 
Hungary). 
At the end of the period (1998) the difference between the highest ratio 
(40.5 percent in Slovenia) and the lowest (37.5 percent in Estonia) is less 
than at the beginning of the 1990s, indicating a process of convergence 
among the New Members, while the distance from the EU countries has 
increased by about 3.6 percentage points. On average, the tax pressure in 
the New Members (0.4 points lower than the European average in 1992) 
becomes 4.0 percentage points lower than in the EU at the end of the 
period (1998). 
The lower tax burden is due to the lower incidence of both tax revenues 
(2.8 percentage points) and social security contributions (1.2 percentage 
points). Within tax revenues, the incidence of direct taxes is much lower 
than in the EU (4.1 percentage points), while the share of indirect taxes is 
higher (1.4 percentage points). 
Among the accession countries the share of individual taxes in GDP 
shows large differences. The difference between the highest and the lowest 
figure is about 2.2 percentage points for direct taxes, 6.5 points for indirect 
taxes and 4.8 points for social security contributions. Similar differences 
are not found in EU member countries (Gandullia 2004). 
More updated comparable figures are available but only for the OECD 
member countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Repub-
lic; OECD 2003a). In the years after 1998 (1999-2002, provisional data) 
the tax-to-GDP ratio has decreased for all these countries, excluding the 
Czech Republic, where the ratio increased from 38.9 to 39.2 percent. The 
ratio decreased from 39.1 to 37.7 percent in Hungary, from 35.0 to 34.3 
percent in Poland and from 34.4 to 33.8 percent in the Slovak Republic. 
Even if the data from the EU Commission and those from the OECD are 
not directly comparable (in addition the coverage of countries is differ-
ent), it can be argued that during the decade 1992-2002 a general process 
of reduction in tax pressure has taken place in most of the accession 
countries. 
The tax structure by legal categories, measured as the distribution of 
tax revenue among major taxes ( direct taxes, indirect taxes and social 
security contributions) has changed over time (see Table 1.2), while in the 
same period the tax mix has remained quite stable within the EU 
members. 
Table 1.2 Tax mix in New Members and EU 15 as a percentage of total taxation, 1992-98 
1992 1998 
cz EE HU PL Sl NM EU NM-EU CZ EE HU PL SI NM EU NM-EU 
Direct taxes, of which 25.5 35.3 22.0 32.0 18.3 26.6 32.6 -6.0 23.5 29.6 22.4 29.6 19.3 24.9 32.2 -7.3 
Personal income 8.9 22.5 16.3 19.9 16.8 16.9 23.2 -6.3 13.6 22.7 16.7 22.0 16.3 18.2 21.8 -3.6 
Corporation income 16.6 12.7 5.7 12.1 1.5 9.7 5.6 4.2 9.7 6.9 5.7 7.7 3.0 6.6 7.0 -0.5 
Indirect taxes, of which 36.0 32.6 38.9 38.3 35.8 36.3 32.4 4.0 32.4 38.1 41.9 38.1 46.7 39.4 32.6 6.8 
VAT 17.8 24.4 13.0 0.0 16.8 14.4 16.2 -1.8 17.2 23.5 20.3 20.9 22.5 20.9 16.4 4.4 
Excise duties 9.3 5.0 13.5 0.0 8.9 7.4 8.2 -0.9 9.7 10.1 10.8 10.3 10.9 10.4 8.2 2.1 
Others 9.1 3.2 12.6 38.3 10.1 14.7 8.0 6.7 5.5 4.8 10.8 7.1 13.6 8.4 8.2 0.1 
Total tax revenue 61.4 67.9 60.9 70.3 54.1 62.9 65.0 -2.0 55.9 67.7 64.3 67.7 65.9 64.3 64.8 -0.5 
Social contributions 38.6 32.1 39.1 29.7 45.9 37.1 35.0 2.0 44.1 32.3 35.7 32.3 34.1 35.7 35.2 0.5 
Employers 23.8 31.6 30.4 10.8 18.8 23.1 19.6 3.5 28.7 31.7 29.8 11.6 10.9 22.6 19.2 3.3 
Employees 8.9 0.0 7.2 11.0 24.9 10.4 11.6 -1.2 10.2 0.0 5.4 11.9 21.0 9.7 11.7 -2.0 
Self employed 5.8 0.5 1.5 8.1 2.2 3.7 3.9 -0.2 5.2 0.5 0.8 8.7 2.2 3.5 4.5 -1.0 
Total fiscal revenue 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
Administrative level 
Central government 77.6 44.0 54.1 63.3 45.9 57.0 55.1 1.9 73.1 53.6 55.3 59.0 58.3 59.8 53.8 6.1 
Local government 9.1 23.9 6.7 7.3 8.1 11.0 7.2 3.8 12.0 14.1 9.0 9.0 7.7 10.4 9.4 1.0 
Social Security 13.6 3 2.1 39.1 29.7 45.9 32.1 35.0 -3.0 14.9 32.3 35.7 32.3 34.1 29.8 35.0 -5.1 
Sources: see Table 1.1. 
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At the beginning of the 1990s, the broad fiscal structure of New 
Members comprised social security contributions (37.1 percent), indirect 
taxes (36.3 percent) and direct taxes (26.6 percent). Compared with the 
EU figures, it was higher (by 2.0 percent) than the share of social security 
contributions and lower than the incidence of tax revenues, Among taxes, 
in the New Members the share of direct taxes was lower (6.0 percent) and 
the share of indirect taxes higher (4.0 percent). It should be noted that the 
higher incidence of indirect taxes was mainly due to the presence of 'other' 
taxes, different from VAT and excise duties. Within social contributions, 
the incidence of employers' contributions was higher (3.5 percent). 
Among individual New Member countries, the tax structure was consid-
erably different. On one hand some countries (Estonia and Poland) had 
tax structures based about two-thirds on taxes and the remaining third on 
social contributions, which was in line with the EU average. On the other 
hand, in Slovenia the share of tax revenues was very low (54.1 percent), 
while the share of social contributions was high ( 45.9 percent). 
At the end of the period (1998), the tax mix changed as the result of the 
reduction in direct taxes (1.7 percent) and social security contributions (1.4 
percent), and was compensated for by an increase in the share of indirect 
taxes (3.1 percent). The decrease in direct taxes was due to the large 
reduction in corporate income taxes (3.1 percent), partly offset by an 
increase in personal income taxes (1.3 percent). In the field of indirect tax-
ation, as an effect of the process of convergence to the European stand-
ards, the main change is represented by the large fall of 'other taxes' (6.3 
percent), almost exactly offset by the increase in the VAT revenue. 
The comparison with the EU average shows that, at the end of the 
period, the tax structure of New Members is even more different than at 
the beginning of the 1990s. More specifically, in 1998 the tax mix between 
taxes and social contributions was almost equal for EU members and New 
Members. But the tax mix has changed between direct and indirect taxes. 
The difference in share of direct taxes in the comparison between New 
Members and EU countries has increased from 6.0 to 7.3 percent, while 
the same difference regarding indirect taxes has increased from 4.0 to 6.8 
percent. 
The variation in the share of individual taxes between New Members 
countries has continued to be considerable. For instance, in 1998 the share 
of direct taxes ranged from 19.3 percent in Slovenia, 22.4 percent in 
Hungary to 29.6 percent in Estonia and Poland. The share of personal 
income tax ranged from 13.6 percent in the Czech Republic to 22.7 percent 
in Estonia. The share of the corporate income tax ranged from the low 3.0 
percent in Slovenia to the 9.7 percent in the Czech Republic. 
Selected New Members also differ in the way they provide arrange-
ments between the central and the sub-national levels of government. 
Table 1.2 shows the attribution of tax revenues to the three sub-sectors of 
general government (central, local and social security sectors). In 1992, 
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only Hungary showed a tax structure by level of government not very dif-
ferent from the EU average. The share of central government receipts in 
the other New Members varied from 77.6 percent in the Czech Republic 
to 45.9 percent in Slovenia and 44.0 percent in Estonia. The share of local 
government ranged from 7.3 percent in Poland to the high 23.9 percent in 
Estonia. Finally, the share of social contributions varied from 13.6 percent 
in the Czech Republic to 45.9 percent in Slovenia. 
During the 1990s, the tax structure changed on average, with the 
decrease in the shares of local government and social security offset by the 
increase in the share of the central government. The Czech Republic and 
Estonia appear the most (tax) decentralized countries among New 
Members, while the other countries show similar tax structures, in line 
with the EU average.2 
1.4 Institutional features of current tax systems 
Personal income tax 
Modern personal income taxes have been introduced in recent years 
(Hungary in 1988, Poland in 1991, the Czech Republic in 1993). After the 
reforms, New Member countries adopted neither a full comprehensive 
income tax model nor ( as recommended by foreign experts - like McLure 
1992 - in order to encourage private savings) an expenditure tax model, 
but rather a hybrid tax base. Before reforms, countries were used to apply-
ing separate schedules to different sources of income; generally the 
systems were not progressive. 
Today (see Table 1.3) the personal income tax (PIT) rates are progres-
sive in some of the accession countries, but many of them (the Baltic 
states) apply a flat rate taxation; a linear system of personal income taxa-
tion also exists in the Slovak Republic after the 2004 tax reform. In 
Poland, the recent tax reform proposal (still not enacted) moves in the 
same direction. The flat rate is 26 percent in Estonia, 25 percent in Latvia, 
33 percent in Lithuania and 19 percent in the Slovak Republic. However, 
even in these countries PIT is made partially progressive by basic relief 
(Estonia) or the exemption of a minimum amount of the personal employ-
ment income (Lithuania). 
The maximum number of tax brackets is six (Slovenia). The lowest 
marginal tax rate applied to the first bracket is in the Czech Republic (15 
percent); the highest level is applied in Lithuania (33 percent). Top mar-
ginal tax rates range from 19 percent in the Slovak Republic to 50 percent 
in Slovenia. Until recently, in the Slovak Republic, the tax schedule was 
progressive with five tax brackets and marginal rates ranging from 10 to 38 
percent. A comprehensive tax reform has been launched, effective from 
January 2004. The core of the reform consists of a flat marginal tax rate of 
19 percent on all personal ( and corporate) income and the increase of 
Table 1.3 Structure of the personal income tax in New Members 
Country Tax unit Number of Minimum Maximum Highest rate Tax base Reliefs 
brackets tax rate tax rate applies from 
(euro) 
Czech Republic Individual 4 15 32 10,400 Most capital income Basic relief. 
taxed separately Marital status 
(15-25%) relief. Child relief. 
Estonia Individual 1 26 26 n.a. Most capital income Basic relief. Child 
exempt. relief. 
Hungary Individual 3 18 38 5300 Capital income Tax credits for 
taxed separately at wage income, 




Poland Individual. Option 3 19 40 9600 Most capital income Basic relief (tax 
for joint taxation taxed separately credit) and relief 
(splitting system) (15-20%) for wage income 
and social security 
contributions. 
Slovak Republic Individual 5 10 38 13,600 Most capital income Basic relief. 
(before 2004 reform) taxed separately Marital status 
(15-25%) relief. Child relief. 
Slovak Republic Individual 1 19 19 n.a. Interest income is Basic personal 
(after 2004 reform) taxed separately. allowance. Marital 
Dividends are tax status allowance. 
exempt. 
Slovenia Individual 6 17 50 33,200 Comprehensive Basic relief. 
Family allowances. 
Sources: Countries' chapters; OECD (2003b); Martinez-Serrano and Patterson (2003). 
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basic relief for low income earners (OECD 2004). The reform introduces a 
flat rate tax, where progressivity is obtained through a basic personal 
allowance (19.2 times the minimum subsistence amount), which is doubled 
in the presence of a dependent spouse. Among the accession countries, the 
degree of progressivity of the personal income tax appears higher in Slove-
nia, also as a result of the basic personal tax relief (Cok 2003; see also 
Chapter 11). 
In all countries the tax unit is the individual; only in Poland may 
married couples opt to be taxed on their joint income; in this case a split-
ting system is applied where the tax bill is twice the income tax due on half 
of the joint income, provided the joint income does not include capital 
income taxed at the flat 20 percent rate (OECD 2003b). 
Standard relief is implemented in most countries through tax 
allowances in the form of fixed deductions from the PIT base. Apart from 
the Polish optional splitting system, marital status tax relief and child relief 
can be found in the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. In 
Hungary, a non-standard tax relief is applicable in the form of employee 
tax credits, which decrease with the level of wage income. 
Tax bases are far from being comprehensive. In most countries (with 
the exception of Slovenia) capital incomes are taxed outside the PIT under 
separate (preferential) schedules or are tax exempt. The only non stan-
dard system of taxing capital income can be found in Hungary, where divi-
dends are taxed separately at the 20 percent tax rate, increased to 35 
percent for 'excess dividends', that is dividends paid in excess of a speci-
fied rate of return on equity (actually double the prime national discount 
rate). 
In Poland, the erosion of the tax base determined by tax relief and 
special tax regimes has, until recently, been relevant (IMF 1999b ). More-
over, the PIT expenditure programs, introduced in 1992 and intended to 
compensate lower-income taxpayers for the withdrawal of price subsidies, 
were extremely regressive (Cavalcanti and Li 2000). The classic tax-cuts-
cum-broadening-tax-base reform model proposed in 1999 has still not 
been enacted (IMF 2003). It should also be noted that since 2002 most 
capital income has been taxed under a separate schedule (20 percent on 
interest and capital gains, 15 percent on dividends). 
The present systems are the result of fundamental tax reforms imple-
mented during the transition and during the 1990s. For instance, when the 
PIT was introduced in Hungary (1988) there were 11 tax brackets (60 
percent was the top marginal tax rate); marginal tax rates and brackets 
changed almost on a yearly basis; the 1999 tax reform reduced from six to 
three the number of tax brackets and the corresponding tax rates in order 
to reduce the burden of taxation on labor (IMF 1999a); following reduc-
tions, the top marginal tax rate reached the level of 38 percent. 
In the Czech Republic, the number of brackets and level of top rates 
have been reduced since the introduction of the PIT in 1993 (Bronchi and 
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Burns 2000); the last reduction took place in 1999 with the number of 
brackets reduced from five to four in 1999 and the top marginal tax rate 
from 40 to 32 percent, because very few taxpayers were taxed at the 
highest bracket. 
In Poland, despite the presence of three tax brackets most taxpayers 
(94.9 percent) fall into the first bracket whose upper limit is about €9600 
(see Chapter 10). This explains the tax reform proposal of a linear income 
taxation (the proposal has still not been enacted mainly for revenue 
reasons; see Lenain and Bartoszuk 2000).3 The effective structure of the 
Polish income tax system is close to the flat tax model, realized through 
basic relief (standard fixed tax credit) and a first tax bracket which 
includes almost all income. 
Finally, in all New Members, PITs are the exclusive competence of 
central government; however, in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovak 
Republic, Poland and Hungary, the tax revenues are also allocated to sub-
national government. 
Corporate income tax 
The two largest accession countries, Hungary and Poland, were the first to 
reform their Soviet-inspired enterprise profit tax (Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab 2000). Poland introduced a uniform enterprise profit tax in 1989, 
then replaced it with a modern corporate income tax in 1992. In Estonia, 
CIT was adopted in 1993 (as in the Czech Republic) and reformed in 1999 
and 2000; in Latvia, the CIT replaced the profit tax in 1995 (Brekis and 
Revina 2003). 
Present corporate taxes in New Members are linear and central. In the 
Czech Republic, the tax revenues are allocated between the central and 
local governments. Only Hungary applies a local levy on corporate taxpay-
ers on a tax base similar to the value added. 
As illustrated in Table 1.4, statutory CIT rates in accession countries 
are currently moderate and generally lower than those in EU countries. 
Apart from the Estonian case, where retained earnings are untaxed, the 
lowest tax rate can be found in Hungary (18 percent), the highest in the 
Czech Republic (31 percent).4 
Similarly to EU countries, the reduction of corporate tax rates has been 
particularly relevant during the second half of the 1990s. In Poland, the tax 
rate was lowered from 40 percent (in the period 1989-96) to 27 percent 
(2003).5 In Hungary, the tax rate was halved in 1995 (from 36 percent to 18 
percent), but at the same time a 'supplementary tax' levied at 23 percent 
was imposed on distributed profits (replaced in 1997 by a classical with-
holding tax on dividends at 20 percent, or at the reduced applicable treaty 
tax rate). In Latvia, where the CIT is relatively recent, the tax rate was 25 
percent in 2001, and was then reduced to respectively 22, 19 and 15 
percent in the following three years. In the Slovak Republic the tax rate 
Table 1.4 Structure of the corporate income tax in New Members 
Country Statutory Integration with Depreciation Carry forward of Main tax incentives 
tax rate PIT for dividends losses (number 
Buildings Machinery Inventories of years) 
Czech Republic 31 Final withholding Declining- Declining- Weighted 7 Investment tax incentives. 
tax (15%) and balance balance average Tax holiday (10 years for 
relief at corporate (25 years) (6 years) new firms and 5 years for 
level expansion). 
Estonia 26 Exemption Financial Financial Financial Not applicable 
accounting accounting accounting 
(IFRS) (IFRS) (IFRS) 
Hungary 18 Classic (final Straight-line Straight-line LIFO 5 ( unlimited for Investment reserve of 
withholding tax (25 years) (14.5%) start-ups) 25 % . R&D ( deduction of 
20%) 200% costs). Investment 
tax incentives. 
Poland 27 Classic ( final Straight-line Declining- LIFO 5 ( only 50% of the Accelerated depreciation 
withholding tax (40 years) balance loss deductible of 30% in the first year. 
15%) (14%) in each year) Special Economic Zones. 
Slovak Republic 19 Exemption Declining- Declining- Weighted 5 Tax holiday (10 years for 
balance balance average new firms or expansion). 
(30 years) (6 years) 
Slovenia 25 Partial (40%) Straight-line Straight-line LIFO 5 10% investment reserve. 
exemption (20 years) (4 years) 20% tax relief for 
investment in fixed assets. 
Sources: Countries' chapters; Jacobs et al. (2003); Martinez-Serrano and Patterson (2003). 
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has been cut from 40 percent (1999) to 29 percent (2000), 25 percent 
(2002) and 19 percent (after the 2004 tax reform). 
At the time of transition, the applicable tax rates were very high com-
pared with international standards (55 percent in the Czech Republic, 50 
percent in Hungary and up to 75 percent in Poland). Now, on average the 
statutory tax rate in selected accession countries is 24.33 percent (it is 23.6 
percent considering all the accession countries; see Jacobs et al. 2003), 
which is considerably lower than the current average tax rate of EU 
member states (31.68 percent) or the OECD average (30.79 percent). 
The main non-standard CIT is represented by the Estonian experiment 
(Raju 2003) where, after the 1999 reform, the tax is no longer levied on 
any retained earnings, but only on distributed profits and capital gains; the 
tax rate is set at 26/74 of the net distribution (26 percent of the gross distri-
bution). This levy is not a withholding tax and is consequently not reduced 
under tax treaties. 
The experiment (in line with a proposal made by Tanzi 1975) has been 
based on different characteristics (Raju 2003): the argument that the 
ability to pay can be evaluated only at personal level (not at the level of 
legal persons); the tax base is not the enterprise's profits (actually the tax 
code does not define 'profits' for tax purposes), but their use (dividends 
and other specific kinds of income distribution); the timing of taxation of 
corporate income, which is deferred until their distribution; and finally, the 
argument that not taxing corporate profits assures more neutrality, 
through the elimination of the distortions caused otherwise by the tax 
system. 
The selected countries apply different systems of integration with the 
personal income tax: some of them (Hungary and Poland) apply a 'classic' 
system, even if dividends are taxed with a final withholding tax, at rates 
generally lower than marginal PIT tax rates. Some countries apply a 
system of exemption, full (Slovak Republic) or partial ( 40 percent in 
Slovenia); in Estonia, dividends are taxed only at corporate level. Finally, 
the Czech Republic combines a final withholding tax with partial tax relief 
at corporate level. 
More specifically, Hungary and Poland apply a classic system of corpor-
ate taxation, even if dividends are taxed through final withholding taxes. 
In Hungary, corporate earnings distributed as dividends are effectively 
taxed at a rate of 34.4 percent (increased to 46.7 percent for 'excess distri-
butions'). Distributions higher than normal are penalized through the 
application of an higher tax rate, which increases the incentives for com-
panies to reinvest profits (where the effective tax rate is 18 percent) rather 
than distribute them (IMF 1999a). Thus, Hungary, together with Estonia 
(and Lithuania), provides a substantial preference for retained earnings, as 
opposed to distributed profits. 
In the Czech Republic, the double taxation of corporate ( distributed) 
earnings is alleviated both at personal and corporate levels. On dividends, 
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a final withholding tax is levied at a rate (15 percent) equal to the lowest 
marginal PIT rate; moreover, the company may credit 50 percent of the 
withholding tax against its corporation income tax liability, reducing in 
these instances the effective corporate income tax on distributed earnings 
to 36.17 percent. Slovenia applies a system of partial exemption ( only 60 
percent of dividends are taxed under PIT). After the 2004 tax reform, the 
Slovak Republic has replaced the classic system with a system of dividends 
exemption. 
Corporate tax bases appear lower than their potential because of exten-
sive exemptions and tax incentives. In the Baltic states, the degree of tax 
erosion caused by preferred tax treatments is still considerable (Brekis and 
Revina 2003). 
In the earliest stages of transition, foreign investors were given special 
tax privileges in the form of tax holidays and reduced CIT rates. In the 
early 1990s, Hungary removed various tax exemptions and incentives, but 
this trend was reversed in the second half of the 1990s when the range of 
activities qualified for tax incentives was expanded (IMF 1999a). The same 
trend can be found in Poland, which during the mid 1990s re-introduced 
extensive tax exemptions, targeted at foreign investors, as instruments to 
compete with Hungary and the Czech Republic in attracting foreign direct 
investments (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2000; Schratzenstaller 2003). 
In 1997, the Czech Republic introduced more investor-friendly policies 
and tax holidays targeted at large investments. The Slovak Republic was 
the last to enter the competition for foreign direct investment starting 
from 1998. 
In addition, in Poland, corporate tax liabilities have traditionally been 
reduced by tax incentives for investments in certain sectors or made by 
certain firms, for instance export-oriented firms and start-ups (Lenain and 
Bartoszuk 2000). Preferential tax regimes have been granted in Special 
Economic Zones, even if they will be repealed after the entry of Poland in 
the EU (see Chapter 10). In this field, the 2000 tax reform (partly enacted) 
achieved substantial progress on tax policy (IMF 2003), broadening the 
corporate tax base through the elimination of many previous investment 
allowances, the revision of the structure and rate of depreciation deduc-
tions and the closure of loopholes in the legislation. However, the role of 
tax-related investment incentives still appears substantial (Schratzenstaller 
2003; Appel 2003). 
As in Hungary and Poland, the Czech Republic (see Bronchi and Burns 
2000) soon after the transition introduced a number of corporate tax 
incentives (mainly in the form of tax holidays) in order to promote new 
investment, innovation and entrepreneurial activity. However, these 
schemes failed to achieve their aims (OECD 1995) and were abolished at 
the time of the introduction of the modern CIT (1993). The growing pres-
sure of international competition induced the authorities to re-introduce a 
range of investment incentives at the end of the 1990s. 
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Also in the Slovak Republic, but more recently (2004), a comprehen-
sive tax reform has been introduced. The core of the reform consists of a 
flat marginal rate (19 percent) applied to all corporate incomes, financed 
by the elimination of almost all tax incentives and exemptions (OECD 
2004; Miklos 2004). 
As reported in Table 1.4, in taxing corporate profits a number of 
approaches can be observed, especially in the determination of taxable 
income. As already illustrated, in Estonia the tax base is not linked to 
profits, with retained earnings untaxed. Distributed earnings are assessed 
according to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
without adjustments for tax purposes. 
In the calculation of the tax base, buildings may be depreciated in all 
New Members. The declining-balance method is in use in the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, the straight-line system is compulsory in the remaining 
countries. The useful life ranges from 20 (Slovenia) to 40 years (Poland). 
For tangible fixed assets (plant and machinery) the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovak Republic apply the declining-balance method. The 
Czech Republic also recognizes a first-year deduction of 10 percent in 
addition to the annual depreciation for the acquisition of new machinery. 
Hungary and Slovenia restrict depreciation to the straight-line method. In 
the evaluation of inventories, two main methods are applied. Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia permit the last-in, first-out (LIFO) method, while the 
Czech and Slovak Republics allow the option for the weighted-average 
cost method. None of the New Members allows a carry-back of losses; the 
carry-forward is allowed in all countries, subjected to restrictions. Losses 
can be carried forward only for five years in most countries (seven years in 
the Czech Republic). In Poland, the amount of loss to be set off from 
taxable income in each year is limited to 50 percent of the loss. The carry-
forward is unrestricted in Hungary for start-ups. 
Finally, the selected countries make large use of specific tax instruments 
targeted to increase domestic and foreign investment (see for details 
Jacobs et al. 2003). Tax holidays can be found in both the Czech and 
Slovak Republics for new firms or expansion of existing firms. In Hungary 
and Slovenia, companies may utilize a tax-free reserve of profits, to be 
used to finance new investment. More generally, tax incentives targeted at 
new investment are frequent in almost all the selected countries. 
The desirability of many existing preferential tax schemes has been 
questioned as an instrument to promote domestic and foreign investment 
(OECD 1995; Owens Chapter 6, this book), for example their compatibil-
ity with European law (Meussen 2003). 
Consumption-based taxes 
As illustrated earlier (Table 1.2) countries rely heavily on indirect taxes 
that account (in 1998) for about 39.4 percent (against 32.6 percent in EU 
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countries) of total tax revenue and 15.3 percent (against 13.9 percent in 
the EU) in terms of GDP. VAT revenue covers the main share (20.9 
percent of total tax revenue and 8.1 percent in terms of GDP). In addition 
the excise revenues show figures higher than the EU average (10.4 against 
8.2 percent in terms of total tax revenue and 4.0 against 3.5 percent in 
terms of GDP). 
In the early stages of transition, one of the most immediate tax policy 
objectives in the area of indirect taxation was to replace the complex and 
inefficient turnover taxes (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2000). In Poland 
for instance, the turnover tax had been applied with more than 100 differ-
ent tax rates (see Chapter 10). An even more complex sales taxation was 
in force in the Czech Republic (Bronchi and Bums 2000). The basic choice 
was between a single stage retain sales tax or a traditional value added tax 
(Cnossen 1998). The desire to join the EU induced almost all the central 
and eastern European countries to adopt the basic EU value added tax 
model. Hungary was the first country to introduce VAT (1988), followed 
by Poland (1993), while Slovenia was the last country (1999). 
The value added tax systems applied in most new member countries are 
very close to the European model. These countries have recently carried 
out reform in the field of VAT in order to comply with the provisions of 
the EU Directives. Some of them have requested transitional measures. 
The VAT structure is predominantly dual - or (more frequently) mul-
tiple - rate (see Table 1.5). Only the Slovak Republic shows a single-rate 
structure, as a result of the recent flat tax reform. The standard VAT rate 
ranges from 25 percent in Hungary to 18 percent in Estonia. It should be 
noted that the Hungarian rate is equal to the highest applied in the EU 
(specifically in Denmark and Sweden; see Cnossen 2002). Most countries 
apply one or two reduced rates, ranging between 3 (Poland) and 15 
percent (Hungary). Many countries apply a O percent rate on some basic 
products and services. 
The presence of multiple-rate structures in the selected countries (with 
the exception of the Slovak Republic) can be explained, other than 
through the heritage of the past multiple-rate turnover taxes, by the 
attempt to mitigate the regressive burden distribution of the VAT meas-
ured against income. However, the rate differentiation still appears to be 
an ineffective and ill-targeted instrument. 
Currently, the standard rate applied on average in the selected New 
Members (21 percent) is higher than the EU (un-weighted) average (19.4 
percent). 
For many countries, bringing the agricultural sector into the tax net has 
been one of the most important EU accession requirements in the field of 
indirect taxation. Until 2000 in Poland, the entire sector was de facto zero-
rated (Lenain and Bartoszuk 2000), while currently a reduced rate (3 
percent) is applied on most non-processed agricultural products. 
The range of activities exempted from VAT or subject to reduced tax 
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rates still appears to be wide. A good example is given by the Czech 
Republic, which combines a high statutory standard tax rate (22 percent) 
with a wide range of items subject to reduced taxation; the effect is that 
the VAT productivity is very low by international comparison (Bronchi 
and Burns 2000). As for the personal and corporate income taxes, VAT is 
central, but in the Czech Republic the revenues are also allocated to 
regions and municipalities. 
The accession to the EU will have more impacts in the field of excise 
taxation. Accession countries show wide differences in the way they levy 
excises on alcoholic beverages, tobacco and on hydrocarbon fuels. In this 
field during the 1990s some common trends can be identified: the move 
toward the conversion of ad valorem rates into specific rates; the increase 
in effective tax rates (even if they are still below international levels); the 
gradual equalization of rates applied to domestic and imported products; 
the convergence of tax rates among neighboring countries. The advantages 
of a specific excise regime over ad valorem taxation in terms of revenue 
raising capacity, reduction of consumption and in terms of contrast to 
trade diversion have been recommended to the accession countries by 
international observers (see for instance, Cnossen 2001 in the field of 
tobacco taxation). 
For some excises (for instance those on wine and on spirits) accession 
will have few effects in terms of an increase of tax rates, which are already 
in line with the EU minimum requirements. On the contrary (see Table 
1.5) most countries will have to increase significantly the tobacco duties 
and, some of them, the rates on hydrocarbon fuels (Martinez-Serrano and 
Patterson 2003; see also Chapter 2). 
1.5 Equity and efficiency profiles of current tax systems 
Looking at the structure and evolution of the New Members tax systems, 
Table 1.6 shows the economic structure measured as the share of indi-
vidual taxes in GDP and in total taxation by economic category ( consump-
tion, labor and capital). It should be noted that the economic tax mix, 
indicating a country's preference for one tax over another, shows some dif-
ferences from the EU standard. While, in EU countries, taxes on labor 
contribute more than half total tax revenue, taxes on consumption less 
than 30 percent and taxes on capital more than 20 percent, in the New 
Members the contribution of taxes on labor and of taxes on consumption 
is higher (respectively, 2.2 and 6.3 percentage points); the contribution of 
taxes on capital is much lower (9.5 percentage points) mainly as a result of 
the shadow economy's wide evasion and the low taxation of income from 
financial capital. 
The distance from the EU standard increased during the 1990s; this 
means that the tax structure of New Members in the early 1990s was much 
closer to the EU structure than in more recent years. Within the New 
Table 1.6 Structure of taxation by economic function and implicit tax rates in New Members and EU 15 
Early 1990s Late 1990s 
cz EE HU PL SI NM EU NM-EU cz EE HU PL SI NM EU NM-EU 
Structure according to the economic function as a percentage of GDP 
Consumption 13.2 11.4 14.9 9.7 13.9 12.6 12.3 0.3 11.1 13.5 14.1 13.0 16.0 13.5 12.6 0.9 
Labor 20.8 19.9 23.7 18.8 24.9 21.6 20.7 0.9 21.4 19.8 19.2 19.1 21.4 20.2 20.6 -0.4 
Capital 8.9 6.1 8.0 8.6 1.6 6.6 7.7 -1.1 5.7 4.1 5.3 4.2 1.3 4.1 9.1 -5.0 
Structure according to the economic function as a percentage of total taxation 
Consumption 30.7 30.4 32.0 26.2 34.2 30.7 28.1 2.6 29.1 33.8 36.7 34.3 39.5 34.7 28.4 6.3 
Labor 48.6 52.9 50.8 50.6 61.5 52.9 52.9 0.0 55.9 53.1 49.7 50.4 52.6 52.3 50.1 2.2 
Capital 20.7 16.2 17.2 23.1 4.0 16.2 19.0 -2.8 14.9 12.5 13.7 11.1 7.6 12.0 21.5 -9.5 
Implicit tax rates 
Consumption 18.4 14.4 18.5 11.9 18.4 16.3 22.7 -6.4 15.6 15.9 19.2 16.3 21.0 17.6 23.6 -6.0 
Labor employed 37.0 37.5 40.8 37.3 36.9 37.9 36.9 1.0 38.6 37.1 39.6 32.2 38.4 37.2 37.4 -0.2 
Capital and business n.a 29.4 n.a n.a 29.7 n.a 16.2 n.a n.a 20.2 n.a n.a 31.2 n.a 21.0 n.a 
Sources: EU Commission (2000) for New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2003). 
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Members, the tax preferences appear not very different, with the main 
exception of Slovenia, where the contribution of consumption taxes is 
much higher than the average and the contribution of taxes on capital 
much lower. 
A full picture of the distribution of the macro-tax burden is given by the 
implicit tax rates, measured as individual tax revenues expressed as a per-
centage of their respective tax base.6 Even if the contribution of taxes on 
consumption to the total tax revenue is higher in New Members than in 
the EU countries (as a result of the higher propensity to consume in New 
Members), the implicit tax rate is considerably lower (17.6 percent against 
23.6 percent). The distance from the EU average has slightly decreased 
over the period. The reason is that most countries (with the exception of 
the Czech Republic) have increased the effective taxation on consump-
tion; in Poland and in Slovenia for instance, the implicit tax rate on con-
sumption increased by, respectively, 4.4 and 2.6 percentage points. 
As in EU countries, the effective taxation of labor appears higher than 
that on consumption and, for Estonia and Slovenia, on capital. However, 
the evolution over time of the implicit tax rate on labor has been different 
in EU members and New Members countries. In the EU, the tax rate has 
risen from 36.9 to 37.4 percent, while in the New Members the tax rate has 
decreased from 37.9 to 37.2 percent. However, it should be noted that in 
two countries (the Czech Republic and Slovenia) the implicit tax rate on 
labor has increased, while a large fall has taken place in Poland and, to a 
less extent, in Hungary. 
Other than at macro-level by economic function, the distribution of the 
tax burden can be observed at micro-level and compared for some New 
EU countries, OECD members. Table 1.7 illustrates specific measures of 
horizontal tax equity, where both the personal income tax and social 
security contributions are taken into account. The table (based on OECD 
2003b) compares the average effective tax rates of two different categories 
of tax payers: a single individual without children and a one-earner 
married couple with two children, both earning the same income level (100 
percent APW). In each country, differences in the effective tax rates rep-
resent how the tax system treats the different economic positions of tax-
payers. Looking only at the personal income tax, horizontal equity seems 
to be pursued effectively in all the selected countries. For instance, in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic, the average effective 
tax rate is halved for the one-earner couple with children. In all the coun-
tries, social security contributions are flat, thus not directed at horizontal 
tax equity purposes. 
A more comprehensive picture can be obtained from the last column of 
the table, where average effective tax rates are determined taking into 
account both the tax system (personal income tax and social security con-
tributions) and the benefit system ( cash transfers). The Czech and Slovak 
Republics and Hungary appear as those countries that give more emphasis 
Table 1. 7 Measures of horizontal tax equity in selected New Members 
Country Average effective tax rate 
(income tax) 
SSC Average effective tax rate 
(income tax +SSC -cash transfers) 
Single individual One-earner married Single individual One-earner married Single individual One-earner married 
without children couple with two without children couple with two without children couple with two 
(APW) children (APW) (APW) children(APW) (APW) children (APW) 
Czech Republic 11.2 5.3 12.5 12.5 23.7 3.7 
Hungary 16.6 7.6 12.5 12.5 29.1 7.8 
Poland 6.0 4.0 25.0 25.0 31.0 25.0 
Slovak Republic 6.5 3.2 12.8 12.8 19.3 3.1 
Source: OECD (2003b). 
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to horizontal tax (and benefit) equity. More generally, this result is con-
firmed when all the effects of the different fiscal treatments of families are 
considered (see OECD 2003b). 
With reference to vertical equity, Table 1.8 reports measures of statu-
tory tax progressivity, constructed by comparing the share of income paid 
in tax by taxpayers at different income levels (van den Noord and Heady 
2001). Table 1.8 (based on OECD 2003b data) presents measures of statu-
tory tax progressivity for low-wage (67 percent of the APW) and high-
wage (167 percent of APW) people, taking into account only the personal 
income tax or the social security contributions. Personal income taxes are 
progressive in all selected countries, but (with the exception of Hungary) 
at degrees generally lower than those existing in the EU countries (see 
Gandullia 2004). Hungary shows a pronounced tax structure across differ-
ent income levels, while the progressivity is more concentrated at above-
average income levels in the Slovak Republic. Poland appears as the 
country with the lowest progressivity across different income levels; in this 
country, until very recently, the progressivity was even lower due to the 
regressive effects of the tax expenditure programs ( Cavalcanti and Li 
2000). Finally, in all the selected countries, statutory social security contri-
butions are neutral or progressive. 
In the field of labor taxation it is well known that the tax burden in New 
Members has been historically high, mainly due to the need to finance the 
high level of social security and welfare expenditures; as a consequence, 
countries have not been able to deter effectively the underground 
economy and to relieve unemployment (Tanzi 1993b; see also the fore-
word). 
Table 1.9 reports the total tax wedge on labor in the selected countries 
(100 percent APW) and its evolution during recent years (where homo-
geneous data are available). The tax burden has decreased in Hungary, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic, while it has increased in the Czech 
Republic. Currently, labor is still most heavily taxed in Hungary, even if in 
the last seven years the reduction in the tax wedge has been larger than 
in the other selected New Members. It should be noted that given 
the average tax wedge on labor in the most important EU countries 
Table 1.8 Statutory tax progressivity in selected New Members 
Country Low-wage progressivity High-wage progressivity 
Income tax Total Income tax Total 
Czech Republic 2.48 3.01 3.62 4.24 
Hungary 6.71 8.01 15.51 18.81 
Poland 1.60 2.27 1.40 1.96 
Slovak Republic 1.71 1.88 5.06 5.97 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD (2003b) data. 
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Table 1.9 Tax wedges on labor (as a percentage of labor costs) in selected New 
Members 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Czech Republic 42.6 42.9 42.8 42.7 43.1 43.1 43.5 
Hungary 52.0 52.0 51.6 50.7 49.6 49.0 46.3 
Poland 44.7 43.9 43.2 43.0 43.0 42.7 42.7 
Slovak Republic n.a n.a n.a n.a 41.9 42.1 41.4 
Source: OECD (2003b). 
(43.5 percent; see Gandullia 2004) labor appears to be less taxed in Poland 
and the Slovak Republic and much more than the average in Hungary. 
The taxation of labor appears to be most relevant for lower-paid labor. 
As in most EU countries, some measures have been introduced in the 
selected New Members to reduce effective tax wedges on low-paid 
workers. All four countries apply lower tax wedges on low-income (67 
percent APW; OECD 2003b ). However, according to the last available 
data (2002), the tax wedges on lower-paid labor in the New Members are 
still much higher than the European average. Compared with the Euro-
pean average (34.11 percent), the tax wedge is always above 40 percent in 
the selected countries (ranging from 40.3 percent in the Slovak Republic 
to 42 percent in Hungary). 
With reference to the effective taxation of (corporate) capital, some 
studies report estimations for specific countries (see for instance, Holeck-
ova et al. 2003; Schratzenstaller 2003; Dethier and John 1998). The only 
comparative study about the New Members (Jacobs et al. 2003) reports the 
(forward) effective average tax rates (EATRs) for domestic investments.7 
Looking at Table 1.10, there is a wide range of EATRs within the New 
Members, from the low 19.37 percent in Hungary to 24.73 percent in 
Poland. 
The average EATR in the selected New Members is 22.42 percent, 
about six percentage points lower than the European average (EU Com-
mission 2001). Compared with the main EU countries, overall the New 
Members appear to have a significant advantage. The advantage increases 
considerably if the effects of tax incentives are considered ( as shown in the 
last column of Table 1.10, the average EATR decreases from 22.42 
percent to a low 16.56 percent). 
As in EU countries, debt appears to be the most tax-efficient source of 
financing, followed by retained earnings. However, on average, the 
advantage of debt over equity is lower in the New Members than in the 
EU as a result of the lower statutory tax rates. The effective tax rate on 
retained earnings and on new equity is the same for all countries, with the 
exception of the Czech Republic and Estonia. In the Czech Republic, the 
EA TR on new equity is lower as a result of the tax credit on distributed 
Table 1.10 Average effective tax rates on domestic corporate investments in New Members 
Average for each source of finance Average for each asset Overall 
average 
Overall Retained New equity Debt Buildings Machinery Inventories with tax 
average earnings incentives 
Czech Republic 24.18 28.90 26.40 17.30 21.60 21.10 24.90 16.40 
Estonia 22.52 19.50 28.60 19.50 22.50 22.50 22.50 11.34 
Hungary 19.37 21.70 21.70 14.80 23.20 17.60 17.40 17.05 
Poland 24.73 27.90 27.90 18.50 25.30 27.30 23.90 23.92 
Slovak Republic 22.10 25.00 25.00 16.30 21.30 20.90 23.30 11.19 
Slovenia 21.60 24.50 24.50 15.80 20.70 20.20 22.10 19.44 
New Members average 22.42 24.56 25.66 17.03 22.42 21.61 22.34 16.56 
--
Source: Jacobs et al. (2003). 
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earnings, while in Estonia the tax rate on retained earnings is lower 
because they are exempt from taxation until they are distributed. The spe-
cific Estonian system (in terms of exemption of retained earnings) pro-
duces the effect (neutrality) that EATR on retained earnings and on debt 
is the same, and that the EATR does not change across different types of 
investments (buildings, machinery and inventories). 
Notes 
1 I would like to thank Luigi Bernardi, Maria Cecilia Guerra, Christopher Heady 
and Nicola Iacobone for helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining 
errors are mine. 
2 A clearer move toward fiscal decentralization in New Members appears when 
looking at more recent and general comparable data (OECD 2002). 
3 According to the original plan (Government's 1998 White Paper) the tax rates 
would have been lowered from the schedule 19, 30 and 40 percent to 18 and 28 
percent in 2002, with the elimination of the top marginal tax rate (IMF 2003). 
4 Considering also the other accession countries, the highest tax rate is in Malta 
(35 percent), the lowest in Lithuania and Cyprus (15 percent). In Lithuania, the 
tax rate is even lower (13 percent) for SMEs. 
5 In the new tax reform proposal, still not approved, the tax rate should be further 
reduced to 19 percent. 
6 However, among New Members, the implicit tax rates on capital and business 
are only available for Estonia and Poland. 
7 The study reports also EATRs about international investments, but only from 
the perspective of parent companies located in Germany. 
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2 Main tax policy issues 
Luigi Bernardi and Mark Chandler 
2.1 Executive summary1 
The main purpose of taxes is to finance public spending. Hence, it is 
worthwhile scrutinizing the size and the scope of government in New 
Members, before considering their tax structure. On this topic, it has often 
been argued that governments in some transition economies, such as the 
New Members, are too big relative to their tax capacity and the need not 
to interfere with economic development. On average, public expendi-
ture/GDP ratio is at present not far from 42 percent in the New Members. 
This figure is just below what is observed for far higher income countries 
and well over the level reached by other transition economies at the same 
level of per capita income. 
However, one must notice the lack of robustness that characterizes all 
empirically estimated relationships between tax or spending/GDP ratio 
and per capita incomes. Usually, a statistically significant fit does exist but 
a scatter plot is very dispersed. The correlation looks still weaker inside 
the worldwide sub-sample of transition economies. Hence - not surpris-
ingly - other variables contribute to explaining a higher/lower than 
'normal' level of public spending. Actually many factors - economic, polit-
ical and social in nature - seem to be working to pull up spending in the 
New Members. 
By better focusing our attention on the problem, we observe however 
that, in transition economies, large spreads in public spending are almost 
entirely due to the public sector's engagement in the provision of welfare 
treatments and services. Once more the particular situation of New 
Members should call for a relevant public intervention in the welfare area. 
However, in some New Members there has been a move towards partially 
funded private pension schemes and itemized social insurance funds tar-
geted to single risks. Time will tell what has been the best chosen way. 
After the first years of transition to a market economy, and excluding 
the period around the Russian crisis of 1997, New Members' rates of 
growth have generally been satisfactory enough, and apparently they were 
not curbed by too cumbersome governments. Notwithstanding their bigger 
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governments, New Members outperformed both CIS and Latin America 
countries, while only the catching-up 'Asian tigers' did better. However, 
both statistical evidence and economic theory suggest that there exists a 
negative, although weak, link between the level of taxes and public spend-
ing on one side and growth rates on the other. Therefore, non-minimal 
and well-targeted tax cuts could contribute to further enhancing growth, 
which indeed would help to reduce the current painfully high unemploy-
ment. Some scaling down of public expenditure is hence called for. 
Detailed analyses on the issue mainly suggested the need to redirect and 
better target social programs, to make more efficient use of resources in 
education, health and public administration and finally to strengthen bud-
getary procedures. 
According to authoritative opinions, total fiscal pressure is also too high 
on average in the New Members and should not exceed about 30 percent, 
a level more consistent with the New Members' tax capacity and which is 
more supply friendly, but which stays around eight points under the figure 
of the last few years. Furthermore, the tax mix should be changed. Direct 
taxes look comparatively low with respect to indirect taxes. Social contri-
butions remain very high. At a first check, we find that total fiscal pressure 
may go down, although perhaps by some points less than the above-
quoted normative prescription. This is the case if one wants to avoid the 
disruption of public contributions to welfare treatments and services. By 
adding up some increase in direct taxes to the scaling down of total expen-
ditures and taxes, a basket of (tentative) about six-to-seven GDP points 
might be allocated to the higher priority tax cuts. Where they are to be 
allocated is not a question to answer immediately. 
According to the structure of taxation by economic function and to 
implicit rates, the trade-off between efficiency and equity in taxation not 
only arises but also appears particularly binding. From the point of view of 
efficiency, the New Members' tax structure overburdens labor and hits to 
very different degrees the various (productive and rent) components of 
capital and business (i.e. national accounting operating surplus). From the 
point of view of equity, consumption taxes stay high, are traditionally con-
sidered as regressive and may be particularly painful in New Members, 
because of the - low - level and the - uneven - distribution of personal 
incomes. 
In these circumstances, it is quite difficult to strike a welfare maximizing 
balance between efficiency and equity. A somewhat formal solution would 
be to divide equally the resources' basket between efficiency - lighter tax 
wedge on employed labor, via a cut in social contributions - and equity -
income tax enlargement and consumption tax squeezing. 
This chapter also separately examines the four main categories of taxa-
tion in the New EU Member states. The first of these is personal income 
tax. Although some countries have clearly attempted to implement a 
uniform taxation of income, they remain in the minority. We discuss 
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several explanations for the non-uniform taxation of income in these 
former command economies. The special interest explanation may explain 
why taxation of income from profits is lower than taxation of income from 
labor when social security payments are accounted for. Another plausible 
explanation is the attempt to minimize tax evasion and take account of the 
limited capacity of tax authorities in these countries. Making income tax 
more progressive is a debated issue, and the solutions adopted by single 
New Members vary considerably, on economic, social and political 
grounds. Progressivity is very low in some of the states and this appears to 
be determined by a combination of factors, including neighbors, expecta-
tions of taxpayers, and the ability of high earners to cooperate effectively 
to pursue their interest against progressivity. An alternative is to widen the 
base via the inclusion of incomes that, at present, are generally exempt or 
just slightly taxed and - even more - through the recovery of tax evasion, 
particularly from the hidden economy. 
The taxation of corporate income has also been imaginative in the New 
Member states. Estonia abolished it in 2000 and others have reduced the 
rates substantially. Estonia's radical action does not appear to have been a 
major constraint on the collection of personal income tax. However, 
reductions in corporate income tax are only weakly correlated with the 
capacity of entrepreneurs to speed the economic catch-up of New Member 
states with the rest of the EU. Poland, for example, offers the least 
freedom for businesses among New Member states, and yet has the most 
lenient taxation of profit relative to labor income. Dynamic efficiency 
requires that mild taxation of corporations should be maintained, to favor 
the enlargement of entrepreneurship and to attract FDI also after the pri-
vatization decade. However, corporation (or at least dividends) tax should 
not vanish, as it should impede the diffusion of avoidance activities. 
The - painfully increasing - harmonization of excises to EU standards is 
mandatory, just lightened by a long transition period. VAT structure 
hence becomes the only degree of freedom to relieve consumption taxa-
tion. Exemptions and reduced (perhaps in few cases also negative) rates 
should also therefore be well targeted according to the empirical evidence 
of Engel's curves. Additionally, as to equity, we have already noticed that 
New Members have to redirect their social programs. Therefore, welfare 
programs that are effective in relieving the living conditions of the poor 
should be more equity improving. From this point of view, implanting a 
social safety net is the main step. 
By comparing the efficacy of VAT with that of personal income tax in 
the region we find the tax base of VAT is at least 80 percent larger than 
that of personal income in these countries. This implies that replacement 
of personal income taxation with VAT on the margin may yield unusually 
large efficiency gains. We also compare the efficacy of VAT collection 
across the region, and find that the Visegrad region performs less well than 
the Baltic states. We should be careful with such comparisons, however, 
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since it is likely that the Baltic states suffer from relatively large under-
recording of GDP, and this would bias their recorded VAT efficacy 
upwards. 
Radical changes to the social security system in several New EU 
Member states have left their populations somewhat more at risk regard-
ing their pensions due to the instability of the financial markets. This may 
be understandable given the instability of collective institutions over the 
longer term in this region, and the resulting low trust in such constitutions 
among the population. However, it is interesting to observe that the 
nations that would be commonly held to be the most capitalism savvy, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia, have retained the collective pooling of risk 
common in the rest of the EU. 
2.2 The size and scope of government 
It has often been argued that government in some transition economies, 
such as the New Members, is too big relative to their tax capacity and the 
need not to interfere with economic development. A clear updated version 
of this argument, particularly useful for our purposes, has recently been 
presented by Mitra and Stern (2003) (see also Begg and Wyplosz 1999). 
These authors observe that, after the shift to a market economy, the share 
of public expenditures in CSB countries (Central, Southeastern Europe 
and Baltic states, including all the New Members) has decreased but just 
by about five points of GDP, from about 47 percent in 1992 to near 42 
percent in 2000. This share is about five points higher than the correspond-
ing value on the trend line which fits a set of public expenditure/GDP 
ratios against corresponding per capita incomes for a sample of near 50 
developed and developing countries in 2000. Furthermore, the level of 
public expenditure in CSB countries is just 0.5 points under the value 
observed for high-income OECD countries, while it is about 13 points 
higher than the corresponding value of CIS (Commonwealth of Independ-
ent - i.e. post USSR - States), which decreased by almost 20 points from 
1992 to 2000.2 A broad discussion of the previous argument can be synthe-
sized around the following three main issues. 
Public expenditure/GDP ratio and per capita income 
The econometric performance of Mitra and Stem's ( and also of other 
authors') relationship between public expenditure/GDP ratios and per 
capita incomes does not look very robust: the resulting R2 is not higher 
than 0.3.3 The highest-income countries show an expenditure/GDP ratio 
variable within a range from 25 to 55 percent, with the lowest-income 
countries within a range from 15 to 50 percent. 
We briefly go further on the topic. Table 2.1 shows a more definite, 
albeit small, sample of transition economies pertaining to main world 
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Table2.1 Government revenue/GDP percentage ratios, per capita incomes and 
rates of growth - selected transition economies: year 2000 
Revenue/GDP Per capita GDP Growth 
New members 
Czech Republic 41.1 4940 2.9 
Estonia 38.7 3510 6.4 
Hungary 44.0 4550 3.8 
Poland 40.4 4100 4.1 
Slovenia 43.3 9160 4.8 
CIS 
Belarus 44.3 860 5.8 
Kazhakstan 19.6 1230 1.7 
Russia 37.0 1730 3.5 
Turkmenistan 23.4 850 1.8 
Ukraine 34.2 640 6.0 
Latin America 
Brazil 32.9 4310 0.8 
Chile 19.3 4630 5.4 
Colombia 16.2 2290 2.8 
Mexico 12.1 4790 6.9 
Venezuela 8.5 3150 3.2 
East Asia 
China 16.5 780 8.0 
Philippines 12.7 1050 4.0 
India 15.6 440 7.2 
Malaysia 20.1 3390 8.3 
Thailand 14.2 2010 4.4 
Sources: New Members and CIS countries, Mitra and Stem (2003); Latin America: Martner 
and Tromben (2003); East Asia and growth rates: UN Statistical Yearbook, 2002. 
Notes 
Per capita GDP values are in US$ at 2000 exchange rates and not PPP corrected. Some data 
refer to 1999. 
areas. Tax (=more or less spending)/GDP ratios may be contrasted to per 
capita GDP. High values of taxes to GDP ratios are reported for all New 
Members, where the per capita incomes stay almost always at the mean 
values4 usually reported for transition economies and not far from their 
own average. At broadly comparable levels of per capita income, Latin 
American countries show very large differences across countries in the 
tax/GDP ratio. In any case, the specific ratios stay well below New 
Members' values. CIS countries' tax/GDP ratios are also widely dispersed. 
There is no discernible and statistically significant correlation between per 
capita incomes, which stay well below both those of New Members and of 
Latin American countries. Low per capita incomes are also shown by East 
Asian countries, with the exception of Malaysia, and in this area tax/GDP 
ratios are generally quite low. 
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Therefore, the multi-facet explanatory factors (Burgess and Stern 1993; 
Gupta et al. 2001) of the size and scope of government go well beyond the 
per capita income relationship suggested by Wagner's law (Wagner 1883), 
as has been recognized for a long time by the most authoritative literature 
(Musgrave 1969). Given this conclusion, we have then to notice that, 
broadly speaking, many factors might keep up the level of expenditure in 
New Members: the level of literacy, the relatively small size of the agricul-
tural sector, the degree of urbanization, an ageing population, the long-
term legacy of communist social aims on voters' preferences and lobbying 
activities, weak budgetary institutions and so forth. 
More specifically however, the supposed over-sizing of New Members' 
governments is almost entirely due to the level of social security and 
welfare expenditures. According to Mitra and Stem's data, in New 
Members these programs together account for the 14.0 percent of GDP, 
against 15.6 percent observed in high-income countries, and just the 7.8 
percent of CIS countries. Here, the welfare programs have been seriously 
cut in the post-communist era, particularly in Asian states. The remaining 
functional structure of public expenditure does not differ too much among 
country groups (including Education and Health, the latter with the excep-
tion of CIS countries, which cut it down to 2.2 percent of GDP in 2002). It 
is then the (public) provision of welfare services that makes the difference 
among the observed levels of public expenditure in transition economies. 
This is not an uncommon feature when one looks at a wider set of coun-
tries at various stages of development (Burgess and Stern 1993), including 
those with a high pro capita income (Richards et al. 1994). 
Political economy views may give an initial explanation of the survival of 
wide welfare programs in East European transition economies (Milanovic 
1999). It is commonly reported (Tanzi 1993a for all) that in almost any 
country an increase in poverty and a more unequal distribution of incomes 
occurred with the transition process. As a consequence, most social indic-
ators went down and this stimulated electoral support for income mainte-
nance programs intended to avoid the disruption of social cohesion. 
Furthermore, population ageing shared by almost all New Members 
pushes social security and health care expenditures up further. Other 
factors seem to suggest the difficulty of scaling down education, health 
care and social protection programs in New Members (Heller and Keller 
2001), as has been accomplished in other countries (Tanzi and Schuknecht 
1997). A large proportion of the population is unemployed and/or poor 
and anyway requires public intervention against income and disability risk, 
as well as not being excluded from proper level of health care and educa-
tion. New programs are required to meet the specific social risks of market 
economies (Kopits 1992). However it should be noticed that many, albeit 
not all, New Members are moving toward 'three pillars' pension schemes 
and itemized public insurance funds to cover other social risks. Pros and 
cons of this move are discussed at length later in the chapter. 
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A final remark is however necessary. Any suggestion to preserve the 
wide scope and aims of social programs and public services might be chal-
lenged by alleging the high level of corruption that characterizes the public 
sector in most transition economies, especially the post-communist ones. 
Generally, the answer to this must not necessarily be found in scaling 
down public activities to the level of the 'minimal state' (Burgess and 
Stern 1993). More precisely, it has been argued that corruption can be 
fought by speeding up structural reforms. Still, we must point out that 
almost all of our selected New Members stay at the top of the structural 
reforms index in transition economies, as well as at the bottom of the cor-
ruption ranking (Abed and Davoodi 2000).5 
Size of government and economic performance 
After the first years of transition to a market economy, and excluding 
the period around the Russian crisis of 1997, New Members' rates of 
growth have generally been satisfactory and apparently they were not 
curbed by too cumbersome governments. As shown in Table 2.1, at 
present the Czech Republic runs at a 3 percent increase in GDP yearly; 
Estonia and the other Baltic states perform far better at more than 5 
percent yearly; Hungary stays around 4 percent, as substantially do Poland 
and Slovenia. 
Transition economies of CIS countries as well as those of Latin 
America do not perform generally better, and a clear cut relationship with 
taxes to GDP ratios looks very difficult to find. 'Asian tigers' outperform 
all other transition economies' growth: here, as has been seen, the size of 
government is generally small (20-25 percent of GDP). A necessary 
caveat to be raised here is that the direction of causality in this relation-
ship is quite uncertain, especially for transition economies. Furthermore, 
in Asian countries the level of income per capita is still low, thus some-
what reducing the demand for public goods. Economies are still passing 
through the catching-up stage. The households' cohesion of the peasant 
society survives. On the contrary, inside more urbanized societies, such as 
the New Members, the supply of public goods and the provision of welfare 
services might give a contribution not just to equity, but also to efficiency 
(Atkinson 1999). 
More broadly speaking, cross-country correlation analyses (Agell et al. 
1997)6 as well as a diversified but converging stream of theoretical liter-
ature (Bernardi 2004)7 came to the conclusion that there is a weak negat-
ive link between the level of taxes and public spending on one side and 
growth rates on the other. Therefore, only huge and well-targeted tax cuts 
can contribute to sustaining economic growth. Then, some cuts in public 
spending, together with a shift in tax bases should take place, for a total 
amount that should not be small. We return to this issue in the following 
sections. 
38 Luigi Bernardi and Mark Chandler 
More efficient and lower spending 
New Members can be included in the group of transition economies that 
seem to do better in raising tax revenue as well as in spending it (Gupta et 
al. 2001), on the basis of selected indicators of governments' tax burden 
and spending benefits. This does not, however, imply that some social pro-
grams need not be revised, in order to perform better, to be less costly, 
and to become more appropriate with respect to the targets. There are 
three main strategies that could be jointly pursued, in order to decrease by 
some points the spending/GDP ratio, so to make possible an equivalent 
reduction of taxes. 
i Redirecting social protection - The process (Kopits 1992) of adapting 
social security programs to the needs and constraints of a market 
economy must be still accomplished. Public pension and income main-
tenance plans should be better tailored to the emerging demographic 
decline8 and to the persisting high level of poverty and inequality. 
Unemployment benefits should be targeted to the recovery of a work 
position and not only to a passive income support. A universal means-
tested social security safety net is still lacking almost everywhere. 
ii More efficient resource use in education and health - It has been con-
vincingly reported that resources are not efficiently employed both in 
education and in health services (Gupta et al. 2001). Education is too 
concentrated in pre- and initial levels as well as in the top ones. Inter-
mediate levels are suffering, especially considering that they must 
supply the new human capacities required by accelerating growth and 
the modernizing of both private and public services. Health requires a 
re-balancing between preventive and curative activities, a reduction of 
hospital beds and times of hospitalization. Both services look over-
staffed. 
iii Public Administration, civil service and budgetary procedures - As 
reported in other parts of this research, the present working of Public 
Administration looks generally poor and inefficient. Regulatory activ-
ities remain cumbersome. Corruption has been cut but not eliminated. 
Public employment must still be downsized to the more limited 
dimensions required by the aims of government in a market economy. 
Public pay is in turn comparatively high. However, improving all these 
aspects is not an easy task. Well-established vested interests and 
powerful lobby groups may resist any reform. They will be more 
easily subdued when hopefully stronger budgetary procedures will 
progressively enter into force, both at the central and local levels of 
government. 
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2.3 Taxation structure and main effects 
Taxation level and structure 
Mitra and Stern (2003) have also outlined something like an 'optimal' tax 
level and structure that would not damage efficiency and growth (see also 
Buiter 1997). The total fiscal pressure and tax mix are basically set accord-
ing to the level of per capita income: here we consider suitable figures for 
the average New Member. The income tax basis accounts for about half of 
GDP, which is a small figure, mainly due to the difficulties in taxing wide-
spread small informal businesses. Given a (not low) average net rate of 20 
percent, the yield could stay around 8 percent of GDP. International 
competition would suggest, in turn, not raising corporation tax over two to 
three points of GDP. 
VAT should be limited to about 7 percent of GDP: it would be difficult 
to enlarge its basis, when both the tax and the administration are new; too 
high rates might be distortionary. Excise duties may total an average of 2.5 
percent of GDP: this burden is already heavy considering that they are 
levied on a tax basis, which amounts to about 5 percent of GDP. Social 
contributions should not stay over a level of around 11 percent of GDP, in 
order not to exert a disincentive effect on labor supply and not to promote 
the shadow economy. To sum up, according to Mitra and Stem's view, the 
total fiscal pressure should not exceed about 30 percent as the average of 
New Members, i.e. around eight points under last year's figure. Mitra and 
Stern continue by observing that the Eastern European tax-mix looks 
more similar to developing than to the developed countries' model and is 
imbalanced both on efficiency as well as on equity grounds. Direct taxes 
look comparatively low with respect to indirect taxes. Social contributions 
remain very high. Their present level would be a legacy both of the com-
munist era and of the need to preserve social cohesion during the first 
years of transition, by means of largely diffused social transfers. Therefore, 
the authors' suggestion is to update the tax mix, through an increase in the 
share of direct taxes, particularly personal ones, balanced by a reduction 
of domestic indirect taxes9 and social contributions. 
We may try a first check of Mitra and Stem's suggestions, by looking at 
the data in Table 2.2. It should be possible to find some room to increase 
income tax, especially by enlarging its basis. Corporations should not be 
taxed more heavily, and possibly less, to attract FDI. On the contrary, 
some burden could be imposed on capital incomes and gains as well as on 
immovable wealth, which at present are widely exempt or hit very little. 
On average, the New Members' VAT level does not differ much from 
the 'optimal' value. Excise duties will trend upwards as a consequence of a 
progressive harmonization to the EU's levels. Other indirect taxes (not 
considered by Mitra and Stern) should be somewhat reduced, especially 
the (low) remaining custom duties, but will continue to give some GDP 
Table 2.2 Taxes/GDP percentage ratios: selected New Members and EU 15 (late 1990s) and 'optimal values' 
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia Un weighted 'Optimal EU15 
average values' 
Direct taxes, of which 9.0 11.1 8.7 11.2 7.8 9.6 10.5 13.7 
Income tax 5.2 8.5 6.5 8.3 6.6 7.0 8.0 9.3 
Corporation tax 3.7 2.6 2.2 2.9 1.2 2.5 2.5 3.0 
Indirect taxes, of which 12.4 14.3 16.3 14.4 18.9 15.3 9.5 13.9 
Value added tax 6.6 8.8 7.9 7.9 9.1 8.1 7.0 7.0 
Excise duties 3.7 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.4 4.0 2.5 3.5 
Total taxes 21.4 25.4 25.0 25.6 26.7 24.8 20.0 27.6 
Social contributions 16.9 12.1 13.9 12.2 13.8 13.8 11.0 15.0 
Total fiscal revenue 38.3 37.5 38.9 37.8 40.5 38.6 31.0 42.6 
Sources: EU Commission (2000) for New Members and Eurostat (2000) for EU. Mitra and Stern (2003) for 'optimal values' (see text). 
Notes 
Data from New Members differ from those in Table 2.1, because of the change in source and reference year. 
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points of yield (non-consumption and stamp taxes). Therefore, as a tend-
ency, indirect taxes on the whole seem to be destined to remain around 
their present level. Some cut should be required to lighten their worsening 
inequality level. 
Social contributions stay some points over the 'optimal value' and are 
still higher than the level suitable to deter the underground economy and 
to relieve unemployment, by reducing the tax wedge on labor (Tanzi 
1993b). 
To conclude, the aforementioned expenditure cuts should allow a 
reduction, by some points, of the total fiscal pressure, even if the target 
suggested by Mitra and Stern seems difficult to reach without disrupting 
the previously discussed public support welfare programs and services. By 
adding up some feasible enlargement of direct taxes, the bundle for tax 
cuts does increase. Where should they be concentrated? A brief deepening 
of the analysis seems worthwhile to find a proper answer. 
Taxation by economic/unction and implicit rates 
The structure of taxation by economic function and according to implicit 
rates may give a clearer picture of the efficiency and equity effects of the 
tax burden, rather than the simple classification by institutional items we 
have considered up to now. 
i Efficiency - According to a traditional rule, growth-enhancing taxes 
should be mainly imposed on consumption and rents, while leaving 
productive factors less hit. Table 2.3 shows that, by economic function, 
New Members' consumption taxes stay on average around 13 percent, 
within a max-min interval of about ±2 percentage points. Still accord-
ing to economic function, EU 15 consumption taxes are somewhat 
lower than those in New Members. The difference becomes smaller by 
considering implicit rates. Both these results are mainly due to the 
higher propensity by New Members to consume in comparison with 
that of the EU. Employed labor is heavily hit in New Members, 
according both to the taxation structure by economic function, and to 
implicit rates. Average values of both figures do not vary much among 
countries and stay a very few points below EU ones. Finally, taxes on 
capital and business give a yield in GDP terms that is more than one 
third lower than the EU average. This wide gap is mainly due to the 
shadow economy's wide evasion and to the generous exemptions 
allowed to financial capital incomes. To sum up, from the point of 
view of efficiency, the New Members' tax structure overburdens 
labor and hits, to a very different degree, the various components of 
capital and business (i.e. national accounting operating surplus). On 
the contrary, notice that consumption taxes stay at a comparatively 
high level. 
Table 2.3 Structure of taxation by economic function and implicit rates in New Members and EU 15 (late 1990s) 
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia 
Economic functions % GDP 
Consumption 11.2 12.7 13.8 13.0 16.0 
Labor employed 18.5 19.8 19.9 14.0 20.1 
Labor self-employed 2.9 1.3 1.2 5.1 -
Capital and business 5.7 0.3 5.0 4.2 4.4 
Implicit tax rates 
Consumption 15.6 15.5 18.9 16.3 21.0 
Labor employed 38.6 39.4 41.9 37.2 38.4 
Capital and business - - - - 21.5 
Sources: EU Commission (2000) for selected New Members and Eurostat (2000) for EU 15 (1997 unweighted average). 
Notes 
Total taxation according to economic function is over Total fiscal revenue in Table 2.2, because of some double counting. 
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ii Equity - Consumption taxes are traditionally considered as regressive. 
In New Members they may be particularly painful, because of the low 
level of per capita income, the wide share of unemployed and low 
pension drawers, as a consequence of the dismantling of consumption 
subsidies. Taxes on labor are not as heavy. They are paid only by 
working people, and they largely finance welfare programs from which 
these people benefit. Thus, the trade-off between efficiency and equity 
in taxation does not just arise but appears particularly binding. 
Some more issues on the efficiency-equity trade-off 
In these circumstances, it is quite difficult to strike a welfare maximizing 
balance between efficiency and equity. Inequality in the distribution of 
incomes increased during the years of transition, and thus redistributive 
policies are required (Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000; see also Aghion and Com-
mander 1999). Can tax system contribute to these policies, without damag-
ing efficiency? A first step could be to reduce the high levels of social 
contributions, leaving room for an increase in personal income tax, and in 
order to partially finance social programs, as we have already suggested. 
Performing this step by making income tax more progressive is a 
debated issue, and the solutions adopted by single New Members vary 
considerably, on economic, social and political grounds. One should also 
consider the need to make the tax as simple as possible, to avoid unafford-
able difficulties of administrative enforcement (Tanzi 1993a; Bernardi and 
Majocchi 1994). Furthermore the redistributive effects of steeper gradu-
ated tax rates should not be over-evaluated just because incomes are 
highly concentrated around their (low) modal value. To summarize, a 
higher contribution of personal income tax to redistributive policies rests 
on two main conditions: a certain substitution of it for social contributions 
and the enlargement of its basis. The latter may be performed via the 
inclusion of incomes that at present are generally exempt or just slightly 
taxed10 and - even more - through the recovery of tax evasion, particularly 
from the hidden economy.11 A more uniform treatment of different 
incomes will also improve efficiency. 
Efficiency requires the reduction of social contributions. In principle, 
they should be replaced not only by giving a more important role to 
income (and wealth) taxation but also without reducing the present heavy 
consumption taxes. However, this would be somewhat extreme, because of 
the stringent equity argument already dealt with. The current satisfactory 
New Members' rates of growth do not impose it. The resources' basket 
(tentatively about six-to-seven GDP points of an income tax increase and 
expenditure cuts) might be equally divided between efficiency - a lighter 
tax wedge on employed labor, via a social contributions cut - and equity -
income tax basis enlargement and consumption taxes' squeezing. 
The mandatory harmonization of excises to EU standards was already 
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planned to take place gradually during a transition period of up to ten 
years, so as to avoid the reduction of living standards and the growth of 
illegal markets. The VAT structure - as to exemptions and reduced 
(perhaps in few cases also negative) rates - should also be well targeted 
according to the empirical evidence of Engel's curves. This is the only 
degree of freedom to lighten consumption taxation.12 
Efficiency targets require that the mild taxation of corporations should 
also be maintained, to favor the enlargement of entrepreneurship and to 
attract FDI (Easson 1998; Funke and Strulik 2003), after the privatization 
decade and despite the complaints of neighboring EU countries (Germany 
especially). Low general rates are also the best way to allow the dismant-
ling of too favorable regimes for offshore firms, which are contrary to the 
EU code of conduct for business taxation. However, corporation ( or at 
least dividends) tax should not vanish, in order to impede especially the 
diffusion of avoidance activities. 
We have already noticed that most New Members have already intro-
duced or are planning to start reforms that are aimed at increasing the sus-
tainability of welfare programs. We repeat now that many of these 
changes should be definitely applauded ( e.g. the entitlements required for 
age pensions or the means test for other benefits); while some of them are 
very questionable ( e.g. the diffusion and itemizing of contributions to 
public social program funds), and on some others the jury is still out (the 
shift to mixed PAYG-funded systems for pensions). All in all, welfare pro-
grams that are effective in relieving the living conditions of the poor 
should be more equity improving. From this point of view, a social safety 
net is the main step. 
2.4 A closer look at the most critical features of the main 
taxes 
Personal income tax 
The standard prescription of orthodox economics is that the most efficient 
income tax is one that is uniform. The claim is that efficiency is highest 
when rates of taxation are the same across all types of income. This leads 
automatically to a further oft-quoted requirement that the tax base should 
be comprehensive, including all items that provide real income, since the 
tax cannot be uniform if some types of income are untaxed. However, in 
the vast majority of countries we observe that income tax is not as uniform 
as it could be, partly because the tax base is not comprehensive, but also 
for other reasons. We might have hoped that countries that largely created 
a tax system from scratch around 1990 would have had an opportunity to 
implement a uniform income tax. However, what we see in the New EU 
Member states today is far from this, and it is thus pertinent to ask why. 
In order to consider this further it is necessary to review the assump-
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tions on which the orthodox recommendation is based, especially given 
the normative nature of any discussion of efficiency. First, it is based on a 
Paretian definition of efficiency, with no attempt to make social welfare 
trade-offs with non-Pareto optimal states. Secondly, it is static, saying 
nothing about the impact of prior choices on economic decision-making. 
Thirdly, the prescription assumes that static economic (narrowly defined) 
efficiency is the primary goal of policy, disregarding social, political and 
other costs. A challenge to any of these three assumptions has the poten-
tial to provide a public interest explanation for departing from uniform 
taxation. 
However, we must also recognize that narrow interests have played a 
role in the formation of tax policy in the New EU Member states. Follow-
ing Olson (1965), the more narrowly a group can define itself, the more 
success we would expect it to have in reducing its tax burden. Hence we 
might expect taxation of capital gains to be relatively less burdensome 
than taxation of a more wide-ranging category such as labor income. To 
some extent this type of phenomenon may form part of the political costs 
of forming winning coalitions behind legislative programs, but it may also 
result from more structural inefficiencies in the political process. We might 
test this prediction against the taxation of dividends. To take into 
consideration the double taxation of this form of income, Table 2.4 lists 
the rates of corporate income tax and tax on dividends, calculates the com-
bined rate and compares it with the general income tax rate. 
The results are mixed. In five of the eight countries in this sample the 
combined dividend tax rate is lower than the top rate of income tax, and in 
only one case is it higher. Since we might expect shareholders to be in the 
top income tax bracket in most of these countries, that is a relevant com-
parison. However, it must also be noted that for individuals in the lowest 
income tax bracket, investing in shares, for example through their pension 
funds, implies higher tax rates than on ordinary income in five of the eight 
countries. This latter comparison has special relevance in Poland, since 
over 90 percent of taxpayers there are in the lowest tax bracket. In Estonia 
and, from the beginning of 2004, Slovakia, we observe the orthodox rule of 
equal tax rates across income types, achieved by not taxing profit at the 
corporate level in the former case and by non-taxation of dividends com-
bined with equal corporate and personal income tax rates in the latter. 
This picture changes considerably when we take into consideration 
social security contributions. Adding the social security taxation to the cal-
culation of tax paid on labor income implies that labor income is taxed 
more highly than dividends in all countries. Only within the lowest per-
sonal income tax bracket in Slovenia is labor income taxed more lightly 
than dividends. There are two caveats to this finding. First, in many coun-
tries there is a cap on social security payments, hence the marginal rate of 
labor income taxation for top earners is only the top rate of personal 
income tax. Secondly, not all of the social security contribution is lost to 
Table 2.4 Corporations, dividends and PIT rates in selected New Members 
Country CIT Dividend Combined tax Ordinary Social security contributions Combined 
on income income labor tax 
from profit PIT Employer's Employee's 
Czech Republic 15.5" 25.0b 36.625 15.0---32.0 35.0 12.5 44.9-55.9 
Estonia o.oc 26.0 26.000 26.0 33.5 1.0 45.1 
Hungary 16.0 20.0 32.800 18.0---38.0 29.0 11.5 43.7-57.5 
Latvia 15.0 0.0 15.000 25.0 24.1 9.0 45.0 
Lithuania 15.0 15.0 27.750 33.o (15.W 31.0 3.0 50.4 (37.1) 
Poland 27.0 15.0 37.950 19.0---40.0 18.4 18.7 44.4--58.8 
Slovakia 19.0 0.0 19.000 19.0 34.7-36.5 13.4 47.9-48.6 
Slovenia 25.0 30.0 47.500 17.0---50.0 16.1 22.1 44.3-66.5 
Sources; Corresponding country chapters of the book; Ernst and Young and Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) (2003), p. 11; Yakimova 
(2002), p. 101; Cok (2003); MSI (2004); http://www.socmin.lt/?1845851012; http://www.cato.org/research/articles/tupy-040204.html; KPMG (2003); owns 
calculations. 
Notes 
a This rate only applies to dividends. 
b Non-pension fund dividends. 
c 26 percent on profits repatriated abroad. 
d The lower rate applies to creative works. 
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the individual; some provides income in kind through increased unemploy-
ment, disability or pension insurance. This is in contrast to personal 
income tax payments, which provide no marginal benefits to the indi-
vidual. However, it should be noted that, in most of the New Member 
states, it is young people who have proved the most entrepreneurial, and 
these persons' valuation of state social insurance is naturally low due to 
uncertainty over the future of the system. 
Another example of non-uniform income taxation is the non-taxation of 
interest income in Latvia. Combined with the non-taxation of dividends in 
this country and the deductions for expenditure on education and health 
there is an apparent distortion in favor of investment in financial and 
human capital and against consumption. A counter-argument to this is that, 
since investments come from funds that are already taxed as income once, 
taxation of such investments would be a distortion in favor of consumption 
and it is the Latvian structure that is neutral. Perhaps the strongest critique 
of this Paretian efficiency view is that it ignores equity. We may object on 
equity grounds to a system that does not tax high incomes gained from 
investments, especially since we know that many of the assets were accu-
mulated illicitly during the chaotic early independence years. And the 
equity view is not entirely divorced from efficiency: if we accept the dimin-
ishing marginal utility of income we might well expect that total social 
welfare would increase as we shift the tax burden from labor to investment 
income. Orthodox consideration of dynamics tends to assume that taxation 
of investment reduces economic growth to a sub-optimal level. However, to 
show this would require consideration of the size of positive externalities 
from one investment on returns or risk of another. 
There may also be inefficiencies in the EU New Members' income taxa-
tion due to an oversight, providing ready opportunities for reform. Such 
an oversight can result from the weak public administration and govern-
ment capacities in the former Soviet block countries. However, the rapid 
development of these economies likely contributes to the continuous cre-
ation of new areas for reform that are yet to be addressed, thus increasing 
the challenge for New Member state governments. 
While the forgoing relates to the legal structure of taxation, the illegal 
evasion of tax has also had important consequences for universality in the 
New EU Member states. By putting payment of taxes on an ad hoe basis, 
or worse making it dependent on manipulation of the bureaucracy, 
evasion reduces the efficiency of the tax system considerably. The exist-
ence of this type of distortion in the tax system also opens up the possibil-
ity of a trade-off between legal distortions and evasion. Hence, in 
Lithuania, the income tax rate on creative work is 15 percent, in contrast 
to the 33 percent standard income tax rate. While this may be criticized for 
distorting the labor market in favor of non-standard labor contracts, it is 
clearly an attempt to take account of the relative ease with which indi-
viduals that create products independently can evade the income tax. 
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Progressivity is an issue on which the New EU Member states have 
found a surprising variety of solutions. While the orthodox Paretian effi-
ciency position has demanded no progressivity, standard Western practice 
has implemented it on equity grounds and the 'ability to pay' theory. We 
might also argue for it on the basis of the benefit principle if we accept that 
higher income individuals benefit more from the state than lower income 
individuals.13 It should be noted that all current income tax systems are to 
some extent progressive since they all have personal exemptions. 
However, among the New EU Member states, the three Baltic states and 
Slovakia have all now rejected multiple tax rates and, combined with very 
low personal exemptions, this means that their average income tax rates 
hardly vary across the income range. While there has been some debate on 
the introduction of multiple tax rates, particularly in Lithuania, these have 
so far not been supported by any Baltic government. Indeed, the trend 
appears to be in the opposite direction, with Slovakia's recent abandon-
ment of multiple rates. 
Although the equity argument would appear critical in the Baltic states 
at this time, there are a number of conditions of their transition that have 
perhaps contributed to the absence of multiple income tax rates there. 
First, for young people especially, the Baltic states might be seen as places 
where one's income level is very hard to predict, with plenty of opportun-
ities for increasing it rapidly. Hence, even those on low income may prefer 
the dream of low tax on high income in the future. This, however, implies 
a surprising love of risk given the uncertainty level. Perhaps a more plausi-
ble explanation of this idea is that voters are generally optimistic about 
their opportunities to move up the income scale, although this is not some-
thing that seems congruent with most public opinion survey results. An 
alternative is that there is a public interest in encouraging entrepreneurs to 
earn high incomes by generating economic activity, thus creating a 
dynamic positive externality for all. This may be particularly acute in the 
relatively low income Baltic states. In addition, it may be an attempt to 
limit tax evasion, in recognition of the greater ease with which high 
income earners would evade, or even avoid, tax. This may be accentuated 
partly by the small size of the Baltic states, and also by their relative lack 
of capacity in tax collection, being the only New EU Members to have 
emerged from the USSR itself. Lastly, we should not ignore the influence 
of the special interest of high-income individuals. These form small 
enough groups in the Baltic states to be able to lobby governments effect-
ively against any increases in their tax rates. 
In contrast, the country with the most progressive income tax rates, and 
the largest range in its tax rates on non-exempt income, is Slovenia. This is 
also a small country, although within the size range of the Baltic states; 
hence, size does not appear to have been a crucial factor easing tax 
evasion and avoidance here. This suggests that neighbors may also be 
important here; Slovenia borders relatively high tax states, such as Croatia 
Main tax policy issues 49 
and Italy, whereas the Baltic states neighbor Russia, with its flat 13 percent 
income tax rate. However, we might also expect the arguments about the 
Baltic states to apply in reverse to Slovenia. Slovenia has, perhaps, a more 
stable social structure than the Baltic states, Slovenians may be more real-
istic about their chances to change their position in society, Slovenians 
may expect less positive externalities from entrepreneurs (possibly due to 
greater integration with other EU states), and may have more confidence 
in the tax authority's ability to impose high tax rates on them. Lastly 
there may be a more disperse group of high income earners in Slovenia 
and political institutions may be more adept at resisting interest group 
pressure. 
Corporate income tax 
It is well known that the role of corporate income tax, or profit tax, in the 
tax system has been controversial, at least since the development of Mus-
gravian public finance, and this controversy has been played out graphi-
cally in the New EU Member states. We may recall that orthodox public 
finance theory criticizes the profit tax as a cause of the double taxation of 
dividends. This, it is often argued, compounds the injustice of taxing 
investment from income that has already been taxed, resulting in a triple 
taxation of such funds, before they are even spent. Furthermore, econo-
mists argue that the fiction of taxation of a 'legal person' only serves to 
hide the true burden of the tax on real persons. As we have already seen, 
Latvia and Slovakia have prevented the double taxation of dividends by 
making dividends tax exempt. Estonia took another course, abolishing the 
corporate income tax from the beginning of 2000 and taxing only profits 
distributed abroad, while leaving domestic dividends taxed at the same 
rate as ordinary income. This has, however, brought Estonia into conflict 
with the European Commission, since it implies prejudicial tax treatment 
of dividends paid to non-Estonian versus Estonian corporate shareholders. 
Arguments in favor of taxation of corporations can be divided into the 
income measurement dilemma and the practical. The income measure-
ment dilemma is that the retained profits of a corporation may give real 
benefit to its owners even if never distributed and the shares are never 
sold. Shareholders gain financial security and economic and social power 
through the increased strength of their company. Hence the only way to 
tax this real benefit would be at the corporate level. The practical argu-
ment is that, even in advanced EU members, Finance Ministries believe 
that without the corporate income tax the scope for avoidance and evasion 
of personal income tax and social security payments would be significantly 
higher, since the incentive for corporations to show employment expenses 
would vanish. With corporations no longer required to declare their 
expenditures, evasion would become significantly tougher for the authori-
ties to prevent, possibly leading to a weakening of the personal income tax 
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and social security system. In particular, if persons who incorporated 
themselves ( e.g. doctors and lawyers) faced no profit tax, they would find 
it much easier to hide personal income from the tax authorities. Hence, we 
observe continued corporate income tax rates of up to 31 percent in the 
Czech Republic. Note that even at that rate the incentive to hide employ-
ment expenditure still exists; it is more financially advantageous to pay 31 
percent on retained earnings than even the lowest 15 percent income tax 
rate on wages, due to the 35 percent social security tax on wage income in 
that country. This pattern is repeated everywhere so profit tax is only a 
partial offset to the cost of honestly declaring wages. 
While the income measurement dilemma is of a more normative nature, 
it is potentially useful to ask whether the Estonian experiment in elimin-
ating the corporate income tax for domestic investors has led to the 
damage to personal income tax collections predicted by the practical argu-
ment. While recent data on personal income tax revenue are not readily 
available for Estonia, the overall level appears to have held steady at 
about 8.5 percent of GDP from 1999 to 2002, despite a dip of about a per-
centage in the initial two years of reform.14 
We know that there is a third, more fundamental, argument in favor of 
taxes on profit, however. A truly uniform tax system must not discriminate 
against labor income. However, labor income can also be interpreted as a 
return on investment in human capital. Much of that investment may not 
be financial but an investment of effort, for example while undergoing 
schooling. Hence, to completely remove taxation of income from financial 
investments while retaining it on investments in human capital would 
create a bias. It would mean that persons would have an artificial incentive 
to pay more attention to studying the stock market than to studying more 
traditional subjects that create real productivity. From a truly orthodox 
economic perspective there is no reason to tax returns on an investment of 
saved financial resources any differently from an equivalent return on an 
investment of leisure time. 
The forgoing looks only at static welfare considerations, however. 
States have often felt that there are dynamic benefits from encouraging 
economic agents to shift to profit seeking activities rather than labor. An 
individual is likely to be more dynamic and flexible when involved directly 
in profit seeking activities than when working for labor income. This may 
spill over to faster growth in GDP for the state as a whole. In addition, 
since individuals are risk averse, while the state can afford to be risk 
neutral with regard to a particular investment, there may be good reasons 
to expect under-investment in more risky activities by individuals. The 
state can reduce taxation of profit to increase efficiency in both cases. How 
much optimal profit tax would then differ from tax on labor income would 
then vary from country to country depending on the types of profit seeking 
activities likely to be encouraged, the varieties of labor likely to be dis-
couraged and their relative dynamism in the economy in question. Gener-
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ally, we might expect that the optimal differentiation between labor 
income tax and profit tax would be negatively correlated with the flexibil-
ity of the labor market and institutional hindrances to business in the 
economy. However, flexibility of the labor market also improves the busi-
ness conditions for entrepreneurs and thus the overall effect of this factor 
might be relatively weak. 
Comparing the ratio of disposable income from profit and from wages 
across the New Member states we find labor taxed relatively the most in 
Poland, Latvia and Hungary.15 If we include social contributions and look 
at the ratios of disposable income, the greatest disincentive to sell labor is 
in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary (see Table 2.5). The countries with the 
most even-handed treatment of dividends and labor income are the Czech 
Republic and Estonia. We may compare these data with the data from the 
Heritage Foundation on which countries have the greatest economic 
freedom, and thus the best conditions for entrepreneurial dynamism.16 The 
Heritage Foundation data show starkly that Estonia is much more 
economically free than the other New Member states. Hence it is 
surprising that Estonia is one of the countries with the least tax incentive 
to switch from labor to profit seeking. This appearance may be illusory, 
however, since in Estonia investors may defer taxation by retaining earn-
ings within the company, providing a greater tax bias against labor than is 
apparent from the tax rates alone. Conversely, Slovenia and Poland are 
estimated to be the countries with the least favorable business conditions. 
Hence it is surprising to see that Poland has the largest tax incentive to 
switch towards entrepreneurship. Slovenia has a middle-sized tax incentive 
against labor, again contradicting the expectation that such incentives are 
less useful in countries with less supportive business environments. 
Overall, then, the pattern is mixed with good reason to suppose that busi-
ness lobbying that is not in step with the public interest drives some coun-
tries' reductions in profit tax. 
There is also a question of international competition to lower corporate 
Table 2.5 Disposable income of shareholders versus wage earners from equal total 
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taxation. Some countries may be tempted to attract foreign investment by 
imposing a relatively low rate of tax on profit.17 It is often argued that 
foreign direct investment has positive dynamic externalities for the 
economy by accelerating the introduction of more efficient management. 
Profits repatriated by foreign investors in Estonia are subject to a 26 
percent tax, thus this small Baltic state cannot be accused of using the 
repeal of the profit tax to compete aggressively for foreign investment. 
This criticism could more logically be aimed at Latvia, Lithuania and 
Hungary, all of which have taxed profits at less than 20 percent for some 
time. There is some evidence that these low tax rates are having knock-on 
effects throughout the region. In 2004, there have been dramatic reduc-
tions in the profit tax rates in Poland and Slovakia, combined with a 
further easing in Latvia and Hungary. Whether these rates are moving 
below what would be optimal is difficult to say definitively, given the 
previous arguments justifying the presence itself of a corporate tax. The 
most extreme case is Poland, where profit seekers keep a 67 percent larger 
proportion of their earnings than is kept by top-income-tax-bracket indi-
viduals dependent on wages. 
Value Added Tax and excises 
It is worthwhile recalling that value added taxes, like income taxes, were 
originally seen as a way to tax total GDP. Rather than tracing income, 
VAT uses the value added at each stage of production as the tax basis. 
Hence it is revealing to compare the success of VAT in raising revenue 
with that of the income tax. This comparison is less precise in countries 
with multiple income tax rates. Moreover, the exemptions and deductions 
of the income tax and the exemptions of the VAT mean that the tax bases 
are not the same. However, from the orthodox economic perspective, all 
these differences are sources of inefficiency and not necessarily less perni-
cious than evasion of taxes. Hence it is still of interest to compare the effi-
cacy of these two taxes in terms of revenue raised. Table 2.6 makes this 
comparison. To take the example of Lithuania, in 2000 its personal income 
tax and VAT each raised 7.6 percent of GDP despite the fact that the 
basic income tax rate was 33 percent while the VAT rate was only 18 
percent. Hence, the average efficacy of a percentage of VAT was almost 
double that of a percentage of income tax. Any deviation of either of those 
taxes from a comprehensive tax on GDP is a source of inefficiency accord-
ing to economic theory, whether that deviation results from legal or illegal 
activity. So this very raw number provides a strong argument in favor of 
shifting the balance of taxation from the personal income tax towards the 
value added tax in that country. In Hungary, by contrast, a significantly 
higher rate of VAT did not result in proportionately higher revenue and 
hence was not as demonstrably more efficacious than its multiple-rate per-
sonal income tax. 
Table 2.6 Rates of PIT and VAT compared with their revenue as a percentage of GDP in selected New Members in 2000 
Country PIT rates PIT revenue PIT efficacy VAT rate VAT revenue VAT efficacy VAT/PIT efficacy ratio 
Czech Republic• 10.0-40.0 5.2 0.13-0.52 22.0 7.6 0.35 0.6--2.7 
Latvia 25.0 6.0 0.24 18.0 7.8 0.43 1.8 
Estonia 26.0 7.7 0.30 18.0 9.5 0.53 1.8 
Hungary" 20.0-40.0 7.0 0.18-0.35 25.0 8.6 0.34 1.0-1.9 
Lithuania 33.0 (15.0) 7.6 0.23 (0.51) 18.0 7.6 0.42 1.8 (0.8) 
Poland• 21.0-40.0 5.5 0.14-0.26 22.0 8.0 0.36 1.4-2.6 
Slovakia• 17.0-42.0 5.2 0.12-0.31 23.0 7.6 0.33 1.1-2.8 
Slovenia• 17.0-50.0 6.4 0.13-0.38 20.0 15.4 0.77 2.0-5.9 
Sources: Yakimova (2002); Mitra and Stern (2003); country chapters of the book. 
Note 
a 1999-2000 average. 
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Perhaps a more robust comparison is to compare the success of VAT 
across countries. Here we see that the VAT efficacy, which is equivalent to 
the ratio of the VAT tax base to GDP, ranged from 33 percent in Slovakia 
to 77 percent in Slovenia. Slovenia stands out as a success story here, and 
underlines the room for other New Member states to improve. But it is 
interesting to note that the other more advanced countries in the group, 
the Visegrad countries, do not do well and are superseded by the Baltic 
states. Hence we may ask, why does Estonia do so well at collecting VAT 
and why does Hungary do so badly? One drawback of this simple 
approach is that it ignores the underestimation of GDP that results from 
tax evasion. Hence the Baltic states may appear to have higher VAT effi-
cacy than the Visegrad countries only because the latter have done a 
better job at measuring GDP. 
Excise taxation is an area of some controversy as the New Member 
states integrate into the European Union. During the accession negotia-
tions the European Commission felt that the low excise duties in many 
accession states threatened the taxes of existing member states and 
demanded increases. This was clearly going to be politically unpopular in 
the accession states. Their governments' dilemma was increased by the 
fact that excise taxes had proved to be the most easily evaded and hardest 
to implement. In countries that border Belarus or the countries of former 
Yugoslavia, the opportunity for smuggling cigarettes, alcohol and petrol 
was high. Hence New Member states negotiated transition periods of up to 
10 years, during which they would gradually increase excise duties to EU 
norms, while trying to clamp down on smuggling and evasion. Such excises 
can increase the efficiency of the taxation system by taxing goods with 
relatively low price elasticities of demand and negative externalities. 
However, a jump in taxation that leads to expansion of evasion will only 
serve to weaken the taxation system, along with other social institutions. 
Social security contributions 
As is well known, governments have long decided that some benefits 
should be allocated to individuals based on their tax history. Certain bene-
fits would be conditional on the individual having paid taxes over a 
minimum period, others would also vary according to the amount of taxes 
paid. Governments started using this approach with regard to pension 
benefits, and have gradually extended it to other areas. Hence, the govern-
ment provided a type of collective insurance of individuals against the 
'risk' of reaching old age and viewed this differently to other benefits. 
There was a distinction between welfare 'Beveridgean' payments to 
ensure the elderly a minimum standard of living and 'Bismarkian' pension 
benefits based on how much an individual had paid in during their working 
years. Hence taxes paid for social security became viewed differently to 
other taxes that had no effect on the individual's eligibility for benefits. 
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This system raises a number of interesting questions that it is worth-
while to recall here, because they have been answered in different ways by 
the New Member states. The first question might be what is the govern-
ment's role in providing these benefits? If individual benefits depend on 
individual premiums, why can't the private insurance market efficiently 
serve this demand? One answer to this for risk-averse individuals is that 
collective provision allows for more comprehensive risk pooling. Private 
insurance will seek to discriminate among individuals based on their riski-
ness, and individuals themselves will self-select insurance pools based on 
their knowledge of their own riskiness. To avoid the uncertainty generated 
by lack of knowledge of their future risk level, individuals rationally 
decide to organize the insurance collectively without heed to individual 
characteristics that affect risk. The collective has no incentive to discrimi-
nate, which private insurance companies would have even if they were 
legally forbidden from doing so. Another argument in favor of the collect-
ive provision of pensions is that it gives a benefit to middle-class voters, 
hence strengthening support for collective benefits that would otherwise 
go only to the poor. This may increase social welfare due to the diminish-
ing marginal utility of income. 
While the forgoing arguments seem to continue to garner support as a 
basis for social security systems, there is another that appears less widely 
respected, particularly in several of the New Member states. Individuals 
saving for their retirement are initially considering investments of 30 years 
or longer. This is a long enough period to see through several cycles of 
financial markets but not necessarily all. In the financial history of the 
twentieth century there have been 30-year periods during which stock 
market indices were lower at the end than at the beginning. Individual 
investors face even more risk in practice since their investment portfolios 
are unlikely to mirror stock market indices precisely. Hence, even over 
these relatively long periods, considerable financial risk remains for an indi-
vidual. Collective provision of social security is a way to remove this risk. 
However, in a number of New Member states the financial risk has 
been returned to the individual through implementation of the 'three 
pillar' pension system. This leaves in place a reduced basic pension based 
on pay-as-you-go contributions of current workers, but diverts some social 
security taxes to investment in individual accounts with returns dependent 
on the success of the fund the taxpayer decides to invest in. The third 
pillar then consists of favorable tax treatment of any additional non-
mandatory investments the individual makes to these funds. The states 
that have implemented the three-pillar pension system include Hungary, 
Poland and the Baltic states (Lithuania significantly later and more cau-
tiously than the other two), and most recently, Slovakia. Interestingly, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia have resisted such moves, perhaps demon-
strating the greater credulity of the populations of these more capitalism 
savvy nations to the vagaries of financial markets. 
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Another element of the experience of several New EU Member states 
has been the expansion of the public insurance principle to other benefits. 
It is perhaps natural that workers' accident compensation is related to 
their income at work and a similar case can be made for maternity leave 
and disability benefits. The level of social contributions tax rates depends 
on the generosity of the benefits relative to average wages and the depend-
ency ratio of benefit recipients to taxpayers. It ranges from 26 percent of 
the total cost of employment in Latvia to 38 percent in Hungary. The high 
rate of social security tax in Hungary is partly governed by its low labor 
force participation rate, less than 60 percent until 2000 compared with 
over three quarters in Latvia. Social contributions are a larger proportion 
of the total cost of employment than the personal income tax in all New 
Member states, e.g. 38 percent versus a maximum of 24 percent, respec-
tively, in Hungary. Thus, it is often social contributions that are primarily 
blamed for creating incentives for businesses to hide wage payments. 
Continuing the Hungarian example, it is preferable to pay 16 percent 
profit tax on a sum than show it as expenditure on employment and pay a 
minimum of 50 percent of it in tax, consisting of 38 percent social contribu-
tions and a minimum of 12 percent personal income tax. 
As mentioned above, many analysts have traditionally not considered 
social contributions as taxes because they provide a direct benefit to the 
individual payer. However, we must recognize that social contributions are 
still involuntary levies collected by the state, and that many of their bene-
fits may not be of practical use. In traditional pay-as-you-go pension 
systems, the contributions of workers made no difference to their benefits 
at the margin unless they were in their last ten years of employment. In 
the three pillar systems that have swept the region, many contributors 
might well heavily discount their expected returns based on the greater 
financial risk. Higher income individuals, especially, are likely to find state 
pension schemes, particularly in the relatively poor New Member states, 
inadequate and prefer private insurance for disability, unemployment and 
pensions. All individuals in these relatively unstable societies are likely to 
assign low probabilities to welfare benefits being available for them when 
needed. Hence, for a successful entrepreneur in the New Member states, 
who is likely to be young and have high income, social contributions pay-
ments may represent a true tax in the sense that they provide little 
expected benefit. 
Notes 
1 The authors thank R. Puglisi for careful reading and suggestions in a number of 
areas. 
2 The PPP per capita income is evaluated at about US$9350 for CSB countries, 
$3850 for CIS countries, and $26,200 for high-income OECD countries. A 
wider picture about the decline of government size in transition economies may 
be found in Gupta et al. (2001). 
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3 Burgess and Stern (1993) show a similar estimated relationship for the ratio of 
taxes to GDP. Here also total explained variability is quite low (R2 = 0.03); the 
constant term value is high; the coefficient associated with (log of) pro-capita 
income is higher than one and statistically significant at 5 percent. However this 
means that the countries' scatter plot is very dispersed, that public goods are 
superior goods, but the percentage average (not marginal) increase of expendi-
tures or taxes/GDP ratio is less than for per-capita income, within any observed 
range. Also Gupta et al. (2001) give about the same results, for 148 countries, 
considering the period 1970-98. 
4 The exception is Slovenia, whose per capita income reaches a value 
(>US$6000 per year) commonly ascribed to high-income countries. 
5 The average value of the structural reform index for New Members is about 50 
percent over the corresponding average of the other post-communist European 
and ex-USSR states. Corruption ranking performs more than twice better on 
average with respect to the same sample of other countries, the only worse 
exception being Latvia and Lithuania (in fact ex-USSR republics), but not 
Estonia. 
6 A large number of such analyses were performed during the last 30 years. The 
emerging relationship between the level of taxes and public spending and 
GDP's rate of growth, all in all was found weak and unstable. It turned out that 
crucial control variables are the stage of a single country's development (if in 
the catching up phase or not) and the share of old people in the total popu-
lation. 
7 This holds true for labor market models, and for both exogenous and endoge-
nous growth models. 
8 See later in this chapter for a discussion concerning the alternative of public 
PA YG or of partially private funding pension schemes. 
9 A similar suggestion might be found also in Burgess and Stern (1993) both for 
developing and transition countries. 
10 Here we may anticipate that labor income generally is more heavily taxed 
(including social contributions) than saving vehicles. This is also a specific case 
of equity-efficiency trade-off. 
11 This task should be accomplished through a large recourse to presumptive and 
minimum taxes (Tanzi 1994). 
12 Notice however that VAT outperforms PIT as 'productive' efficiency in almost 
all New Members. 
13 This argument is based on the idea that it is the state that guarantees the insti-
tutions of private property that give rise to the current distribution of income. 
14 See Chandler et al. (2002) and Research Center of the Institute for Privatiza-
tion and Management (2003). 
15 These comparisons are based on the top rates of labor income taxation. 
16 Miles et al. (2004). 
17 This issue is discussed at length elsewhere in this book. 
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3 The political economy of taxation 
and tax reforms 
Paola Profeta1 
3.1 Introduction 
Political economy arguments are at the centre of the debate on the trans-
ition process from communist to market economies that took place in 
most EU New Members. They have been used to explain or justify 
many aspects of the transition, to characterize the different performances 
across transition countries, and to discuss the strategies of the economic 
reforms. 
In this chapter, I will focus on the main political economy arguments 
related to the issue of taxation in New EU Members countries. I will 
analyze how political economy arguments can explain and justify many 
aspects of tax systems and tax reforms in New EU Members (as described 
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this book), how they can explain some differences 
across transition countries, and what is their role in shaping tax reforms. 
From a tax policy perspective, new and more efficient instruments of 
taxation were introduced with the transition (for instance, VAT) while the 
major existing problems concern how to raise revenues, the definition of 
the role of government and the relation between levels of government, tax 
administration and taxation of small enterprises, a closer harmonization 
with EU tax systems. A general problem concerns the definition of a fiscal 
institution, including tax administration, which represents an endogenous 
outcome, since institutions are a product of the transition process. I will 
focus on these issues and provide a political economy perspective. 
Political economy arguments are at the centre of both the positive and 
the normative sides of the analysis of the political economy of transition 
reforms. The normative side focuses on the political constraints faced by 
the reformers. There exist ex ante constraints related to the conditions for 
a reform to be feasible and accepted - and ex post ones, related to the con-
ditions for a reform to be maintained and not reversed after its implemen-
tation and after the outcome is observed. The positive side focuses on the 
action of special interest rent seeking groups, which, depending on the 
economic, social and political initial conditions of reforms, have a different 
impact on the reform process. There is also a wide debate about the polit-
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ical economy desirability of big bang/shocking reforms versus gradualist 
reforms. I will analyze these issues in the context of tax reforms. 
This line of analysis belongs to the political economics literature, a more 
general and fundamental field of economic research, based on the inter-
play between economic problems and their political determinants (see 
Persson and Tabellini 2000). The political economy of transition has been 
largely studied by Roland (2001, 2002). The political economy of taxation 
has been previously studied by Hettich and Winer (1999) and Profeta 
(2004). While many suggestions can be derived from studies of various 
authors, especially at the World Bank and the IMP, there is not a compre-
hensive analysis of the political economy of taxation focusing on New EU 
Members countries. 
This chapter is organized as follows: first it examines issues on the polit-
ical economy of tax systems in New Members countries. Second, it ana-
lyzes tax reforms in New Members countries, from both a positive and a 
normative side. This is followed by a conclusion. 
3.2 Issues on the political economy of tax systems in New 
EU Members 
This section starts with some information on the politics of the New EU 
Members analyzed in this book. Then, it addresses, from a political 
economy view, some of the main problems faced by these countries: how 
to raise revenues, to redefine the role of government and of different 
levels of government, to build a new fiscal institution, to administer taxes 
and to tax small enterprises. 
Some/acts 
It is useful to start with some information on the political systems in the 
New EU Members. This section shows that these countries are character-
ized by a general political instability, measured at different levels. 
All these countries have opted for a parliamentary regime, the main 
form of government in Western Europe. Roland (2002) shows that 
Hungary and Slovenia have been very stable, with an average time 
between elections respectively of 48 and 47 months, while this time has 
been 32 months in the Czech Republic, 36 in Estonia and 36.5 in Poland. 
Average government duration has, however, been low (18.2 in the Czech 
Republic, 12.9 in Estonia, 17.9 in Poland, 23.3 in Slovenia) with the excep-
tion of Hungary ( 48). Government duration between the two most recent 
elections has, in general, been longer (24 in Poland and Slovenia, 48 in 
Hungary) with the exception of the Czech Republic (12) and Estonia (12), 
reflecting political tensions or instability. The average number of parties in 
government ranges from 2.2 in Estonia to 2.7 in Hungary, 3 in Slovenia, 
3.2 in the Czech Republic and 3.4 in Poland, with a high percentage of 
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right-wing parties in government. There is a huge variation in the re-
election of incumbents: 50 and 100 percent of re-elected governments 
respectively in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, while zero in the other 
three considered countries. 
How to raise revenues 
Pre-transition countries were characterized by three major sources of taxa-
tion: turnover taxes, enterprise taxes and payroll taxes. The taxation of 
resources and indirect subsidies were implicit in the state allocation of 
under-priced resources. During the transition, corporate income taxes fall, 
due to the loss of revenues from profits of publicly owned enterprises 
under the price liberalization, the diffusion of tax exemptions and tax 
arrears, and the use of harder budget constraints. This led to a decrease of 
the importance of income taxes, although personal income taxes 
increased, and a general decrease of tax revenue as percentage of GDP. 
At the same time, indirect taxes (VAT, sales, turnover taxes and excises) 
increased in their importance. As a general trend, the evolution of the 
share of tax revenue to GDP and the share of major taxes on GDP in 
transition countries appears to be U-shaped, reflecting both the loss of 
traditional profit, turnover and payroll tax revenues and the difficulties in 
tax administration (Mitra and Stern 2003). 
The transition implies a movement from a system where the govern-
ment decided first, before citizens had access to the resources of the 
economy, to one with a reduced role of the public sector, where the 
government needs to collect revenues before spending. This means that 
New EU Members countries need to build a fiscal system based on new 
and more efficient instruments of taxation, for instance by increasing the 
share of direct taxes, personal income taxes, with respect to the share of 
revenue from domestic indirect taxes. However, the way in which rev-
enues can be raised represents a major problem. This is an issue where 
political factors interplay with economics arguments to design the current 
status of the fiscal systems. To raise revenues, i.e. to collect taxes, a polit-
ical will is necessary, which is based on the support of citizens as voters 
(Burgess and Stern 1993). However, to agree on policy decisions aimed at 
changing the composition of revenues, people need to believe and trust 
the efficacy and the fairness of the system. In absence of this belief, people 
may choose not to support the policy, or not to pay. Thus, an adequate tax 
administration is necessary to guarantee an efficient extraction of 
resources. How the political system affects the ability to extract resources 
is a crucial issue. These countries risk being stuck between the need of 
increasing revenues, the weakness of tax administration and the political 
difficulties of changing the status of tax policy in the absence of public 
positive beliefs in the system. 
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The role of government 
A related issue concerns the new role of government in New EU Members 
countries. 
Data from Gupta et al. (2001) show that, on average, government 
spending as a percentage of GDP in New EU Members countries has 
declined since the early 1990s. As a consequence, these governments are 
smaller than those in Western European countries (Tanzi and Schuknecht 
1997). However, this reduction in government spending does not necessar-
ily imply a reduction of the role of government, but rather represents the 
answer of the government to its limited revenue-raising capacity and a 
shift of resources across different uses and functions. As explained before, 
in the new system, the government needs to collect revenues before spend-
ing. This revenue constraint is affected by the economic development of 
the country and the level of its tax administration. After being taken, the 
decisions over spending plans are difficult to change, especially if they 
concern expenditures involving long-term commitment and a large 
number of beneficiaries (such as pensions, health, public unemployment). 
Since New Members countries have, in some cases, economic conditions 
(per capita income and economic structure) closer to developing countries 
than to industrial countries (see Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000), we expect that 
in these countries taxes cannot stay as high as their current levels and they 
will start to fall. As a consequence, governments need to be realistic when 
committing to expenditure programs, by reducing their programmed levels 
accordingly. However, Gupta et al. (2001) find that this reduction of 
government spending has not been sufficient in many New EU Members 
countries, where the level of government spending still remains quite high, 
owing to rising indebtedness, a heavy regulatory burden and the preva-
lence of non-cash transactions. At the same time, this reduction of govern-
ment spending has not been appropriate: governments in many New EU 
Members have now to provide services, such as kindergartens, health care 
centres and housing, that were previously the responsibility of the state-
owned enterprises, and they have to provide subsidies to meet social needs 
for groups negatively affected by economic reforms. As a consequence, an 
appropriate definition of the role of the new governments is still needed. 
In this respect, political economy determinants should be taken into 
account (Alesina and Perotti 1995): political economy constraints to 
reform, vested interests, preferences of regional groups, a strong tax 
administration and control are all elements that may affect the size and 
scope of governments. 
Moreover, the role of government depends on the relations between 
the executive and the legislative branches of government. The political 
process that generates the legislature and creates the executive branch of 
government has an impact on this outcome. It is essential that the execu-
tive and the legislative branches have close views and that they are 
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working under common, clear and well-defined rules, strategies and 
objectives, to contrast possible pressures by powerful political groups or 
figures in the legislative or the executive branch, aimed at reducing the tax 
liabilities of specific taxpayers or protecting tax arrears. 
These difficulties may explain why some governments are more effective 
than others in the transition process. According to the EBRD Transition 
Report 1998 among our countries, central and eastern European countries, 
such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, have been 
more successful in the transition, followed by Estonia and the Baltics. 
The success of the transition process in the fiscal area also depends on 
both the allocation of fiscal responsibilities among the different levels of 
government and on the creation of well-working fiscal institutions. Both 
these issues have a political economy component, as I will show in the next 
two sections. 
Levels of government 
The definition of the role of government in fiscal issues implies the defini-
tion of the fiscal responsibilities of the subnational and national govern-
ments. This has to be done through clear and precise rules. In the absence 
of these rules, political interests can intervene, on top of economic consid-
erations. The assignment of revenue is related to the assignment of expen-
ditures: apart from the transfers they receive from the central government, 
subnational governments need adequate resources to pay the expenditures 
under their responsibilities, and they have to be forced to respect their 
budgets. In New Members countries it is often the case that fiscal arrange-
ments between national and subnational governments are vague and local 
governments can act without control. 
During the transition, several expenditure responsibilities ( education, 
health and social welfare) are assigned to subnational governments, but 
without a clear definition of the basis for expenditure and revenue assign-
ments. Revenue assignments and taxing powers were often maintained at 
national levels, with an inadequate system of intergovernmental transfers. 
This has led to intergovernmental fiscal imbalances, low efficiency of 
public services, and has limited the potential benefits from decentraliza-
tion. Moreover, this has left a large space for discretionary fiscal behavior, 
including bargaining among the different levels of government and 
between the budget entities and their suppliers (such as utility companies) 
at the subnational level. 
The main challenge for the leading reform countries, such as the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, is the definition of government responsibilities at 
the local level, including details over revenue and expenditure assign-
ments. In these countries the role of intermediate levels of government is 
now relatively clear, but the role of the local governments is still problem-
atic, with problems of fragmented or inefficient service delivery. Local 
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governments need greater accountability, to collect their own sources of 
revenue and decide with greater autonomy over them. 
A second challenge is represented by establishing clear, transparent and 
stable rules for transfer systems, which would avoid the process of negotia-
tion based on political interests. 
Finally, local governments should be monitored and their borrowing 
should be limited. Information and the capacity of subnational govern-
ments in public expenditure and debt management are necessary. 
Fiscal institutions and tax administration 
Fiscal institutions are necessary to have a successful transition of the fiscal 
system. 
In the pre-transition period, taxes were mainly collected on the basis of 
negotiations between the enterprises and the government. There were no 
precise rules, codified tax law, well-defined tax bases and tax rates. As 
there were no explicit taxes, most individuals had no direct contacts with 
the tax authorities and they did not even know how much they were actu-
ally paying. 
The transition made it necessary radically to change the tax system. The 
elimination of the planned economies implied that the government could 
not directly control quantities and prices to be taxed, and had to rely on 
tax declarations, which were not always correct due to large tax evasion. 
The main sources of revenues, such as tax on state enterprises, disap-
peared, while the number of new potential taxpayers largely increased due 
to the birth of private sector activities. In addition, corruption and bribes 
increased. 
All these changes called for a radical reform of the tax system (Tanzi 
and Tsibouris 2000). A totally new, transparent tax system was necessary 
and new fiscal institutions were required. These new fiscal institutions, 
such as the tax administration, were essential to allow a correct function-
ing of the new tax system. Radical reform means that not only do the new 
fiscal institutions have to introduce new instruments of taxation, a trans-
parent fiscal system, and a well-working tax administration, but also that 
they have to correct attitudes, incentives and relations. In particular, the 
new fiscal institutions have to strengthen enforcement and at the same 
time develop the taxpayer education and improve compliance. This means 
that taxpayers have to be informed about the need to pay taxes, and to be 
assisted in paying them, through the simplification of procedures. 
However, these institutions had numerous difficulties. They were 
created lacking financial resources, specialized skills and technical know-
ledge and with no clear definition of strategies and objectives under a 
defined legal system. Moreover, it has to be stressed that political 
economy issues played a twofold important role in this respect. In fact, on 
one side, political interference by powerful groups in politics and 
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economics posed an additional constraint to the activities of the newborn 
fiscal institutions, especially for the tax administration. On the other side, 
these institutions were created arbitrarily, rather than through a structured 
political process, and thus, owing to their lack of authority, they were even 
more exposed to these political interferences. 
Tax administration in transition countries is highly politicized. Wide-
spread tax exemptions, deferrals and arrears indicate that the tax system is 
politicized, firms bargain with the state to obtain tax concessions and so 
on. As a result, tax compliance is low and tax avoidance is high. An inter-
esting study by Schaffer and Turley (2000) measures the effective tax 
administration in transition economies, by calculating the ratio between 
effective and statutory tax rates for 25 transition countries. This ratio is 
calculated for three taxes paid by the firm: corporate income tax (CIT), 
value added tax (VAT) and social security tax (SST). Huge differences 
between effective and statutory tax rates indicate tax compliance and col-
lection problems. The authors find that, due to the greater politicization of 
the tax system, the shortfalls in effective tax yields in transition economies 
(calculated on 1997 data) are larger than a benchmark for mature 
economies (the 1996 average of the EU-15 countries) where tax systems 
are well established, the administrative capacity is stronger and tax arrears 
are tolerated less frequently. However, the leading transition countries 
(Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states) 
have effective/statutory tax-rate ratios similar to the EU average. Focusing 
on the countries analyzed in this book, for VAT, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary have an effective/statutory tax ratio of 0.40, Poland of 0.46 and 
Estonia of 0.68, while the EU-15 mean is 0.45. For SST, Poland shows a 
value of 0.76 followed by Hungary with 0.80, Estonia with 0.83, the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia with 0.94, while the EU-15 mean is 0.88. Finally, for 
CIT, Slovenia shows a value of 0.15, Poland of 0.20, Estonia of 0.22, the 
Czech Republic of 0.23, Hungary of 0.26, while the EU-15 mean is 0.24. 
This result contrasts with the values obtained for other transition countries 
largely behind in the transition process, which show lower values of the 
ratio of effective/statutory rates. In fact, the authors find that progress in 
transition, measured by an EBRD transition indicator, is positively corre-
lated with effective tax administration. The authors also find that countries 
with larger bribes have less effective tax administration, owing to a highly 
politicized tax administration. In transition economies, it is not uncommon 
for firms to pay bribes to government officials in return for tax concessions 
and various favors. Obviously, the amount of these payments does not 
appear in government fiscal accounts. Interestingly, the EBRD (1999) and 
the World Bank construct a measure of the extent to which firms pay 
bribes to government officials: the average bribe tax in our analyzed trans-
ition countries ranges from 2.5 in Poland, to 2.8 in Estonia, 3.4 in Slovenia, 
3.5 in Hungary and 4.5 in the Czech Republic. Again, these leading trans-
ition countries perform better than the other transition countries. 
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As stressed by Mitra and Stem (2003), this politicization of the tax 
administration should be avoided. Political will plays an essential role in 
the administration of tax policy at two different levels: (i) to support the 
hardening budget constraints and (ii) as a commitment to simplify proce-
dures and tax regimes and to create an attractive investment climate. 
However, this does not imply that tax administration should be used for 
political ends, such as enforcing tax discipline on large taxpayers. 
Taxation of small enterprises 
A crucial issue in tax systems of New EU Members countries is the treat-
ment of small enterprises. In this specific field, we find many issues have 
already been discussed regarding the weakness of tax administration, and 
its political determinants. 
Small enterprises are a key sector in promoting growth and employ-
ment in transition countries. Mitra and Stern (2003) find a positive correla-
tion between the number of small firms and the level of development of 
the country. A major challenge for governments of New EU Members is 
to create an attractive and competitive investment climate, which would 
give incentives to the activities of restructured and new enterprises. This 
challenge requires a clear political strategy. This strategy includes reducing 
excessively high tax rates for small firms, simplifying regulatory proce-
dures and tax administration for small firms and eliminating tax exemp-
tions that benefit powerful special interests. All these measures would 
encourage compliance by small firms. A study by the EBRD (1999) finds 
that taxes and regulations are among the more important obstacles to the 
development of new enterprises in transition countries. Among the New 
EU Members, Poland and Hungary have less complex systems of tax on 
business. However, tax incentives for new enterprises are currently almost 
zero in all countries, because of harmonization with the EU systems. 
3.3 Issues on the political economy of tax reforms in New 
EU Members countries 
This section addresses general issues of the political economy of transition 
reforms, from a normative and a positive side. 
The normative side: political constraints 
The normative side focuses on the political constraints faced by the 
reformers. 
Following Roland (2002), these political constraints can be of two 
types: (i) feasibility constraints, also called ex ante political constraints, 
that can block decision-making and prevent reforms from being accepted, 
and (ii) ex post political constraints, that can reverse a reform after its 
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implementation. These two types of constraints are not the same in the 
presence of uncertainty and reversal costs. In reforming transition coun-
tries, aggregate ( concerning the economic effects of reform programs) and 
individual ( concerning the identity of the winners and losers of the 
reforms) uncertainty and reversal costs play a crucial role. The final output 
of the transition process is uncertain and the political constraints are dif-
ferent if this outcome will be a positive result, or at least an improvement 
with respect to the status quo, or if it will be a negative result, since in the 
latter people may want to reverse a reform. Uncertainty may imply that a 
majority will oppose a reform even though ex post it could have benefitted 
from the reforms (see Fernandez and Rodrik 1991). Reversal costs make it 
more difficult to start a reform. A sequence of politically feasible reforms 
is more difficult in the presence of uncertainty. In this case, gradualist 
reform packages have higher ex ante feasibility and higher ex post irre-
versibility of enacted reform than big-bang strategies, which involve high 
reversal costs (Dewatripont and Roland 1995). In fact, countries such as 
the ones analyzed in this book, which have followed a gradual reform 
process, by starting transition early, growing and then facing the prospect 
of entry into the European Union, have been more successful in the trans-
ition process. 
To relax the ex ante political constraints and start a reform under 
the status quo, it is necessary either to design a reform, which compensates 
the losers, and credibly commit to this design, or to make only a partial 
reform. Focusing on tax reforms, the design of a reform package, 
which includes compensating transfers, seems quite difficult. Compen-
sation by redistributive transfers would be feasible only if distortionary 
costs of collecting revenues were not very high and enforcement of tax 
collection were guaranteed, both conditions being quite far from the 
picture of the tax systems in New EU Members countries described in 
section 3.2. Such kinds of compensations also need the commitment of 
decision makers, whereas it is unlikely in these countries that the coalition 
in power today could commit to continuation of these policies by 
future coalitions. These difficulties may explain why partial reforms 
are more easily implemented, although they have the risk of creating 
rents for given groups that will be threatened by further reforms (see the 
following subsection), and thus create opposition to further reforms. 
The sequence of reforms is also important, since more popular reforms 
at the beginning may build support for further, initially less popular, 
reforms. 
Reforms supported by broader coalitions are more likely to be ex ante 
politically feasible. These reforms are also more likely to be ex post 
politically feasible, since if they are accepted by broader coalitions, they 
will be reversed with more difficulty. However, there may exist a trade-off 
between political constraints and graduality of reforms: if ex ante political 
constraints are less important, a less gradual reform may ensure more irre-
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versibility. Again, starting with more popular reforms is preferred, to 
avoid support for reform reversal. 
Roland (2001) argues that the political constraints to reform have been 
less strong in Central Europe than in other transition countries, such as 
the former Soviet Union. He argues that geopolitical factors play an 
important role: transition represents an opportunity for many countries, 
including the ones analyzed in this book, to shift from being a satellite 
country of the Soviet empire to being anchored to the European Union, 
adopting its political and economic system. People do not see this event 
as a traumatic experience, as for instance in Russia, but rather as a libera-
tion. Governments such as the Czech Republic's, Hungarian and Polish 
entered a 'transition tournament', trying to show they were the most 
advanced transition country, in order to attract investments. This created 
favorable political support for reforms, especially in the field of taxation, 
which are essential for the development of foreign investments and new 
enterprises. 
The positive side: the role of interest groups 
In New EU Members, politically powerful special interest groups and rent 
seeking play an important role in tax reforms (Roland 2002; Burgess and 
Stern 1993). The support of powerful lobbies may be essential to imple-
ment specific reforms, which would never be approved by the majority of 
people. In particular, owners of privatized enterprises, who represent a 
minority and are thus not likely to be pivotal in elections, may have incen-
tives to organize as a lobby and exert their economic and political power 
to obtain tax advantages for their firms, as happened in many cases (see 
section 3.2). 
New rich individuals benefit from many tax advantages and tax exemp-
tions. Corruption is strictly related to the action of these groups. 
It can be noticed that the action of powerful social networks, such as 
the Catholic Church and the Solidarity Trade Union in Poland, have been 
important in countering the Communist Party and in creating social 
support for the transition. In other countries, where these social networks 
did not exist, oligarchs and insiders emerged as a more powerful political 
and economic force. 
The question of rent seeking is also related to the distribution of wealth 
and power. The transition process increased inequality with political and 
economic consequences. The increase in inequality affected the political 
decision-making through different political channels, which go beyond the 
median voter theory, including the relative role of electoral politics and 
special interest politics, and the policy and political coalition formation 
process. A vicious circle emerges when a few rich individuals are politic-
ally powerful: they can influence reforms in their favor, which in turn 
creates persistence for their economic and political power. 
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3.4 Conclusions 
New EU Members are experiencing fundamental changes. Tax systems 
and tax reforms represent one of the major challenges that these countries 
have to face. In these countries, politics and economics strictly interact in 
all sectors of the society, including taxation. Many problematic issues of 
taxation and tax reforms in transition countries are related to political 
determinants, such as the definition of the role of government and the 
relation between levels of government, the definition of a fiscal institution, 
including tax administration and taxation of enterprises. In particular, tax 
policy improvements have been substantial, while tax administration 
remains weak and fragmented, hence representing a crucial constraint to 
revenue collection and to the general working of the tax system. Political 
economy factors are behind this lack of efficacy of the tax administration. 
Political constraints are fundamental both to start and implement tax 
reforms ( ex ante political constraints) and to maintain such reforms ( ex 
post political constraint). Majority voting models do not capture the essen-
tial elements of the political process to determine tax reforms in these 
countries, such as the action of the rent seeking interest groups and of the 
economically and politically powerful lobbies that emerged from the trans-
ition process. A natural extension of this chapter would be to compare 
more appropriate political economy models to analyze specific economic 
reforms in transition versus developed countries. I would expect that lob-
bying models perform better in the case of transition countries than the 
more common median voter models, especially in sectors such as taxation, 
characterized by a strong influence of powerful interest groups. 
Note 
1 Department of Public Economics, University of Pavia, Italy. E-mail: 
paola.profeta@unipv.it. 
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4 Fiscal policy in the accession 
countries 
Fedele de Novellis and Salvatore Parlato 
4.1 Introduction, contents and main conclusions 
The analysis of the future framework that will prevail in an enlarged 
Europe must encompass several aspects concerning the macroeconomic 
and public finance characteristics of the accession countries, their first best 
strategy in managing the transition towards the Union, and the weak 
points that emerge in the design of fiscal rules governing the EU 12 zone. 
Only by taking account of these elements is it possible to discuss and 
propose some guidelines for the design of new rules that fit the needs of a 
very heterogeneous and decentralized group of countries. 
Even though the accession countries do not represent a homogeneous 
group, it is still possible to remark on some aspects of their macroeco-
nomic structure. They are generally small and open economies, so that 
most of the shortcomings of financial and market liberalization apply to 
these countries, i.e. a critical exposure to financial and currency crises. 
With respect to this point, an optimal policy should avoid, at first glance, a 
prolonged transition time before the adoption of the euro. With respect to 
macroeconomic figures, the New Members countries show, and will show 
in the future, GDP growth and inflation rates higher (and more volatile in 
the past years) than those experienced in the early EU countries. This will 
happen both for catching-up and Balassa effects. Giving the hypothesis of 
a single monetary policy, a corollary to the previous assumption is that 
accession countries will benefit from low real interest rates. A non-sec-
ondary aspect in defining a fiscal rule concerns the public finance of these 
states, since they are generally low debt, high deficit and high capital 
expenditures countries. 
All these elements must be taken into account in the design of the 
optimal fiscal rule governing both the transition and the steady state 
phases of an enlarged Europe. Given the excessive output volatility shown 
in the past, fiscal rules based on output gap measures could be unfeasible 
or too weak as constraints in the short run, even if appropriate in the 
steady state hypothesis, when output volatility could be removed in the 
calculation of output gaps. Furthermore, rules based on debt sustainability 
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would not have an effective binding effect during the transition, since 
almost all countries will enter the EU with a very low starting debt-to-
GDP ratio. 
Therefore, the trade-off between a transition-focused and steady-state-
focused rule is evident. The softer the budget constraints in the transition, 
the higher the risk of weak sustainability in the long run. Then the fiscal 
rule should be coherent with the general macroeconomic strategy that will 
be adopted to manage the enlargement. If the enlargement is conducted 
with a strategy of long transition, then fiscal rules must be soft constraining 
to avoid financial turbulence to the accession countries, i.e. fiscal rules 
based on the debt concept should prevail. 
Conversely, a no-transition strategy would not necessitate, by the defin-
ition of rules that will soften the transitional period. Therefore, nominal 
ceilings to the deficit-to-GDP ratio could be maintained as binding con-
straints for national fiscal policies, and cyclically adjusted measures moder-
ately used to address the decisions of the ( enlarged) European 
Commission in its judgements with respect to the rule. In short, a no-
transition hypothesis should be accompanied by the adoption of the actual 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Therefore, the question is whether the 
SGP is a good fiscal rule for the EU 12 countries or it requires a substan-
tial revisiting. 
The implementation of the SGP started in a favorable situation of high 
growth with the belief that all divergence phenomena should have been 
removed in a few years, without generating a significant role for the asym-
metric effects of SGP during the transition. Problems started with the eco-
nomic slowdown of late 2000. The need for reforming the SGP became 
increasingly obvious in the course of 2002, when some (the most import-
ant) countries experienced a pro-cyclical policy mix due to extremely 
simple and homogeneous rules for the European Union, which is instead 
still heterogeneous and characterized by persistent inflation differentials 
(Creel and Le Cacheux 2003; De Novellis and Parlato 2004). The violation 
of the deficit ceiling of 3 percent on GDP by half of all EU countries 
expected for 2004 (European Commission 2004) has made the debate on 
the rewriting of the pact deferrable no longer. Furthermore, the persis-
tence of low GDP growth in Europe has renewed the hard criticism about 
the consistency of the SGP with policies aimed to stimulate growth. Then 
the choice of a fiscal rule for accession countries passes through the reform 
of the SGP, since the latter could not be used in its actual form as sug-
gested above. The paradox relies on the fact that, although the SGP could 
be shown to be an optimal fiscal rule, it could not necessarily work in the 
EU 15 ( or 25) group since the EU does not converge spontaneously in the 
medium term towards an ( optimal) economic union. To reach a solution 
for the design of a fiscal rule in an enlarged Europe, it is necessary jointly 
to treat the problems that characterize the EU 15 and the accession coun-
tries. The optimal fiscal rule, on one hand, should be able to ensure more 
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flexibility to the EU 15 countries, given the existing inflation differentials, 
and to free resources to finance capital public expenditures, in order to 
promote growth both in EU 15 and in New Members countries; on the 
other hand, it should be able to impose fiscal severity and ensure fiscal sus-
tainability of each member state and of the enlarged area as a whole, once 
it is established that a non-transitional period is required for the accession 
countries to join the euro. 
Posed in these terms, the proposal that arises implies an internal revisit-
ing of SGP, by adopting a multiple targeting criteria in the spirit of Maas-
tricht accession criteria. Specifically, the rule of 3 percent should still be 
maintained but weighted by the level of debt-to-GDP ratio and, where 
available, by the cyclical adjusted primary balance. Moreover the new 
SGP should be addressed towards a golden rule conditional on debt-to-
GDP ratio, in order to promote public investments without risking the 
fiscal sustainability in the long run. The rationale underlying this setting 
would resemble that used in the conduction of monetary policy by the 
ECB. As the European Central Bank (ECB) uses two pillars in conducting 
monetary policy in EU 12 - one simple and easily accountable (the 2 
percent limit of inflation rate), the other not defined but considered 
(money growth) - the 'enlarged' European Commission could adopt a 
similar strategy, by declaring the 'targets' in terms of deficit and the debt-
to-GDP ratio, but not revealing ex ante in which way it evaluates the sus-
tainability of national public finances. Given a deficit and a debt-to-GDP 
ratio, sustainability would depend on judgements about GDP growth, the 
composition of revenues and expenditures, the launch of structural 
reforms, and so forth. 
If the ECB has been successful in conducting monetary policy without 
curbing inflation under 2 percent, the European Commission in the same 
way could ensure fiscal stability, allowing some countries to breach the 3 
percent limit. Of course, this proposal would involve some procedural 
adjustment in order to make the Commission more accountable and more 
powerful in its role, but this would seem to be an unavoidable price to 
grant stability, flexibility and co-ordination to fiscal policy in an enlarged 
Europe. 
4.2 Growth and inflation in the accession countries 
From the beginning of the 1990s, the accession countries shared a common 
economic development. With the start of the transition period they experi-
enced a deep recession, followed by a period of rapid growth starting from 
the middle of the past decade. At the end of the 1990s they also suffered 
because of the Russian crisis. More marked were the negative impacts on 
Baltic countries, which however recovered rapidly in the following two-
year period. Even though, at the beginning of the new decade, the phase 
of deceleration of the international cycle weakened the performance of 
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these countries, starting from 2003 they have already shown a cyclical 
recovery, in spite of the economic weakness of the demand in the Western 
Europe economies. 
Regardless the evolution of the cycle, these economies have experi-
enced high growth rates since the second part of the 1990s, although, as 
shown in the Table 4.1, the rhythms of growth were rather differentiated. 
All in all, the economic performance observed during the 1990s can be 
evaluated positively, once we take into account the not easy macroeco-
nomic environment outside these economies. The Western European 
countries, especially Germany, that could have offered a support to 
growth, showed a weak internal demand. The difficulties of the Russian 
economy must be included, as that experienced high output volatility 
during the last decade. 
It is too soon to draft a definitive judgement on the results of the first 
phase of the transition, the evidence being still mixed. First, countries that 
joined EU in 2004 show, on average, high rates of development, higher 
than those observed in other transition economies. 
The second aspect is related to the high output volatility. This instabil-
ity comes partly from the specific shocks coming from the Russian crisis at 
the end of the 1990s, but is largely due to widespread changes occurring in 
the productive structure at the beginning of the decade. During the 1990s 
a reduction in output growth dispersion among different economies was 
also observed. Therefore, the high output volatility does not necessarily 
constitute a structural feature of these economies. 
Third, and strictly connected to the previous aspects, it is difficult at the 
moment to quantify, on the basis of the most common techniques, the 
growth trend that characterizes these economies. As a consequence of 
the measurement of the dimension of the cyclical component of the 
growth being extremely uncertain, it is hard to impose fiscal targets based 
on structural balances to these countries. 
As concerns prices dynamics, the general tendency with respect to the 
1990s was clearly declining. As open and small economies, the accession 
countries are exposed to exchange rate volatility. Therefore, it is straight-
forward to notice how any policy aimed at curbing inflation must be 
focused on the control of the exchange rate. In this case it is important to 
recognize that, especially for the Baltic countries, even if the euro consti-
tutes the most important currency as a reference for fixing the exchange 
rate, the Russian ruble could have an important role in influencing the 
domestic prices. This factor could represent a further element of instability 
once New Member states adopt the euro as their national currency. 
However, in the last few years monetary and exchange rate policies 
were not entirely successful in curbing inflation, thus implying a real 
appreciation of the exchange rate. Such a phenomenon reflects the 
high productivity achieved in the tradable sectors, which entails the so-
called Balassa effect. The economies experience a rise in price dynamics 
Table 4.1 Selected economic indicators for accession countries 
Year Poland Hungary Czech Slovak Slovenia Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Republic Republic 
( a) Gross Domestic Product- year on year percentage change 
1996 6.0 1.3 4.3 5.7 3.5 3.9 3.7 4.7 
1997 6.9 4.6 -0.8 5.6 4.6 9.8 8.4 7.0 
1998 4.8 4.8 -1.1 4.1 3.8 4.6 4.8 7.3 
1999 4.1 4.2 0.5 1.3 5.2 -0.6 2.8 -1.8 
2000 4.0 5.2 3.2 2.2 4.6 7.3 6.8 4.0 
2001 1.0 3.8 3.1 3.3 2.8 6.5 7.9 6.5 
2002 1.4 3.3 2.0 4.4 2.9 6.0 6.1 6.8 
94-04 average 4.5 3.5 2.1 4.2 4.1 4.4 5.8 5.4 
(b) Consumer prices - year on year percentage change 
1996 19.9 23.5 8.8 5.4 9.9 23.1 17.5 24.6 
1997 14.8 18.3 8.4 6.2 8.3 10.6 8.5 8.9 
1998 11.6 14.1 10.7 6.7 7.9 8.2 4.6 5.1 
1999 7.3 10.0 2.1 10.6 6.1 3.3 2.4 0.8 
2000 10.1 9.8 3.9 12.0 8.9 4.0 2.7 1.0 
2001 5.5 9.2 4.8 7.3 8.5 5.8 2.5 1.3 
2002 1.9 5.3 1.8 3.3 7.5 3.6 1.9 0.3 
2003 0.8 4.7 0.1 8.5 5.6 1.3 3.0 -0.8 
( c) Current account - as a percentage of GDP 
1996 -2.3 0.6 -7.1 -9.6 0.3 -9.2 -5.5 -9.2 
1997 -4.0 -1.4 -6.7 -8.5 0.3 -12.1 -6.1 -10.2 
1998 -4.4 -4.7 -2.2 -9.0 -0.6 -9.2 -10.7 -11.9 
1999 -8.1 -5.1 -2.7 -4.9 -3.5 -4.7 -9.8 -11.2 
2000 -6.1 -6.2 -5.3 -3.7 -2.9 -5.7 -6.9 -6.0 
2001 -2.9 -3.4 -5.7 -8.5 0.2 -6.1 -9.5 -4.8 
2002 -2.8 -3.9 -6.5 -8.1 1.7 -12.3 -7.8 -5.3 
2003 -3.1 -6.0 -6.9 -2.2 
(d) External debt-as a percentage of GDP 
1996 35.3 61.9 36.7 38.8 21.1 35.2 41.0 30.5 
1997 36.6 53.3 40.8 48.5 22.6 55.5 49.0 34.3 
1998 37.3 58.0 42.7 55.9 25.1 56.0 50.9 34.9 
1999 42.2 61.1 41.6 53.4 26.9 55.4 57.5 42.6 
2000 42.4 65.6 42.1 56.3 32.8 58.5 65.6 43.7 
2001 39.2 65.0 39.1 56.5 34.4 58.8 72.6 44.4 
2002 43.5 55.4 37.8 55.7 40.0 72.3 83.0 45.0 
Sources: OECD, EBRD. 
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notwithstanding a stable competitive position, as the productivity differen-
tial in the tradable sectors is higher than that registered in the no-tradable 
sectors. This phenomenon could well persist when the euro is adopted, 
thus entailing a systematic inflation differential compared with the other 
European countries and a constant real appreciation of the exchange rate. 
In Figures 4.l(a)-(c) two real exchange rate measures based on consumer 
prices and on the manufacturing unit labor cost are represented. The 
cumulative distance between the two variables is caused by the part of the 
real appreciation of the exchange rate deriving from the Balassa effect and 
thus is not attributable to a loss of competitiveness for the sector exposed 
to the competition. 
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Figure 4.1 (c) Real exchange rates - Poland. 
Finally, the accession countries have generally shown during the last 
few years - with the exception of Slovenia - high current account deficits 
so that they have accumulated high levels of foreign debt. Generally it is 
normal that current accounts register some deficits in the economies in the 
early development stage, as they attract foreign capitals to compensate for 
insufficient internal savings to finance investments. If such development 
materializes, there are no problems for repaying external lenders and the 
foreign debt is not a concern. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to evaluate 
whether the competitive position or the sustainability of the current 
account deficit could influence the opinions of financial markets, thus 
putting under pressure the debt sustainability. Such characteristics expose 
these countries to the risk of a currency or financial crisis. 
Starting from the tendencies that emerged in the last decade, we are 
able to propose a rapid description of some structural features of the 
accession countries and to compare them with the Western European 
countries. In particular, Table 4.2 shows the relevant levels of income and 
prices for these countries. 
The implicit relative prices are calculated on the basis of the relation 
between the GDP expressed in terms of effective nominal exchanges, and 
GDP expressed in terms of Purchasing Power Parity. The accession coun-
tries are compared with the Eurozone. Generally, the correlation between 
the relative levels of per capita GDP and the relative prices is maintained. 
The accession countries present levels for both variables that are relatively 
low, but are higher than those of the other three Eastern European 
economies included in the table. Only Slovenia presents per capita income 
and relative price levels close to those of some countries of the Eurozone, 
such as Greece and Portugal. 
Table 4.2 Per capita GDP and relative price level 
Per capita GDP Relative price levels 
Current prices and exchange rates Current prices and PPP exchange rates 1995 2003 
1995 2003 1995 2003 
EU15 98.6 103.3 100.4 102.1 98 101 
Euro area 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 100 
Estonia 10.6 23.3 31.2 43.0 34 54 
Latvia 7.6 16.0 26.3 37.3 29 43 
Lithuania 7.3 19.1 31.0 42.2 23 45 
Poland 14.0 20.3 35.1 42.8 40 47 
Hungary 18.4 30.3 44.9 56.3 41 54 
Czech Rep. 21.5 32.9 63.3 63.9 34 51 
Slovak Rep. 15.4 23.2 40.4 50.0 38 46 
Slovenia 42.4 52.2 61.3 70.3 69 74 
Malta 36.6 44.9 63.2 65.7 58 68 
Cyprus 57.7 71.0 74.9 78.8 77 90 
Total AC-JO 16.4 25.0 41.3 49.1 40 51 
TotalEU-25 84.8 90.6 90.5 93.5 94 97 
Romania 6.7 9.5 27.6 28.4 24 33 
Bulgaria 6.6 9.7 28.2 28.8 24 34 
Turkey 11.7 12.9 27.3 25.4 43 51 
Sources: calculations on EC AMECO database. 
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The brief analysis of economic features of these countries allows us to 
point out some stylized facts, which will be useful for drawing indications 
about the perspectives of these economies. The tendencies of the last few 
years showed a sustained path of development for the accession countries, 
indicating that a catching up process is happening. This allows us to 
forecast a phase of high growth for the next few years. Notwithstanding 
this, extreme caution is necessary before drafting indications about the 
dynamics of potential output. In fact, the development path observed 
during the last few years was extremely unstable, mainly in the early stages 
of the transition. The GDP growth was accompanied by a gradual increase 
of the relative level of both the per capita GDP and the relative prices. 
Therefore, real exchange indicators show a tendency towards appreciation 
and the phenomenon seems to be persistent. 
4.3 The optimal strategy to join the euro 
The analysis in the previous section has shown that the target for nominal 
and real convergence entails internal conflicts. The catching up could 
require a phase with relatively high inflation, but the attainment of Maas-
tricht criteria would impose on these countries restrictive economic pol-
icies aimed at reducing inflation. According to some studies, the priority 
would be attributed to the real convergence: the adhesion to the euro and 
the attainment of the parameters of Maastricht criteria should be deferred. 
An opposite view emphasizes that joining the euro could facilitate faster 
economic development. Therefore, the accession to the euro should be 
achieved quickly. 
A long transition could have several advantages, if one considers that a 
real convergence could imply a reduction in the differences of the eco-
nomic structures. Economic structures of the accession countries that are 
more similar to those of the Western Europe countries would allow a 
reduction of the risks of asymmetric shocks, and therefore make it easier 
for these countries to participate in the European single currency. More-
over, it must also be observed that the behaviors that the accession coun-
tries will exhibit in the next few years are difficult to appraise. For the 
following years, greater opportunities will be introduced into the Euro-
pean markets, but also greater exposure of local industries to competitive 
pressures. The transition could create a context of extremely elevated 
uncertainty (Issing 2003). In such conditions, it would seem more appro-
priate to maintain the availability of one economic policy instrument, such 
as the exchange rate. 
On the other hand, the advantages of a no-transition strategy could 
be extremely high. First, as the differences among incumbent and 
New Members countries are very pronounced, the advantages of real con-
vergence disappear, since the convergence would require an infinite 
horizon in which to be completed. Moreover, this implies that fulfilling the 
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Maastricht criteria would impose an excessive cost to the accession coun-
tries. Furthermore, if mechanisms such as the Balassa effect were in 
action, then a group of countries would experience inflation rates 
systematically higher than others, rendering such a policy partially inco-
herent. Finally, since curbing inflation should be inevitably based on 
pegging the exchange rate, such a policy could be difficult to implement in 
small and open economies where capital inflows play a significant role 
(Wyplosz 2003). 
On the basis of these considerations, an alternative option should allow 
for an immediate access to the euro, without imposing restrictive policies 
aimed at fulfilling the Maastricht criteria, since a no-transition strategy 
would actually be incompatible with such requirements. 
This exception would also be opportune, once taking into account that 
the monetary instability of the New Members countries would not be 
without effects for the other economies of the Union. The choice to delay 
the adhesion to the euro produces uncertain and risky outcomes. Another 
argument in favor of a fast entry to the euro is represented by the fact that 
the same transition towards the euro can be rendered more unstable from 
the lack of sufficient reputation of the national Central Banks, since in 
some cases their independence is not still complete. If a greater independ-
ence of the national Central Banks is required, as is essential for adhesion 
to the single currency (Padoa Schiappa 2002), this could be deferred for a 
long time. The road of the fast adhesion to the euro concurs also to 
encompass this type of problem. 
There also exist intermediate options to loosen ties for the adhesion to 
the euro, although they are not easy to apply. As an example, the inflation 
requirement could be maintained, but in a less restrictive manner in order 
to take account of the catching-up stage. Moreover, it is clear that the 
adhesion to the euro could be facilitated if the structure of parameters 
were modified by rendering them less tight. The increased probability of 
adhesion would entail at least two benefits: on one hand it would stimulate 
virtuous policies, because of the greater probability of succeeding with 
them. On the other hand, these same policies would be less onerous, 
because they could be accompanied by a reduction in interest rates. 
4.4 The fiscal position of the accession countries 
The budget position of the accession countries is illustrated in the country 
chapters of this book. As is shown, the situation is not homogeneous and 
each country presents marked differences with respect to the other coun-
tries. In general terms, these are the main elements that emerge from the 
reading of the data. 
The role of the public sector is large. The incidence of revenues and 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP is relatively high, compared with 
that of the EU countries, and higher than that observed in the other trans-
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ition economies. This reflects a historical inheritance of the accession 
countries that, at the beginning of the transition, already presented a high 
weight of the public sector. Since the early stages of the transition, the 
weight of the public sector on the GDP has been drastically reduced by 
the wave of privatization of publicly held industries. 
The reduction was evident in Hungary, where the amount of total 
outlays has been lowered, starting from the early 1990s, from around 60 
percent of GDP to 50 percent at the beginning of the new millennium. In 
Poland, expenditures dropped from 54 percent to 46 percent of GDP in 
recent years. In both countries, however, data show that the reduction of 
the public expenditure has been interrupted in the last few years. In 
Poland, the recent increase in public expenditure is mainly due to growth 
in the current disbursement, in part offset by a reduction in the capital 
outlays. In the Slovak Republic the route of curbing expenditure is more 
recent: still in 2000 the expenditure reached the highest level, 65 percent of 
GDP, and then recorded a strong reduction in 2001 and 2002. 
It seems that in the economies where the greater programs of expendi-
ture cuts were experienced, a relaxation in the plans of reforms happened 
later. The strategies followed by the Czech Republic, Slovenia and the 
three Baltic countries are different. These countries, in fact, in the middle 
of the 1990s already presented small levels of public expenditure and, 
since then, they have not realized expenditure reductions. On the con-
trary, in the case of the Czech Republic, an increasing trend in public 
expenditure is observed, starting at the end of the past decade. The three 
Baltic economies share the same path: an upsurge of public expenditure 
occurred in 1998-99 and a strong reduction in the following years. This 
evolution, influenced by the Russian crisis, testifies to a strong reactivity of 
the budget to the cycle from the side of the expenditure. 
As concerns interest expenditure, this can be approached from the 
'property income paid by government' according to the definition pro-
posed by the OECD. Interest payments on debt have been strongly 
reduced in Poland and Hungary, thanks to the fall of interest rates caused 
by the reduction of inflation. Interest expenditure has been low in the 
Czech Republic, a country characterized by a low level of the stock of 
public debt as a percentage of GDP, but it increased in the Slovak Repub-
lic, in line with the contextual increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Consid-
ering that the reductions of the expenditure involved much more than the 
expenditure in the capital account, we point out that the four greater 
economies experienced stable current primary spending as percentage of 
GDP, with the exception of the Slovak Republic, where a solid reduction 
has been realized. 
Therefore, on the expenditure side of the budget, accession countries 
show a deterioration of composition, since capital outlays decrease while 
current ones remain stable or increase. 
This is, above all, the case of Poland, where the level of the net capital 
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outlays has been reduced on values close to 2 percent of GDP. In Hungary, 
this level of expenditure goes from values of 6-7 percent of GDP in the 
middle of the 1990s to values around 4.5 percent in the last few years. 
Even if these values of capital expenditure are high on average, they 
show a problem in perspective. In fact, efforts to balance the budgets in 
order to join the euro could be concentrated on capital expenditure, thus 
preventing these economies from pursuing a welcome level of investments 
in infrastructures to accelerate the catching-up process. 
The revenues show a not very different structure with respect to the 
euro countries. Dynamically, revenues show an evolution close to that of 
expenditures. However, their incidence on the GDP has reduced less than 
the expenditure did, thus favoring a deficit reduction. The reduction 
generally involved indirect taxes. Only Poland registered a fall in direct 
taxes as a percentage of GDP. 
Generally, making reference to the reclassification of the OECD, the 
main divergence in the structure of revenues with respect to the euro 
countries regards the low level of the direct taxes on personal income. 
Conversely, indirect taxes are not low, even in comparison with euro coun-
tries. Hungary and the Slovakian Republic show a sufficient contained 
level of social contributions. 
Since the revenue structure is similar to that experienced by European 
countries, one can suppose that accession countries' budgets would show, 
in the future, the same response to the cycle registered in Europe. Even if 
this were the case, the problem remains open of correctly measuring such 
elasticity given the high output volatility observed during the past. 
However, once this lack of stability is removed, it is arguable whether 
budget elasticity in accession countries will be very close to that of the 
European states. 
The budget deficits are, on average, higher than in other European 
countries, but within the accession countries there is a certain differenti-
ation. Some countries, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, exhibit a 
rather high deficit, while others share more contained imbalances. The 
target of 3 percent of GDP is breached almost everywhere in the larger 
economies. Instead, it is achieved by Slovenia and the three Baltic coun-
tries. On average, the Central European countries show higher deficits 
than the Baltic countries, although the reverse is true when we consider 
economic growth. In particular, the Baltic countries have been heavily hit 
by recession due to the Russian crisis, but their fiscal position has been 
quickly strengthened in the successive phases of expansion of the eco-
nomic cycle. The Central European countries instead have largely adopted 
pro-cyclical fiscal policies (Zogada 2003). 
The main feature of fiscal position of the accession countries relies on 
the low levels of debt they share. It is worthwhile noting that the low levels 
of public debt widely reflect the initial conditions of the transition. 
Economies that exhibited an elevated public debt at the beginning of the 
Fiscal policy in the accession countries 85 
1990s, such as Poland and Hungary, still have a debt-to-GDP ratio higher 
than other countries. However, these are not exceptional values, and are 
reducing. Poland reduced its debt-to-GDP ratio from over 50 to 46 
percent, while in Hungary the debt-to-GDP ratio declined from 80 percent 
in 1995 to 55 percent at the beginning of the current decade. Similarly, 
countries that initially had contained debt levels still have a low degree of 
indebtedness. An exception is constituted by the Czech Republic and the 
Slovakian Republic, which have shown an increasing debt-to-GDP ratio 
(Zogada 2003). In Slovenia and in the Baltic republics, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio is negligible. 
4.5 The choice of fiscal rule 
A binding starting point in selecting the fiscal rule that best fits the needs 
of New Members countries relies on the macroeconomic strategy pursued 
to join the euro. As stated above, the strategy to adopt the euro is twofold. 
One prescribes a prolonged transition, the other implies an instantaneous 
transition. Inevitably, the choice of a fiscal rule depends on the strategy 
that will be adopted. If joining the euro is subjected to the condition that 
the Maastricht parameters are satisfied, the optimal fiscal rule would be 
the one that ensures a soft constraint to budget policies in order to facili-
tate the transition. Conversely, if the euro is adopted without fulfilling any 
entry criteria, then the optimal fiscal rule should focus on a steady state by 
ensuring there is a balanced budget policy that is coherent with long-run 
equilibrium. 
If this were the case, because the steady state is a situation in which 
countries have accomplished the transition towards medium-term posi-
tions of being close-to-balance, a fiscal rule will not provide a ready-made 
recipe for tackling the problems that countries with deficits still close to 
the upper ceiling face in the event either a cyclical downturn or a financial 
crisis. Such a fiscal rule should be devoted only to guaranteeing budget 
flexibility in a close-to-balance framework (in cyclically adjusted terms). 
On the contrary, if the transition period implies New Members countries 
are out of long-run equilibrium, then the budget flexibility allowed by a 
fiscal rule should be ensured regardless of the cyclical position or the 
budget condition of a country. 
Therefore, the trade-off emerging from the above-discussed scenarios 
(long transition versus no transition) is between flexibility and severity of 
fiscal rules. The more flexible is the fiscal rule, i.e. it does not interfere with 
national fiscal policy whatever the economic shock, the less severe it will 
be in ensuring fiscal sustainability in the long run. Conversely, the more 
well suited the fiscal rule is for steady state equilibria, the less useful it will 
be to help governments avoid financial or currency crises that are gener-
ated by adverse shocks during the transition towards the euro. Given this 
framework, an optimal fiscal rule should maximize both flexibility and 
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sustainability of fiscal policy conditional on the macroeconomic strategy 
that has been chosen, i.e. long transition or no transition. 
Even though we do not provide an analytical derivation, it is still pos-
sible to draft some prescriptions on the optimal rule by using the above-
described stylized facts regarding budget conditions, the economic 
structure and the cyclical position of candidates countries. 
First, many of these countries share a high deficit-to-GDP ratio. This 
suggests that it is better not to impose on the New Members the condition 
that they have to fulfill the close-to-balance criterion, since it could never 
allow these countries to adopt the euro. In fact, they would be exposed too 
much to the risk of breaching the ceiling and thus incurring financial 
turmoil during the transition. For more fragile countries, such a strategy 
could entail a never-ending transition. Under this condition, there would 
be two feasible solutions: to eliminate the transition period, thus allowing 
the accession countries immediately to adopt the euro as their currency, or 
to change the target used in the fiscal rule. If the latter were the case, a 
shift from deficit to debt-to-GDP ratio as a target for fiscal rule could be 
optimal, given the low indebtedness shared by candidate countries. 
Of course, this solution could entail a fiscal laxity by allowing the New 
Members countries to enlarge their public deficits. Moreover, given their 
actually high nominal GDP growth rates, such a solution would make the 
budget condition of accession countries very fragile in the medium term. 
Therefore, after taking into account the above-discussed optimality of a 
no-transition strategy from a macroeconomic point of view, the best 
choice for accession countries seems to be the adoption of a fiscal rule 
based on deficit-to-GDP ratio. In order to allow an immediate entry into 
the Eurozone, the target on deficits could be substantially relaxed in the 
early stage of enlargement, with the fiscal sustainability ensured by high 
growth, low real interest rates and small debt-to-GDP ratios. Of course, 
the laxity of initial conditions should not prevent the fiscal rule imposing 
credible paths of deficit reduction in the medium term. 
The choice of entry parameters softer than those used in the Maastricht 
Treaty would also be desirable as it reduces the risk of breaching the 
ceiling and thus lowers the risk that a disruptive capital flight hits the 
accession countries more than a legal penalty could do. 
In the design of the optimal fiscal rule, the concept of structural bal-
ances also matters. The use of such measures is justified by the necessity to 
avoid national governments being induced to pursue pro-cyclical policies 
in order to respect the fiscal rules. Defining the budget targets in structural 
terms helps the automatic stabilizers to function freely when the economic 
is hit by an adverse shock, without easing fiscal control on national public 
finances. 
The adoption of such indicators within the rule governing the fiscal 
policy in the accession countries would also be desirable, but the transition 
they experienced towards a free market signalled a structural break in the 
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statistics. As a consequence, the authors do not have the data necessary to 
calculate output trends and to know rapidly effective GDP growth (they 
are frequently revised). Therefore, output gap measures, which are not 
univocally determined and subject to periodical revisions in the industrial-
ized countries, are far from being unambiguous indicators to be used for 
the accession countries, at least in the early stages of the enlargement. 
Consequently, the use of structural balances as the target of fiscal rules 
could be greatly misleading. However, looking at structural balances as 
reference values could be a complementary strategy in evaluating whether 
fiscal rules are fulfilled based on nominal targets. Of course, once the 
problems in calculating output gaps are removed, a shift of the targets 
from nominal to structural balances would be desirable within the fiscal 
rule suited for the accession countries. 
Finally, once the optimal fiscal rule has been defined as regards nominal 
targets and the speed to reach them, qualitative properties of the rule have 
to be investigated. One of the most recurrent criticisms against fiscal rules 
based on nominal deficit concerns the disincentive that they pose in devel-
oping public capital accumulation. To alleviate this problem, the so-called 
'golden rule' has been proposed. According to the golden rule of deficit 
financing, borrowing is allowed to finance public investment. Implement-
ing the golden rule requires establishing a dual budget separating invest-
ment spending from current spending. 
The main advantages of the golden rule are those of spreading the 
burden of capital projects over the different generations of taxpayers bene-
fitting from them and avoiding the efficiency loss caused by distortionary 
taxation, if the tax rate fluctuates over time. The lack of this possibility 
may negatively affect capital spending. 
The problem is particularly relevant in the initial transition period, in 
which current generations have to tax-finance new projects, while also 
paying interest on past debts. However, this argument hardly holds for 
New Members countries, largely engaged in a catching-up process towards 
higher per-capita GDP levels. 
According to Coricelli and Ercolani (2002), the enlargement of the EU 
should be a good occasion to modify the actual rules prevailing in the 
Eurozone for the Early Comers. However, there are a number of argu-
ments against the introduction of the golden rule (Buti et al. 2003). 
First, if applied to gross public investment, the golden rule would be an 
obstacle to deficit and debt reduction. In particular, given the ratio of 
public investment as a percentage of GDP, the long-run equilibrium level 
of government debt could be very high, especially in an environment of 
low inflation. 
Second, what is important is overall capital accumulation in both 
private and public capital. For instance, a well-devised tax reform that, by 
lowering tax burden and distortions, leads to higher investment may be 
preferable to public investment. Moreover, there is no clear evidence in 
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the empirical literature that investment in public infrastructure always 
leads to significant positive growth effects. 
Third, a dual budget may distort expenditure decisions in favor of phys-
ical assets and against spending on intangibles. Moreover, the golden rule 
provides leeway for opportunistic behavior, as governments would have an 
incentive to classify current expenditure as capital spending. 
Given these shortcomings in the use of a golden rule, the adoption of a 
not strictly binding target for nominal deficit on GDP, which encompasses 
the distinction between current and capital spending, does not have to be 
associated with discretionary power in pursuing such soft budget con-
straints. Otherwise, a soft target and high discretion would entail weak 
credibility of such a fiscal rule. 
By combining all the above assertions and considering that a golden 
rule scheme could be designed to be internal to the actual SGP (Buti et al. 
2003), the policy prescription which emerges for the accession countries is 
quite obvious. When a no-transition strategy is opted for, namely a entry 
strategy to the Eurozone which does not encompass the fulfillment of the 
Maastricht criteria, then the optimal fiscal rule for accession countries is 
the one actually in force in the EU, i.e. the SGP. In fact, all the figures 
composing the optimal fiscal rule constitute only internal adjustments of 
the SGP. 
On this basis, the next step to evaluate whether a revised version of the 
SGP could be adopted to manage fiscal policy in an enlarged Union is to 
test how optimal is such a modified rule for New Members countries. This 
question would appear paradoxical, but recent events testify how difficult 
it has become to maintain in action the SGP without changing the Treaty. 
The implementation of the SGP started in a favorable situation of high 
growth. Problems started to show with the economic slowdown of late 
2000. The need for reforming the SGP became increasingly obvious in the 
course of 2002. The violation of the deficit ceiling of 3 percent on GDP by 
half of the total EU countries expected for 2004 (European Commission 
2004) and the contextual launch of the enlargement of the Union to 
selected Eastern countries, namely the EEC countries, make the debate 
on the rewriting of the pact deferrable no more. 
Since the design of a new pact appears unavoidable in order to correct 
the adverse effects shown in the past, and to prevent divergence phenom-
ena for an enlarged Europe in the future, it is opportune to consider firstly 
the drawbacks on which the main criticisms of the pact rely. 
Subsequently, it will be possible to verify whether the internal 
adjustments to SGP proposed above are coherent with such proposals, 
thus indicating the existence of a uniform effective fiscal rule for an 
enlarged Europe, or if differentiated fiscal rules are required among the 
Union. 
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4.6 The main shortcomings of the SGP 
Generally a fiscal rule based on numerical targets is required to share 
some optimal properties that could be summarized by the so-called 
Kopits-Symansky's criteria. 
According to these criteria, an ideal fiscal rule should be well defined, 
transparent, simple, flexible, adequate relative to the final goal, enforce-
able, consistent and underpinned by public finance reforms. 
Quoting Kopits and Symansky (1998), as summarized by Creel (2003): 
1 'a fiscal rule should be well-defined as to the indicator to be con-
strained, the institutional coverage, and specific escape clauses, in 
order to avoid ambiguities and ineffective enforcement'; 
2 'an essential characteristic of a durable fiscal rule is transparency in 
government operations, including accounting, forecasting, and institu-
tional arrangements' in order to gain 'popular support'; 
3 'rules should be characterized by simplicity to enhance their appeal to 
the legislature and to the public'; 
4 'rules must be flexible to accommodate exogenous shocks beyond the 
control of the authorities'; 
5 'fiscal rules should be adequate with respect to the specified proximate 
goal'; 
6 'a fiscal rule should be enforceable. (There is) a need for constitutional 
or legal statutes, possibly accompanied by penalties for non-
compliance and authority for enforcement'; 
7 'a closely related criterion is for a set of fiscal rules to be consistent inter-
nally, as well as with other macroeconomic policies or policy rules'; 
8 'most rules cannot last for long unless they are supported by efficient 
policy actions. [ ... ] From this perspective, [ ... ] a fiscal rule may be 
viewed as a catalyst for fiscal reforms that would be necessary anyway 
to ensure sustainability'. 
These eight properties cover a mix of political and economic concepts. 
Some of them are more political than economic, whereas the reverse is 
true for the others. A simple way to assess the quality of SGP is to test 
how it fits the optimal properties listed above (for a complete discussion 
see Buti et al. 2003; Creel 2003). 
Regarding the first feature, for example, the SGP appears only partially 
well-defined with respect to the policy variables subject to constraints 
(budget balance and gross public debt) and the institutional coverage 
(general government), since a new reference value, i.e. the cyclically 
adjusted budget balance, was added without an appropriate specification. 
Indeed, it is not often emphasized that such a rule would be effective to 
alleviate the strictness of the SGP during cyclical downturns only in ex ante 
terms, because ex post measures of output gap are conditioned by effective 
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output results. The problem here is to share common and unquestionable 
estimations of potential output for a reasonable period ( at least five years). 
The SGP also specifies the escape clauses (the exceptional conditions 
under which the 3 percent of GDP deficit ceiling can be exceeded) and the 
penalties to be applied in the case of persistent excessive deficits. 
However, elements of ambiguity remain. 
The SGP medium-term target of 'close to balance or in surplus' remains 
vague and the exceptional conditions under which the 3 percent of GDP 
deficit ceiling can be exceeded are not well established, since they under-
line that the medium-term target of 'close to balance or in surplus' would 
be related to a potential output concept, thus implying a zero debt rule for 
EU countries in the long run. 
As to flexibility, different elements play differently. On the one hand, 
the SGP includes a tight specification of the escape clauses, thereby redu-
cing the discretion of the Council and the flexibility of the rules. On the 
other hand, by putting more emphasis on medium-term targets and high-
lighting the implications of cyclical fluctuations, it increases flexibility com-
pared with a simple deficit ceiling targeted in the short run. Nevertheless, 
as discussed above, this flexibility derives from a lack of transparency and 
from a not well-defined concept of a cyclically adjusted budget balance 
used as a medium-term target. 
It also seems quite obvious that the pact is not enforceable at all, at 
least until the credibility of possible sanctions will not be increased. Evid-
ence shows that a country facing a proposition of early-warning mechan-
ism by the European Commission does not face reputational costs under 
the form, say, of higher long-term interest rates. The imposition by the 
Ecofin council of an early-warning procedure on France had no impact, at 
least until mid-2003, either on long-term interest rates or on the willing-
ness of the French government to reduce its deficit at a faster pace. This is 
heightened by the fact that the council is in charge of the final decision on 
the implementation of sanctions and hence a risk of a partisan application 
of the rules exists. It is not surprising that at the end of 2003 an early-
warning procedure against France and Germany was interrupted by 
Ecofin: the effect was to suspend the enforceability of the SGP. 
Finally, a good fiscal rule has to be internally consistent and consistent 
with other policies. Even though the former point is sufficiently satisfied, 
the latter has been seriously missed twice. First, a strong emphasis on 
annual targets may have created a tension between fiscal policies and 
structural policies. For instance, the existing rules may deter pension 
reforms that enhance sustainability in the long run but may involve a tem-
porary rise in the deficit. During 2003, in fact, this point was strengthened 
by including structural reforms in the European Commission Judgement 
on National Stability Programs. Second, and by far the most important, 
the present design of SGP does not appear consistent with a single mone-
tary policy set for a group of countries characterized by persistently differ-
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ent rates of inflation. As shown in our previous work (De Novellis and 
Parlato 2004) and in Creel and Le Cacheux (2003), this situation could 
entail divergent dynamics in the public finances of each European country, 
thus hindering a transition toward a steady state in which member states 
are economically homogeneous. As a corollary, homogeneous fiscal rules 
defined in the Stability and Growth Pact are ill suited and might even be 
counterproductive, exacerbating such diverging paths. 
Such criticisms could be summarized by a couple of issues identifying 
the weak points of the pact, on which basis several proposals to replace or 
radically revise the pact are proposed. 
First, the SGP reduces budgetary flexibility, since the 3 percent of GDP 
reference value is not such a hard ceiling to breach, and not only in excep-
tional circumstances and for a limited period. As the literature on currency 
areas ( and the recent experience) has shown, higher budgetary flexibility is 
required to respond to country-specific shocks in the absence of national 
monetary independence. In order to create sufficient room for maneuver, 
a rapid transition to broadly balanced budgets in structural terms is 
required, but in a situation of subdued growth, such a transition would 
require pro-cyclical policies that may worsen the cyclical conditions. 
Second, the pact does not curb governments' incentives to increase 
expenditure or cut revenue in favorable cyclical periods. Evidence of a 
pro-cyclical bias still affecting budgetary policies in euro area countries is 
provided by fiscal behaviors in 2000. In a situation of buoyant growth (3.4 
percent for the euro-area as a whole) and an oil price hike that put upward 
pressure on inflation, countries with high deficits failed to seize the 
opportunity to reduce their fiscal imbalances. 
Third, unlike the Maastricht convergence, sticking to the rules of the 
SGP may not pay politically. As argued by Buti and Giudice (2002), under 
the SGP, the carrot of entry has been eaten while the stick of exclusion has 
been replaced by the threat of uncertain and delayed sanctions. Moreover, 
the very success of the SGP in reducing the budget deficits would, in fact, 
be to rebuild the capacity of governments to pursue politically motivated 
fiscal actions. This temptation may prove irresistible in election years. 
Furthermore, the SGP discourages public investment. Maintaining 
budget positions 'close to balance or in surplus' implies that capital expen-
diture will have to be funded from current revenues. Hence, it will no 
longer be possible to spread the cost of an investment project over all the 
generations of taxpayers who benefit from it. This may imply a disincen-
tive to undertake projects producing deferred benefits and entailing a 
significant gap between current revenues and current expenditures. The 
disincentive is stronger during consolidation periods. 
Finally, by focusing on short-term commitments, the SGP disregards 
structural reforms. This criticism has different nuances. First, the SGP 
focuses almost exclusively on short-term objectives for the budget deficit. 
As such, it provides incentives for creative accounting and one-off 
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measures that blur the transparency of public accounts. Second, the stock 
of public debt does not enter the SGP and neither do the contingent liabil-
ities of public pension systems. Hence, the pact treats equally countries 
with different medium and long-term prospects and different debt levels. 
This may imply that the pact is too demanding for countries in sound fiscal 
positions. Third, the pact may prevent countries from implementing pol-
icies - such as pension reforms - which improve sustainability over the 
medium and long term at the price of a short-term deficit worsening. 
4. 7 A new stability and growth pact for the enlarged 
Europe 
By using the above criticisms as a starting point, several proposals were 
put forward to revise the fiscal rules that regulate public governance in 
Europe. They include procedural reforms, institutional reforms and meas-
ures aimed to enhance financial market discipline. All these issues, 
anyway, do not establish how to change or correct the SGP, but they indi-
cate how to help to ameliorate fiscal policy governance by using non-
numerical rules. Therefore, they are not very close to the scope of this 
chapter, i.e. to discuss numerical rules that well fit the public financial 
needs of EU enlargement. 
In this spirit, proposals on how to change the focus of SGP were largely 
produced. They encompass rules accounting for the composition of the 
public finance variables or for long run sustainability. The focus on quality 
has been translated into two proposals for reforming the SGP: the so-
called golden rule of deficit financing and the expenditure target/rule. 
Having just discussed the former it is possible to restrict the judgement to 
the latter. 
Expenditure rules present some positive aspects as they refer to the 
budgetary items that governments can control and they can be easily 
defined and monitored. Moreover, they allow stabilizers to work on the 
revenue side and may prevent expenditure relaxation in upturns. 
The use of expenditure rules in a multinational context, however, 
appears problematic, since uniform spending rules would de facto impose 
homogeneous social preferences on politically heterogeneous countries, 
while country-specific rules would be difficult to enforce (Buti et al. 2003). 
Furthermore, they would have to be complemented by a deficit or debt 
rule, since they do not say anything about the revenues behavior. 
As regards long run sustainability and heterogeneity, the current EU 
rules do not appear to be very concerned with these issues. Two solutions 
have been proposed in the literature: the first is to choose a medium-term 
target that ensures long-term sustainability while taking on board country 
specificities; the second is to focus directly on the public debt ratio. 
In a previous work (De Novellis and Parlato 2004) we stressed the 
problem of heterogeneity. The accumulation of public debt depends on 
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the deficit and on the growth of nominal GDP. As catching up countries 
are characterized by higher potential growth and higher inflation (the 
latter due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect), they can afford to have higher 
deficits without endangering the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Hence, the 3 percent ceiling and the close-to-balance rule are over-
restrictive for these countries. Given the higher public investment needs of 
less mature economies ( especially in an enlarged EU), the current fiscal 
rules could harm the catching up process. 
Even if such reasons could justify a revision of the SGP, it is also true that 
a rule encompassing all the shortcomings could be unfeasible. Buiter and 
Grafe (2002), for example, propose what they call a Permanent Balance 
rule, which would ensure sustainability and fiscal prudence while taking into 
account country differences. Their rule is based on the permanent budget 
balance, which is given by the difference between the constant long run 
average future values of tax revenue and government spending. While the 
rule is theoretically rigorous, its applicability appears doubtful, since it 
requires the estimate of the permanent value of tax and spending, thus likely 
violating the criteria of simplicity and enforceability discussed above. 
However, as pointed out above, rules that allow fiscal constraints to be 
relaxed during the transition phases entail non-secondary problems in the 
long run. For example, nominal GDP growth can be higher in catching up 
economies but also highly variable. This implies a potential conflict 
between discipline and stabilization. If a country, which maintains a high 
structural deficit, is hit by a shock, the automatic stabilizers may lead to 
very high deficits. While, in principle, these deficits are of a cyclical nature, 
the risk of spiraling debt and interest payments should not be disregarded. 
This risk is particularly high in accession countries, which still suffer from 
limited creditworthiness and may see capital inflows dry up quickly. 
A possible solution to this drawback could be the adoption of a non-
uniform ceiling across member states, under which a nominal deficit is 
forced to stay, whatever the shock hitting the economy. To fix such a 
maximum allowed deficit for each member, a measure of fiscal sustainabil-
ity could be adopted. For example, the debt-to-GDP ratio could be used as 
a reference value. However, this type of rule, if clearly made explicit, 
would entail a non-homogeneous target across countries, thus heavy vio-
lating the SGP. 
Since the cost of abandoning the SGP would be too high (Blanchard 
and Giavazzi 2004; Buti et al. 2003), a more complex rule would be 
needed. On the other hand, the enlargement implies that the more the rule 
must govern the more complex it will be. 
Posed in these terms, the proposal that arises implies an internal revisit-
ing of SGP, by adopting a multiple targeting criteria still in the spirit of 
Maastricht accession criteria. Specifically, the rule of 3 percent should still 
be maintained but weighted by the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio and, 
where available, by the cyclically adjusted primary balance. Moreover, the 
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new SGP should be addressed towards a golden rule conditional on the 
debt-to-GDP ratio in order to promote public investments without putting 
at risk the fiscal sustainability in the long run. The rationale underlying 
this setting would resemble the one used in the conduction of monetary 
policy by the ECB. As the European Central Bank uses two pillars in con-
ducting monetary policy in Euro 12, one simple and easily accountable 
( the 2 percent limit of inflation rate), the other not defined but considering 
(money growth), the 'enlarged' European Commission could adopt a 
similar strategy by declaring the 'targets' in terms of deficit and the debt-
to-GDP ratio, but not revealing ex ante in which way it evaluates the sus-
tainability of national public finances. Given a deficit and a debt-to-GDP 
ratio, sustainability would depend on judgements about GDP growth, the 
composition of revenues and expenditures, the launch of structural 
reforms, and so on. 
If the ECB has been successful in conducting monetary policy without 
curbing inflation under 2 percent, then the European Commission could in 
the same way ensure fiscal stability by allowing some countries to breach 
the 3 percent limit! 
Of course, this proposal would involve some procedural adjustment in 
order to make the Commission more accountable and more powerful in its 
role, but this would seem to be an unavoidable price to grant stability, flex-
ibility and co-ordination to fiscal policy in an enlarged Europe. 
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5 Tax administration and the 
shadow economy 
Viktor Trasberg 
5.1 Introduction and contents 
This chapter generalizes certain aspects concerning tax administration 
developments in the New European Union Member countries from 
Central Europe and the Baltic states. During the last decade, all these 
countries have passed radical social and economic reforms to become full 
members of the EU. One of the most difficult challenges in transition 
countries has been institutional build-up in line with general economic 
restructuring, privatization and stabilization activities. Nevertheless, devel-
oping a new tax system, and establishing a well-organized and fiscally 
capable revenue collection mechanism is not an easy task. 
The tax system inherited by the former transition countries was not 
'generally suitable for gradual reform' (Taxation and Transition 1994). In 
the command economy, resources for production of public goods were 
channeled primarily from state-owned enterprises to the government 
budget. There was no need for special revenue collection and resource 
allocation institutions other than central planning agencies or committees. 
As companies became private, foundations for the already-existing 
government budget revenues declined radically. Moreover, in the situation 
of fast falling output and a decrease in individuals' real incomes, the trans-
ition countries' governments became fiscally trapped. Implementation of 
structural reforms and social protection required adequate funds for 
public spending but the revenue basis disappeared or was being eroded. 
Therefore, governments in new emerging market economies had to adopt 
new tax system principles and to establish efficient revenue collection 
institutions. 
Certain criteria have been developed which an efficient tax system and 
administration should meet.1 In addition, researchers have analyzed differ-
ent aspects of tax reform conditions, developments and results for trans-
ition countries.2 In particular, a new tax system in those countries must 
respond for the needs of an expanding market economy, guarantee the 
required fiscal resources for government activities and distort, as little as 
possible, the entrepreneurial incentives (Taxation and Transition 1994). 
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As a general principle, a tax administration should be organizationally effi-
cient, and also transparent, understandable and logical for taxpayers. 
Tax levels and administration procedures are also significant elements 
of an investment environment. Entrepreneurs, when planning investments, 
are concerned not only about the level of tax rates but also about tax-
related procedures and other tax system characteristics. As has been said, 
'a revenue administration, that is perceived to be arbitrary or predatory, 
discourages investment' (Gill 2003). 
Nevertheless, the majority of the literature about the reforming tax 
system in transition countries is concerned more with general tax policy 
developments and less attention is given to how to reform the tax adminis-
tration organization itself (Hogye 2000; Mitra and Stern 2003). Developing 
a new tax system is a large-scale, time consuming and permanent process. 
For that reason, improving tax administrative capacity is still an impera-
tive issue in all New EU Member countries. It includes not only adopting 
new laws, founding new tax structures and a radical improvement of the 
tax administrative process, but also changing the behavior of all involved 
parties - as well as taxpayers and administrators.3 It is crucial to create and 
strengthen a new 'tax culture and ethics' as an important factor that sup-
ports a well-organized tax administration.4 
In particular, the tax collecting capacity is directly correlated with the 
scope of the shadow economy activities. For certain reasons, which will be 
discussed below, most of the transition economies suffered from bursts of 
shadow economy activities in the early period of market reforms. A high 
level of unofficial economic conduct limits potential budget revenues, 
destabilizes public morale and has various other negative impacts on 
economy and society. Accordingly, the progress of tax administration 
reforms in transition economies is widely related with gaining control of, 
and thereafter reducing, unofficial economic activities. 
Above all, this chapter's main focus is on drawing interrelations 
between tax administration processes and shadow economy activities, 
along with analyzing those issues in certain New EU Member countries. 
Therefore, the chapter is structured as follows. After the introduction, the 
second section presents a formal scheme to analyze the tax gap as a weak-
ness in the tax administration and the extent of shadow economy activities. 
The third section characterizes the tax administration situation and devel-
opments in the transition period and last part generalizes shadow economy 
activities in New EU Member countries. 
5.2 Shadow economy and tax administration 
Tax gap reasons 
The most important task of the tax administration is fiscal - to collect the 
planned amount of tax revenues to cover the requirement for public 
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expenditures. In reality, tax administrators in many countries are strug-
gling with revenue administration inefficiencies that do not allow them to 
collect the predicted amount of tax revenues. Therefore, the tax adminis-
tration should be continuously improved or totally reshaped, as in the case 
of the transition economies. 
A widely recognized measure of the tax revenue service effectiveness, is 
the size of country's tax gap - the 'difference between the tax that should 
be paid according to the tax laws ... and the tax which is actually col-
lected' (Silvani and Baer 1997). 
There are several reasons for a tax gap or taxpayers' non-compliance. 
Rationally, the tax gap includes taxes not paid due to evasion; tax arrears; 
the shortfall in taxes due to taxpayers' misunderstanding of the tax laws 
and other reasons (Silvani and Baer 1997). Nevertheless, the exact size of 
the tax gap is difficult to calculate because it is not viable to obtain an 
overwhelming amount of data to estimate the precise potential tax base 
and predict tax subjects' compliance level. In particular, the extent of the 
tax gap largely depends on the country's economical, political, historical 
and cultural circumstances. In this chapter, we focus on two important 
aspects of the tax gap - inefficiencies related to the tax administration and 
the extent of shadow economy activities. 
Figure 5.1 shows the main relations causing the tax gap as well as 
depicting their interrelations and rationale. The circles connect blocks 
whose activities are interrelated or interdependent. Later, the figure will 
be taken as an explanatory tool for analyzing transition countries' tax 
administration developments and the extent of shadow economy activities. 
As mentioned, there are several reasons why potential tax revenues 
differ from actually collected ones. From the figure, the tax gap depends 
on an inadequate tax administration and shadow economy activities, which 
both result in tax avoidance or evasion. 
The tax administration cannot be efficient without a comprehensive 
legislative basis, and as well as strong legal foundations for taxation, an 
institutional aspect is also critically important. Tax administration means 
establishing capable tax collecting agencies; distributing employees among 
tax offices; maintaining information systems between governmental agen-
cies; calculating and levying taxes; inspection of individuals and com-
panies; solving the contradiction between taxpayers and revenue 
administrators; charging penalties on non-compliant taxpayers, and many 
other activities. 
Therefore, tax collection institutions and agencies should be well organ-
ized, properly managed and capable. For example, taxpayers' non-com-
pliance depends directly of the possibility of control of their activities' 
records or incomes. As stated, 'administrators overall effectiveness will be 
low if auditing are not effective in discouraging evasion' (Silvani and Baer 
1997). However, post-communist countries' tax administration in the early 
period of reforms is characterized by a clearly inadequate and unstable 
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Figure 5.1 Tax administration and the shadow economy (source: see text). 
legal base combined with inefficient tax administering. Technically poorly 
equipped tax agencies, low skilled and little motivated (or even corrupt) 
tax officials are some reasons for unsatisfactory tax revenue collection. 
To generalize, all aspects of tax administration must be continuously 
monitored and analyzed to make required improvements in the case of 
organizational and institutional inefficiencies. In particular, it is important 
in the circumstances of greater than ever globalization of economic activ-
ities and widening difficult-to-tax businesses such as Internet-related com-
mercial transactions. 
Tax gap and shadow economy 
There is an extensive literature that analyses the extent of the shadow 
economy and its impact on economy and society.5 Researchers also have 
developed comprehensive taxonomies of the conception of the shadow 
economy.6 Nevertheless, we are here concerned with only those shadow 
economy aspects that are related to tax evasion, and are not focusing on 
several other negative ( or sometimes positive) results, which arise from 
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unofficial economic activities. Therefore, here the term shadow economy 
is used to 'refer to the value of economic activity that would be taxable 
were it reported to the tax authorities' (Brooks 2001). Logically, the larger 
the extent of the shadow economy, the wider the gap between the poten-
tial amount of taxes and that actually collected. 
What are the motives behind entrepreneurs' shadow economy activities 
and an individual's reasons for avoiding reporting their incomes or for 
cheating? In common understanding, there is a mix of several reasons for 
existence of shadow economy activities (see also Figure 5.1). Here we con-
sider three aspects, which are also considered as related tax gap reasons. 
First, different theoretical and empirical studies have proved that the 
extent of shadow economy activities is related to a high tax burden on 
individuals and companies.7 Some authors extend that cause and empha-
size the burden of total government regulations as a rationale for the 
shadow economy (Johnson and Kaufmann 2001). 
By staying outside of the official economy and not reporting their 
incomes, individuals will save considerable amounts of money, which 
would otherwise be taken by governments as taxes. Similarly for com-
panies, a possibility to not pay taxes maintains income and also gives them 
competitive advantage compared with law-abiding companies. For 
example, companies might be motivated to use unofficial labor, which 
allows evading of payments of social security contributions. 
Second, several findings suggest that inadequate and weak tax institu-
tions are reasons for shadow economy activities.8 Similarly, the adequate 
strength and efficiency of the government institutions reduces the extent 
of the shadow economy. If there are poor legal foundations or law 
enforcement is weak and unstable, then the motivation and opportunities 
to avoid taxes will increase. 
Making tax administration stronger does not automatically mean that 
the government should just add a number of tax laws and statutes, or 
toughen law enforcement. There is a risk that increased regulation makes 
the tax system more complex and enhances the power of bureaucracy. In 
particular, in the situation of fragile democracies in transition countries, 
stronger government action might lead to increased tax non-compliance, 
depressed entrepreneurial activities and corruption. The extent of corrup-
tion is one clear reason for limits on a government's ability to collect taxes 
(Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000; Johnson and Kaufmann 2001). Corruption 
undermines a society's trust in the tax authorities, distorts and decreases 
the transparency of the economic environment and therefore decreases 
both domestic and foreign investment. Worldwide, tax administrations 
constantly figure near the top of public-sector organizations that have a 
high level of corruption (Gill 2003). 
The third group of reasons explains the shadow economy activities on 
the grounds of a society's historical traditions and mentality. For example, 
'social networks, personal relationships and high profit from shadow 
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economy activities' are strong motives, which keep people away from 
working unofficially (Schneider and Enste 2000). By some means, support-
ive main-set towards shadow economy demonstrates also citizen's distrust 
or ignorance against the state. Owing to earlier harmful experiences, 
former post-communist countries clearly had many reasons not to trust 
their governments. Therefore, the shadow economy should be considered 
as a 'natural wrongdoing' that always exists and cannot be replaced com-
pletely. The question should therefore be focused in another way- how to 
diminish scope of the shadow economy and reduce its negative con-
sequences, particularly with respect to societies' tax collecting abilities. 
Tax avoidance and evasion 
Weak tax administration and underground economy activities both 
become visible as tax avoidance and tax evasion (see Figure 5.1). Tax 
avoidance is defined here as the attentive activities of businesses or indi-
viduals to minimize their tax burden. Tax avoidance includes, for example 
employee discounts, fringe benefits, all do-it-yourself work and neighbor 
help (Hogye 2000; Schneider and Enste 2000). Usually, these activities are 
not illegal; however, inadequate or unclear laws implicitly support tax 
avoidance. 
Legal tax avoidance happens if it is possible to use loopholes in tax 
laws. Often, this is possible due to a combination of the complexity of tax 
laws and inexperienced tax officials. As examples, consider the wide use of 
offshore companies in transition countries for business dealings to avoid 
taxes or the great difficulties in properly taxing sophisticated stock market 
transactions. 
Paradoxically, on one hand, sophisticated and detailed tax regulations 
can largely cover all possible income sources and economic transactions, 
but on the other hand may provide additional possibilities for legal tax 
avoidance. For example, there is a causal link between the complexity of 
an income tax system and its impact on the shadow economy (Schneider 
and Enste 2000). Schneider and Enste (2000) conclude that a sophisticated 
tax system creates the possibilities for legal tax avoidance due to tax 
exemptions, but, positively, it decreases labor supply in a shadow 
economy. 
In contrast, tax evasion is identified when taxes - imposed on indi-
viduals or businesses - are just not paid and thus an illegal act is commit-
ted. Tax evasion includes unreported income from self-employment or 
different and other business activities. Tax evasion therefore means cheat-
ing and is considered as a shadow economic activity. 
Tax avoidance and evasion are directly related to a potential budget 
revenue shortage9 (see Figure 5.1). Limited budget revenue cuts a gov-
ernment's abilities to put into practice its spending policies - the provision 
of public services and the implementation of welfare programs. As a 
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short-term reaction, governments make efforts to fulfil} the budget short-
fall by increasing tax rates. In turn, a higher tax burden distorts tax sub-
jects' economic conduct and may increase tax evasion and shadow 
economy activities. As the literature points out, spiral-like movements can 
take place in such circumstances - a decrease in tax revenue collections 
will force governments to increase tax rates, which again are opposed by 
taxpayers through attempts to evade taxes (Schneider and Enste 2000). 
To some extent, closing tax loopholes by governments can reduce legal 
tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. However, too strong and bureau-
cratic tax administrations bring risks that the tax base will be distorted. In 
particular, in transition economies 'too heavy-handed approach in dealing 
with tax evasion could damage dynamism of small business and the infor-
mal sector' (OECD 2000). 
5.3 The tax administration situation and developments in 
the transition period 
Structural changes and the decline of government 
The organizational principles of command type economies are widely pre-
sented in the literature concerning transitional societies. In these societies, 
a centralized planning system regulates resource allocation, production 
decisions and public spending (Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000). The majority of 
financial flows required for public needs are generated by the state-owned 
enterprises as 'surpluses' of their economic activities. These surpluses are 
captured by the state budget, using a mixture of taxes, such as turnover 
taxes on goods, 'profit taxes' and payroll taxes (Taxation and Transition 
1994). These 'taxes' were mainly individualized as 'normative' by enter-
prises or industries for fiscal transfers to the centralized budget. Planning 
bodies were able directly to control and distribute enterprises finances due 
to the limited number of production entities. As resources for funding 
social and public programs were obtained directly by the planning institu-
tions, there was no need for (tax) revenue administration. 
Governments' expenditure size in former communist countries was 
remarkably high compared with the EU average level in the early 1990s. 
At the beginning of reforms in 1989-91, in many countries, government 
expenditure covered more than 50 percent as weighted against the GDP 
level (see Table 5.1). 
As a part of market reforms rationale in all transition countries, the 
economic role of the government started a remarkable downturn during 
the course of transition. Many of government functions just disappeared 
or were given to private economic agents. Along with the state role in the 
economy declining, its expenditure share in GDP decreased. On average, 
the Baltic countries' governments expenditure size in GDP was lower than 
that of the Central European transition countries. 
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Table5.1 Consolidated government expenditure in transition countries, percent-
age of GDP, average level per period 
1989-91 1992-94 1995-97 1998-2000 2001-02 
Czech Republic 59.6 48.2 42.4 42.2 45.4 
Slovak Republic 59.6 55.8 45.9 43.9 48.1 
Hungary 58.2 62.0 50.3 47.4 52.3 
Poland 45.5 50.0 47.1 42.4 43.9 
Slovenia 44.3 46.2 43.4 43.7 42.6 
Estonia 33.8 36.5 39.9 40.7 37.7 
Latvia 42.0 33.9 40.7 43.1 38.0 
Lithuania 47.3 31.2 34.5 37.2 31.6 
Source: Transition Reports on years 1994, 1997 and 2003 and author's calculation. 
However, besides the natural process of government sector decline, 
other factors also limited the government's expenditure capacity. Namely, 
at the beginning of reforms, most of the governments in transition coun-
tries were just not able to collect as much revenue to continue with the 
previous expenditure level. Two reasons for this must be pointed out, the 
collapse of former budget revenue funding principles and the explosion of 
shadow economy activities. 
The preceding revenue collection principles were practically paralyzed 
and the traditional 'tax' base disappeared in most of the transition coun-
tries. Soviet-type enterprises, previously the main taxpayers, were 
economically unstable and their activities declined sharply. In addition, in 
the early 1990s, total output fell in all transition countries. As pointed out 
by various studies, emerging new firms in the private sector could not 
immediately generate enough tax revenue (Hogye 2000). 
In addition, the legal base for tax collection was insufficient and tax law 
enforcement remarkably weak. As mentioned, the 'old system is largely 
gone, but a new system [was] far from coming into existence. Thus ... a kind 
of institutional vacuum has developed' (Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000, p. 3). 
In present-day terms, tax-administrating institutions were missing or 
were in an emerging stage in most transition countries. Personal income 
taxation was in its infant phase and consumer taxes (VAT, excises, other) 
were missing in most of the transition countries. 
In addition, tax administration institutions were often incapable of 
dealing with the unprecedented explosion of shadow economic activities. 
The new emerging private sector had strong incentives not to declare rev-
enues and also had 'outstanding' inventiveness in finding and using tax law 
weaknesses. Success by governments in encouraging new private com-
panies to report their incomes was insubstantial and, as a result, extensive 
tax evasion took place. 
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General government fiscal balance 
Despite the fact that most governments of transition countries cut their 
expenditure in the period 1989-91, most of them were not able to keep the 
general government budget balanced.10 The transition countries general 
government balance, during the transition years, is presented in Table 5.2. 
There is no common level of government budget unbalance for all 
transition economies during the years 1989-2002. One group of reformer 
countries, such as Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia, were able to cut their 
expenditures and maintain a balanced or low deficit even in the situation 
of a considerable decline in output and a decrease of government revenues 
in the years 1989-94. Another group of countries (Hungary, Poland and 
Lithuania) failed, for different reasons, to radically cut government expen-
ditures and therefore suffered from larger budget deficits. 
All these countries' general government budgets, except for Estonia, 
were in deficit during the period 2001-02. During recent years, New Euro-
pean Union Members had to implement costly structural reforms to be 
qualified to EU and NATO requirements. Necessary structural reforms 
included implementation of pension and healthcare reforms, improving 
environment protection and infrastructure functioning, and were accom-
plished with military and other reforms. As Table 5.2 shows, the govern-
ments' budgets deficit during 2001-02 were even larger than a decade ago. 
Tax administration reform in New EU Member countries 
Tax administration reforms 
Reforming or improving the tax system and administration is not only a 
problem for transition or developing countries. Governments in developed 
countries have a continuous pressure to modernize their tax systems in 
order to keep their economies competitive and to collect adequate 
resources for social programs. 
Table 5.2 General government balance in transition countries (percentage of 
GDP), average per period 
1989-91 1992-94 1995-97 1998-2000 2001--02 
Czech Republic -1.4 -0.4 -1.8 -3.2 -5.9 
Slovak Republic -1.4 -7.3 -2.0 -7.2 -7.3 
Hungary -1.1 -6.5 -5.5 -3.9 -7.0 
Poland -3.6 -5.3 -3.2 -3.3 -6.1 
Slovenia 0.9 0.2 -0.5 -1.2 -2.2 
Estonia 3.4 0.1 -0.2 -1.8 1.0 
Latvia 3.1 -1.0 -1.8 -2.6 -2.4 
Lithuania -4.4 -2.8 -3.6 -5.7 -1.6 
Sources: Transition Report, 1994, 1997, 2003 and author's calculations. 
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Nevertheless, a clear difference between developed EU and transition 
countries was the time limit within which the new tax systems must be put 
into operation. Transition countries required a new tax system and institu-
tions promptly - to replace, without delay, the old revenue system. There 
was no time and few possibilities for gradual improvement or for experi-
menting with existing tax arrangements. Building up a new and efficient 
tax administration system is not an easy task in the situation of a fast col-
lapse of half a century's existing economic and social organization. 
As a matter of fact, fast reforms brought essential changes to indi-
viduals' and companies' activities. Equally, at the personal and business 
level, in many transition countries tax obligations were an entirely new 
phenomenon and an additional burden during the period of radical 
reforms and falling living standard. Obviously, one of the reasons for indi-
vidual taxpayers' high non-compliance was also a lack of experience in tax 
reporting. In addition, the attitude towards tax authorities was not very 
helpful. 
As mentioned, there was an urgent need in transition economies to 
establish a tax system that can respond to the conditions of the market 
economy and ensure funding of government programs in the situation of 
fast decline of production. Success of the reforming tax administration and 
increasing tax-collecting capacity was directly related to achievements in 
general economic reform. Privatization, economic restructuring and stabi-
lization activities influenced the build-up of new taxation systems and 
forced the continuous development of the legal foundations. At the same 
time, progress in tax system reform had a positive impact on attracting 
foreign investments, the stabilization of government finance systems and 
the decline of the shadow economy. 
Reforming the tax administration was highly dependent on the govern-
ment's political commitment and its capability to make radical and fast 
changes. As mentioned by the United Nation Economic Commission for 
Europe, the prospect of EU membership had an enormous impact on the 
process and nature of tax reform in these economies, especially in more 
recent years, before they became EU members (Secretariat of the Eco-
nomic Commission For Europe 2004). 
Nevertheless, while the New EU Member countries have developed 
modern tax policy and legislation, the institutional changes in tax adminis-
tration delayed policy. This is due, 'not only to a greater focus on changes 
in [tax] policy rather than administration in the early years of transition, 
but also to the fact that demands on administration arising from changes in 
tax policy would usually precede development of supporting institutions' 
(Mitra and Stern 2003). Considering this, those shaping the frames of tax 
reforms should consider imminent European Union membership and 
therefore increase their administrative capacity and institutional efficiency. 
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Institutional efficiency 
Tax administration inefficiency in transition countries was caused by legal, 
institutional and managerial weaknesses. These are interrelated com-
ponents, which must be improved to increase the effectiveness of the tax 
procedures generally. 
The legal aspects of tax administration mean that the law should ade-
quately cover taxation-related issues. Most of the transition countries' 
loopholes in tax law have been obstacles for efficient revenue collection. 
Tax laws and regulations have changed, often due to the fast-changing 
economic environment. In addition, the law has not been strong enough to 
allow authorities successfully to pursue cases of tax evasion through the 
courts (OECD 2000). At the same time, driven by administrative consider-
ations, tax legislation should be as simple as possible so as not to devastate 
new entrepreneurial incentives and confuse unsophisticated taxpayers. 
Institutionally, an increase of tax administration efficiency has many 
similarities to business organizations and consists of many specific 
characteristics.11 Generally, a capable institution requires a clear vision of 
its functions and an organizational structure; a rational allocation of 
employment and professional management; improvements in technology 
and better client service. 
A tax administration institution should have appropriate autonomy and 
its responsibilities and organizational structure exactly defined. Studies in 
transition countries have revealed disorganized coordination between tax 
administration agencies, unclear administrative power and inadequate del-
egations of responsibilities and illogical distribution of employees by 
bureaus and departments (Hogye 2000). 
From a managerial aspect, revenue collection offices in transition 
economies are often poorly equipped and managed. The problems include 
inappropriate use of modern computer and office technology; ineffective 
use of available information to control non-compliance; weak collection 
enforcement and the existence of corrupt practices. Often, the motivation 
of tax authorities' employees was weak owing to low salaries and unpleas-
ant working conditions (Hogye 2000). 
Nevertheless, tax administration has been strengthened in all New EU 
Members and has improved towards purpose-oriented, functional and effi-
cient tax collection institutions. 
5.4 Shadow economy and non-compliance 
Explosion of the shadow economy 
As economic activities moved outside the state sector, a match between 
government revenue and expenditure became problematic in all transition 
economies. In addition, as living standards generally fell, governments 
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faced pressure to increase expenditure at the same time as the economic 
downturn reduced the tax base. The emerging private sector was not able 
to produce a suitable amount of revenue to fill the revenue gap. 
Attempts to increase the existing tax burden were followed by large-
scale tax avoidance and the growth of unofficial economic activities. Then 
taxpayers became 'subject to an ever greater tax pressure ... prompting 
many to withdraw from business or to opt for the underground economy' 
(Aslund 2002). 
Therefore, radical reforms began in the early 1990s. All transition 
economies met the sudden increase of shadow economy activities. The 
shadow economy included a wide range of activities - from 'innocent' 
unreported labor activities to criminal actions. Many of these activities 
were related to tax evasion, tax fraud and corruption. 
Table 5.3 shows the average level of the shadow economy in transition 
countries for the first half of the 1990s. To estimate the level of under-
ground activities, different methods can be used.12 As the table shows, 
countries' results are different due to the various methods used by differ-
ent researchers. 
The figures presented by Schneider and Enste show smaller levels of 
shadow economy activities than those estimated by Lacko. As the table 
shows, the estimated level of total underground activities varies from 
about 13 percent in the Czech Republic to more than 38 percent in Lithu-
ania in period 1990-93. In the later period, the average size of the shadow 
economy was about the same in Central European states but increased in 
the Baltic states. However, the level of the shadow economies remains 
high in most of the transition countries, and hence had a negative impact 
on potential government budget revenues. 
The explosion of the shadow economy in combination with falling 
output and the disappearing tax base immediately created problems with 
budget revenues. The turn to the shadow economy undermines the tax 
Table 5.3 Size of the shadow economy in transition countries, as GDP level, per 
period 
Country 1990-93 1994-95 
Czech Republic 13.4 (28.7) 14.5 (23.2) 
Slovak Republic 14.2 (30.6) 10.2 (30.2) 
Poland 20.3 (31.8) 13.9 (25.9) 
Hungary 30.7 (30.9) 28.4 (30.5) 
Slovenia - (28.5) -(24.0) 
Estonia 23.9 (35.9) 18.5 (37.0) 
Latvia 24.3 (34.9) 35.3 (43.6) 
Lithuania 26.0 (38.1) 25.2 (47.0) 
Sources: Schneider and Enste (2000) and studies of Johnson et al. (1997) and Lacko (1999). 
Estimates are given in brackets. 
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base and makes it hard for the state to provide important public services, 
such as infrastructure development, social programs and health care. 
Decrease of the shadow economy in New EU Member countries 
As noted above, there are many reasons for tax avoidance and shadow 
economy activities. Concerning the possibilities to decrease the shadow 
economy in the transition economies, three general aspects are emphas-
ized here. 
First, the apparent excessive tax burden on individuals and businesses is 
the main reason for making tax evasion a 'sin worth committing', particu-
larly in the situation where the government lacks the capability to enforce 
proper compliance, and there are emerging businesses. The experience of 
the Baltic states suggests that high tax rates have encouraged informal 
economic activities and discouraged formal employment (OECD 2000). 
An increase of tax and government regulations in low-income transitional 
societies is resisted more strongly than far richer societies.13 Therefore, an 
optimal level of tax rates will keep businesses in the official economy and 
individuals are not so hostile to reporting their incomes. 
Second, a high level of regulations, bureaucracy and corruption, gener-
alized as a burden imposed by government, is realized to be an even 
stronger reason for the rise of the shadow economy than high marginal 
corporate or personal income rates (Johnson and Kaufmann 2001). The 
fast demolishing of the formerly strongly centralized political and econom-
ical system left a gap before new democratic institutions were able to 
govern the society efficiently. As a result, an uncertain legal environment 
and a lack of democratic control over institutions was followed by an 
increase in bureaucracy and corruption. Building up efficient administra-
tive institutions is a relatively slow process and requires remarkable legal, 
administrative and behavioral activities. Nevertheless, as economic and 
social reforms have progressed, most of the transition countries have 
experienced a general shift towards formal activities (OECD 2000; Hogye 
2000). 
Third, there is need to create and promote tax 'ethics' and social 
'norms', which are widely recognized by the society and support law-
abiding behavior. The existence of such norms suggests, that individuals 
will comply with tax responsibilities because they believe that it is good 
social behavior.14 The tax administration should shape individuals' and 
entrepreneurs' behavior towards loyalty with their tax liabilities and there-
fore, incorporate them into official taxpayers 'society'. 
Taking into consideration New EU Members' post-communist legacy, 
there has been a prevailing mutual mistrust between taxpayers and the tax 
authorities, which materialized in the absence of a tradition of voluntary 
compliance with tax liabilities. Enhancing trust in the fairness of the tax 
administration would encourage voluntary compliance (Mitra and Stern 
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2003). Based on this, the transition countries' tax administration reforms 
have been targeted to a wide recognition of voluntary compliance, self-
assessment of tax obligations by taxpayers and clearly defined rights and 
obligations both of the tax authorities and the taxpayers. Hunting non-
compliant taxpayers and punishing tax evaders are not in themselves the 
main objectives of the tax administration. Successful administrations make 
the tax-paying community realize that non-compliance will be detected 
and effectively punished (Silvani and Baer 1997). 
In conclusion, in the course of economic reforms and strengthening of 
government capability, the tax administration has increased efficiency and 
the amount of taxes in most of the New EU Member countries. The goal 
of harmonizing their systems of public finance with those in the EU has 
provided one of the most important catalysts of the reforms (Secretariat of 
the Economic Commission For Europe 2004). In line with a decrease of 
tax burdens, taxpayer-friendly tax procedures and transparent government 
activities, the extent of the shadow economy activities decreased in all 
former transition countries. 
Notes 
1 Institutionally, EBRD, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OECD and 
others have developed their recommendations and strategies for tax adminis-
tration reforms. Relevant references are presented in the list of website 
sources. 
2 For example, Mitra and Stem (2003); Tanzi and Tsibouris (2000); Ebrill and 
Havrylyshyn (1999); Silvani and Baer (1997); Hogye (2000). 
3 The general structure of activities needed for tax reform in transition countries 
is given in Tanzi and Tsibouris (2000), Hogye (2000) and Mitra and Stem 
(2003). 
4 More detailed analyses of the concept is provided in the works of Alm and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2000); Nerre (2001), and Tanzi and Tsibouris (2000). 
5 The mentioned literature here includes the works of Schneider and Enste 
(2000), Johnson and Kaufmann (2001), Johnson et al. (1997), Lacko (1999) and 
Brooks (2001). 
6 For example Schneider and Enste (2000). 
7 All earlier mentioned authors emphasize the tax burden as a main reason for 
shadow economy activities. 
8 For example, Tanzi and Tsibouris (2000); Schneider and Enste (2000); Johnson 
and Kaufmann (2001). 
9 The term is used here to differentiate from term 'budget deficit', which has a 
more specific meaning. 
10 Only Hungary and Poland had, in the period 1989-91, full control over their 
national budgets, all other selected countries were, in that time, parts of federal 
countries. 
11 For example, a detailed description of activities required by tax administrative 
institutions is given in Hogye (2000). 
12 Methods described by Schneider and Enste (2000); Brooks (2001). 
13 Johnson and Kaufmann (2001). 
14 A more detailed explanation of the concept is provided by Alm and Martinez-
Vazquez (2000); Tanzi and Tsibouris (2000); Brooks (2001). 
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6 Competition for FDI and the role 
of taxation 
Jeffrey Owens 
6.1 FDI and the role of taxation1 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the 'transition' economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)2 have risen dramatically over the past 
decade. The region's share of the global total has increased from 0.2 
percent in 1988-90, to 2.3 percent in 1998-2000. Total inward FDI for the 
region amounted to US$26.5 billion in 2000, an increase of roughly 5 
percent over the preceding year, close to double the amount received in 
1996, and nearly 90 times the figure for 1990. FDI flows to CEE countries 
increased further to $27.2 billion in 2001, a year in which global FDI 
flows declined by half. The bulk of the total (over 75 percent) has gone to 
four countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Russian 
Federation. 
FDI flows to the SEE Member countries of the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe (SEE)3 also rose substantially over the last decade, with 
the year 2001 volume reaching almost 50 times that for 1991. However, 
after a sharp initial rise, the annual inflow remained largely static over the 
period 1998-2000, at just under $4 billion a year, although rising to $4.5 
billion in 2001. Romania, by far the largest country in the region, accounts 
for more than one-quarter of the total, with Bulgaria and Croatia the 
other principal recipients. 
To what extent does taxation have an impact upon FDI decisions? This 
question has been the subject of many studies over the past 30 years, and 
answers provided and opinions on the subject continue to differ widely. 
Some studies have considered the effects of tax systems generally, some 
have examined specific taxes (especially the corporate income tax), while 
others have concentrated on tax incentives. 
In principle, taxation ought to be important, since it influences after-tax 
profitability. Investors that are able to achieve reduced tax exposure in 
one project would be expected to choose it over an identical project that 
has the same level of risk and return. This much seems self-evident. 
However, econometric studies, which seek to establish the relationship (if 
any) between tax burdens and FDI levels in a particular country, have 
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been mostly inconclusive, largely due to difficulties in modeling and meas-
uring variables thought to influence FDI flows, and in measuring consis-
tent FDI series over time and across countries. Survey studies, based upon 
questionnaires addressed to MNE managers, tend to show taxation as 
ranking relatively low compared with other factors, while in some cases 
taxation is singled out as an important consideration ( depending largely on 
how and to whom questions are posed). 
It is evident that certain tax considerations are more likely than others to 
affect FDI decisions. The overall level of taxation in a country, as meas-
ured, for example, by its tax-to-GDP ratio, does not appear to directly 
influence inward or outward FDI. Among OECD member states, Japan 
has a relatively low level of taxation and receives very little FDI, whilst 
Belgium and Sweden are comparatively high-tax countries yet have sub-
stantial FDI inflows. This suggests that, to the extent that tax is relevant, it 
is the tax mix and design features that are more important, possibly to a 
varying extent depending on the type of investment in question. Tax 
administration (and transparency) would also be expected to be important. 
Not surprisingly, corporate income tax (CIT) has received the greatest 
attention from analysts, since it most closely affects the amount of profit of 
a MNE that is available for distribution to shareholders. Several recent 
studies have found a significant relationship between effective host 
country CIT rates and levels of FDI.4 
However, as noted above, a number of difficult modeling and data 
measurement problems continue to pose challenges to researchers (while 
survey findings raise difficulties of their own). A key problem in estimating 
the sensitivity of FDI to host country taxation stems from difficulties in 
measuring host country tax burdens. A host country average effective tax 
rate is measured, in principle, by dividing host country CIT revenues (plus 
possibly other host country taxes) by true host country profit measured on 
an arm's length basis. However, true host country profits are difficult (if 
not impossible) to measure given the existence of tax-motivated profit 
stripping to low-tax jurisdictions (in principle, profits booked in low-tax 
jurisdictions should be taken into account). But this requires (confidential) 
firm-level data on cross-border transactions, as well as estimates of the tax-
motivated elements of inter-affiliate cross-border payments. 
Individual income tax and employee and employer social security con-
tributions are generally less important considerations, except where they 
have an unusually large impact on labor costs. Consumption taxes, such as 
the value added tax, would also typically have relatively little relevance to 
market-oriented FDI decisions. Such taxes tend to be passed on to con-
sumers rather than borne by producing enterprises, and apply equally to 
competing domestic products and to imports.5 
By contrast, import taxes and customs duties may be quite important in 
two ways. High import taxes and duties constitute a tariff wall, which may 
encourage MNEs to invest in a country rather than export to it. Once they 
114 Jeffrey Owens 
are there, such duties provide protection against imports from competi-
tors: in that way high import duties may actually constitute an incentive to 
some types of market-oriented investment. But at the same time, high 
duties and taxes mi the import of machinery and other capital goods 
increase the initial cost of investment and the cost of imported goods used 
in production, and may constitute a substantial disincentive to FDl.6 
It is widely held that export-oriented FDI is more sensitive to the host 
country tax burden than is market-oriented investment. Taxes that directly 
affect the cost of production and corporate income tax are typically 
reflected in the price of exported products or services, tending to make 
demand for those products ( and therefore investor interest in a given 
export site) sensitive to host country tax considerations. Tax considera-
tions seem to be of the greatest importance to firms exporting services,7 
followed by those manufacturing for export, and seem to be less important 
to firms in the natural resource sector. These differences reflect the 
relative mobility of the investment and the range of choice of possible 
locations. 
By contrast, market-oriented FDI tends to be relatively little affected 
by considerations of taxation unless the host country tax is unusually bur-
densome - that is, unless the tax system (policies and/or administration) 
imposes compliance and possibly other costs that cannot be shifted onto 
others. Taxes that affect the cost of production, to the extent that they are 
borne by domestic and other MNE competitors and can be passed on to 
consumers, may not be problematic ( depending on the degree of competi-
tion in output and factor markets), while taxes on profits may, to some 
extent, be passed on to consumers. Finally, MNEs with global operations 
( or more limited operations but with finance affiliates located in tax 
havens) may have considerable scope to 'manage' (reduce or largely elimi-
nate) host country tax burdens, implying that statutory provisions may 
have little bearing on actual tax burdens and investment decisions. 
Apart from tax rates and tax base considerations, two other tax-related 
factors are likely to be taken into consideration. First, MNEs will prefer to 
invest in countries that have concluded tax treaties with their home 
country in order to avoid potential double taxation, although the existence 
of a treaty may not be a decisive factor, particularly if an investor can 
invest through a third country that has a treaty with both the home and 
target (host) country (i.e. opportunities exist for 'treaty shopping') and to 
have available dispute resolution procedures. Second, the quality of the 
potential host country's tax administration is often a major consideration. 
Uncertainty, ambiguity, too frequent changes in the legislation, inconsis-
tency in its interpretation and application, corrupt officials, excessive 
penalties and related administrative factors can constitute a severe disin-
centive to investment.8 
A further factor, and one that is often overlooked, is that a large pro-
portion of FDI is in the form of reinvestment, or of additions to existing 
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investments. Taxation may not have played a major part in the initial 
decision to invest in a particular country but it may have an important 
influence on decisions to reinvest or to expand. Among the reasons com-
monly given for dissatisfaction with host country conditions are inconsis-
tent tax laws and erratic tax administrations. This 'never again' factor 
inevitably has a substantial effect on future investment plans. 
Most of the studies undertaken before 1990 found that taxation was a 
relatively minor consideration in most FDI decisions. More recent studies 
have tended to suggest otherwise: taxation is becoming an increasingly 
important factor. For this development, there may be a number of expla-
nations. 
• As other barriers to FDI are eliminated, the remaining obstacles 
assume an increased importance. Taxation has always been recognized 
as being a factor in FDI decisions, other considerations being equal. 
Today, many of those other considerations have become more or less 
equal. 
• The process of globalization is characterized by greatly increased 
international production: the components that go to make a finished 
automobile may come from five or six different countries. Sales are no 
longer made principally in the country of production and investment is 
no longer oriented to a single market. 
• The creation of common markets, customs unions and free trade areas 
has had a similar effect, making it easier to supply a number of 
national markets from a single location unimpeded by tariff barriers, 
and also sometimes reducing other differences between the Member 
countries. Thus, the distinction between market-oriented and export-
oriented investment has become less clear. 
These latter two points seem especially important. The fact that export-
oriented investment is more likely than market-oriented investment to be 
influenced by tax considerations has been recognized for many years. 
However, the growth of international production and the coming into 
existence of free trade areas or common markets has changed the picture 
radically. When goods and services are allowed to move freely within a 
single multinational market, it is possible for FDI to be both market-
oriented and export-oriented. A single location may be selected within 
that market to supply all of the countries composing the market. The 
market potential of the actual country where production is located 
becomes relatively unimportant, the cost of production becomes more 
important, as do other factors such as central location, communications, 
availability of labor - and taxation. 
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6.2 Tax considerations in SEE countries 
FDI decisions in the SEE region are typically based on expectations of 
above-normal rates of return, but accompanied by a high perceived level 
of risk (including political, economic, governance and other risks). Dif-
ficulties in predicting macroeconomic developments tied to political and 
economic instabilities in the region, difficulties in predicting the applica-
tion ( or not) of host country laws, and difficulties in predicting costs tied to 
dealings with host country bureaucracy, on top of other market-related 
uncertainties, imply significant project risk. These difficulties in predicting 
project outcomes tend to render questions over the exact level of the 
effective host-country tax rate as relatively unimportant, provided that the 
effective tax rate is not viewed as excessively high. This is particularly true 
where significant scope exists for multinationals to effectively set the 
effective host country tax burden that they are willing to bear, through the 
use of careful tax planning. 
This view was confirmed in a survey of SEE investors by Emerging 
Market Economics Ltd, which found that special tax incentives, rather 
than encouraging FDI, either were not taken into account (were judged to 
be unimportant), or operated to discourage investment. Tax incentives 
were discouraging to investment where the provisions were difficult to 
track, understand or comply with and/or invited corrupt behavior on the 
part of tax officials, tending to increase project costs and uncertainty. 
Particularly discouraging were non-transparent incentive regimes, includ-
ing those subject to frequent change and involving excessive administra-
tive discretion. Investors exhibited a strong preference for stable and 
sound tax systems that did not deviate significantly from international 
norms. 
The following conclusions are relevant to addressing tax impediments 
to FDI in SEE countries. 
• Unstable and non-transparent tax policies, combined with non-
transparent and corrupt administrative practices, have contributed to 
project costs and heightened perceptions of project risk in many SEE 
countries, tending to discourage investment. Tax incentives have 
tended to contribute to uncertainty and project risk, particularly 
where administered in a discretionary fashion. 
• The 'enabling environment' should include a relatively simple tax 
system offering competitive host country tax treatment, with basic 
corporate tax rules that generally follow international practice. 
• Statutory Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rates currently in force in the 
SEE countries, in the range of 15 percent to 25 percent are already 
moderate or low by international standards. Efforts to improve com-
petitiveness of tax systems should concentrate on removing impedi-
ments, streamlining and relaxing certain basic features of tax systems, 
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improving transparency and predictability, while imposing a reason-
able tax burden on host country profits. Such changes should operate 
to lower project costs, lessen the scope for corruption, and reduce 
actual and perceived levels of risk, which taken together should 
operate to encourage additional greenfield FDI. 
• Countries relying on book income, as a basis for measuring taxable 
income, should aim to ensure that national (and, where relevant, inter-
national) standards for proper, transparent financial accounting are 
established, understood and followed by taxpayers and adhered to by 
public ( auditing) officials. 
• Progressive and regressive corporate tax rate structures should be 
reconsidered, given the benefits of a flat (single) corporate tax rate 
structure. 
• The classical tax variant with final withholding tax on dividends paid 
to resident shareholders, which most SEE countries have opted for, 
offers a number of advantages, including simplicity, relative ease of 
administration, and reduced scope for evasion. SEE countries relying 
on alternative mechanisms to integrate corporate and shareholder-
level taxation should reconsider the benefits of this approach. 
• Double, or possibly multiple, taxation of profit distributed along a 
chain of related corporations should be avoided, for example by pro-
viding dividend exemptions on inter-corporate dividends between 
related companies, with final withholding on dividends paid outside a 
corporate group. Dividend gross-up and credit provisions at the 
corporate shareholder level should be avoided if found to add to com-
plexity. 
A substantial portion of the study focuses on targeted corporate tax 
incentives, which have been widely used by SEE countries to promote 
investment. A key finding of the study is the coexistence in SEE countries 
of generous and largely inefficient tax incentive provisions alongside core 
corporate income tax provisions that, in certain areas, are at odds with 
international norms. 
• Business loss carry-forward provisions have been found to be restric-
tive in certain SEE countries ( e.g. three-year loss carry-forward), rela-
tive to international norms (five-to-seven year or more). Where tax is 
a factor in business location choice, restrictive loss carry-forward pro-
visions could be a discouraging factor. Countries with restrictive loss 
carry-forward rules are therefore encouraged to relax those rules as 
quickly as possible. 
• Depreciation rules, another key component of corporate income tax 
systems, are found in a number of SEE countries to be overly complex 
and/or restrictive in the amount of tax relief provided. Certain changes 
( e.g. greater use of the declining-balance method, a reduction in the 
118 Jeffrey Owens 
number of depreciable asset classes) would streamline tax calculations 
while providing considerable scope for encouraging investment, while 
limiting revenue losses. Where depreciation claims continue to be 
mandatory (i.e. unclaimed capital costs cannot be carried over), 
greater importance should be placed on relaxing loss carryover provi-
sions ( as noted above). 
As regards the international aspects of corporate tax systems, and to 
the operation of other domestic taxes, certain policies are recommended 
( e.g. introduction or strengthening of base protection measures) but it is 
recognized that different approaches and variants may be chosen at the 
'domestic' level. 
• Where tax treaties do not currently exist with major capital exporting 
nations, and the conclusion of such treaties is expected to be a number 
of years off, countries should consider reducing statutory (non-treaty) 
rates to levels closer to treaty norms. 
• Countries without thin-capitalization rules, or with variants that have 
been found to be weak, should consider introducing or strengthening 
those rules. 
• Countries without transfer pricing rules should consider their intro-
duction, while those with such rules are encouraged to examine their 
application in practice to ensure enforcement of arm's length prices in 
international transactions. 
• Countries with relatively high employer social security contribution 
rates should consider lowering those rates to international norms as 
quickly as possible. Where such reductions are not possible currently 
due to budgetary pressures, labor market conditions should be exam-
ined to determine if institutional changes are possible to enable a 
partial shifting of such contributions onto employees. 
• Where special customs duty exemptions are provided on imports of 
machinery and equipment for certain investors, consideration should 
be given to a general reduction or elimination of import duties on 
most types of machinery and equipment. Where revenue requirements 
make immediate implementation impossible, consideration might be 
given to an announced gradual reduction. 
A critical issue is the continued existence in many SEE countries of 
profit-based incentives, including tax holidays and partial profit exemp-
tions, which are particularly prone to aggressive tax planning. The review 
and analysis of incentive regimes underscores the need of policy-makers to 
recognize the various avenues by which domestic and foreign investors can 
artificially characterize non-qualifying profits as profits qualifying for tax 
relief. Revenue losses to unintended investments obviously erode the 
ability of a given incentive to meet a cost-benefit test. 
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These concerns are compounded by the fact that protecting the host 
country tax base from aggressive tax-planning opportunities created by 
certain tax incentives requires effective defensive tax measures and tax 
administration to counter the 'stripping' of host country profits to offshore 
financing subsidiaries. Unfortunately, SEE countries generally do not have 
such measures and practices, owing to the relatively limited experience of 
SEE tax officials in the international tax area. 
The following conclusions emerge regarding the use of tax incentives in 
SEE countries. 
• Tax holidays are an especially inefficient form of tax incentive, being 
the most open to tax planning. Unlike incentives earned as a percent-
age of investment (which cap revenue losses to some fraction of quali-
fying expenditures), tax holiday relief is not limited in this way to the 
desired activity. Instead, all returns over the holiday period on invest-
ment - including returns covering initial investment costs as well as 
normal and 'super-normal' profits - are earned tax-free. Providing this 
level of tax relief on targeted profits - as well as on profits of related 
non-qualifying firms, transferred to tax holiday firms using non-arm's 
length pricing and financing arrangements - should be seen as exces-
sive. In addition, contrary to certain views, tax holidays offer limited 
'simplification' opportunities ( e.g. where taxpayers must maintain tax-
payer accounts to support tax calculations over the post-holiday 
period). 
• For similar reasons, partial profit exemptions are viewed as an ineffi-
cient form of incentive, as they provide tax-planning opportunities and 
tax relief not tied to investment ( albeit possibly on a reduced scale, 
proportionate to the percentage relief offered). Like tax holidays, 
partial profit exemptions are unlikely to create an efficient result, with 
opportunities for tax planning and corresponding revenue losses out-
stripping any benefits. 
• Reinvestment allowances, providing a tax deduction equal to 
some percentage of (pre-tax) reinvested profit, are of questionable 
use. If incentives tied directly to investment are desired, it would 
seem preferable to rely on provisions that provide relief in respect of 
investment expenditures without regard to the specific sources of 
finance. 
• Accelerated depreciation may be an attractive option, but likely of 
limited interest to investors if the basic capital cost allowance system is 
restrictive ( e.g. mandatory depreciation claims combined with limited 
loss carry-forward rules). However, general accelerated depreciation 
applied to a streamlined system of capital cost allowance categories, 
when combined with five to seven year loss carry-forward rules, 
offers a relatively simple and efficient means to encourage investment 
(as elaborated earlier). 
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While unconditionally promoting the use of accelerated depreci-
ation is not suggested, it is recognized that policy-makers have to 
respond to political pressures to introduce incentives to promote FDI. 
Given this, there may be relative advantages with this form of tax 
incentive. Some support can also be found for investment tax credits 
(largely to the limits such incentives place on revenue losses, com-
pared to profit-based incentives). However, such incentives, while 
offering certain advantages, raise some concerns in the SEE context. 
• Investment tax credits and investment tax allowances provide a relat-
ively flexible mechanism for targeting additional tax relief (beyond 
that provided through depreciation) to qualifying investment expendi-
tures. Unlike tax holidays, they provide a means to curb tax revenue 
loss by limiting the amount of relief earned to some fraction of quali-
fying investment; by possibly limiting the amount of credit to some 
fraction of (pre-credit) tax payable ( or limiting the amount of 
allowance to some fraction of (pre-allowance) taxable income). 
However, such measures may be abused by taxpayers (e.g. 'churning' 
of qualifying assets to enable multiple access to tax relief), require 
separate special accounts to track unclaimed balances, and may distort 
investor choice towards short-lived assets. 
Certain other observations are made as regards tax incentive use, 
including problems with multiple 'stacking' of incentives, scope for 
zones to exacerbate rather than control rent seeking, and the need 
for 'automatic' triggering mechanisms and a 'workable' set of rules for 
investors and tax administrators. 
• Countries should avoid excessive 'stacking' of corporate tax and other 
incentives. Offering multiple incentives tends to be counterproductive, 
as it increases complexity contributing to compliance and administra-
tive costs. It also leads to unintended patterns of tax relief across dif-
ferent taxpayers and asset types, leading to inefficiencies in resource 
allocation. Furthermore, it can create an impression to investors that 
the country does not have basic 'enabling conditions' necessary for 
profit-making in the host country, and is attempting to rely on an 'easy 
fix'. It can also cast doubt over the fiscal position of the country, and 
contribute to concerns over sovereign risk. 
• Special 'zones' giving relief from profit-based taxes tend to attract 
highly mobile labor-intensive activities (as opposed to long-term 
capital intensive activities). Incremental investment will be low where 
zones largely cause capital to be diverted from elsewhere in the 
country. Where rights to operate from a special zone are granted by 
officials on a discretionary basis, they invite rent-seeking behavior and 
weaken efforts aimed at routing out corruption. 
• The triggering mechanism for tax incentive relief (whatever its form) 
should be as 'automatic' as possible, with qualifying criteria stipulated 
clearly in accessible laws and regulations, in an effort to minimize the 
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scope for corruption and rent seeking (which tends to escalate with 
the degree of discretion given to tax officials in granting relief). 
• When considering alternative incentive mechanisms, a fundamentally 
important requirement is a 'workable' set of rules and regulations that 
are understandable not just to taxpayers, but also to tax administra-
tors. Tax incentive design should avoid overly complicated provisions 
to the extent that the tax administration is inexperienced, or otherwise 
weak. 
Perhaps the most effective investment 'incentives' are realized by 
addressing impediments in the basic tax system (i.e. simplifying tax calcu-
lations and lowering tax rates on business where possible, taking into 
account overall fiscal requirements and the incidence of alternative tax 
bases). Examples could include the use of a single (rather than multiple) 
corporate tax rate structure; streamlining complex capital cost allowance 
systems; liberalizing restrictive loss carry-forward rules; increased reliance 
on (withholding) taxation at source; lowering employer social security con-
tribution rates ( offset possibly by increased Value Added Tax (VAT) or 
Personal Income Tax (PIT) rates). In addition, providing a stable regime 
that is applied in a transparent and non-arbitrary fashion is essential to 
attract and retain investment. 
Lastly, there are a number of issues raised with the targeting that arises 
with incentives which, by definition, provide targeted rather than generally 
available tax relief. A number of general conclusions may be drawn. 
• Targeting incentives specifically to foreign investors creates distortions 
to the extent that foreign investors favor certain sectors or business 
activities over others. Such targeting is also open to tax planning (with 
domestic companies disguising themselves as foreign by investing 
through offshore holding companies), and can foster taxpayer resent-
ment of foreign capital and apathy towards the tax system ( discourag-
ing voluntary compliance and feeding the underground economy). 
Targeting foreign investors may also run counter to national treatment 
obligations (e.g. WTO and/or EU law). 
• Targeting incentives to new investment projects attempts to limit tax 
relief to new capital. However, qualifying new investment may not be 
incremental (i.e. would occur in the absence of tax relief). Windfall 
losses are also imposed on existing capital (reduced share values), 
raising equity concerns. Tax planning is also encouraged, with 
investors characterizing 'old' ( existing) capital as 'new' ( e.g. through 
selling a company to an offshore holding company, which then rein-
vests the funds into the host country). 
• Targeting by size of investment creates distortions over the choice of 
firm size and the organization of business activities, resulting in ineffi-
ciencies. An exception may be drawn if market failure results in an 
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under-investment in small firms. However, it is important that one 
assess whether small firms are being denied capital for reasons of 
market failure, or as a result of the normal and proper functioning of 
credit and equity markets. If instances of true market failure tend to 
be the exception rather than the rule, such targeting should be dis-
couraged, given the inability of government to target incentives prop-
erly. Where small firms are targeted, rules should be introduced to 
discourage large firms from dividing assets across new companies so as 
to qualify for relief. 
• Targeting by business activity, in general, should be discouraged, in 
particular where it is unclear that government has better information 
than the private sector in determining which activities/sectors are 
likely to be more profitable (picking 'winners'). Exceptions may apply 
where market failure can be identified, for example in the case of 
R&D and environmental protection, where the private sector tends to 
ignore social 'spillover' benefits and under-invests. However, even in 
these areas, it remains necessary to administer certain 'grey' areas 
( e.g. subsidizing pure research versus other forms of research versus 
development). Difficulties in assessing the degree of market failure 
suggest that incentive relief should be moderate. 
• Targeting incentives to underdeveloped regions may be called for to 
address market failures curbing investment. However, regional-based 
incentives have rarely been efficient in encouraging FDI. Where pro-
grams have failed, it is normally because of a lack of 'enabling con-
ditions', and an inability of incentives to create a critical mass of 
activity that would help generate these conditions. Where regional 
incentives are used to promote activity, despite efficiency concerns, 
the incentives should be carefully targeted to investment in well-
specified areas, and monitored on a frequent basis to assess results. 
Sunset provisions in general should apply (see below), and the con-
tinuation of incentives should depend on results. 
• Targeting by type of finance (e.g. retained earnings) creates distor-
tions in capital markets and should be avoided. If the objective is to 
encourage investment, it would be more efficient to target investment 
expenditures directly (without regard to how they are financed). If the 
tax system is creating distortions towards excessive levels of debt 
finance, consideration should be given to introducing/strengthening 
thin-capitalization rules. 
• Targeting incentives to apply for a fixed period to temporarily boost 
economic growth runs a risk of mistiming (aggravating rather attenu-
ating cycle effects). However, announcing and immediately imple-
menting targeted incentives to apply for a short period ( e.g. one to 
two years) may shift forward investment that would have otherwise 
been delayed. Furthermore, in general, all incentives should be intro-
duced with a sunset clause stipulating that a given incentive will expire 
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at a certain date (which may then be extended, conditional on a posit-
ive evaluation of past effects). 
• For SEE countries working towards membership of the EU, in the 
longer term their tax incentives will have to be consistent with the 
state aid rules and, consequently, it seems advisable to avoid incen-
tives of such a duration or type that they will have to be dismantled on 
eventual accession. 
• Whatever the form of targeting, the benefits in terms of avoiding tax 
relief to unintended recipients must be weighed against the additional 
administrative costs in monitoring the program, defending boundaries 
under pressure, and implementing measures to address tax abuse. 
• Finally, excessive discretion in the targeting of incentives, by con-
tributing to a lack of transparency, invites corruption and increases 
perceived risks, thereby discouraging investment across all (targeted 
and non-targeted) activities. Thus, as with the provision of incentives 
themselves, the process of identifying qualifying activities should be as 
'automatic' as possible, through careful drafting of the applicable tax 
laws and regulations. 
On balance, there may be merit in policy change in the direction of a 
relatively simple tax system offering a competitive statutory corporate 
income tax rate, accelerated depreciation with flexible loss carry forward 
rules, and possibly carefully targeted investment tax credits ( or 
allowances) with anti-abuse rules. At the same time, SEE countries need 
to implement base protection rules ( e.g. transfer pricing rules, thin-capital-
ization rules) to guard against aggressive tax planning and enable collec-
tion of a fair and reasonable share of tax on host country profits that can 
be easily managed by MNEs. A number of tax policy changes recently 
introduced by SEE countries move in the direction of the arguments elab-
orated in this chapter. 
Given that a simple corporate tax system can deliver a low effective 
host country tax burden - while avoiding compliance and administration 
costs associated with complex and possibly redundant incentive provisions 
- SEE countries may wish to resist the use or introduction of 'add-on' 
fiscal incentives to enrich the tax pot, given their poor track-record in 
encouraging incremental FDI. This view recognizes that the ability to use 
the tax system to attract investment depends critically on the state of the 
'enabling environment' in a host country. Special tax incentives are 
unlikely to attract investment where political instability, economic instabil-
ity, and/or governance problems remain a serious issue. In such cases, 
efforts to administer a tax incentive may heighten uncertainty and per-
ceived risks and discourage investment. Having said that, it is unchallenged 
that there is pressure on SEE countries to offer a list of special incentives 
given the fierce competition for FDI within the region and the availability 
of a wide range of tax incentives in competing jurisdictions. However, SEE 
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countries are advised to reflect seriously on the merits of adhering to a 
structurally sound system capable of generating tax revenues to help 
finance public expenditures ( e.g. infrastructure development in support of 
an 'enabling environment'), taking into account country experiences and 
the various considerations raised in the report. 
Annex: tax systems, rates and incentives in SEE countries 
This section reviews host country tax systems, tax rates and incentives in 
SEE countries, with a focus on direct taxation and corporate income tax in 
particular. 
The corporate income tax systems in all of the countries are fairly con-
ventional, adopting essentially the 'classical' model, and in most cases 
applying final withholding tax on dividends paid to domestic individuals.9 
Exceptions apply in FYR Macedonia and Serbia, which impose tax at the 
personal shareholder level. Under Macedonia's system, personal tax is 
levied on dividends received, with a personal tax credit for tax withheld at 
source. Serbia's partial inclusion approach is somewhat unique. Tax is first 
withheld at source on 50 percent of distributed profit (giving an effective 
withholding tax rate of 10 percent), and rather than providing a credit for 
this tax, shareholders are taxed on half of dividends received. This results 
in a slightly higher effective personal tax rate than if dividends received 
were taxed in full, with credit for withholding tax. 
All of the SEE countries adopt a broadly similar approach to the com-
putation of taxable income, although the rules on deductible expenditures 
may be seen as somewhat restrictive in Albania, FYR Macedonia and 
Serbia and Montenegro. 
Over the past decade there has been a fairly steady reduction in CIT 
rates throughout the SEE region, mirroring worldwide trends, and 
perhaps evidencing an element of tax competition. Figure 6.1 shows where 
basic corporate income tax rates stood on 2001. None of the countries 
have what would be considered high statutory corporate tax rates. Of 
course, the statutory rates, while relevant to tax-planning incentives, do 
not tell the full story in determining effective tax rates: the determinants of 
the tax base, and special tax incentives must also be factored in. 
The depreciation systems appear to differ considerably across SEE 
countries in terms of their level of complexity (although it is unclear from 
certain questionnaire responses whether full detail was provided). In 
certain cases, most notably perhaps in the case of Serbia and Montenegro, 
scope would appear to exist for simplification of depreciation frameworks, 
perhaps in combination with more generous depreciation provisions. 
Most of the countries permit losses to be carried forward for five years. 
However, Albania and FYR Macedonia permit only a three-year loss 
carry-forward, and Moldova appears to provide no loss relief at all. Provi-
sions denying loss carry-forwards beyond three years may be seen as 
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Figure 6.1 Statutory CIT rates in the SEE countries, 2001. 
Notes 
The CIT rates shown are those applicable to retained earnings ( as opposed to distributions). 
FBHdenotes Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina; RS denotes Republic of Srpksa. (a) The 
rate shown is the top CIT rate (under a regressive schedule). (b) The rate shown is the top 
CIT rate (under a progressive schedule). 
impeding investment, particularly when judged against international 
norms. The rules are particularly onerous where depreciation claims are 
mandatory, as they are in most SEE and other transition economies. 
There are also important considerations as regards the interaction of loss 
provisions and investment incentives, particularly investment allowances 
(addressed below). 
Certain differences are found in the treatment of intercorporate divi-
dends. Bulgaria and Macedonia (FYR) waive such dividends from with-
holding tax at source, imposing withholding tax only when profits are 
ultimately distributed to individual shareholders. Albania limits the 
exemption to distributions to related companies as a means of eliminating 
multiple-taxation of profits distributed along a (related) corporate chain. 
Distributions to unrelated companies are subject to withholding tax (at 15 
percent, versus 10 percent on distributions to resident individuals), which 
is creditable at the intermediary level. Romania levies withholding tax on 
intercorporate dividends without relieving measures, tending to discour-
age vertical corporate structures. Serbia also levies withholding tax on 
intercorporate dividends, but relies on a gross-up and credit system at the 
corporate level to relieve withholding and (notional) corporate tax paid at 
source. 
Personal income taxes are generally fairly low: the top rate varies from 
a low of 18 percent (FYR Macedonia) to a high of 40 percent (Romania), 
although the thresholds for the highest rate, being related to local income 
126 Jeffrey Owens 
levels, are relatively low. By contrast, payroll taxes and social security con-
tributions are significant, and vary from 32 percent to about 53 percent of 
wages. In most of the countries the largest portion is paid by the employer. 
Investment incentives 
In examining the current state of play in the SEE countries in the tax 
incentive area, one observes that most countries have moved towards 
adherence to national treatment, and in some cases full adherence. While, 
in the past, incentives were overtly targeted at foreign investors, today this 
is not the case, although instances of such targeting can still be found. 
Whether the adjustments toward national treatment were motivated by 
international obligations, or out of concerns over negative consequences 
of denying incentive relief to domestics, or out of a recognition that, in 
practice, foreign investors are the main beneficiaries of direct tax incen-
tives, this reorientation is an encouraging development. 
The review of current and past incentive use in recent years is also 
illuminating. All SEE countries have tested a variety of tax incentives in 
the past, often with seriously disappointing results, and have moved to 
eliminate or replace them. A number of countries have changed their tax 
incentive provisions significantly over recent years: Bulgaria and Romania, 
in particular, have followed rather erratic courses, removing incentives 
and replacing them with others at regular intervals. At the same time, SEE 
officials have recognized the importance of establishing credibility in the 
tax policy area to investors, and the corresponding need to provide 'grand-
fathering' provisions, despite the ensuing revenue losses (see Table 6.1). 
Currently, one observes widespread reliance on VAT and customs duty 
exemptions and zone incentives. Outside its zone legislation, Albania 
limits its VAT and customs duty relief to a three-year deferral for pur-
chases, or in-kind share contributions, of machinery and equipment. Raw 
materials are exempt for customs duty, but only for inward processing for 
ultimate export. 
All SEE countries currently have zone legislation, with varying degrees 
of incentive relief and take-up activity. In Albania, while zone legislation 
has been drafted, no such zones have been established. This may be at 
least in part explained by the fact that corporate tax relief ( e.g. tax holi-
days, profit exemptions) are not on offer, whereas they are in zones in 
other SEE countries. 
Investment expenditure-based incentives are currently used in all SEE 
countries, in some countries more faithfully than others. While examples 
of an investment tax credit and investment allowances can be found, one 
observes a preference for the investment allowance variety. This is clearly 
the case in FYR Macedonia, which currently employs no fewer than three 
variants - one targeted at environmental protection, another targeted at 
regional activities, and a third that is more general in application. In each 
case, the full amount (100 percent) of expenditure on qualifying assets 
Table 6. 1 Investment tax incentives in SEE countries 
Albania Bosnia and Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Moldova Romania Yugoslavia 
Herzegovina (FR) 
Tax holidays X X X X X 
Partial profit exemption X X 
Preferential CIT rate X X 
Accelerated depreciation X X X X X 
Investment allowance X X 
Reinvestment allowance X 
Investment tax credit X X 
Customs duty exemption X X X X X X 
Customs duty deferral X 
VAT exemption X 
VAT deferral X 
Special wnes offering 
Customs duty exemption X X X X X X X X 
VAT exemption X X X X 
Tax holiday (CIT exemption) X X X X X 
Other tax exemptions X X X 
Notes 
These provisions apply as of 2001. This table reports incentives available for new investment (ignores 'grandfathering' provisions). 
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may be set off against taxable income. This is also the case for investment 
allowances provided in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
However certain overall limits may apply. FYR Macedonia caps its 
regional allowance at 50 percent of taxable profit, for example, whereas its 
general allowance is subject to a 25 percent cap. Similarly, the Republic of 
Srpksa caps its allowance at 15 percent. On the other hand, the environ-
mental allowance in Macedonia is not subject to a cap, nor is the invest-
ment allowance in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.10 
Unrestricted investment allowances may be problematic to the extent that 
they enable the conversion of unutilized tax allowances into tax losses, 
which can then be carried forward subject to loss carry-forward restric-
tions. Even where the allowances are capped, their interaction with other 
provisions ( e.g. accelerated depreciation) may have a similar effect. 
Another interesting variant is the approach taken by Romania, where 
the allowance appears to be strictly targeted at investment financed by 
retentions, rather than debt-financed investment or investment financed 
by new share issue. The general reinvestment allowance also differs from 
those noted above in that half rather than the full amount of expenditures 
on qualifying assets may be deducted from taxable profit, while the SME 
reinvestment allowance permits the full amount to be deducted. The rein-
vestment allowance for large investment projects is earned at a 20 percent 
rate, which is supplemented with accelerated depreciation provisions that 
boost the first year deduction to 70 percent of qualifying investment 
expenditures. 
Reliance on a reinvestment allowance may be motivated by an effort to 
encourage foreign direct investors to reinvest profits in Romania, rather 
than distribute those earnings to parent or holding companies abroad. But 
given the aim of encouraging domestic investment, it is not clear why 
investment financed by new share issue would be denied relief. If a 
concern exists over highly-leveraged firms, given the base-eroding effects 
of interest deductions, attention to other policy areas might be preferable 
to a source of funds restriction. Such areas could include introducing thin-
capitalization rules (currently Romania does not have such rules), and 
revisiting policies towards the setting of non-resident withholding tax rates 
on interest paid to treaty partners that do not tax interest income. 
The only SEE country relying on the investment tax credit variant was 
Serbia. The credit follows very closely international norms in the use of 
this measure, with credits earned on qualifying capital at a 10 percent rate, 
and with total claimed credits capped to not exceed 50 percent of tax 
otherwise payable. A richer variant is targeted at SMEs, with the credit 
rate increased to 30 percent and the cap lifted to 70 percent. 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania and Serbia all promote their 
corporate systems as offering accelerated depreciation. However, while 
the relevant provisions for Croatia and Macedonia do provide for depreci-
ation of qualifying assets at a faster rate (25 percent higher) than would 
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otherwise apply, it is unclear whether these higher rates are actually higher 
relative to true economic depreciation. Accelerated depreciation appears 
more likely in Croatia, which doubles its depreciation rates for targeted 
capital, and Romania which, as noted above, provides a first-year deduc-
tion of 50 percent of qualifying depreciable capital costs as part of its 
'large project' incentive program. 
Despite the disappointing results associated with profit-based incentives 
- those offering tax relief as a percentage of profits of qualifying firms - it 
is unfortunate that a number of SEE countries continue to use them. In 
some cases, tax holiday and partial profit exemption incentives are avail-
able without regional restriction. In others, their application is targeted at 
profits derived from zone activities. Wherever used, however, it is highly 
unlikely that such incentives would be found to be efficient given the tax-
minimization opportunities created, unless qualifying firms are audited on 
a regular and professional (arm's length) basis. 
Targeting such relief to zones may help limit incentive abuse - in 
particular, related-party transactions and financial structures aimed at arti-
ficially characterizing non-targeted profits as profits from zone activities. 
The use of zones would tend to limit the number of firms eligible for profit 
exemptions, and increase prospects for auditing of tax accounts to establish 
if profits are determined on an arm's length basis. However, in practice it is 
unclear whether this potential is realized. Without safeguards ensuring 
transparent and arm's length relationships between zone companies and 
tax officials administering incentives, a zone program - by bringing 
together tax officials and select companies to negotiate an agreement on 
zone activities - may contribute to, and institutionalize, a setting that is ripe 
for corruption. In other words, zone programs providing for profit exemp-
tions may feed rather than lessen scope for abuse and corruption. 
As noted, the use of .profit-based incentives is widespread in the SEE 
region. Indeed, all of the countries considered resort to these incentives, 
with the exception of Albania and Bulgaria. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
FYR Macedonia and Moldova all offer tax holidays targeted explicitly at 
FDI. Firms that are entirely foreign-owned enjoy a five-year tax holiday in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, compared with a three-year holiday in Macedo-
nia. Firms satisfying a minimum foreign participation threshold (20 
percent) enjoy a partial profit exemption in both countries, with the 
exempt proportion in FYR Macedonia tied to the proportion to foreign 
participation, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, set at fixed, descending 
amounts (100 percent, 75 percent, 30 percent) over a three-year period. 
Foreign participation of at least 30 percent ( or investment of at least 
$250,000) triggers a tax holiday of one to six years in Moldova, subject to 
turnover restrictions. Tax holidays in Croatia at ten years, standing out as 
the most generous of those examined, may be seen as implicitly targeted at 
FDI, given the requirement of a minimum of $7 million invested (or alter-
natively 75 new jobs created). 
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Regionally-targeted tax holidays and other variants are also observed. In 
the Republic of Srpksa, a three-year tax holiday is provided to new firms 
operating in regions designated as underdeveloped. In Serbia, profits on 
activities in underdeveloped regions may be fully exempt for two years. 
Special tax holidays of up to five years are also available in Serbia for profits 
derived from concession contracts. Other variants also exist, including the 50 
percent profit exemption for listed-companies in FYR Macedonia. 
While Albania and Bulgaria stand out from the rest in not providing a 
'carte blanche' to MNEs in setting their own effective corporate tax rate, it 
is noteworthy that this vision has been learned the hard way. Prior to 1999, 
Albania gave a four-year tax holiday to domestic and foreign-owned 
enterprises engaged in manufacturing activities. Following the holiday, 
manufacturing firms were provided with a 60 percent profit exemption. 
This program was found to be inefficient, and difficult to administer. 
Particularly difficult to administer was the requirement that tax be paid ex 
post on profits exempted over the holiday period in the event that firms 
terminate their activities following the holiday. The Albanian rules con-
tained a provision requiring that the manufacturing activities, qualifying 
for the holiday, continue for six years (for a total of ten beyond the 
holiday period). Such provisions, typical under most tax holiday programs, 
are notoriously difficult to enforce. The Albanian tax holiday was also 
found to be open to corruption, given discretion over the selection of qual-
ifying firms, and the overall prevalence of non-arm's length relationships 
between officials and those firms. 
Similarly, Bulgaria provided a three-year tax holiday to foreign-
controlled firms (satisfying a 50 percent foreign ownership requirement), 
followed up with a 50 percent profit exemption for two years. For priority 
investment projects (in excess of $5 million), the 50 percent profit exemp-
tion was available for ten years. Again, the program was found to be ineffi-
cient, open to taxpayer manipulation, and prone to rent-seeking behavior 
on the part of tax officials. 
A particularly striking and important finding is that one currently 
observes a perplexing combination of generous tax incentives in a number 
of SEE countries, alongside restrictive rules governing basic tax treatment 
(e.g. treatment of losses). Other tax impediments to investment are also 
observed, including complex and cumbersome depreciation rules. 
Notes 
1 This chapter and the accompanying annex are based upon a study undertaken 
in the context of the Investment Compact for South East Europe, a key compo-
nent of the Stability Pact. The study was led by W. Steven Clark, Head of the 
Tax Policy and Statistics Unit at the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Admin-
istration, and Professor Alex Easson, at Queen's University, Canada, in co-
operation with the Investment Compact team. A full version of the study can 
be found in the publication Tax Policy Assessment and Design in Support of 
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Direct Investment: A Study of Countries in South East Europe. Luca Gandullia 
intensively cooperated with a careful revision to this chapter. I am indebted to 
him. 
2 Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, 
Serbia and Montenegro. 
3 The Member countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova (since 2001), 
Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro. 
4 A survey conducted for the Ruding Committee, for example, found that 57 
percent of MNE managers within the EU always regarded the (statutory) 
corporate tax rate on business profits to be a relevant consideration in deciding 
in which country to locate business activity. The proportion rises to 80 percent 
when MNEs who usually take statutory CIT rates into account are included. 
Next in importance after CIT rates were withholding tax rates (40 percent), 
depreciation rules (36 percent) and loss relief (35 percent). The survey, 
however, was not concerned with other types of tax. 
5 Note that consumption taxes, if sufficiently high, may lower domestic consump-
tion demand but would not be expected to have any significant influence over 
export-oriented investment. 
6 Halvorsen, in a study of FDI in Thailand, found customs duties and import 
taxes to be an important factor. 
7 According to the Ruding Committee report, financial service centers are the 
most sensitive to taxation; co-ordination centers and R&D centers somewhat 
less so. The survey conducted for the Committee found that tax was always or 
usually a major factor in the location of 70 percent of co-ordination centers and 
of almost 80 percent of financial centers. 
8 This especially seems to be the case in some of the countries of Eastern Europe 
and Southeast Europe. 
9 The present Croatian corporate tax system came into effect in 2001. The previ-
ous system was unique, being described by some as a business consumption-
type tax, or a form of cash-flow tax. By allowing a deduction for 'interest' 
imputed to corporate equity, the tax base was substantially narrower than 
under more conventional systems. 
10 An investment allowance may be restricted to some percentage (under 100 
percent) of qualifying investment expenditures - but the amount of allowance 
earned may or may not be capped to some percentage (under 100 percent) of 
taxable profit (measured before the allowance). Without such a cap, the 
allowance may eliminate taxable profit, or if large enough relative to profit, 
create a tax loss (i.e. a loss that can be carried forward for tax purposes). 
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7 The Czech Republic 
Simone Pellegrino1 
7.1 Introduction and executive summary 
Before the 1993 splitting of the previous Czechoslovakia unitary state, the 
Czech economy had been in transition from a planned economy system to 
a market-oriented economy. The three main goals of economic reforms 
were: the privatization process of both enterprises and the bank system; 
the liberalization of prices and of foreign trade; fiscal reform. All of these 
goals have almost been completed. During the 1990s, the Czech Republic 
made progress in restructuring and modernizing its economy, but dif-
ficulties arose from both the political and the economic side. 
In the early 1990s about 80 percent of all national enterprises were pri-
vatized and today only a small proportion of the strategic industries is still 
in public hands. The 1990s' reforms induced a revolution in the country, so 
it was important to maintain social cohesion during the transition to the 
market model economy and balance the sacrifices of new tax system with 
the benefits of public expenditures (Sujan and Sujanova 1994). 
The Czech Republic is a traditional industrial country and today its 
plants and equipment are rather obsolete. Its etonomy mainly depends on 
foreign trade, but this was in imbalance during most of the 1990s. In the 
early 1990s, the government debt was very small: however, in 1996 it 
reached just about 13 percent of GDP. During the last few years it rapidly 
increased because expenditures have grown more than revenues, despite 
the large privatization receipts of the last few years. Until 1995, the 
government budget continued to have a moderate surplus, while the 
budget of the following years had an increasing deficit. It is important to 
notice that an increase in poverty levels and in income inequality took 
place during the transition. The Czech income per capita Gini coefficient 
increased from 0.20 in 1988, to 0.23 in 1992 and to 0.26 in 1996, and prob-
ably it has been still increasing over the last few years. The Czech per 
capita GDP is not more than about 40 percent of the EU-15 average 
(unweighted PPP values), but is the highest in comparison with EU New 
Members' ones. 
The fiscal reform started in 1993 and the new tax system is close to the 
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EU model. Mainly, it comprises the personal and corporate income taxes, 
the value added tax, the excise duties, the real estate tax, the road tax, the 
inheritance and gift tax and other minor taxes. During the following years 
the system was repeatedly amended, but no great improvements were 
made in the areas of direct taxation and in value added tax. In fact, one of 
the main current problems concerns VAT harmonization according to the 
EU standards, in particular with respect to tax rates and tax exemptions; 
important changes are planned for the next few years. The structure of 
revenues is somewhat different from EU standards. The main share of 
total revenues (44 percent in 1998 and not different until recently) is still 
given by social contributions, which thus stay as the most important levy 
imposed on individuals and corporations. The Czech Republic social con-
tributions are among the highest around the world. By adding social secur-
ity contributions to personal income tax, the negative consequence arises 
of a very high taxation of labor. This can create distortions in the labor 
market, open opportunities to the shadow economy and induce a loss of 
competitiveness, compared with other countries (especially EU New 
Members). 
VAT constitutes the second most important tax. In 1998, its revenue 
amounted to 6.6 percent of GDP and to 17 percent of total revenues, and 
it is about 50 percent of indirect taxes. There are two rates, 22 and 5 
percent, but the list of goods taxed at 5 percent was reduced at the begin-
ning of 2004. 
The personal income tax has a progressive structure, which is given by 
four tax brackets and some allowances. The rates range from 15 to 32 
percent, but more than one half of the taxpayers fall into the lower bracket 
and the average effective tax rate is not higher than 10 percent. Although 
inflation was very high during the last decade, the income tax structure has 
not been fully compensated for fiscal drag. Corporation income tax 
revenue amounted to 3.7 percent of GDP and to 17 percent of total tax 
revenue in 1998; it was introduced in 1993 and its structure is close to the 
EU model. Starting from the year 2000, it has been applied at a flat rate of 
31 percent, but up to 1999 it was at 35 percent; a rate reduction down to 28 
percent is planned for 2004 (it will be 24 percent in 2006), to compete 
better with other new EU members, which have introduced lower tax rates 
during the last few years. 
The Czech fiscal government structure was made up of only two tiers, 
but since 2001 there have been three tiers: the central government, regions 
and the municipalities. These number more than six thousands and their 
average size is very small. However, the Constitution also makes provision 
for some larger regions, but before 2001 these regions were not realized. 
Their functions were performed by 77 district offices that were merely 
non-autonomous arms of the central government. From 2002, 14 regions 
were started, but they were totally funded by the central government until 
2003. This structure will be completed during the next few years, because 
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today there is insufficient monitoring of the local government debt and 
expenditures and there are no adequate fiscal equalization transfers. The 
main aim of local budget reform is to increase the share of local sources of 
revenues and the municipalities' own taxes. 
By considering now the 1998 distribution of fiscal burden on specific 
factors, it can be noticed that employed labor was the factor most heavily 
taxed, at an implicit tax rate of 38.6 percent, while the implicit tax rate on 
consumption was just 15.6 percent, a value very low in comparison with 
the standard VAT rate of 22 percent. From 1993 to 1998, the taxation on 
employed labor steadily grew, from 16.9 GDP points to 18.5, while the 
share of revenues of the other factors decreased: that on consumption 
from 13.2 GDP points in 1993 to 11.1 in 1998; that on self-employed labor 
from 4 GDP points to 2.9 and that on capital and business from 8.9 GDP 
points to 5.7 (a decrease due to the need of reducing corporate incomes 
tax rates from their initial levels). 
The current parliament debate mainly focuses on reducing the budget 
deficit, to avoid an expected steep increase of public debt during the next 
few years. Since 1997, in fact, public debt has continued to rise, because 
the increasing budget deficit has been financed through the issuance of 
government bonds purchased by the private sector, despite large privatiza-
tion receipts. Czech governments, however, are very reluctant to adopt the 
necessary reforms, to make expenditure cuts, industrial restructuring and 
to reform the legislation system and financial market transparency; 
instead, bank privatizations have been completed in 2001. 
The deterioration of the budget balance has been due both to an 
increase in spending and to a decline ( or a lesser increase) in tax revenue. 
According to new data, fiscal revenue has been steady in the last few 
years: in 2000 the Czech total fiscal revenue was 39.3 percent of GDP, 39.1 
percent in 2001 and 39.8 percent in 2002. However, the level of public 
expenditure (excluded net lending) was 42.1 percent of GDP in 1998, 43.7 
percent in 2000, 44.2 percent in 2001, 46.6 percent in 2002; levels that are 
too high to achieve the Maastricht rule of a 3 percent budget deficit. Some 
reforms could not be postponed, in order to stop the primary unbalance 
increase. A recurrent proposal is to reform the social security system, to 
take better account of demographic development: retirement ages should 
rise, as required in almost any other EU country. The pension system, in 
fact, operates as a pay-as-you-go system and absorbs about 9 percent of 
GDP and 24 percent of public expenditures. 
So the most important issue of fiscal policy would be the sustainability 
of public finances in the medium run. No basic steps have been made 
during the last years, but finally a reform was approved by the government 
and parliament in summer and autumn 2003. At present, the equilibrium 
of the public finances is not under control. The reduction of the budget 
deficit will have to become the highest priority of the Czech government in 
the next few years. Its institutional framework and its low public debt, 
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mixed with the new market power economy starting in the 1990s, were 
negative ingredients (from the political point of view) to create a good 
environment for economic growth and institutional stability over the last 
decade (Bronchi and Burns 2000). 
7.2 The structure of the system at the end of the 1990s and 
its development after the collapse of the communist regime 
A broad view of the cu"ent structure of taxes and social security 
contributions 
In 1998, the Czech Republic's total fiscal revenues were 38.3 percent of 
GDP. Total tax revenues amounted to 56 percent of total fiscal revenues 
and to 21.4 percent of GDP, while the remaining 44 percent was given 
by social contributions that were the main source of revenue with a share 
on GDP of 17 percent. This share became high and exaggerated if com-
pared with the EU average level. Still, in 1998, the net rate of employee 
contributions was 7.5 percent and the net rate of employer contributions 
was 22.75 percent of labor income. Then, social security contributions' 
composition was also unbalanced because of the higher value of those 
contributions imposed on employers than on the employees, and because 




Other taxes ___ ___,, 
0.4% Other duties 
4.3% 
Real Property Tax Road Tax 
0.6% 0.6% 






Figure 7.1 Structure of the Czech Republic total revenue in 1998 (source: see text). 
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Direct taxes were lower than the indirect ones and this was due to the 
low level of personal income tax, which amounted to only 5.2 percent of 
GDP and to 13.6 percent of total revenue. Corporation income tax 
revenue amounted to 3.7 percent of GDP and to 9.7 percent of total 
revenue. The second most important tax was VAT and its revenue 
amounted to 6.6 percent of GDP and to 17.1 percent of total revenues. Its 
standard rate and share of total taxation as well as its share of indirect 
taxes equaled about the EU average. The share of excise duties was 9.7 
percent of total revenue and 3.7 percent of GDP. 
The development of the system from the early to the late 1990s 
During the ten years from 1993 to 2003, the Czech Republic fiscal system 
did not basically change because, already in the early 1990s, it was sched-
uled as the EU model. Despite this, the transition process and the EU 
harmonization required some changes. As shown in Table 7.1, the Czech 
total fiscal revenue decreased by 10 percent, and this was made by cutting 
total tax revenue from 26.3 percent of GDP in 1993 to 21.4 percent in 
1998, while the social contributions' level has been relatively stable during 
this period (see Figure 7.2). In the same years, expenditures have been cut 
by only 4 percent and this gap is the origin of the net borrowing increase 
during the last few years. 
The most relevant changes in total tax revenue composition have been 
the reduction of both direct and indirect taxes. The direct ones decreased 
by two GDP points from 10.9 percent in 1993 to 9 percent in 1998 and this 
difference can be split into a reduction by 50 percent of corporation tax 
revenue and an increase from 3.8 percent of GDP to 5.2 percent of per-
sonal income tax revenue. The cut has been more evident with respect to 
indirect taxes, which decreased from 15.4 percent of GDP in 1993 to 12.4 
percent in 1998. This relevant decline was due not only to the VAT rate 
reduction from 23 to 22 percent but also to the increasing list of goods 
taxed at the reduced rate. VAT reduction is one third of the total cut in 
indirect taxes, while excise duties have been steady and the other indirect 
taxes have been cut by 1.9 GDP points. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, it was necessary for the Czech tax system 






















Source: Government Final Account of the Czech Republic for 1998, Czech Republic Ministry 
of Finance. 
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Figure 7.2 Total tax revenue in the Czech Republic from 1993 to 2000 as a per-
centage of GDP (source: see text). 
to decrease the rate and the share of corporation tax (16.5 percent of total 
revenues in 1993), because the level was one of the highest in the world 
and it would not have been consistent with a market system. These cuts 
were very big and fast: the tax rate was 75 percent in 1986, 55 percent in 
1991, 45 percent in 1993, 39 percent in 1996, 35 percent in 1998 and now 
(2003) 31 percent. The profits taxation as a percent of GDP was 7.1 
percent in 1993, 5.6 percent in 1994, 4.0 percent in 1996 and 3.7 percent in 
1998, but still today stays high compared with both the EU average and 
EU selected New Members' level (7 percent of total revenues in the EU 
area, 9.7 percent in the Czech Republic and 6.4 percent in the other EU 
New Members). 
Although social security contributions remained relatively stable from 
1993 to 1998 as a share of GDP, their share of total revenues has increased 
from 38.6 to 44 percent, but this is due to the decrease of total tax revenue. 
It is important to notice that, in this period, social contribution revenues 
have exceeded the social expenditures, but this surplus will be necessary in 
the future because health and pension expenditures are increasing, as can 
be observed in other EU countries. 
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The apportioning of revenue among government tiers and fiscal 
federalism 
The Czech fiscal government structure was made up of just two tiers until 
2001: the central government and the municipalities, which number more 
than 6000 and have a very small average size (80 percent of municipalities 
have less than 1000 people and 90 percent less than 2000 people). Their 
number grew by 50 percent from 1990 to 1992 because, at that time, a 
'Municipality Act' established the liberalization of municipalities' rights 
and their 'absolute' independence. So, because of this breaking up of the 
country, one of the most important problems of fiscal and administrative 
structure is the efficiency level of such small bodies. 
However, the Constitution also makes a provision for larger regions, 
but before 2001 these regions were not realized and their functions were 
performed by 77 district offices that were arms of the central government 
without any autonomy. From 2002, there are 14 regions at work but they 
are totally funded by the central government. This structure will be com-
pleted during the next few years, because today there is insufficient moni-
toring on the local governments' debt and expenditures and there are no 
adequate fiscal equalization transfers. 
The law, in fact, provides that the debt of local governments may not 
exceed 15 percent of the previous year's revenues but the local governors 
want to increase more local spending. Today, 65 percent of municipalities 
are carrying some form of debt. 
Although local revenues are mainly distributed among municipalities 
according to the number of inhabitants, the gap in economic growth and 
GDP per capita among the regions has been growing over time because a 
share of revenues was distributed according to the locations of the busi-
ness activities; the concentration of enterprises and businessmen in the big 
cities is an important fiscal disadvantage for poor areas under the current 
tax sharing system. This gap can affect the opportunity to create an effect-
ive system of fiscal equalization transfers, to prevent lower tiers' financial 
crises and to give to local governments an adequate ability to predict their 
revenues in the medium run. Furthermore, the current structure of distrib-
ution of tax revenue among government tiers increases the competition 
among municipalities for the permanent residence of inhabitants. Finally, 
an important obstacle to further decentralization is the already mentioned 
size structure of the Czech municipalities. 
In 1998, the share of total revenues accruing to central government was 
73 percent of total revenues ( 44 percent, excluding social contributions for 
pensions), while that to local governments was 12 percent and that to 
health funds was 15 percent. From the early to the late 1990s, these shares 
of total revenue did not change in a relevant way. The share of central 
government decreased only by 4.3 percent (8 percent, excluding social 
contributions for pensions), while the share of local governments 
142 Simone Pellegrino 
increased by three percentage points and that of health funds increased by 
1.4 percent (Kamenickova 1999) - see Table 7.2. 
The Czech total revenue share of sub-national level can be split in 47.7 
percent of tax revenues ( of which 90 percent is from income tax and 5.6 
from property tax), 36.3 percent of non-tax revenues and 16 percent of 
grants (1999 data). This share is lower than both that existing in the EU 
area (27 percent) and that in selected EU New Members (19 percent). 
During the 1990s, grants became less important than in the previous 
system and other kinds of revenues have been increased, like revenue 
sharing of the personal income tax and of the corporate income tax. 
However, the most popular local tax, i.e. the property tax, has a small role 
in municipalities' revenues and in income redistribution; its share on total 
revenues is very low. This tax is collected by central government and its 
revenue is transferred to municipalities, and this is not an efficient system 
to provide for the political independency of this tier of government. 
Besides, the cadastral system should be modernized in the future. 
In conclusion, the Czech Republic local governments have limited tax 
autonomy compared with the size of their spending responsibilities and 
local needs; this is a problem, especially for the smaller municipalities that 
have a bigger gap between tax capacity and expenditure needs than other 
municipalities. At present, central government regulates the public ser-
vices under local government competence and finances a high share of 
spending. In fact, only a share of municipalities' revenues derives from 
own taxes and a consistent share derives in the form of grants from the 
state level. This structure cannot be efficient in allocating competencies 
among tiers and can tempt local governments to increase spending. In fact, 
some small local governments have been bankrupted in the last few years. 
However, the Czech system is just emerging from the centralist era that 
characterized the communist regime, and the fiscal reform of the early 
1990s has already incorporated some important elements of decentraliza-
tion that will be completed in the future (OECD 2002). 
A comparison with other main New Members and the EU 
average 
At the end of the 1990s, the Czech Republic's total fiscal revenue was 
similar to that observed for the other selected EU New Members, but 
more than four percentage points lower than the EU average. This dif-
ference is very important for fiscal planning because the expenditure level 
was four GDP points higher than the total revenue. 
Fiscal revenue was six GDP points lower than the EU average (27.6 
percent) while social contributions were two GDP points more than the 
EU average and three GDP points more than the EU New Members' mean 
level. In comparison with the other New Members, the same level of total 
revenues was characterized by a different tax mix: the Czech Republic 
Table 7.2 Structure and development of fiscal revenue in the Czech Republic, New Members and EU 15 as a percentage of GDP, 
1992-98 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
--
Czech New EU Czech New EU Czech New EU Czech New EU 
Republic members Republic members Republic members Republic members 
Direct taxes, of which 10.9 10.1 13.5 10.3 10.0 12.9 9.2 9.6 13.4 9.0 9.2 13.7 
Personal income 3.8 6.4 9.6 4.6 7.0 9.3 5.1 7.1 9.3 5.2 6.7 9.3 
Corporation income 7.1 3.6 2.3 5.6 2.9 2.4 4.0 2.5 2.7 3.7 2.5 3.0 
Indirect taxes, of which 15.4 15.6 13.4 14.4 16.5 13.7 13.5 16.9 13.7 12.4 15.5 13.9 
VAT 7.6 5.1 6.7 7.3 7.4 6.8 7,0 7.4 6.9 6.6 7.9 7.0 
Excise duties 4.0 3.4 3.4 4.0 4.2 3.5 3.9 4.1 3.4 3.7 4.1 3.5 
Others 3.9 9.3 3.3 3.2 5.0 3.4 2.6 4.9 3.4 2.1 3.6 3.5 
Total tax revenue 26.3 25.7 26.9 24.7 26.4 26.6 22.7 26.5 27.1 21.4 24.7 27.6 
Social contributions 16.5 16.1 14.5 16.6 15.7 14.9 16.5 14.3 15.3 16.9 14.2 15.0 
Employers 10.2 10.0 8.1 10.7 9.0 7.9 10.9 8.0 8.3 11.0 7.9 8.2 
Employees 3.8 5.3 4.8 3.9 5.1 5.2 3.8 4.8 5.1 3.9 4.8 5.0 
Self employed 2.5 1.8 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.9 
Total fiscal revenue 42.8 41.8 41.4 41.3 42.2 41.5 39.2 40.8 42.4 38.3 38.9 42.6 
Administrative level 
Central government 33.2 25.9 22.8 31.1 25.8 22.4 29.1 25.4 22.4 28.0 23.9 22.9 
Local government 3.9 3.0 3.0 4.9 3.5 3.2 4.7 3.4 4.0 4.6 3.7 4.0 
Social Security 5.8 12.9 14.5 5.4 12.9 14.9 5.4 11.5 15.2 5.7 11.4 14.9 
Sources: EU Commission (2000a) for Czech Republic and New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2000) for EU-15 (1997 unweighted average). 
Notes 
Czech data start in 1993 and Social security is only health. 
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total tax revenue was three GDP points lower than in other New 
Members, whereas social contributions were three GDP points higher. As 
for the share of total tax revenue, the Czech Republic had the same level 
of VAT and excise duties, a lower level of personal income tax and a 
higher level of corporation tax. 
The splitting of taxes into direct and indirect ones was different from 
the EU standard, which is characterized by a share of 50 percent for both 
the indirect and the direct ones. This disparity is due to the level of per-
sonal income tax that is four GDP points lower than the EU average. Both 
revenue and rate of corporate income tax are, instead, close to the EU 
mean levels. 
Indirect taxes show a total amount which is 1.5 GDP points lower than 
the EU average and three points lower in comparison with New Members' 
mean value. However, the share of total fiscal revenue is similar to the EU 
average and not very different from EU New Members' mean level. Both 
VAT and excise duties levels are similar to the EU's. However, other indi-
rect taxes give a low yield, including real property tax, real property trans-
fer tax, gift and inheritance tax, road tax, local levies. 
The Czech total social contributions as a share of GDP are well above 
both the EU (15 percent) and the New Member average values (14.2 
percent). The gap can also be due to the particularly high level of 
employer contributions. Anyway, as a share of total fiscal revenue, Czech 
contributions were 9 percent higher than the EU average and 8 percent 
higher than EU New Members' mean value. 
7.3 Some quantitative and institutional features of main 
taxes 
Personal income tax - PIT (Danz piijmu fyzickych osob) 
The personal income tax was introduced in 1993, when the Czech Repub-
lic was founded. At the time of the communist regime, this tax did not 
exist because the redistribution of income was pursued by subsidies to 
consumption goods, as in the other planned economies. Before the 1990s, 
different sources of income were taxed at different rates and the whole 
system was only slightly progressive. Wage earnings were also taxed at a 
flat rate, but the level of the rate changed according to the taxpayer's age, 
sex, marital status and number of dependants. The current personal 
income tax is similar to that observed in many European countries. 
However, the aggregate income is not all-embracing, because many 
sources of income are taxed under a separate regime. The taxing unity is 
the individual and the tax is paid by both residents and non-residents: the 
worldwide income principle is put on the residents, whereas the non-
residents are taxed on their Czech source income. 
Income from different categories is aggregated to form the tax base 
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and, after excluding the deductions allowed by law, a progressive rates 
schedule is applied. This comprises four brackets with increasing marginal 
rates: the lower rate is 15 percent and the highest is 32 percent. From 1993 
to 1999 there were five brackets and the highest rate was at 40 percent. 
The subsequent reduction of the brackets was due mainly to two reasons. 
First, few taxpayers were taxed at the highest bracket and, second, there 
was the accepted fundamental paradigm to broaden the taxable base and 
to reduce the number and the level of the rates. The top rate of 32 percent 
is low compared with that mainly existing in the EU countries but it is 
similar to the rate in force in the other EU New Members. 
There are several categories of taxable income: 
a income from wages and salaries; 
b income from business activity and independent services; 
c income from leasing or rents; 
d income from capital assets; 
e other incomes. 
Social security contributions paid by employees are deductible in full 
while, according to the tax code, donations for purposes of science, educa-
tion, culture, medicine, ecology, sports and religion are deductible up to 10 
percent of the taxable base. 
There are other tax allowances to promote horizontal and vertical 
equity. If the allowances exceed the taxable income, the taxpayer simply 
pays no tax because there is not a negative income tax system, but losses 
( only for business activities) can be carried forward for seven years. At the 
time of writing (2003), the basic personal allowance per year is €1188.75 
(Kc38,040), and the others depend on the family's status. If the taxpayer's 
spouse has an annual income lower than the basic allowance, an additional 
allowance of €678.75 (Kc21,720) is granted to the taxpayer; there is also 
an allowance of €734.40 (Kc23,520) for each dependent child living in the 
taxpayer's household (see Table 7.3). 
The taxable base from business activity and intellectual rights is deter-
mined with similar rules in force for the corporate income tax but is taxed 
Table 7.3 Structure of income tax in the Czech Republic 
Dan z prijmu fyzickych osob 2003 - Values in euro 
Brackets Marginal Basic Allowance Allowance 
rates allowance spouse fora son 
Up to 3230.20 15 1188.75 678.75 743.40 
3230.2~460.40 20 1188.75 678.75 743.40 
6460.40-9880.61 25 1188.75 678.75 743.40 
Over 9880.61 32 1188.75 678.75 743.40 
Source: see text. 
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with the progressive rate schedule of the personal income tax. The general 
rule provides that the expenses are deductible in detail from the income, 
but the taxpayer may determine the taxable base from all business activity 
by a lump sum deduction applied to these sources of income. The amount 
of deduction differs according to the type of business. Income from leasing 
or rent is taxed according to general rules. 
Income from dividends and interest paid to individuals is not aggregate 
to the taxable base of the income tax but is taxed under a separate regime: 
it provides a 25 percent final withholding tax on dividends and a 15 
percent final withholding tax on interest from saving accounts and from 
dividends and interest paid by pension funds. The capital gains basis is the 
difference between the selling and the purchasing price but almost all 
capital gains realized outside corporation income are tax exempt. 
The beneficiary is both the central and local governments: 44.2 percent 
of the revenue from the income tax on self-employed ( 42.35 percent to 
municipalities, 1.86 percent to regions) and 25.19 percent (3.1 percent 
regions, 22.09 percent municipalities) of the revenue from withholding tax 
on wages and salaries of employees accrue to local governments and they 
are distributed among municipalities according to the number of inhabit-
ants. The 23.69 percent from withholding tax on wages and salaries of the 
employee and the revenue from taxes withheld on interest and dividend 
accrue to municipalities (20.59 percent) and regions (3.1 percent). The rest 
accrues to central government. 
Corporate income tax - CIT (Danz piijmu pravnickych osob) 
Corporation tax was also introduced in 1993. During the communist 
regime, the state gave the production plans to enterprises, showing what 
they had to make; prices were state-controlled and enterprises had a poor 
role in the allocation process. Taxes on enterprise surpluses were subject 
to negotiation and set with respect to national industrial policy objectives. 
They yielded more than 10 percent of GDP and the tax rate was far higher 
than those rates applied in EU countries. It was 75 percent in 1988 and 55 
percent in 1991. Then, the state appropriated a high share of enterprise 
profits. The new corporation tax is similar to that applied in EU countries. 
Both public and private companies, and non-commercial bodies, are taxed 
on their worldwide income and the base is given by the net profits of each 
company because no group taxation is granted. There are also specific reg-
ulations on transfer pricing and thin capitalization. Losses can be carried 
forward for seven years. Non-resident companies are taxed on their Czech 
source income but permanent establishments of foreign companies are 
taxed like domestic companies. 
Interests and dividends are included in the recipient's taxable income 
and royalties and capital gains are included in enterprise gross income. 
Dividends are taxed both at the company and at the shareholder level. 
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The double taxation is alleviated by means of a 50 percent lump-sum tax 
credit against the enterprise tax liability of the withholding tax on the divi-
dends paid out. For holding companies there is a system of tax exemption 
for distributed profits and the tax rate is specified in the respective inter-
national double tax avoidance treaty. 
Expenses that are allowed as a deduction are those incurred in obtain-
ing the gross income. Tangible assets with a useful life less than one year 
are fully deductible in the year of acquisition and those with a useful life of 
more than one year are deductible at a rate ranging from 0.33 percent to 
25 percent, according to the depreciation category. Both linear and accel-
erated depreciation is allowed. Inventories may not be depreciated. Intan-
gible assets are deductible for a period ranging from four to 12 years but 
only if their initial price exceeds €1266.75; other intangible assets are fully 
deductible in the year of acquisition. 
Royalties, interest, donations (in the limit of 2 percent of taxable income), 
paid real estate tax, social security contributions, road tax and lease expenses 
(if the leasing period is above 20 percent of the useful life of assets and at 
least three years) are deductible from the Corporate income tax. 
At the time of the communist regime, there were tax incentives for 
direct investments; today, these incentives have been abolished and 
replaced with many activity-specific allowances, tax credits or relief on 
new assets, temporary exemptions from corporate income tax for new 
investment and subsidies for education of employees. Starting from 2000, a 
flat rate of 31 percent is applied, but it was 35 percent up to 1999. Invest-
ment companies, investment funds and pension funds are taxed at 15 
percent, but this treatment will be abolished from 2004. Four-fifths of 
revenue from corporate income tax accrue to central government and one 
fifth to local government ( on the basis of population). 
Value added tax - VAT (Dait z piidane hodnoty) 
The main difficulty of transition for the Czech fiscal system has been the 
shift from the turnover tax applied before 1993 to the value added tax 
according to EU standards. The turnover tax was applied to all goods and 
it was very complex, both for the number of rates, ranging from -0.74 to 
733 percent, and for that of the commodities groups (1506 percent). A lot 
of necessary goods were subsidized. 
Now, Czech VAT is similar to the EU model but there are some differ-
ences that will have to be overcome. The basis of assessment is the price of 
the taxable supply excluding the VAT, and the tax is also payable on 
imports. The beneficiaries are the central government, regions and munici-
palities. Only individuals and entities with a turnover above €15,834.31 
must be registered for value added tax. 
According to the EU directive that provides only two rates ( a standard 
rate higher or equal to 15 percent and a reduced one between 5 and 
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15 percent on some goods), the Czech Republic adopted a standard rate of 
22 percent, and a reduced rate of 5 percent on water, agricultural, food and 
pharmaceutical products, constructions and restaurant services. However, 
the list of goods taxed at the 5 percent rate must be reduced according to 
EU harmonization because the changes planned for the 2004 are not suffi-
cient. Exports, financial services and many public services are tax exempt. 
Excise duties (Spotiebni dan) 
The Czech Republic has several excise duties that were introduced during 
the tax reform of 1991 and 1992. The main items are as follows. 
a Hydrocarbon fuels and lubricants - The tax is charged on petroleum 
products and oils that are produced or imported. The beneficiary is 
the central government and state fund of transport infrastructure. 
Rates range from €258.10 per one thousand liters of motor oils to 
€343.29 per one thousand liters of motor car and aircraft petrol. 
There are many exemptions: for example, the duty on light heating oil 
is refunded if it is used for heating purposes. 
b Alcohol - The basis of assessment is the number of liters of ethyl 
alcohol and the rate is €7.41 per liter of ethyl alcohol and €3.00 for 
fruit spirits distilled by fruit growers. The tax is paid by producers, 
importers and processors of alcohol and liquors. The beneficiary is 
central government. 
c Beer - The basis is the hectoliters and the rate depends on annual pro-
duction: €0.76 per hectoliter if the annual production is more than 
200,000 hectoliters and there are five rates ranging from €0.38 per 
hectoliter to €0.68 applied to five brackets if the production is less 
than 200,000 hectoliters. The beneficiary is central government and 
the tax is paid by producers and importers of beer. 
d Wine - The rates range from €0.076 per liter to €0.74 per liter accord-
ing to the wine qualities. The tax is paid by producers and importers of 
selected products and the beneficiary is the central government. 
e Tobacco - The basis is the kilogram of tobacco for production of ciga-
rettes, tobacco refuse for smoking and pipe tobacco and the unit for 
cigarettes. The rates range from €0.021 (for filter cigarettes) to €27.07 
(for tobacco refuse for smoking). The taxpayers are the producers and 
importers of tobacco products and the beneficiary is the central 
government. 
Local taxes 
a Real Property Tax (Danz nemovitost{) - An annual tax is imposed on 
buildings and land. Taxpayers are the owners of buildings and land 
and all revenue accrues to local government. The basis for buildings is 
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the area of the ground plan of the overhead part of the structure in 
squares meters, and rates range from €0.032 per square meter to 
€0.127. For the land the bases are average prices in the cadastre areas 
and rates range from 0.25 percent to 0.75 percent of average price for 
cultivated lands. The rate for a built-up area is €0.0032 per square 
meter and that on developed land is €0.032 per square meter multi-
plied by coefficients according to the size of the municipality. 
b Levy on Withdrawal of Land from Agriculture and Forestry - A lump 
sum levy calculated depending on the environment, climate and other 
factors is payable by subjects who ask for permanent withdrawal of 
land. Forty percent of revenue accrues to municipality and 60 percent 
to the central fund of environment. 
c Other taxes - Infrastructure tax, Resort and recreation fees on visitors, 
Waste tax, Dog tax, Recreational unit tax, Entry tickets tax, Tax on 
operating slot machines, Tax on operating gambling machines and Tax 
on use of public space are paid to municipality. 
Social security contributions 
Social security contributions, applied to labor and self-employed income, 
were introduced in 1993. They are fully deductible from the personal and 
corporate income tax bases. The base of both social and health insurance 
of employees is the gross wage and the total rate is 47.5 percent, of which 
12.5 percent is paid by the employee and 35 percent by the employer. The 
base of the self-employed is 35 percent of net income but there is a 
minimum of €579.54 (€1368.84 for health insurance) and a maximum of 
€15,390.95 tax base. The minimum health insurance tax base for 
employees is 12 times the minimum wage. The beneficiary for social insur-
ance taxes is the central government and the taxes enter the general 
budget. Health insurance taxes are earmarked and health insurance funds 
maintain an individual account for each insured person. 
Other minor taxes 
a Road Tax (Silnicni dan) - Commercial cars used for an entrepreneur-
ial activity in the Czech territory are taxed by the Road Tax. For pas-
sengers cars the tax rate ranges from €38.00 to €133.01 and the basis 
is the cylinder capacity in cubic centimeters; other vehicles are taxed 
from €57.00 to €1596.098 and the basis is the total weight in tons and 
number of axles. The beneficiary is the central government. 
b Inheritance Tax (Dan dedicka) -The heir of a property is taxed on the 
value of the property. Spouses and relatives in direct line are tax 
exempt. Relatives in collateral line are taxed with rates ranging from 3 
percent to 12 percent, while all other persons are taxed from 7 percent 
to 40 percent. The beneficiary is the central government. 
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c Gift Tax (Dan darovaci) - The acquirer of donated property is also 
taxed. There are three categories, as with the Inheritance tax: spouses 
and relatives in direct line are taxed on donated property from 1 
percent to 5 percent, relatives in collateral line from 3 to 12 percent 
and other persons from 7 to 40 percent. There are some exemptions 
according to the value of the donated property. The beneficiary is the 
central government. 
d Real Property Transfer Tax (Dan z prevodu nemovitosti) - Sellers of 
real property must pay to central government 5 percent of the con-
tracted price of transferred real property. 
e Customs Duties (Cla) - The importers of goods are taxed on the 
custom value of imported goods according to the Customs tariff. All 
revenue accrues to the central government. 
f Highway Fee (Poplatek za uzivani dalnice a rychlostni silnice) - All 
drivers of motor vehicles using a highway pay this fee to central 
government (state fund of transport infrastructure) on the basis of 
tonnage of vehicles. 
7.4 The fiscal burden 
The distribution of tax change: taxation by economic functions 
and implicit tax rates 
Table 7.4 depicts the distribution of fiscal burden by economic function 
and by the implicit tax rates from the early to the late 1990s. Looking at 
the classification according to economic function (which shows the ratios 
between the overall tax burden on different factors and a common large 
basis, given by GDP), it can be seen that, in 1998, the most important con-
tribution to the total fiscal revenues originated from employed labor, and 
amounted to 48.4 percent of total revenues and to 18.5 GDP points ( of 
which 60 percent was paid by employers), while 2.9 GDP points (7.6 
percent of total revenues) arose from self-employed labor, 11.1 GDP 
points (30 percent of total revenues) from consumption and 5.7 (15 
percent) from capital and business ( of which 65 percent from profits, 10.5 
from real estate and 12.3 from shares and saving) - see Figure 7.3. 
From 1993 to 1998, only the taxation on employed labor steadily grew, 
from 16.9 GDP points to 18.5, with an increase by 9.5 percent. Its total 
increase can be split into 12.5 percent on employers and 87.5 percent on 
employees. The share of revenues from the other factors of production 
decreased: that of consumption from 13.2 GDP points in 1993 to 11.1 in 
1998 (with a decrease of 16 percent), that of self-employed labor from 4 
GDP points to 2.9 (with a decrease of 2.8 percent) and capital and busi-
ness from 8.9 to 5.7 (with a decrease of 36 percent, which was necessary to 
reduce the rates on corporate incomes from their initial non-market 
levels). Thus, the 4.5 GDP point reduction of total fiscal revenue, which 
Table 7.4 Structure and development of taxation by function and by implicit rates in the Czech Republic, New Members and EU 15, 
1992-98 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
Czech New EU Czech New EU Czech New EU Czech New EU 
Republic members Republic members Republic members Republic members 
Economic functions 
Consumption 13.2 13.6 10.9 12.8 14.5 11.2 12.2 14.7 11.3 11.1 13.5 11.4 
Labor employed 16.9 19.7 20.6 17.6 19.4 20.7 18.1 19.0 21.4 18.5 17.9 21.2 
Labor self-employed 4.0 2.9 2.4 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 
Capital and business 8.9 4.3 7.2 7.8 5.0 6.8 6.0 4.3 7.1 5.7 4.5 7.5 
Implicit tax rates 
Consumption 18.4 16.3 16.2 17.5 17.4 16.5 17.1 17.8 16.7 15.6 16.6 16.8 
Labor employed 37.0 37.1 39.0 37.8 38.3 40.2 37.2 37.4 42.0 38.6 38.0 41.9 
Capital and business - - 32.2 - - 30.3 - - 30.5 - 31.1 
Sources: EU Commission (2000a) for Czech Republic and New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2000) for EU 15 (1997 unweighted average). 
Notes 
Taxation according to economic function is as a percentage of GDP. Total may stay over Total fiscal revenue in Table 7.2, because of double counting. 
Estonia's 1992 implicit rates and all Czech rates refer to 1993. Implicit rates for capital and business are available only for Estonia and Slovenia. 
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Figure 7.3 Taxation by economic function in the Czech Republic in 1993 and 1998 
(source: EU Commission (2000a)). 
took place in the 1990s, was obtained by cutting both consumption and 
capital and business revenues and increasing taxation on the labor factor. 
Looking now at the implicit tax rates (Figure 7.4), which show the ratio 
between the total tax revenue on each factor and the total tax base of the 
same factor (including all taxes), we can see that, in 1998, employed labor 
was the most heavily taxed, at an implicit tax rate of 38.6 percent, while 
the implicit tax rate on consumption was only 15.6 percent, a value very 
low in comparison with the standard value added tax rate set at 22 percent 
(EU Commission 2000a). 
Data for capital and business are available just for 1995 and 1996 and 
were, respectively, 41.7 and 38.4 percent. The dynamic of the employed 
labor's implicit tax rate from the early to the late 1990s was slightly 
growing, with an increase of 4.3 percent (from a value of 37 percent in 
1993). The implicit tax rate on consumption, instead, was constantly 
decreasing, with a reduction of 15 percent from 1993 to 1998. 
Other indicators of fiscal burden 
Czech Republic social contributions are among the highest in the world; 
thus, the summing of contributions to personal income tax has the negat-
ive consequence of a high taxation of labor, which can create distortions in 
the labor market, open opportunities for the shadow economy and origi-
nate a loss of competitiveness, especially in comparison with other New 
EU Member Countries. 
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Figure 7.4 Implicit tax rates in the Czech Republic from 1993 to 1998 (source: EU 
Commission (2000a)). 
In 1998, the labor cost was 135 percent of net wage, a value that cannot 
be compatible with an economy in transition and is high in comparison 
with the value of other countries at the time they were at the current 
Czech level of development. In the near future, the tax wedge on labor is 
planned to decrease but politicians will have to solve the problem (as in 
almost all developed countries) of reducing the existing generous pension 
schemes in the context of an aging population. 
The cut of the corporation tax rate has gone in the right direction, but 
now further steps (such as changes of the taxable base and an increase of 
the effectiveness of the system, above all for foreign investors) should be 
carried out because a low statutory rate is important, but only effective 
average rates can affect the Czech capacity to attract foreign investment, 
and only effective marginal rates can be decisive in the choice of how 
many investments to do. As to capital incomes, we notice that they are 
taxed at very different rates: marginal tax rates on personal income and 
rates on interest are substantially lower than the corporation income tax 
rate, interests are fully deductible from corporation tax base and the 'all-
in' tax rate on corporation income is different according to the firms' 
decisions concerning dividend distribution: these differences affect firms' 
financing decisions and have given rise to a preference for the debt. Thus, 
there are significant differences in marginal effective forward rates, 
according to the sources of financing ( debt financing or financing with new 
equities) and to the specific type of assets (Holeckova et al. 2002). 
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At the time of the communist regime, the share of GDP coming from 
private sector activities was very small; earnings and social benefits were 
extremely equalized; redistribution of income came up basically with indi-
rect taxation (price subsidies) and there were only a small number of large 
enterprises. The 1990s reforms involved the introduction of market 
competition, large privatization and liberalization: then, it was important 
to maintain the social cohesion during the transition to the market 
economy and balance the sacrifices of new tax system with the benefits 
from public expenditures. For these reasons, a real evaluation of the polit-
ical and economical changes of the transition period can be done only by 
considering taxation and expenditures and the income redistribution. 
On the road to a market society, during the 1990s income inequality has 
risen considerably (mostly because of the fast advance of the top decile 
share) and the incomes structure has undergone important changes. In the 
meantime, both pension schemes and the social transfers were reformed; 
and unemployment benefits and guaranteed minimum wage were intro-
duced. The communist countries had a lower value of Gini coefficient (0.2) 
in comparison with the market-driven countries, and the Czech Republic 
was not an exception: Czech income per capita Gini coefficient increased 
from 0.20 in 1988, 0.23 in 1992 and 0.26 in 1996 and probably it has been 
still increasing during the last few years (Vecernik and Stepankova 2002) -
see Table 7.5. 
From the late 1980s to the first half of the 1990s, the fiscal system 
became more progressive, then after-tax incomes became much greater 
even than before-tax incomes, while during the communist regime the tax-
induced reduction of income inequality was insignificant. In 1988, the last 
quintile paid 39.7 percent of revenues and in 1996 it paid 53.6 percent. In 
1988, 67 percent of total transfers come up to the first three quintiles, 
while in 1996 it increased up to 77 percent (Table 7.6). 
However, it is important to underline that more than half of the total 
population is taxed inside the two lowest brackets of income tax, while 
very few taxpayers are taxed within the highest one. Then, the most rele-
vant limit of the existent fiscal system as to income redistribution is the 
lack of a negative income tax: some equitable effects could be obtained at 
the advantage of the lowest income taxpayers if personal income 
allowances were replaced by tax credits. This change could induce an 
Table 7.5 Gini Index on Czech household income 
Per household Per capita 
1988 1992 1996 1988 1992 1996 
0.29 0.32 0.33 0.20 0.23 0.26 
Sources: Microcensus 1988, 1992 and 1996. 
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Table 7.6 Distribution of taxes and transfers according to quintile shares in the 
Czech Republic 
Quintiles 1 2 3 4 5 
Taxes 
1988 1.7 11.1 20.2 27.3 39.7 
1996 1.8 5.4 14.1 25.1 53.6 
Transfers 
1988 27.5 23.4 17.1 15.8 16.2 
1996 27.5 30.6 20.4 12.7 8.8 
Sources: Microcensus 1988, 1992 and 1996. 
increasing loss of revenues. It could be compensated for by an increase of 
the share of real property tax, which in the Czech Republic stays at a very 
low level (about 0.6 percent of total revenues in 1998) - see Table 7.7. 
A comparison with other New Members and the EU 15 countries 
In 1998, the Czech structure of revenue according to economic function 
was close to both the EU and EU new member average, but we can 
observe same differences in the 1990s dynamic and in 1998 values. In 1998, 
the share of consumption was the same as the EU average and two GDP 
points lower than that of New Members, while the share on employed 
labor was the 87 percent of the EU average (21.2 percent of GDP) and 
two GDP points more than that of New Members. The share of self-
employed labor was higher than both EU and new member averages, 
while that of capital and business was three-quarters of the EU average 
and it was 1.2 GDP points more than that in New Members. 
Table 7. 7 Distribution of Czech household income according to decile shares 
Per household Per capita 
1988 1992 1996 1988 1992 1996 
1 2.5 2.9 2.8 5.3 4.9 4.3 
2 4.1 4.1 3.9 6.6 6.4 5.9 
3 5.9 5.8 5.6 7.4 7.3 6.8 
4 7.6 6.9 6.7 8.1 7.9 7.6 
5 9.3 8.1 7.9 8.8 8.6 8.3 
6 10.7 6.9 9.4 9.6 9.2 9.1 
7 12.0 11.1 10.9 10.6 10.1 10.1 
8 13.2 12.8 12.7 11.8 11.3 11.5 
9 15.1 15.2 15.4 13.6 13.1 13.7 
10 19.6 23.5 24.7 18.2 21.1 22.6 
Sources: Microcensus 1988, 1992 and 1996. 
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During the 1990s, it can be seen that the trend of consumption revenues 
has been decreasing in the Czech Republic while it was basically steady in 
both EU and New Members. The opposite happened for employed labor: 
it was basically steady in EU countries, from 1992 to 1996, decreased from 
1997 to 1998 in New Members and rose quite significantly in the Czech 
Republic. Both the EU and New Members self-employed average has 
been steady in this period, while it was decreasing by more than one GDP 
point in the Czech Republic; the same has happened for capital and busi-
ness average. 
In 1998, the Czech implicit tax rate on consumption was 1.2 GDP points 
lower than the EU average and one point lower than the New Members' 
one. During the 1990s, it was decreasing in the Czech Republic and steady 
in the other countries, while the implicit tax rate on employed labor has 
been increasing in both the EU and New Members as well as in the Czech 
Republic - but the increase has been more evident in EU countries (three 
GDP points) than in New Members (1.6 points in the Czech Republic and 
only one point in the other countries). 
7.5 Tax reforms and further steps to get closer to the EU 
Macroeconomic and budget outlook 
Over the last decade the macroeconomic situation in the Czech Republic 
has changed considerably mainly because of two factors: the split of the 
previous Czechoslovakia Republic and the transition, starting in 1991, 
from the communist regime to a market-based economy. The radical eco-
nomic reform wanted to obtain macroeconomic stability, low inflation and 
balanced state budget, and also because, during the 1980s, the average 
Czechoslovakian real GDP growth rate declined dramatically from 4.8 
percent to 1.5 percent. Then, prices and enterprises were liberalized, the 
private sector was promoted, an adequate welfare state was launched, 
both domestic and foreign demands were stimulated, and effective mone-
tary and fiscal policies were implemented. 
However, in the early 1990s, the demand for consumer goods and 
investments was very low and the Czech GDP growth rate was negative 
( also because of a restrictive budget policy targeted to obtaining a low 
deficit), while price liberalization and VAT introduction determined a 
drastic increase in the inflation rate. However, the consequent devaluation 
of the national currency resulted in an increase of exports. In 1992, unem-
ployment rate was still very low, near to full employment, but it increased 
during the following years. The economic recession stopped only in 1994 
but the inflation dynamic was decreasing, albeit in a swinging way, for the 
rest of the decade. Both public debt and the state budget deficit were very 
low. 
In the second half of the 1990s, further economic and political dif-
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ficulties arose: a new recession started in 1997 as a consequence of a cur-
rency crisis: the GDP growth rate was then -0.8 percent. The recession 
ended only in 2000, when the growth rate recovered to 2.9 percent (3.6 
percent in 2001). During this period, the unemployed rate rapidly 
increased from 3.5 percent in 1996 to 9.4 percent in 2000 and to 8.9 percent 
in 2001, while the inflation rate continued its decreasing trend from 8.8 
percent in 1996, 10.7 percent in 1998, 2.1 percent in 1999 and 4.7 percent in 
2001. The macroeconomic stabilization policy, aimed at restructuring the 
economy, facilitated the inflation decrease. As a result, the total domestic 
demand increased by 3.9 percent in 2000, sustained by an increase in pro-
ductivity growth of the industrial sector (OECD 2001). 
However, these results have been initially obtained with an expansive 
fiscal policy that became a structural feature of budget policy after the end 
of the economic recession: the general government budget deficit was 1.7 
percent of GDP in 1996, 2.7 percent in 1997, 3.8 percent in 1998, 4.0 
percent in 1999, 4.2 percent in 2000, to increase further to 7.5 percent in 
2001 and to 9 percent in 2002. 
According to new data, fiscal revenue has been steady in the last few 
years: in 2000 Czech total fiscal revenue was 39.3 percent of GDP, 39.1 
percent in 2001 and 39.8 percent in 2002. Instead, the level of public 
expenditure (excluded net lending) was 42.1 percent of GDP in 1998, 43.7 
percent in 2000, 44.2 percent in 2001, 46.6 percent in 2002; levels that are 
too high to achieve the Maastricht rule of 3 percent budget deficit. This is 
also due to the very low level of public debt (which was about 24 percent 
of GDP in 2001 but only 12.9 percent in 1997) in comparison with the 
Maastricht 60 percent level. This can be an advantage or, contrarily, a 
problem for admission into the EU area, because politicians can under-
valuate the necessity of radical tax and expenditure reforms and go on 
with a further accumulation of the debt. Today, on the expenditure side, 
'general government deficits are not of cyclical character' and 'expenses 
are only partially allocated in areas that would generate positive multipli-
cation effects in the long run' (Ministry of Finance 2003). 
During the last few years public expenditure has raised more than 
revenue and, from a political point of view, this has been possible because 
of the just-mentioned level of public debt and the large privatization 
receipts that have contributed to control the debt increase. However, more 
attention will be carried out in the next few years according to the EU 
accession requirements: without reforms the debt is expected to grow to 
40--45 percent of GDP in the next few years. If this happens, the Czech 
Republic will see a rapid increase of interest expenditure that will make it 
more difficult to stay within EU budget deficit limits, through the reduc-
tion of other budget items (Jurajda 2001). 
Despite the stop and go movements of the 1990s, the Czech economy is 
at the top among the EU New Members: its economic level was, and is, 
very high in comparison with all the other post-communist countries for 
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both the GDP per capita level and unemployment rate. It was the first 
post-communist country to receive an investment-grade rating by inter-
national credit institutions. However, without structural reforms it will be 
difficult to continue with a strong GDP growth and a rapid fall of the 
unemployment rate, because Czech industrial plants and equipment are 
rather obsolete. The only way is to promote a more competitive industry 
and a well-functioning capital market and to continue in bank and 
telecommunication privatization (Matallk and Slavik 2002; Mitra and 
Stem 2003). 
In this way it could be possible to improve the current low level of 
private investment, which negatively affects the profitability of enterprises, 
and then to revitalize the industrial sector and increase foreign investment. 
As a result, a higher GDP growth rate could facilitate the reduction of 
the budget deficit, if these policies mix with a greater effectiveness in the 
control of public expenditure. In fact, a fast growth is forecast for the 
period 2003--06, sustained by private consumption and investment; in 
particular, 2.3 percent in 2003, 3 percent in 2004, 3.5 percent in 2005 and 4 
percent in 2006 (Ministry of Finance 2003). However, the needs of a tight 
fiscal policy targeted to budget consolidation can affect the effective 
growth under the Czech potential rate. 
Last years' and planned tax ref onns 
A decade after radical changes in the fiscal system, the Czech Republic has 
now to consolidate the obtained results. However, as we have seen, during 
the last five years the consolidation of the fiscal system proceeded slowly. 
Only in 2001 did parliament adopt a number of amendments to the previ-
ous tax legislation. 
The personal income tax bracket were reduced from five to four and tax 
allowances were increased; no changes in tax rates are expected for the 
next few years, but a lower tax progression is planned, through an increase 
of child allowances to €109.01 per month. It has been calculated that this 
measure could increase the share of taxpayers exempt from tax from the 
current 1.7 percent to 4.3 percent in the case of a households with an 
employed head and to 19.7 percent in the case that the tax allowance is 
allowed for every dependent child. However, this measure could cost 
about 30 percent of income tax current revenue (1.7 percent of GDP). 
However, to make this reform budget compatible, tax rates will probably 
be increased. In the period 2003-06 no important changes are forecast; 
only the allowance for children will be raised. 
As to corporate income tax, some adjustments were adopted with 
respect to the tax base (intangible assets and their depreciation) and the tax 
treatment of foreign enterprises. From 2000, the tax rate was reduced from 
35 percent to 31 percent and, from 2004, a new reduction to 28 percent is 
foreseen, because other EU New Members have introduced lower tax rates 
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during the last few years. Also in 2000 (and amended in 2001), a new law 
was passed on investment incentives for domestic and foreign investors. 
For the next few years a reduction is foreseen to 26 percent in 2005 and to 
24 percent in 2006; in addition there will be changes in the tax base. 
The VAT domain shows the main difficulties. According to the EU 
directives, the Czech Republic adopted a standard rate of 22 percent and a 
reduced rate of 5 percent, but the list of goods taxed with this latter rate 
must be reduced because of the EU VAT harmonization. The new govern-
ment has planned to start this change by 2004 when many goods and ser-
vices will shift to the standard rate. Only food, medicines, books and 
newspapers will not be affected by the new law. In addition, the turnover 
limit for mandatory registration to VAT was reduced from €93,750 (three 
million Kc) to €62,500 (two million Kc) starting in October 2003 and it 
will be reduced to €31,250 (one million Kc) in 2004. Other increases are 
planned for tobacco products, alcohol, fuels and other excise duties. 
However, all these changes must be implemented gradually, in order not 
to provide negative consequences on economic growth. 
Due to tax evasion and to the government decision to slow the VAT 
harmonization and to subsidize the consumption of a lot of goods, we can 
see that VAT productivity (the ratio of VAT revenue on GDP and the 
statutory standard VAT rate) is very low in comparison with other coun-
tries. Less than half of the goods and services consumed in each year was 
taxed at the standard rate. However, in 2003 the share was 40 percent. In 
fact, VAT productivity decreased during the 1990s: it was 60 percent in 
1993, 57.4 in 1997 and 50 percent in 1998. In the future, it will be possible 
to broaden the consumption taxable base and to reduce the standard rate 
that today is high in comparison with other countries. 
At the legislation level, although an equal treatment for foreign and 
domestic investors has been introduced in these years, a new bankrupt 
norm according to the EU model, restrictions on special investment incen-
tives and new holding company structure taxation will be introduced, in 
particular to allow the intra-group compensation of the losses. 
After the 2002 elections, the new minister committed the government 
to reducing the budget deficit before 2006 to the range of 4.9-5.4 percent 
of GDP, through a mix of tax increases and expenditure cuts. However, 
the increase of fiscal revenue on incomes and consumption, as proposed, 
in meeting political opposition. Instead, according to the Economic Fore-
casts for the Candidate Countries of European Commission (April 2003), 
the level of public budget is 5.5 percent of GDP in 2001, 6.5 percent in 
2002, and 5.9 percent in 2004 (provisional data). Without reforms, the 
budget deficit forecast is around 8 percent of GDP and the debt around 47 
percent (Ministry of Finance 2003, Passive scenario). 
According to the proposal, tax revenue will increase as a consequence 
of excise duties' increases and changes to value added tax. Expenditures 
should be cut through reducing the number of public employees, 
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modifying the system for the calculus of the pensions, and reducing some 
state contributions. However, the adjustment process will be inevitably 
slow and it is unlikely that the Czech budget deficit will be less than 3 
percent of GDP in the year of EU admission. 
Therefore, the most important issue of fiscal policy would be the sus-
tainability of public finances in the medium run. No basic steps have been 
made in the last few years but this reform was finally approved by govern-
ment and parliament in summer and autumn 2003. This is the right direc-
tion, also because one of the most important objectives of the Czech 
Republic in the next few years is to maintain a modern social state. A 
radical reform could affect the economic performance at least, in the short 
run, but it is important for the credibility in the long run. In addition, there 
are other problems to be considered for an appropriate tax policy in the 
Czech Republic: the rate of taxation is above that in other development 
countries and it is lower than that in the EU countries. This situation is not 
positive for the potential growth of this country and for the 'tax competi-
tion' after EU accession. On the other hand, a radical change is not pos-
sible because of the budget constraints. 
The need for further steps 
Because of the increase in net borrowing in the last few years, it will be 
important for the Czech government to slow the decline of total revenue: 
this happened from 1998 to 2001 but government diligence in 2002 has not 
been sufficient because many revenues came from the privatization 
receipts that have financed the shortfall of revenues of the last two years. 
An expenditure control and a reduction of tax evasion (Hanousek and 
Palda 2002) are both essential because a further increase in Czech rev-
enues and net borrowing could have negative consequences on a country's 
economy, its competitiveness and its future growth rates. 
An intervention that can sustain a domestic industry should be helpful, 
albeit without affecting government spending. On the other hand, there is 
the need to implement a new structure of the mandatory expenditures and 
subsidies to enterprises, to reduce expenditure level, to favor the sectors 
with the highest development potentials, and to increase public investment 
in less developed areas. 
At the moment, problems arise both with reference to the total tax 
burden and to public expenditure. A quite high tax burden can reduce 
both the attractiveness for foreign investments in the country and the prof-
itability for existing ones, and then undermine the potential economic 
growth of the Czech Republic. Besides this, during the last few years, 
some budget items, such as health and pensions expenditures, had a 
growth faster than national income. Then, in the near future, the present 
decoupling between expenditures and revenue has to be attentively kept 
under control (IMF 2002). 
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The government will have to increase the decentralization to local gov-
ernments so as to control the expenditures growth, to make local govern-
ments more responsible, and to allow more flexibility in determining tax 
rates and fiscal independency. This requires an increase of local own taxes, 
such as the property tax, that today gives only a small revenue to the 
municipalities in comparison with other countries. Greater coordination 
among regional, municipal and central levels of government will be the 
required to reach a well-coordinated economic policy's aims, to make the 
budget process more effective and to reduce growth and employment dif-
ferentials across regions. 
In addition tax expenditures and public pensions need reforming: the 
first to make it more targeted and to harmonize it with the general social 
policy; the second to decelerate the expansion trend of this budget item 
that is now 24 percent of government expenditures, to 9 percent of GDP 
(it is expected to grow to 6 percent of GDP in 2030 without reforms). 
To sum up, by imposing market discipline on the enterprise sector, 
establishing a good climate for foreign investments and security of prop-
erty rights, simplifying regulatory procedures, from 1993 to 1998, the 
private sector share on GDP increased with the number of firms (from 
1993 to 1997 more than two million business licenses for physical persons 
were issued) but their average size is very small. The share of employment 
in small enterprises increased from 24 percent in 1993 to 56 percent in 
1998 and consequently the share of value added in small enterprises also 
increased. This created difficulties in Tax administration and, to minimize 
the room for tax evasion, the law's complexity was increased. It is imposs-
ible to have an efficient tax collection when the number of taxpayers 
increases so rapidly, also because it is difficult to distinguish clearly the 
private consumption income from the business profit (Vitek et al. 2003a) -
see Table 7 .8. 
Instead, costs to collect taxes are around 1.5 percent of total revenues, a 
value similar to that of the other countries, while the number of Tax 
administrative employees is around 15,000 people. During the trans-
formation process the collection costs increased but the efficiency of tax 
administration is low and there are a lot of small tax offices. The major 
Table 7.8 Number of taxpayers in the Czech Republic 
Taxpayers 2001 2002 
Personal income tax 2,685,938 2,877,730 
Corporate income tax 305,517 321,487 
Road tax 921,492 970,825 
VAT 432,282 433,837 
Excises 4824 4858 
Source: Czech Ministry of Finance and Annual Reports. 
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costs are for the collection of the small property taxes, road tax and VAT 
(Vitek et al. 2003b, 2003c). 
Total revenue must be increased to obtain a deficit reduction, the ratio 
with respect to the GDP of the indirect taxation should be increased, a 
more rapid harmonization of the VAT close to the EU model should take 
place, and the effectiveness of tax administration must be improved, in 
order to reduce tax evasion through more effective controls and enforce-
ment and create better tax collection. 
Note 
1 A preliminary version of this chapter was carefully revised by Jan Pavel of Uni-
versity College, Prague, and by Leos Vitek, University of Economics, Prague, to 
whom I express my warmest thanks. 
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8 Estonia and the other Baltic 
states 
Evelin Ahermaa and Luigi Bernardi1 
8.1 Introduction and executive summary 
This chapter is mainly concerned with the fiscal system of Estonia. This is 
neither the widest nor the most populated among the Baltic New 
Members (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). However, enough fiscal data 
are available for this country. As all the Baltic states are quite similar, a 
final short section will be devoted to Latvia and Lithuania. 
Estonia is a small country, of 45,227 square km and 1358 million 
inhabitants. It became an independent republic in 1918, and remained so 
up to the beginning (1940) of the Second World War, when it was incorpo-
rated into the USSR. Independence was gained again in 1991 and a new 
parliamentary Constitution was adopted in 1992. Estonia entered de facto 
into the EU in 2004. The local currency is the Estonian Kroon 
(EEKl = €0.063911), GDP is about €5150 million, nearly €3760 per 
capita, somewhat less than 20 percent of the EU average.2 After a 
1999-2000 slowdown, the economy is at present growing fast, at rates of 
more than 5 percent per year, but unemployment is still over 10 percent. 
Inflation runs around 2-3 percent, as does the government deficit. Public 
debt is not more than 5 percent of GDP. 
Current total fiscal pressure in Estonia reaches about 37-38 percent of 
GDP. This level has been criticized as being too high, compared with the 
need not to interfere with the development process, but it is somewhat 
lower with respect to other New Members. Direct taxes are below indirect 
taxes which will be increased ( especially excises) as a consequence of 
access to the EU. 
Labor income has been heavily hit, preventing job-intensive growth 
while inducing the development of the underground economy, albeit 
that during the last few years the problem of the so-called 'envelope 
salaries' is decreasing, as is the problems of illegal goods and smuggling. 
This raises an equity problem, due to the fact that inequality in income dis-
tribution is increased greatly from the end of the Russian regime. As in 
any former communist country, the level of local government activities is 
low compared with Western European standards. Financing is raised 
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mainly by taxes, which are mostly given by shares of National (income) 
taxes. 
The fiscal reform, adopted after the collapse of the USSR and 
independence, went quickly during the first years of the new Republic: 
unlike in many other transition countries, no revenue fall occurred. As a 
consequence, during the 1990s, the quantitative structure of the system did 
not radically change. In the late 1990s and the early years of this century, a 
general revision of tax laws was performed. Furthermore, the efforts to 
implement a modern tax administration were fairly successful. The main 
problem concerns the enforcement of tax collection. However, corruption 
has not been perceived as being very high, and firms' bribing behavior is 
comparatively lower than in other transition economies. 
At present the broad features of Estonian main taxes are not very dif-
ferent from the corresponding EU models, albeit they are generally 
simpler and show some distinctive features. Income tax exempts almost all 
capital incomes and its structure is rather similar to a linear income tax at 
a marginal rate of 26 percent. The same rate is charged on corporate 
profits but only distributed profits are taxed, while all retained earnings 
are not taxed at all. This mild fiscal treatment of corporations is a common 
feature in the Baltic states. VAT is the usual tax-to-tax European model: 
the standard rate is set at 18 percent, some essential commodities are 
taxed at 5 percent and welfare and other public services benefit from a 
zero rate scheme. A complex structure of excise duties and stamp duties 
are the remaining main state sources of revenue. The local taxes may be 
levied on the same bases as state taxes or on different ones (in particular 
on land). Quite high rates must be paid for social contributions on labor 
income: 20 percent for pensions and 13 percent for health. 
Concerning the distribution of fiscal burden, the main contributions to 
total revenues come from labor-employed income and, to a lower extent, 
from consumption. Notice that in a low income setting, where wages are 
mostly the main component of both total income and the consumption of 
total expenditure, the two kinds of taxation may overlap. Regarding the 
fiscal burden on specific factors, implicit rates show that labor employed 
income suffers from a burden (about 40 percent) almost twice that 
charged on capital and business income. 
Estonia's government budget roughly balanced during the 1990s. This 
was due also to the lack of the monetary financing of the Central Bank 
(prevented by law). In 1999, the deficit jumped to nearly 5 percent, in the 
wake of Russian crisis, but during following years a buoyant economic 
growth and fiscal discipline contribute to gradually reaching a budget 
surplus of 1.3 points of GDP in 2002. It is expected to turn to deficit in 
2004, but for no more than half a point of GDP. 
Recent tax reforms were intended, in particular, to harmonize the exist-
ing tax system with EU requirements, particularly in the field of VAT and 
excise duties. A relevant change, as mentioned before, was adopted for 
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corporation tax: only distributed profits are now subject to tax, while the 
retained ones' are exempt. The new incentive seems particularly intended 
to attract foreign capital, in competition with other transition economies. 
Anyway, it will be right to continue to have a mild taxation on corporations 
and productive activity. Simplified tax regimes will have to be envisaged for 
small business and this could also alleviate tax administration activity. 
Progress toward the EU (and then EMU) requires further harmon-
ization efforts and keeping a low taxation of enterprises. This in turn 
requires a strict monitoring of expenditure, since the budget must continue 
to be balanced, even if the population is declining and aging. 
The fiscal situations of Latvia and Lithuania are not very different, but 
present some peculiarities. Regarding total taxation, Latvia and, in particu-
lar, Lithuania tax less than Estonia. Social contributions are particularly low 
in Lithuania, while both income tax and VAT in each country are under the 
Estonian levels. From the early to the late 1990s, total fiscal pressure did not 
change too much in Latvia and the same occurred in the composition of the 
tax mix among different taxes. On the contrary, fiscal pressure decreased in 
Lithuania: the market-oriented cut of corporations' tax rates was not substi-
tuted by an adequate increase of other taxes. The high degree of centraliza-
tion of both revenues and expenditures in Lithuania is similar to the 
Estonian figure, while Latvia shows some more decentralization in both rev-
enues and expenditures. The main taxes (Income tax, Corporation tax, 
VAT, Social contributions) do not show strong structural differences from 
their Estonian counterparts. In particular, income tax replicates the linear 
flat tax model and corporation tax tries to be mild with earnings and with re-
invested profits. Economic growth is running at a high level in both Latvia 
and Lithuania from the end of the 1990s. Latvia adopted a policy mix which 
favored a higher growth (6-8 percent) coupled with an inflation rate at 
about 2-3 percent and a government deficit on the upper bound of the 
Stability Pact. Lithuania's preference was in favor of a fiscal discipline that 
allowed the rate of inflation to decrease to around 1 percent and the govern-
ment deficit not to be greater than 2 percent. Thus, both countries are sub-
stantially in line with EU and EMU financial requirements. 
8.2 The structure of the system at the end of the 1990s and 
its development after the collapse of the USSR 
A broad view of the current structure of taxes and social security 
contributions 
At the end of the 1990s, Estonia's total fiscal pressure (37.5 percent) was 
not far from the New Members' average (38.9 percent), but was some 
points under the EU mean level. The Estonian broad fiscal structure (see 
Table 8.1) can be split almost exactly into two thirds taxes and the remain-
ing third social contributions. 
Table 8.1 Structure and development of fiscal revenue in Estonia, New Members and EU 15 as a percentage of GDP, 1992-98 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
Estonia New EU Estonia New EU Estonia New EU Estonia New EU 
members members members members 
Direct taxes, of which 13.3 10.1 13.5 11.6 10.0 12.9 10.0 9.6 13.4 11.1 9.2 13.7 
Personal income 8.5 6.4 9.6 8.1 7.0 9.3 8.3 7.1 9.3 8.5 6.7 9.3 
Corporation income 4.8 3.6 2.3 3.5 2.9 2.4 1.7 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.5 3.0 
Indirect taxes, of which 12.3 15.6 13.4 14.9 16.5 13.7 15.5 16.9 13.7 14.3 15.5 13.9 
VAT 9.2 5.1 6.7 11.2 7.4 6.8 10.0 7.4 6.9 8.8 7.9 7.0 
Excise duties 1.9 3.4 3.4 2.1 4.2 3.5 3.3 4.1 3.4 3.8 4.1 3.5 
Others 1.2 9.3 3.3 1.7 5.0 3.4 2.1 4.9 3.4 1.8 3.6 3.5 
Total tax revenue 25.5 25.7 26.9 26.5 26.4 26.6 25.5 26.5 27.1 25.4 24.7 27.6 
Social contributions 12.1 16.1 14.5 13.1 15.7 14.9 12.2 14.3 15.3 12.1 14.2 15.0 
Employers 11.9 10.0 8.1 12.9 9.0 7.9 12.0 8.0 8.3 11.9 7.9 8.2 
Employees 0.0 5.3 4.8 0.0 5.1 5.2 0.0 4.8 5.1 0.0 4.8 5.0 
Self employed 0.2 1.8 1.6 0.2 1.6 1.8 0.2 1.5 1.9 0.2 1.6 1.9 
Total fiscal revenue 37.7 41.8 41.4 39.6 42.2 41.5 37.7 40.8 42.4 37.5 38.9 42.6 
Administrative level 
Central government 16.6 25.9 22.8 22.0 25.8 22.4 20.3 25.4 22.4 20.1 23.9 22.9 
Local government 9.0 3.0 3.0 4.5 3.5 3.2 5.2 3.4 4.0 5.3 3.7 4.0 
Social Security 12.1 12.9 14.5 13.1 12.9 14.9 12.2 11.5 15.2 12.1 11.4 14.9 
Sources: EU Commission (2000a) for Estonia and New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2000) for EU-15 (1997 unweighted average). 
Notes 
Czech data start in 1993 and Social security is only health. 
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Direct taxes are still lower than indirect ones, but far less than in the 
average of the New Members. The yield of personal income tax is not low, 
although it is limited by the narrow base as well as by the flat rate of 
income tax (see section 8.3). 
The total amount of indirect taxes looks comparatively higher. This is 
not due to the existence of a complex structure of excise duties, but rather 
to the narrow coverage of the VA T's reduced rate and to the small 
number of operations that benefit from a zero-rate scheme. 
Social contributions on employed work are slightly lower than the 
average of both New Members and the EU, and are paid by the employ-
ers. However, do not forget that the theory of fiscal incidence firmly states 
that attributing by law the tax charge to employers or employees does not 
much matter as to its final incidence. 
Finally notice that this structure is close to the 'optimal' case, as has 
been proposed by Mitra and Stern (2003) for the whole set of transition 
countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.3 
The development of the system from the early to the late 1990s 
The Estonian new Constitution was adopted in 1992 and the fundamental 
laws of the fiscal reform were passed during the early 1990s. Then, the 
transition from the previous (USSR) regime moved quite fast and there-
after no dramatic changes occurred in the basic structure of the fiscal 
system. Some small changes did occur in the relative share of corporation 
tax and excise duties. 
Corporation tax progressively decreased (from 4.8 percent of GDP in 
1993 to 2.6 percent in 1998) as it assumed the features of a proper market-
oriented corporation tax. Excise duties doubled, during the 1990s, from 1.9 
percent in 1993 to 3.8 percent in 1998. 
One must have well in mind that the transition to a market-oriented tax 
system raised tremendous institutional, administrative and behavioral 
changes, besides quantitative developments (Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000; 
Ebrill and Havrylyshyn 1999). A completely new set of administrative 
bodies and laws had to be created. Previous hidden levies became trans-
parent to taxpayers. Estonia and the other Baltic states were performing 
comparatively well with this process ( e.g. Aghion and Blanchard 1994; 
Coricelli 1997). The early introduction of new taxes4 was not followed by 
any significant fall in total government revenues. Previous discretional tax 
practices gave no rise to the perception of a widespread and deep corrup-
tion.5 Consequently, firms' bribing behavior was comparatively lower than 
in other transition economies. 
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The apportioning of revenue among government layers 
The share of total revenues accruing to central government (20.1 percent 
of GDP in 1998) is nearly twice that which goes to Social Security bodies 
(pensions and health: 12.1 percent). The room for autonomous financing 
of local government is relatively wide, at least when compared with both 
New Members' and the EU's average.6 These shares did not change much 
during the 1990s, except for an exceptional increase in the share of central 
government, balanced by a reduction in that of local governments. 
However, according to the institutional setting inherited from the 
USSR structure, expenditure functions and taxing powers are strongly 
centralized. Local governments' expenditure in 1999 reached not much 
more than 7 percent of GDP (OECD 2002 for this and subsequent data). 
Having the local budgets to balance, local governments' total revenues 
equal total expenditures at about 7 percent of GDP, and are close to 22 
percent of total general government revenues. This figure can in turn be 
split into about 68 percent taxes, 9 percent non-tax revenues, and 22 
percent grants from central government. Notice that, again, just a small 
portion of taxes ( about 10 percent, property taxes) is effectively local gov-
ernments' own resources, while the remaining 90 percent (income taxes) 
being merely a non-autonomous revenue sharing of central taxes. 
A comparison with other main New Members and the EU average7 
Total fiscal pressure (37.5 percent) is about 1.5 points under the average of 
the New Members, 38.9 percent), but more than five points below the EU 
average (42.6 percent). Notice, however, that the share of taxes on total 
fiscal revenues is somewhat higher with respect with both the New 
Members' and the EU's cases. The root of this spread can be mainly found 
in the absence of social contributions directly charged on employees and 
in the low burden of such taxes paid by the self-employed. The splitting of 
taxes into direct and indirect taxes seems to characterize the Estonian 
system as being more advanced with respect to New Members and less in 
comparison with EU 15. Estonian direct taxes are high when compared 
with those of selected New Members but low with respect to EU coun-
tries. The opposite is the case of indirect taxes. See Table 8.1. 
The Estonian level of local expenditure (7.1 percent) is very close to the 
European and Baltic New Members' average (7.2 percent), but is less than 
half the mean value of EU unitary countries (16.2 percent). The share of 
local taxes on total revenues (69 percent) is comparatively high against 
both the other New Members (56 percent) and EU countries (43 percent). 
The financing by means of central government grants is consequently 
lower (22.5 percent), particularly in comparison with EU members (46 
percent). Recall however that the Estonian local tax revenue mainly com-
prises shares of national taxes. 
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8.3 Some quantitative and institutional features of main 
taxes8 
National tax on individual income - PIT (Uksikisiku Tulumaks) 
Estonian personal income tax was introduced in 19939 and further 
amended in 1999. It is close to the PIT standard model, but its features are 
somewhat simpler and country-specific. The yield from resident persons 
accrues at 44 percent into the state budget and at 56 percent into local gov-
ernments. Some items of the potential base are exempt by law, the main 
ones' being as follows. 
Capital incomes: Domestic dividends, interest received from credit 
institutions, inheritances and gifts. Dividends are subject to distribution 
tax (see below), while all other types of interest are included in the taxable 
income: 
a capital gains, from the sale of taxpayer's own domestic dwelling and 
coming from the restitution of expropriated property and privatization 
of the economy; 
b premium and expenses paid to qualified pension schemes; 
c almost all insurance proceeds. However, pensions from qualified 
schemes are taxed at a lower rate of 10 percent by way of a final with-
holding. 
The taxing unity is the individual, including children with own income, 
but resident spouses may submit a joint tax-return. The tax structure is 
very close to the linear income tax scheme. There is a flat rate at 26 
percent, but a basic allowance of about €770 (EEK 12,000) allowed per 
tax year. The same amount holds for any child until 17 years old, starting 
from the third child. Other main allowances concern interest paid to buy a 
house, educational expenses, alimony payments, various social merit dona-
tions and social contributions. 
Corporate income tax - CIT (Ettevotte Tulumaks) 
This tax was adopted in 1993 and amended in 1999 and 2000. The tax is 
payable to the benefit of central government, not only by limited liability 
companies but also by resident partnerships, cooperatives, associations, 
foundations, public-law legal persons as well as by Estonian branches or 
permanent establishments of non-resident similar entities insofar as they 
derive Estonian-source income. 
The base is made up of worldwide net income, including financial items. 
From 2000, the tax has not yet been levied on any retained earning but 
only on distributed profits, gifts and capital gains. The rate is set at 26/74 of 
the net amount of the distribution (26 percent of the gross amount). 
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Value added tax - VAT (Kaibemaks) 
VAT was introduced in 1993; it was further amended in 1999 and benefits 
the central government. Persons (individuals, legal entities and public 
bodies) liable to taxation are those making supplies in the course of their 
business or importing goods and services into Estonia. 
The structure is given by the standard European VAT and exemptions 
follow the general rules: education, health and public services, credit and 
financing institutions services, individual letting of housing and so forth. 
The standard rate is set at 18 percent, but it is scaled down to zero 
(input tax being deductible) in the following main cases: exports, scholarly 
textbooks and Estonian subscribed periodicals. A reduced rate of 5 
percent applies to certain books, medicines and medical equipment, treat-
ment of hazardous waste, funeral requisites and services, theatrical perfor-
mances and concerts, heat and solid fuels sold to natural persons. 
Excise duties (aktsiis) 
Estonia maintains a wide system of excise duties, which has been largely 
updated during the 1990s. The main items are: 
a alcohol - The beneficiary is the state, but peculiarly 3.5 percent of the 
revenue is transferred to the Cultural Endowment of Estonia. Curi-
ously enough, rates are increasing not only from beer to other fer-
mented more alcoholic beverages, but also from these to sparkling 
wines; 
b tobacco - The beneficiaries are the same as in the case of alcohol's 
excise. The tax is paid through revenue stamps, which can be bought 
by the producers and the importers of manufactured tobacco. The 
stamps' value is around €0.50 per package of cigarettes. This value 
will be increased each year until 2010 (roughly EEKl-2 per year); 
c fuel - All the revenue accrues to central government. The tax is 
imposed ( albeit with some exemptions) on any kind of motor fuel 
both manufactured in Estonia and imported. Rates range from about 
€0.02 per liter of fuel oil to about €0.25 per liter of gasoline. These 
excises will also be harmonized with the EU, beginning in 2004 there 
will be an increase; 
d additionally, there is the excise duty on packaging. The tax is paid by 
the importer of packages, by the user of packages, i.e. who fills the 
packages with goods, or by the re-importer of the packaging. 
Heavy goods vehicle tax (Raskeveokimaks) 
There will be a heavy goods vehicle tax from the beginning of 2004. A 
heavy goods vehicle tax is paid on the following classes of vehicles that are 
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intended for the carriage of goods: (1) lorries with a maximum authorized 
weight or gross laden weight of not less than 12 tons; (2) road trains com-
prising trucks and trailers with a maximum authorized weight or gross 
laden weight of not less than 12 tons. Heavy goods vehicles belonging to 
the fire and rescue service agencies of the Defence Forces, National 
Defence League, Border Guard, police authorities, and also state and 
local government agencies of the fire and rescue services, are exempt from 
the heavy goods vehicle tax. 
Local taxes 
The autonomous sources of financing of local authorities (fully or with 
sharing by central government) are basically the following: 
a local taxes (Kohalikud Maksud) - They may be imposed on bases 
already taxed or not by central government. In particular: sales tax 
(maximum rate at 1 percent), boat tax on owners of boats, advertise-
ment tax, tax for closing roads and streets (for demonstrations, proces-
sions and so on), local tax on motor vehicles, tax on keeping animals, 
entertainment tax on recreational activities and parking charge; 
b land tax (Maamaks) -The tax is due from the owners or users of land 
to the benefit of local authorities. The tax is assessed on the value of 
owned land and the rates range from 0.5 to 2 percent. 
Social security contributions (Sotsiaalmaks) 
Social security contributions were adopted by law as late as 1998 to the 
benefit of Social Security and Health Insurance, as a part of the move of 
the welfare system to a Bismarkian model (Oksanen 2001). The total rate 
for all workers is quite high, being set at 33 percent, of which 20 percent is 
for social insurance and 13 percent is for health insurance. In addition, 
unemployment insurance contributions must be paid on employees' 
income. The employer's contribution is levied at a rate of 0.5 percent and 
the employee's contribution at 1 percent. 
Other minor taxes 
Stamp duties (Riigiloiv) accrue to the state budget, and are imposed on 
legal acts and the release of administrative documents. A gambling tax is 
levied on income gained from operating games of skill and betting, to 
the benefit of both the state and local governments. Finally, a first faint 
move toward environmental taxation has been done, by introducing in 
1999 a pollution fee (Saastetasu) payable to central government by the 
owner of an immovable property who releases pollutants or wastes into 
the environment. 
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8.4 The fiscal burden 
The distribution of tax charge: taxation by economic functions 
and implicit tax rates 
The value of taxation according to economic function is given by the ratio 
of the total tax revenue assigned to some factor, divided by a general 
measure of economic activity, i.e. in practice GDP. The resulting values 
come from combining tax rates with the size of any factor and thus enable 
us to evaluate how any factor contributes to the total value of revenues. 
Keeping this in mind, we can see from Table 8.2 that the overall struc-
ture of Estonian taxation according to economic function, broadly speak-
ing, is not at all unusual. Labor employed was the main source of tax 
revenues in Estonia in 1998 (19.8 percent). The next highest contribution 
came from consumption (12.7 percent), whereas the shares of self-
employed labor as well as capital and business10 were quite small. Profits 
are the main components of capital and business taxation. Revenues from 
real estate and financial activities (shares and savings) are still quite low. 
Finally taxes on environment totaled 2.3 percent in 1998, but 1.7 percent 
of this was given by taxes on energy .11 
From the early to the late 1990s, the functional structure of Estonian 
taxation stayed almost unchanged. However taxation of consumption 
increased by a little more than one point from 1992 to 1998, as a con-
sequence of the increase of excise duties, as we have already seen. Taxa-
tion of employed labor increased by about two points, while that of 
self-employed labor remained constant at a very low level. That on capital 
and business practically did not go over the zero level. 
Implicit rates are defined as the ratios of the total tax revenues assigned 
to an economic factor, divided by total National accounts income or cost 
of this factor.12 Therefore, they show the weight of the fiscal burden suf-
fered by any factor, for any dimension of the base. Consider again Table 
8.2. In 1998, employed labor appears to be the factor more heavily taxed, 
at an implicit rate of near 40 percent. This however means that average 
rates of income tax are low, given the total value of social contributions 
(33 percent, as we saw earlier). Furthermore, it is not surprising that the 
implicit rate on consumption (15.5 percent) does not differ very much 
from the incidence of consumption tax measured by economic category. 
Obviously, when income per capita is as low as it is in Estonia (about 20 
percent of the EU average), consumption exploits almost the total amount 
of internal allocation of resources. The current implicit rate on capital and 
business looks as gentle as one could expect just looking at taxation by 
function. This can be easily explained by considering the small share of 
these incomes on total incomes (Figure 8.1). 
Looking back at the early 1990s, both the consumption and labor rates 
show an overall increasing trend, particularly during the first half of the 
Table 8.2 Structure and development of taxation by function and by implicit rates in Estonia, New Members and EU 15, 1992-98 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
--
Estonia New EU Estonia New EU Estonia New EU Estonia New EU 
members members members members 
Economic function 
Consumption 11.4 13.6 10.9 13.5 14.5 11.2 13.5 14.7 11.3 12.7 13.5 11.4 
Labor employed 19.7 19.7 20.6 20.4 19.4 20.7 19.7 19.0 21.4 19.8 17.9 21.2 
Labor self-employed 1.3 2.9 2.4 1.2 2.8 2.4 1.2 2.6 2.4 1.3 2.6 2.3 
Capital and business 0.3 4.3 7.2 0.3 5.0 6.8 0.3 4.3 7.1 0.3 4.5 7.5 
lmplicit tax rates 
Consumption 14.4 16.3 16.2 15.9 17.4 16.5 15.9 17.8 16.7 15.5 16.6 16.8 
Labor employed 37.5 37.1 39.0 35.6 38.3 40.2 37.1 37.4 42.0 39.4 38.0 41.9 
Capital and business 29.4 - 32.2 33.9 - 30.3 20.2 - 30.5 21.5 - 31.1 
Sources: EU Commission (2000a) for Estonia and New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2000) for EU 15 (1997 unweighted average). 
1992 implicit rates and all Czech rates refer to 1993. Implicit rates for capital and business are available only for Estonia and Slovenia. 
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Figure 8.1 Implicit tax rates in Estonia (source: EU Commission (2000a)). 
decade, albeit with some recurring ups and downs. The trend was needed 
to compensate for the slump of capital and business rate which occurred 
from 1994 to 1996. It was simply given by a wide cut in transfers due to the 
state by (publicly held) corporations during the Soviet regime. 
The ability to attract foreign direct investment 
During the 1990s, more than US$100 billion in foreign direct investment 
flowed to the central and Eastern European former communist countries 
and to the new CIS states. Indeed, the FDI was highly correlated with 
cumulative privatization process but was also influenced by an investment 
friendly climate. Estonia performed quite well (Mitra and Stem 2003). 
Foreign direct investment reached 3.9 percent of GDP in 1992-95, when 
the average values were 0.5 percent for the central and Eastern European 
and 1 percent for the CIS countries. The Estonian score was better still in 
1996-99, when FDI reached 5.2 percent of GDP. During these years, 
however, the performance of the European (3.3 percent) and the CIS (2.5 
percent) countries also improved. Contrary to the common trend, Eston-
ian FDI was not very correlated with the diffusion of small enterprises, but 
instead was induced by a good interaction between tax and non-tax incen-
tives. Tax-incentives (see section 8.5) first took the form of generous 
allowances and ad hoe tax-regimes. Subsequently, it was realized that a 
more general mild tax environment would be preferable, according to the 
suggestions of the recent literature (Holland and Owens 1997). It has been 
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estimated that the Tax Reform Act of 2000 (which made exempt non-
distributed profit from taxation) may have the substantial effect of attract-
ing FDI, thus contributing to improving the Act's consequences on welfare 
(=consumption) (Funke and Strulik 2003). 
A comparison with other New Members and EU 15 countries 
We may compare the Estonian tax system in 1998 with those systems of 
both New Members and the EU 15 countries, by looking again at taxation 
both by function and by implicit rates. The Estonian share of taxation on 
consumption is slightly lower than in New Members and higher than in 
EU countries. However, this rank changes when considering the corre-
sponding figures of implicit rates: the burden of Estonian taxes imposed on 
consumption is about one point below the level of both New Members and 
EU countries. These three clusters do not much differ with respect to the 
share of taxation on labor employed and the corresponding implicit rates. 
Taxation spreads increase when comparing the burden on capital and busi-
ness. Estonian figures are comparatively lower from both points of view 
(i.e. by economic function and by implicit rates). A tentative conclusion, at 
least for consumption and labor, is that the shares of burden are deter-
mined more by the relative wideness of the bases than by the specific 
statutory rates. 
8.5 Tax reforms and further steps to get closer to the EU 
Macroeconomic and budget outlook 
During the 1990s, the Estonian general government budget roughly bal-
anced, 13 also because the Central Bank is prevented by law from money 
financing. The economic slowdown of 1999 in the wake of the Russian 
crisis increased, however, the deficit up to 4.7 percent of GDP. VAT and 
excises went down, particularly on imports. Higher unemployment gave 
rise to a contraction of social contributions and income tax yields. During 
the following years, up to 2002, the economic recovery was particularly 
buoyant (at about 5 percent of yearly GDP increase) (EU Commission 
2000b ). A fast growth characterized 2003 and is forecast to continue in 
2004, notwithstanding the risks from external environment. Growth 
performance and fiscal discipline gradually changed the late 1990s' govern-
ment deficit in a budget surplus that reached 1.3 percent of GDP in 2002. 
The forecast decreasing revenues coming from incentive-inducing tax cuts 
and additional expenditures due to EU and NATO membership will 
somewhat deteriorate the budget balance, which is expected to turn negat-
ive, but only to some half point of GDP in 2004, a figure well inside the 
boundaries of Stability Pact. Inflation could go on to be the main Estonian 
departure from European financial requirements. However, the inflation 
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rate, which reached 7.1 percent in mid-2001, decreased to 3.5 percent in 
2002-03 and is forecast to be stable at this level for 2004 (EU Commission 
2003). 
The last few years' reforms and planned tax reforms 
The Estonian tax system has been subject to some changes during the last 
few years and some others are planned for the near future (EU Commis-
sion 2000a; IBDF 2002b ). A common aim is to make the system closer to 
the EU 15 standards. This target informed the reform ( and increase) of 
excise duties (2001-02) and a significant change in VAT. The regime was 
made consistent with the EU 'VI Directive' and a reduced rate (5 percent) 
was adopted for medicines, books and other minor items. International tax 
treaties were signed with some EU 15 countries. Importantly, only distrib-
uted (in any form) corporations' profits are now taxed, while those 
retained and invested have been made exempt. This is a relevant point 
(not exclusive of Estonia) which deserves a short digression. 
The change has been justified as a general measure devoted to promote 
investments and growth. The true reason is somewhat subtler (Easson 
1998). Recall that the main source of state financing was state-owned 
enterprises transfers, under the USSR regime. By transforming transfers 
into a corporation tax, very high rates emerged (around 60 percent). This 
level would have discouraged any foreign investments in Estonia ( and in 
any other former communist country). A preferential tax treatment was 
then accorded to foreign investors. As the corporation tax rate fell, there 
were no reasons for the survival of the specific regime. 
Beginning from about 1996-98, tax competition to attract (Western) 
direct investments begun to increase among Eastern and Central Europe 
transition countries, and various kinds of tax incentives were introduced in 
the corporation tax. Estonia has also competed by the allowance for 
retained profits. By means of a dynamic AGE model, this allowance has 
been estimated to be able to increase substantially investments and capital 
accumulation. However, some crowding out of consumption is likely to 
occur, leaving welfare unimproved, at least in the short-to-medium run 
(Funke and Strulik 2003). 
The need for further steps 
Summing up, the Estonian tax system seems relatively close to the EU 15 
ones. The main rates are in line with the EU 15 average. Regarding the 
shares of broad aggregates of taxes, the Estonian main deviation concerns 
a wider room for social contributions and indirect taxes. Directly or 
indirectly employed labor is thus heavily hit. Consequently, a double 
problem of both efficiency and equity arises. On the grounds of efficiency, 
a reduction of employed labor tax burden is recommended, to allow a 
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more job-intensive growth, taking in account that the unemployment rate 
was still at 12 percent in 2000 (European Commission 2002). The equity 
side of the problem comes (Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000) from the transition 
process having raised inequality in incomes per capita from a before-tax 
Gini of 0.23 in 1987 to a figure of 0.35 in 1995. The tax system should 
correct this fall of welfare, but it is difficult to envisage how it could do it. 
Since most incomes are highly concentrated around a low mean figure, the 
income tax redistributive effect is necessarily poor. 
There will be further changes in tax rates in the field of indirect taxa-
tion. Estonia has got the transition periods for harmonizing excise duties 
of cigarettes and smoking tobacco until 2010, and VAT on heat and solid 
fuels sold to natural persons until 2007 (from 0 percent to 18 percent). 
Additionally, other changes in tax rates will take place after joining the 
EU on 1 May 2004; for example, excise duties on fuels will be increased, 
VAT will be levied at 5 percent on subscribed periodicals and scholarly 
textbooks etc. The transition period of tobacco products was applied for 
because it allows a step by step increase in excise duty, otherwise the sharp 
increase in the tax rate would not be administrated effectively (the prices 
of cigarettes should be roughly double), there would be a tax revenue loss 
( due to the spread of illegal trade generated by price differences between 
Estonia and its neigh boring countries) and it would not correlate with the 
growth of the standard of living. Further recommended actions (EU Com-
mission 2000b) suggest a stronger harmonization of tax policy with EU 
requirements, while preserving a simple and transparent tax policy of 
lower rates for enterprises. A strict control of expenditure is then needed, 
especially taking into account the trends of a declining and aging popu-
lation. In fact, we have already seen that in 1997 the government reformed 
the pension system, by introducing a three-pillar scheme: this however had 
some additional costs for the public budget. To stimulate further growth, it 
would be helpful to devise a simplified tax regime for small businesses, 
which constitute the most dynamic sector of the economy. For the same 
aim, the remaining tax exemptions and tax reliefs should be eliminated. 
Along these lines, the operating difficulties of the tax administration could 
be alleviated (Mitra and Stern 2003). 
8.6 Some information about Latvia and Lithuania 
Both Latvia and Lithuania are similar to Estonia, with respect to location, 
size and, broadly speaking, the number of inhabitants and per capita 
income. The history of the three countries has been largely common, 
particularly during the last decades. Therefore, it is usual to refer to these 
countries as the 'Baltic states', a community of about 6.5 million people, 
whose economy grew fast during the last few years. For both Latvia and 
Lithuania we give brief fiscal data in National account format, as estimated 
by IMF-WB staff. 
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The story they tell shows few departures from the Estonian case. Regard-
ing current taxation, both Latvia and, even more, Lithuania tax less than 
Estonia. Social contributions are particularly low in Lithuania, while both 
income tax and VAT in each country are under the Estonian figure. This 
might be explained by the lower level of per-capita income of Latvia and 
Lithuania (around $3500), compared with that of Estonia (about $4300). 
From the early to the late 1990s, the total fiscal pressure did not change 
much in Latvia, and did not change the main taxes' basic features. 
However, fiscal pressure fell in Lithuania: the market-oriented cut in cor-
poration tax rates was not adequately substituted. The high degree of cen-
tralization of both revenues and expenditures in Lithuania is similar to the 
Estonian figure, while Latvia shows more decentralization of both revenues 
(11 percent of GDP) and expenditures (9.5 percent) (OECD 2002 for 
about 1999). Both Latvian and Lithuanian local governments do not have 
their own tax. They are financed almost exclusively (Lithuania) or largely 
(together with grants and non-tax revenues) by sharing National taxes. 
In Latvia (IBDF 2002a), individuals are subject to individual income 
tax. This is levied on all income received by the taxpayer, albeit with some 
standard exemptions, particularly with respect to capital incomes. As in 
Estonia, the rate is flat, at 25 percent. A personal credit ( about €450) is 
allowed for employment income; a credit (€230) is allowed for each 
dependent. Corporations are subject to 'enterprise income tax' which hits 
once for all corporate income in the hands of the corporation, without any 
further levy on distributed dividends. The tax rate has been decreasing 
from 2001 (25 percent) and reached 15 percent by January 2004, but more 
than one favorable regime has been retained. Land and buildings are 
taxed by local authorities at a rate of 1.5 percent of cadastral value. VAT 
is due when the total yearly value of the supply or import of goods and 
services exceeds about €18,000 for each taxable person. The standard rate 
is set at 18 percent, but - as at 2001 - a reduced rate of 9 percent is applied 
to some essentials. The National Insurance Fund provides benefits for 
almost all kinds of social risk. The rate of contributions given by employ-
ers is 26 percent, that from employees is 9 percent, and that from the self-
employed is 32.3 percent. 
Lithuanian taxes are not very different (Ministry of Finance of Lithua-
nia). The standard flat rate of personal income tax is set at 33 percent. A 
reduced rate of 15 percent is applied however to certain income sources as 
distributed profit, interest, pensions and insurance payments, royalties and 
properties' rents. Corporation tax has a standard rate on both retained and 
distributed profits of 15 percent. The present structure of VAT is quite 
close to the EU's model. The standard rate is 18 percent. In addition, 
reduced rates of 5 percent and of 9 percent are applied. The law on VAT 
envisages cases when the supply is exempt and there are special VAT 
schemes for farmers, tourism services and so forth. 
During the late 1990s, growth was very fast in Latvia (at rates of 5-8 
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percent). This trend is projected (EU Commission 2003) to continue in 
2004, driven by private consumption and fixed investments. The budget 
balance has benefitted slightly from economic expansion. This has been 
due to the already mentioned cuts in corporation tax, which were only par-
tially compensated for by VAT increases. Thus, at the time of writing, the 
general government deficit runs at about two-to-three points of GDP on 
the upper bound of the Stability Pact. The inflation rate is somewhat lower 
than in Estonia in the range of 2-to-3 percent. The picture is not very dif-
ferent for Lithuania. Paradoxically, GDP growth is somewhat lower, while 
both inflation rate (0.3 percent in 2002) and government budget ( -1.9 
percent in 2002) seem to perform better. This is a result of a persistent 
strict fiscal discipline adopted from 1999, when the government deficit 
reached 5.6 percent of GDP. 
Notes 
1 Respectively, Estonian Institute of Economic Research, Tallinn, Estonia, 
e-mail: evelin@ki.ee, and Department of Public and Environmental Economics, 
University of Pavia, Italy, e-mail: luigi.bemardi@unipv.it. Thanks are due for 
suggestions in a number of areas to C. Bronchi, M. Chandler, M. Galizzi and L. 
Pench. A preliminary version was presented at the Congress 'Tax Policy in EU 
Candidate Countries', Riga, 12-14 September 2003. 
2 All UN 2002 data, not weighted in PPP terms. 
3 Total taxes (37.5 percent of GDP) are higher than the upper bound suggested 
by Mitra and Stem (31 percent). Income tax (8.5 percent) stays near the proper 
level (9 percent). VAT (8.8 percent) is high compared with the proper level (7 
percent) as are excise duties (3.8 percent compared with 3 percent). Most of all, 
social contributions (12.1 percent) are over the recommended level (10 
percent). The conclusion should be that the Estonian economy could gain effi-
ciency by a substantial cut of taxes, especially indirect taxes and social contribu-
tions. Notice, however, that Mitra's and Stem's suggested rates are 'optimal' 
only in the sense that they have been extrapolated from the most common 
trends resulting from a cross-section of developing and high income countries. 
On the same topic, see Gupta et al. (2001). 
4 All Baltic states got the maximum score regarding the progress in tax policy 
reform, among both Central and Eastern European as well as CIS countries 
(Ebrill and Havrylyshyn 1999). 
5 Data reported in Tanzi and Tsibouris (2000) show for 1997 a level of the index 
near three times that of Russia and twice that of China. 
6 Notice that the ESA95 National Accounting System does not include sharing 
national taxes in this figure. 
7 A detailed discussion may be found in Mitra and Stem (2003). 
8 This section owes much to EU Commission (2000a) and IBDF (2002a, b). 
9 1993 is a crucial year for tax reforms in Eastern and Central Europe transition 
countries. Not only Estonia, but also the (then) Czech-Slovak Republic, 
Hungary and Poland introduced entirely new tax codes, under the clear influence 
of bodies such as IMP and OECD, after the 1989 initial reforms (Easson 1998). 
10 Capital and business here are substantially given by National accounts operat-
ing surplus, less self-employed income. The main items are thus given by 
incomes and capital gains from the various kinds of wealth. 
11 Data not reported here. See EU Commission (2000a). 
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12 Notice that, in this case, self-employed labor income is included in operating 
surplus, i.e. capital and business. 
13 General government budget was in surplus by 2.2 percent of GDP in 1997, and 
in deficit by 0.3 percent in 1998. 
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9 Hungary 
Francesca Sala1 
9.1 Introduction and executive summary 
Hungary is a landlocked country in Central Europe, with a population of 
10.1 million inhabitants and an area of 93,036km2• After the Second World 
War, Hungary experienced a communist regime until the region's collapse 
in 1989. In 1990, free, multi-party parliamentary elections were held for 
the first time in 43 years. In 1994, Hungary was the first country of the 
region to apply formally for EU membership and, in 1998, the accession 
negotiations were finally launched. After joining NATO in 1999, Hungary 
de facto entered into the EU in 2004, as the Nice Treaty established it in 
2001. Local currency is the forint (HUFl = €0.0039).2 
Growth in Hungary has averaged 4.5 percent since 1997, and was well 
maintained at close to 4 percent in 2001, when GDP was about 61 billion 
euro (per capita, PPP unweighted: about €6150); in the same period 
unemployment fell below 6 percent. The economy outperformed most of 
the other countries during the 2001-03 international slowdown largely 
owing to a strong fiscal impulse and to a consequent increase in private 
consumption. The highly expansionary fiscal policy caused a worsening of 
the general government deficit, which reached 5.2 percent of GDP in 2001 
and 9.2 percent in 2002. Inflation was below 5 percent in 2002. 
Total fiscal pressure in Hungary, after a declining trend during the first 
half of the 1990s, reached 39 percent in 1999 and has been rather stable 
since then. This level is considered too high and harmful for potential 
growth. Furthermore, as in other New Members, tax revenue continues to 
depend much more on indirect taxes while the shares of revenue gener-
ated by income taxes on capital and labor as well as property taxes remain 
relatively low. Social security contributions, making up one third of total 
revenue, are by law levied predominantly as the employers' share, thus 
generating a high tax burden on labor to the detriment of labor market 
participation and employment. As in any former communist country, the 
share of local governments' revenues on GDP, generally used as an indica-
tor of the size of local governments, appears rather low if compared with 
the EU countries' levels. The revenue autonomy too is still very low, with 
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only one third of local government financing coming from own revenues, 
but major changes have occurred since the beginning of the transition 
period.3 
The time development of the tax structure since the beginning of the 
transition period in 1991 was dominated by the structural changes that 
have been achieved in order to move to the fiscal systems prevailing in the 
EU. In the earlier period, from 1991 to 1996, one can see the effects of the 
economic transition in marked changes of the level of total taxation, which 
was decisively lowered from 47 percent of GDP to 41 percent between 
1991 and 1996 and has remained around 39 percent since then. This trend 
is explained by a substantial reduction in the direct taxes to GDP ratio and 
also by a decrease in the social contributions to GDP ratio, whereas the 
indirect taxes share of GDP lowered to a less extent. 
The tax system in Hungary seems relatively close to the EU 15 ones, 
although some distinctive features are still present and further adjustments 
of rates and procedures are needed for accession to the EU. A progressive 
personal income tax with three brackets is applied on aggregate individual 
income, with the exclusion of income from capital and capital gains, which 
are taxed separately; a number of tax allowances in the form of tax credits 
are granted. The taxation of corporate profits is based on a partial integra-
tion system: corporate profits are taxed at a flat rate of 16 percent4 and 
dividends are taxed by way of a flat rate withholding tax of 20 percent; 
beside the standard regime, a number of tax incentives is envisaged for 
large-scale investment or offshore companies. 
The VAT system is very similar to that applied within the EU, although 
transitional measures regarding rate levels and exemptions have been 
required by the EU; the VAT standard rate is 25 percent, the highest 
among the New Members, but reduced rates of 15 percent and 5 percent 
are applied on some basic products and services.5 As stated by EU legisla-
tion, excise duties are levied on alcoholic beverages, tobacco and hydro-
carbon fuels. Among local taxes, a major role is played by the local 
business tax, which accounts for some 85 percent of all local governments 
tax revenues. Finally, relatively high social security contributions and 
payroll taxes must be paid by employers on gross wages, thus augmenting 
the direct cost of labor. 
As to the distribution of fiscal burden according to economic function, 
the main source of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP comes from 
employed labor and, to a lower extent, from consumption. If compared 
with EU 15 countries, Hungarian taxation shows a higher role of taxes on 
consumption, while taxes on employed labor do not differ significantly 
from the EU average. Implicit tax rates confirm the overall picture. 
Considering the macroeconomic and budgetary outlook for 2003 and 
2004, growth is projected to accelerate slightly and new inflation targets 
have been established in accordance with the Central bank; fiscal policy is 
required to return to the announced consolidation path, with a stabiliza-
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tion of the deficit at around 5 percent in 2003 and a further reduction to 
below 4 percent in 2004. 
Tax reforms in recent years appear to have been driven by the commit-
ment gradually to harmonize with the EU and by the aim to improve 
further the environment for the business sector. The former objective has 
informed mainly the VAT and excise duties systems, whereas the latter 
has been translated into a favorable corporate tax regime and into a wide 
range of tax incentives, especially for offshore companies. At present, 
Hungary's taxation system is, to a large extent, aligned with the EU's 
requirements, although further harmonization efforts are needed, notably 
regarding rates of VAT and excise duties. Another recommended action 
concerns the progressive reduction of social security contributions, in 
order to reduce the tax burden on labor and hence stimulate employment. 
The corporate taxation regime should also be reconsidered in light of the 
risk of a harmful tax competition within the EU and a possible EU action 
against specific incentives. 
9.2 The structure of the system at the end of the 1990s 
A broad view at the current structure of taxes and social security 
contributions 
In 1999, the level of aggregate taxation in Hungary was 39 percent of 
GDP, roughly two percentage points below the EU average. The distribu-
tion of fiscal revenues, which can be split into two third of taxes and one 
third of social contributions, shows some striking differences with the EU 
average. As in the other New Members (with the only exception being the 
Czech Republic) indirect taxes play a larger role than in the EU, making 
43 percent of total taxation; indeed, the indirect taxes to GDP ratio of 17 
percent lies above the long-term EU average of 14 percent. 
On the other hand, direct taxes represent a much smaller share of total 
taxation, that is 23.4 percent against the 1996 EU average of 31.2 percent, 
and make up only 9 percent of GDP, well below the 1996 EU average of 
13 percent. This fact can be explained through the relatively low level of 
tax payers' average income and the very low level of the corporate tax rate 
(18 percent).6 
Social contributions' share in total revenue of 33.6 percent lies below 
the 1996 EU average of 36.3 percent. Social contributions are by law 
levied predominantly on employers (fraction 0.82), whereas the 
employees' share amounts to 0.16 of the total and self-employed persons 
contribute only 0.02 of the total. 
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The development of the system from the early to the late 1990s 
The evolution over time of the tax structure during the transition period 
starting in 1991 has been characterized by important structural changes 
that have been achieved in order to bear up to the fiscal systems of EU 
countries. In the period from 1991 to 1996 the economic transition 
involved marked changes of both the level of total taxation and the rela-
tive weights of levies on the factors consumption, employed labor, capital 
and business, included self-employed labor (see section 9.4). 
The level of aggregate taxation was decisively lowered from 47 percent 
of GDP to 41 percent between 1991 and 1996 and has remained around 39 
percent. This reduction is explained by a substantial reduction in the direct 
taxes to GDP ratio, which passed from 12.9 to 9 percent, remaining 
roughly stable from then on, and also by a decrease in the social contribu-
tions to GDP ratio from 16.6 to 13.8 percent in 1996 and 13.0 percent in 
1999. The indirect taxes share of GDP lowered to a smaller extent (17.2 
percent of GDP in 1991 and 16.6 percent in 1999), showing an increasing 
contribution of VAT (6 percent of GDP in 1991 and 8.5 percent in 1999) 
in spite of the excise duties. 
The apportionment of revenue among government layers 
The splitting of the total revenue by receiving administrative levels as per-
centages of GDP shows that, in 1999, the central government received 22.4 
percent and the local governments only 3.2 percent (the social contribu-
tions funds to GDP ratio was, as already said, 13 percent). The share of 
central government in 1999 was 58 percent of total revenue or 88 percent 
of taxes without social contributions; non-central government received 8.3 
percent of total revenue or 12 percent of taxes without social contribu-
tions, composed of 40 percent of the personal income tax, of a local busi-
ness tax, the taxes on land and buildings, one half of taxes on property 
transfer and more than one half of the motor vehicle taxes. The share of 
central government on total revenue did not change much during the 
1990s, being 58.8 percent in 1991, while there has been a slight increase in 
the local governments' share, from 5.6 to 8.3 percent of total revenue (EU 
Commission 2000a ). 
In 1999, the share of total local governments' revenues on GDP, gener-
ally used as an indicator of the size of local governments, was 11.1 percent 
and the share in consolidated national government revenue amounted to 
26.7 percent. As to the composition of total local governments' revenues, 
grants from the central budget accounted for 50 percent, tax revenues for 
33 percent and non-tax revenues for the remaining 17 percent. Notice that 
since the system of local taxes (not compulsory) was implemented in 
1991,7 both the number of local governments collecting local taxes and 
their revenues have been steadily increasing: in 1999, 93 percent of local 
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governments applied local taxes and these accounted for some 18 percent 
of all current revenues, to be compared with the mere 3.5 percent in 1990.8 
Among the local taxes, a major role is played by the local business tax, 
which accounts for some 85 percent of all local governments tax revenues. 
Finally, looking at the revenue autonomy, local governments financing 
can be split into 33.3 percent of own revenues, 18.5 percent of general 
grants and tax sharing arrangements and 48.2 percent of specific grants. In 
1999, tax revenues were almost equally divided between own taxes and tax 
sharing with the central government (OECD 2002c). 
A comparison with other main New Members and the EU 
average9 
In 1998, the level of aggregate taxation in Hungary (38.9 percent) was 
exactly equal to the selected New Members average and less than four 
percentage points below the EU 15 average (42.6 percent). The difference 
in total fiscal pressure was therefore not very large; moreover, almost the 
same proportion between tax revenues and social contributions held (two 
thirds and one third) in Hungary and in the EU. What changes is the dis-
tribution of tax revenues: as shown in Table 9.1, if in the EU direct taxes 
account for 13.7 percent of GDP and indirect ones for 13.9 percent, in 
Hungary direct taxes account for only an 8.7 percent of GDP against the 
16.3 percent of indirect taxes. The same imbalance holds also in other New 
Members - to a major extent in Estonia and Slovenia where the direct 
taxes to GDP ratio is only 7.8 percent. 
Looking at the levels of decentralized expenditure, Hungary's quota on 
GDP in 1999 is 10.4 percent, the second highest level after the Polish one 
(12.1 percent) among European and Baltic New Members (average 7.2 
percent); however, compared with the EU countries' average value of 16.2 
percent, this decentralization indicator appears rather low. The share of 
taxes on total local government revenues (33 perce'nt) is lower than in all 
other New Members (56 percent on average), with the exception of 
Poland where tax revenues account for only 25 percent, and is lower than 
in EU countries (43 percent). On the other hand, the quota of local rev-
enues financed by central government's grants is almost the highest (50 
percent) among the New Members, a very high value if compared with the 
EU average of 46 percent. Finally notice that Hungary is characterized by 
the highest proportion of specific grants on total local financing ( 48.2 
percent of total local revenues) among the New Members (OECD 2002c). 
Table 9.1 Structure and development of fiscal revenue in Hungary, New Members and EU 15 as a percentage of GDP, 1992-98 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
--
Hungary New EU Hungary New EU Hungary New EU Hungary New EU 
members members members members 
Direct taxes, of which 10.1 10.1 13.5 9.4 10.0 12.9 9.0 9.6 13.4 8.7 9.2 13.7 
Personal income 7.5 6.4 9.6 7.4 7.0 9.3 7.1 7.1 9.3 6.5 6.7 9.3 
Corporation income 2.2 3.6 2.3 1.9 2.9 2.4 1.8 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.5 3.0 
indirect taxes, of which 17.9 15.6 13.4 17.9 16.5 13.7 17.8 16.9 13.7 16.3 15.5 13.9 
VAT 6.0 5.1 6.7 7.7 7.4 6.8 7.5 7.4 6.9 7.9 7.9 7.0 
Excise duties 6.2 3.4 3.4 4.2 4.2 3.5 3.9 4.1 3.4 4.2 4.1 3.5 
Others 5.8 9.3 3.3 6.0 5.0 3.4 6.4 4.9 3.4 4.2 3.6 3.5 
Total tax revenue 28.0 25.7 26.9 27.3 26.4 26.6 26.8 26.5 27.1 25.0 24.7 27.6 
Social contributions 18.0 16.1 14.5 17.2 15.7 14.9 13.8 14.3 15.3 13.9 14.2 15.0 
Employers 14.0 10.0 8.1 13.5 9.0 7.9 11.4 8.0 8.3 11.6 7.9 8.2 
Employees 3.3 5.3 4.8 3.1 5.1 5.2 2.1 4.8 5.1 2.1 4.8 5.0 
Self employed 0.7 1.8 1.6 0.6 1.6 1.8 0.3 1.5 1.9 0.3 1.6 1.9 
Total fiscal revenue 46.0 41.8 41.4 44.5 42.2 41.5 40.6 40.8 42.4 38.9 38.9 42.6 
Administrative level 
Central government 24.9 25.9 22.8 24.8 25.8 22.4 23.8 25.4 22.4 21.5 23.9 22.9 
Local government 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.4 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.4 4.0 3.5 3.7 4.0 
Social Security 18.0 12.9 14.5 17.2 12.9 14.9 13.8 11.5 15.2 13.9 11.4 14.9 
Sources: EU Commission (2000a) for Hungary and New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2000) for EU-15 (1997 unweighted average). 
Notes 
Czech data start in 1993 and Social security is only health. 
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9.3 Some quantitative and institutional features of main 
taxes10 
Personal income tax - PIT (Szemelyi jovedelemado) 
The personal income tax in Hungary, envisaged by the Law n.117 of 1995, 
is payable by resident individuals and the tax revenue accrues to both 
central and local governments; the tax sharing arrangement is fixed by the 
annual budget law:11 in 1999 the local governments' share amounted to 40 
percent.12 
The tax base is the worldwide income of any kind, but different rules 
with respect to deductions and rates apply to different classes of income. 
The aggregate income (which includes mainly income from dependent and 
independent personal services and private pensions) is taxed at a progres-
sive rate, but various credits are deductible from the tax liability. From 1 
January 2002, pensions, provided on the basis of statutory provisions, are 
fully exempt from income tax; payments received from a private pension 
fund are taxable, but a credit equal to 50 percent of the tax calculated by 
applying the higher progressive rate, up to the actual tax due, is granted; 
pensions from a mutual insurance fund are exempt if the recipient has con-
tributed to the pension fund for at least three years. The most important 
tax credits, deductible from the tax due, are granted for wage income, 
income from intellectual activities, social security contributions (both 
mandatory and voluntary),13 life insurance premiums, education fees, 
housing mortgage loans, family allowances, donations. 
The taxing unit is the individual. As of 2004, there are three classes of 
taxable income: the minimum tax rate of 18 percent is due on the first 
HUF800,000 (about €3156); 26 percent is levied on the excess up to 
HUFl,500,000 (about €5917) and the top rate of 38 percent on the excess 
over HUFl,500,000.14 
Incomes from capital and capital gains are taxed separately at a flat 
rate, but different rules apply. Interest income is generally exempt (techni-
cally taxed at a rate of 0 percent). Dividends are taxed by way of withhold-
ing at a rate of 20 percent for ordinary and 35 percent for 'excess 
dividends'.15 Rental income derived from immovable property is subject to 
tax at a rate of 20 percent. Finally, capital gains from the disposal of prop-
erty, whether movable or immovable, are taxed at a 20 percent rate, with 
the exception of gains on non-quoted derivative instruments which are 
included in the aggregate income and taxed at a progressive rate. 
Corporate income tax - CIT (farsasagi ado es osztalekado) 
Hungary has a partial integration system for the taxation of corporate 
profits. Corporate profits are subject to the corporate income tax, but divi-
dends paid to natural persons are, as a general rule, taxed by way of the 
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already mentioned flat rate withholding at 20 percent known as 'dividend 
tax', introduced in 1997. Dividends paid to resident corporate share-
holders are, however, normally exempt. 
The taxable entities for corporate income tax, which accrues to the 
central government only, are joint-stock companies, limited liabilities com-
panies, cooperatives, state-owned companies, foundations, associations, 
public service companies, social organizations, churches, risk capital funds. 
Resident companies are taxed on their worldwide income; the taxable 
base is computed from the accounting profits (including also financial 
profits), that is gross revenue minus all deductible expenses. From 1997 to 
2003, the corporate income tax rate was 18 percent, but a special rate of 3 
percent applied to the taxable profits of offshore companies.16 Since 
January 2004 these two rates have been changed to 16 percent and 4 
percent respectively. 
Value added tax - VAT (Atalanos forgalmiado) 
Hungary applies a VAT system under which tax is levied at all levels of 
the supply of goods and services. The beneficiary of the VAT revenue is 
the central government.VAT applies to all natural persons and legal enti-
ties supplying or importing goods or services on a regular basis for profits; 
business with an annual turnover below 2 million forint (about €7890) 
may opt to be exempt from accounting for VAT. 
The taxable amount is given by the value of goods and services supplied 
or imported (excluding VAT but including customs duties). Important 
exemptions include transactions relating to financial services, health care 
services, lease of dwellings, insurance and education. Under reciprocity 
agreements, non-residents doing business in Hungary may reclaim the 
VAT paid on Hungarian supplies of goods and services including the 
importation of goods. 
The standard rate is 25 percent. A reduced rate of 15 percent applies to 
certain basic foodstuffs, medicines, medical supplies, certain textile mater-
ials, coal and electrical energy. A 5 percent rate Goint with the deduction 
of the tax paid on inputs) applies to exports as well as to textbooks and 
specified medicines and medical equipment. The 5 percent rate also 
applies to the development of gas and electricity infrastructures and to 
construction works.17 
Excise duties (Jovedeki ad6)18 
The main items subject to excise duties in Hungary are as follows. 
a Alcoholic products. The beneficiary is the central government and the 
taxpayer is the person producing or importing the excise good. Rates 
increase from sparkling wine to intermediate products, beer and 
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spirits. As from 1 August 2000, the system of consumption taxes and 
excise duties has been amended; the major change concerned wine 
that, within the framework of EU harmonization, became an excise 
product (the tax rate on grape wine initially set was HUF5 per liter -
about €0.02 - against the previously applied consumption tax rate of 
11 percent; since 1 January 2004 the rate became HUF8 per liter -
about €0.03). 
b Tobacco products. Again the excise duty's revenue accrues to the 
central government. The tax base is the retail price (including tax and 
value added tax) and thousand units. As of 2004, for cigarettes tax 
rates are HUF6450 (about €25) per thousand units and 23 percent of 
the retail price. 
c Fuels. The beneficiary is the central government and the tax is levied 
on any mineral oils produced or imported. Tax rates increase from 
diesel (HUF85 per liter - about €0.33), to unleaded petrol 
(HUF103.50 per liter - about €0.41), to leaded petrol. 
Consumption taxes (Fogyasztasi adok) 
Consumption taxes accrue to the central government. The most important 
are levied on: 
a coffee. The applicable tax rate is 12 percent; 
b passenger cars. The tax rates vary from 10 percent applied to a car up 
to 1600cc equipped with a catalytic converter to 32 percent applied to 
a car over 1600cc without a catalytic converter; 
c products made of precious metals (other than silver). The relevant tax 
rate is 35 percent. 
Local taxes 
In Hungary, local governments benefit from tax revenues coming from 
both tax sharing arrangements with the central government and own taxes. 
The main taxes shared with the central government are the personal 
income tax (40 percent sharing), the tax on onerous property transfer (50 
percent sharing), the taxes on inheritance and gifts (50 percent sharing), 
and the motor vehicle tax ( the share of local governments has increased to 
100 percent since 2003). 
There also exist a number of taxes that local governments can impose 
autonomously. The most important of them are as follows. 
a Local business tax (helyi iparzi zesi ado). Since 1991, municipal author-
ities have been authorized to levy local business tax on corporate tax-
payers who have their seat, or who are registered, within their 
jurisdiction. Some municipalities do not charge such tax (but the 
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number of these municipalities is decreasing over time) and a number 
of municipalities grant tax incentives. The tax base for commercial 
activities is the net sales revenues of product sold or service provided 
less the purchasing costs of goods and subcontractors' fees. Manufac-
tures may fully deduct the costs of materials. The maximum rate for 
local business tax was 1.7 percent in 1999 and 2 percent from then 
on.19 
b Land parcel tax (telekad6). Introduced in 1991, this tax is levied annu-
ally on the owner of a land parcel; the tax base can be or the actual 
area in square meters or the adjusted market value of the parcel. 
c Building tax ( epitmenyad6 ). As before, the tax, which is due by the 
owner of a building, is calculated on the floor space in square meters 
or on the adjusted market value of the building. 
d Communal tax (kommunalis ad6ja). This tax can be levied on private 
individuals or on entrepreneurs. If on individuals, the occupants of a 
household dwelling pay HUF12,000 (about €47) per dwelling as a 
maximum annual rate, regardless of the number of inhabitants. This 
tax is suited to localities that have many government-owned social 
flats and cannot rely on property taxes for revenue. If levied on entre-
preneurs, the enterprise pays a maximum annual rate of HUF2000 
(about €8) per employee. 
Social security contributions (f arsadalombiztositasi jarulekok) 
Hungary reformed its pension system in 1997, introducing a multi-pillar 
system combining a PAYG state pension pillar and a fully-funded manda-
tory second pillar consisting of privately-operated pension funds. A volun-
tary third pillar of supplementary private pension was also introduced. 
Employees may either participate in the first and second pillars or remain 
covered by the state pension system only. 
Social contributions are levied at a rate of 29 percent as the employers' 
share20 (pension security contribution at a rate of 18 percent and health 
security contribution at a rate of 11 percent) plus 11.5 percent as the 
employees' share (pension contribution at a rate of 8.5 percent, reduced to 
1.5 percent for members of private pension funds,21 and health insurance 
contribution at a rate of 3 percent).22 
In addition to the social security contributions, employers are obliged to 
pay a fixed health care contribution, which amounts to HUF3450 (about 
€14) per employee per month since 2003,23 and a sick-leave benefit contri-
bution equal to 33 percent of the overall employee's sickness benefits. 
Finally, contributions must be paid to the unemployment fund, with the 
employees' applicable rate equal to 1 percent and the employers' contribu-
tion equal to 3 percent (payroll tax). 
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Other minor taxes 
Besides the personal income tax, the motor vehicle tax is a shared tax. 
This tax was introduced in 1992. Motor vehicles - except those owned by 
public institutions or non-profit organizations and used for public trans-
portation or communal services - are taxed according to their weight. 
Local governments are the taxing authorities, but the central government 
can set up the minimum and maximum rates. The minimum rate is 
HUF400 ( about €1.58) per 100 kg and the maximum rate is HUF800 
(about €3.15) per 100kg. Since 2003, as already noted, all motor vehicle 
tax revenues contribute to the local budgets. 
Among the taxes accruing to the central government, in 1998 a tourism 
contribution (Turisztikai hozzajarulas) has been introduced: this tax is 
levied on enterprises involved in tourism, like hotels, car rentals, casinos, 
travel agencies etc, at a rate of 1 or 2 percent, depending on the type of 
activities carried out, of the net sale revenues. Another tax introduced in 
the 1990s to the benefit of the central government only is the gambling tax 
(Jatekad6), payable by gambling organizers on draws, totalizer-type bets, 
gambling machines, bets based on casinos. 
Finally, the Hungarian taxation system envisages a number of 'environ-
mental' taxes to the benefit of both central and local governments: the 
environmental protection fee, the air pollution levy, the water pollution 
levy, the toxic waste levy, the noise abatement levy. 
9.4 The fiscal burden 
The distribution of tax charge: taxation by economic functions 
and implicit tax rates 
The assignment of total revenue according to the economic function of the 
tax base allows the subsequent calculation of the relative tax load on dif-
ferent production factors and on consumption, which is part of the relative 
factor prices and hence has an impact on factor allocation. The implicit tax 
rate is calculated to serve as a macroeconomic indicator for the factor tax 
loads. 
Table 9.2 shows the structure of Hungarian taxation according to 
economic function as a percentage of GDP (EU Commission 2000a). 
In 1998, the main source of tax revenues was employed labor, which 
accounted for 19.0 percent of GDP. The second highest contribution to 
tax revenues came from consumption, whose taxation amounted to 
13.8 percent of GDP. On the contrary, the shares of self-employed labor 
and of capital and business were significantly lower, being respectively 
1.2 and 5 percent. The main component of capital and business taxa-
tion was profits (2.7 percent of GDP), whereas taxation on financial activ-
ities was very low (0.3 percent of GDP). Finally, in 1998, environmental 
Table 9.2 Structure and development of taxation by function and by implicit rates in Hungary, New Members and EU 15, 1992-98 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
Hungary New EU Hungary New EU Hungary New EU Hungary New EU 
members members members members 
Economic functions 
Consumption 15.9 13.6 10.9 15.6 14.5 11.2 15.3 14.7 11.3 13.8 13.5 11.4 
Labor employed 23.4 19.7 20.6 22.6 19.4 20.7 19.3 19.0 21.4 19.0 17.9 21.2 
Labor self-employed 1.8 2.9 2.4 1.7 2.8 2.4 1.4 2.6 2.4 1.2 2.6 2.3 
Capital and business 4.9 4.3 7.2 4.5 5.0 6.8 4.6 4.3 7.1 5.0 4.5 7.5 
Implicit tax rates 
Consumption 18.8 16.3 16.2 18.5 17.4 16.5 20.6 17.8 16.7 18.9 16.6 16.8 
Labor employed 42.9 37.1 39.0 44.6 38.3 40.2 42.3 37.4 42.0 41.9 38.0 41.9 
Capital and business - 32.2 - - 30.3 - 30.5 - - 31.1 
Sources: EU Commission (2000a) for Hungary and New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2000) for EU 15 (1997 unweighted average). 
Notes 
Taxation according to economic function is as a percentage of GDP. Total may stay over total fiscal revenue in Table 9.1 because of some double 
counting. 
Estonia's 1992 implicit rates and all Czech rates refer to 1993. Implicit rates for capital and business are available only for Estonia and Slovenia. 
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taxation accounted for 3.3 percent, of which 2 percent was covered by 
taxes on energy. 
Looking at the evolution of the functional structure of taxation from 
1991 to 1999, the decrease in the aggregate taxation from 46.7 to 38.6 
percent of GDP can be explained mainly by the reduction in the levies on 
employed labor (-4.7 percent), through a lowering of social contributions, 
and the reduction of taxation in capital and business (-2.7 percent). Taxa-
tion of consumption has been kept relatively constant in the 1991 to 1996 
period and then has been slightly reduced to 14 percent since 1997. Taxa-
tion of energy was, and is, relatively high in Hungary: it was reduced from 
4 to 2 percent of GDP from 1991 to 1996, and increased again to nearly 3 
percent in 1999. 
Considering the factor taxation expressed as a fraction of total taxation 
(including social contributions), the fraction on consumption, after an 
increase in the first half of the 1990s, remained around 36 percent since 
1997. The fraction on employed labor, which reached 51 percent in 1993 
and 1994, decreased to 46.5 percent in 1999. Finally, the fraction jointly 
assignable to capital and business and self-employed labor was 17 percent 
in 1999, more than two points below the value at the beginning of the 
decade. 
The implicit tax rates, shown in Table 9.2, confirm the overall picture: 
relatively high on consumption and not so high on employed labor. In 
1998, the implicit tax rate on consumption was nearly 19 percent, whereas 
the implicit tax rate on employed labor more than 40 percent.24 The evolu-
tion in the 1990s of the implicit tax rates for both consumption and 
employed labor shows an increasing trend in the first half of the decade, as 
a consequence of the economic transition, whereas since 1996 both figures 
have started to decrease. Indeed, the implicit tax rate on consumption 
decreased from 21.1 in 1995 to around 19 percent through the years 1997 
to 1999 and the implicit tax rate on employed labor was reduced from 43 
percent in 1997 to 40 percent in 1999. 
The ability to attract foreign direct investment 
Hungary attracted considerable inflows of foreign direct investment over 
the last decade, resulting in the creation of a competitive and dynamic 
economy. During the period from 1992 to 1995, Hungary was the main 
recipient of FDI flowing to the Central and Eastern European countries, 
both in absolute term and as a percentage of GDP (Mitra and Stern 2003). 
Out of a total of nearly US$21 billion in FDI received by the region, the 
Hungarian share was 45 percent; indeed, FDI reached 5.7 percent of GDP 
in that period against an average value for the whole region of only 0.5 
percent. During the subsequent period, from 1996 to 1999, when FDI to 
the Central and Eastern European countries was more than US$50 billion, 
the relative position of Hungary changed, with Poland and the Czech 
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Republic being the major recipients. Nevertheless, Hungary continued to 
perform well, with a share of FDI in GDP of 3.8 percent compared with an 
average of 3.3 percent. 
In the early 1990s, a skilled labor force available at internationally-
competitive wages combined with numerous tax incentives in the form of 
tax credits and tax allowances was a major factor attracting foreign invest-
ments to Hungary. These tax incentives were phased out at the end of 
1993, but foreign investors still continue to benefit from other incentive 
schemes: the offshore incentive regime, which entails a corporate income 
tax to be levied at a rate of 4 percent,25 and a tax deferral for dividends in 
the case of reinvestment. However, in order to comply with the EU's 
requirements, new tax incentive regimes will replace the existing ones 
from the date of Hungary's accession to the European Union. In addition, 
other more general reforms need to be introduced for Hungary to 
continue in its economic growth and continue to attract investments 
(OECD 2002b), such as intensifying up-skilling efforts, reducing disincen-
tives to labor force participation arising from the early retirement's system 
and disability benefits, and reducing the high burden of social security 
contributions. 
A comparison with other New Members and EU 15 countries26 
The structure of taxation according to economic function in Hungary 
shows some striking differences both with other New Members and EU 15 
countries. Hungarian taxes on consumption have a much higher role than 
in the EU average and a higher role than in other New Members, with the 
exception of Slovenia: considering the factor taxation expressed as a frac-
tion of total taxation, in 1999 the fraction on consumption was still higher 
than 36 percent, in marked contrast with the 1996 EU average of 27 
percent. On the contrary, as in most of the New Members, the share of 
taxation on employed labor displays minor differences with respect to EU 
15 countries (46.5 percent against a 1996 EU average of 51 percent). 
Finally, the fraction jointly assignable to capital and business and self-
employed labor, equal to 17 percent, was still well below the long-term EU 
average of 21 percent and also below the corresponding figures of Estonia, 
Poland and the Czech Republic. The implicit tax rate confirms the overall 
picture: in 1999, the implicit tax rate on consumption was 19 percent, 
against a 1996 EU average of 14 percent, whereas the implicit tax rate on 
employed labor of 40 percent was slightly below the 1996 EU average of 
43 percent. 
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9.5 Tax reforms and further steps to get closer to the EU 
Macroeconomic and budget outlook 
Hungary is one of the fastest growing OECD economies. Growth has 
averaged 4.5 percent in the late 1990s and the unemployment rate fell 
from 8.9 percent in 1997 to 5.8 percent in 2001. Despite rapid output 
growth, the pace of consumer inflation decelerated over the same time 
period from 19 to 7 percent and the current account deficit was reduced 
from almost 7 percent to below 6 percent of GDP. To a large extent, this 
macroeconomic performance reflects radical liberalization and microeco-
nomic reforms achieved through the transition, substantial fiscal stabiliza-
tion and the supportive exchange rate regime which helped preserve the 
international competitiveness of the economy while contributing to 
gradual disinflation. From the second half of 2001 on, the economy faced 
its first endogenous slowdown of the post-transition period, while a new 
exchange rate regime tightened monetary conditions in order to attain a 
more ambitious disinflation objective. Despite slowing, economic growth 
proved more resilient in 2001 than in many other OECD countries, with 
GDP being maintained at close to 4 percent: public infrastructure invest-
ment and private consumption offset the strong decline in exports and 
private business investment. Whereas, during the late 1990s, the govern-
ment achieved significant progress in fiscal consolidation, reducing the 
general government deficit in 2000 to 3 percent of GDP, in 2001 a signific-
ant loosening of the fiscal stance of up to 2.5 percent of GDP took place. 
Fiscal policy was also highly expansionary in 2002: the deficit of the 
general government reached approximately 9.2 percent of GDP, due to 
both one-off expenditures and significant permanent expenditure 
increases, notably on wages and pensions as well as health-related spend-
ing (EU Commission 2003). 
After the 2001-02 slowdown, economic expansion was slightly acceler-
ating, with GDP rising by 3.7 percent in 2003 and by a forecast 4.1 percent 
in 2004. As in 2002, growth throughout 2003 has been primarily driven by 
domestic demand. New inflation targets were agreed between the Central 
bank and the government, at a maximum of 4.5 percent average in 2003 
and 4 percent in 2004. Given the targets proposed in the government's 
medium-term pre-accession program to the European Union, a sharp 
fiscal tightening is required in the period 2003-04. The 2003 budget is 
based on optimistic growth assumptions on the revenue side and planned 
spending cuts across the entire public sector. Overall, a stabilization of the 
deficit at around 5 percent of GDP on an ESA basis is a preliminary result 
for 2003 and a further reduction to below 4 percent is expected in 2004. 
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Recent yeaT"S' and planned tax reforms 
Hungarian tax reforms in recent years appear to have been driven by the 
commitment gradually to harmonize with the EU and by the desire to 
improve further the environment for doing business. In contrast to the EU 
15, however, tax revenues continue to depend much more on indirect 
taxes while the shares of revenue generated by income taxes on capital 
and labor as well as property taxes remain relatively low. 
The EU targets for harmonization has informed the VAT regime and 
the 2000 excise duties reform, even if transitional arrangements have been 
requested to the EU. The VAT system applied is very close to that within 
the EU and the standard rate of 25 percent is the higher among the New 
Members; however, the reduced rates of 15 percent and 5 percent con-
tinue to be used as social policy instruments. As stated by the EU legisla-
tion, excise duties are levied on alcoholic beverages, tobacco and 
hydrocarbon fuels, but rates on alcohol and especially on tobacco are 
again to be adjusted to the higher EU levels. 
Looking at social security contributions, the major change has been that 
the government has tried to compensate employers for massive increases 
in minimum wages and strong wage inflation by cutting the social security 
contributions, which fell between 2000 and 2002 from 33 to 29 percent of 
gross wages. 
The Hungarian tax regime provides an advantageous environment for 
the business sector. The corporate income tax, at 16 percent, is signific-
antly lower than those rates applied in most EU countries (the EU 
average rate is 29.3 percent) and generous incentives ensure that large cor-
porations can achieve tax breaks by investing above minimum thresholds. 
In addition, offshore firms are subjected to a corporate tax of only 4 
percent.27 Finally, the dividend tax regime introduced in 1997 provides a 
dividend reinvestment incentive for foreign investors in the form of a tax 
deferral. In 2001, the government also helped reduce the tax burden on 
SMEs (i.e. medium-sized and small enterprises) by eliminating a special 
turnover tax on tourism transactions, speeding up the pace of VAT 
refunds and by providing an income tax credit. 
The need for further steps 
The tax system in Hungary seems relatively close to the EU 15 ones, so no 
major or structural changes in taxation have been decided for the near 
future ( except perhaps for the elimination of the foreign companies tax 
regime), only gradual adjustments regarding rates and procedures. 
On the grounds of efficiency considerations, it would be desirable to 
continue the process of reduction of social-security contributions (pension 
and health contributions) in order to reduce the tax burden on labor and 
further stimulate employment, especially for the low-skilled, and growth. 
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This is particularly important for small firms, which were hit hard by the 
increase of the minimum wage mentioned above: a timely first step would 
be abolishing the flat-rate health charge, financing the measure by cutting 
other subsidy programs (OECD 2002b). Furthermore, to enhance the 
nation's growth prospects, the authorities ought to reduce the use of 
multiple rates of VAT as social policy instruments28 and, similarly, ought 
gradually to adjust excise duties on alcohol and tobacco products to 
higher EU levels. In addition, in the new context of relatively low infla-
tion, it would be advisable to widen the tax base for personal income by 
including interest income: the extra revenues generated could be used 
to finance offsetting cuts in taxation of wages, further improving the incen-
tive to employment. Looking at corporate taxation, as already noted, 
relatively high social-security contributions and payroll taxes coexist 
with a low taxation of profits and a wide range of tax incentives for firms: 
in view of the EU accession, the current incentive regime, especially for 
offshore companies, should be abolished in order to prevent a dangerous 
tax competition between EU members to attract FDI (Mitra and Stern 
2003). 
Further recommended actions involve the pension system. After the 
1997 reform, which introduced a system combining a PA YG pillar and a 
fully-funded mandatory second pillar of privately-operated pension funds, 
planned adjustments have been postponed and key parameters modified: 
the mandatory nature of the second pillar has been abolished and the con-
tribution rates to such accounts have not been increased from 6 to 8 
percent, as originally planned, but only to 7 percent. At the same time, the 
government has announced that it intends to modernize the existing 
PA YG system, making it more attractive for all workers. These measures 
trade off a short run cash flow gain against long-term liabilities. Given the 
importance of the long run sustainability of the public pension system, 
these moves ought to be reconsidered by the authorities. 
In general, the fulfillment of the short and medium-term fiscal object-
ives, as well as longer-term tax and expenditure reduction policies, require 
a thorough reform of public spending. Longer-term spending reduction is 
important in order to reduce the high tax pressure (39 percent of GDP in 
2001 ), but it presents a real challenge: substantial new spending on infra-
structure, public health, education and environment protection is implied 
by national priorities and EU accession rules, so that the room for such 
items has to be provided by curtailing spending in other parts of the 
budget (EU Commission 2000b; OECD 2002b ). 
Besides the cut back of the government budget directed to reduce the 
high tax pressure, a further reduction of central taxes is required to give a 
place to, and higher potential for, the development of local taxation. 
Although important steps were achieved during the 1990s, the share of 
local governments' revenues in GDP and the revenue autonomy are still 
too low. In the last few years, two main development lines have been 
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mentioned by Hungarian and foreign experts: first, to move towards the 
Scandinavian system giving the potential for local personal income tax or 
surcharges on the national personal income tax; second, to improve the 
present local building tax by moving towards an Anglo-Saxon type value 
base property taxation. 
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online.it. I wish to thank Mihaly Lados of the West Hungarian Research Insti-
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his careful revision of a preliminary version of the chapter. 
2 This is the average exchange rate (ECB) in 2003. 
3 At the beginning of the transition, the rate of revenue autonomy was only one 
fifth. In ten years it doubled, reaching 39.1 percent in 2000. In 2000, for the first 
year, the rate of state grants (block grants and specific grants) within the local 
budget (38.9 percent) was less than the rate of own revenues. The total govern-
ment transfers, including shared taxes (15 percent in 2000), are over 50 percent 
of the total local revenues, whereas they were 70.9 percent in 1992, thus result-
ing in a significant change in the revenue structure of local governments. 
4 This rate has been reduced from 18 to 16 percent since 1 January 2004 (law 
adopted by the Hungarian parliament on 10 November 2003). 
5 In addition, these VAT reduced rates have been recently modified, being equal 
to 12 percent and 0 percent respectively until December 2003 (law adopted by 
the Hungarian parliament on 10 November 2003). 
6 See note 3. 
7 The Law No. C on local taxes was adopted by the Hungarian parliament in 
1990 and has been in force since 1 January 1991. The first year (1991) of the 
new local tax system was a transitional year in which local governments were 
able to choose to use the new system or keep the previous one. 
8 Local taxes accounted for 12.9 percent of total current local governments' rev-
enues in 1999, and 13.4 percent in 2001. In the first year of the new local tax 
system (1991), this ratio was 1.5 percent. 
9 A detailed discussion may be found in Mitra and Stem (2003). 
10 This section owes much to EU Commission (2000a) and IBFD (2002). 
11 The local governments' share of the personal income tax has been changed 
several times over the 1990s. In 1990 it was 100 percent, but it has been reduced 
to 50 percent since 1991 because of the waste differences in per capita personal 
income tax among local governments. Since 1998, the share is 40 percent. 
12 Taxes on private individuals' income from the rental of arable land are wholly 
payable to local governments. 
13 The pension system is a three-pillar system consisting of a statutory state 
pension, a mandatory private pension and a supplementary private pension. 
14 Until 2003 the rates applied on individual income were 20, 30 and 40 percent 
and also the income brackets were slightly different. Modifications were 
adopted by the Hungarian parliament on 10 November 2003. 
15 Excess dividends are defined as dividends paid in excess of a specified rate of 
return on equity, which is equal to double the prime discount rate of the 
National Bank of Hungary. 
16 In the early 1990s, the rate of the corporate income tax was 36 percent. 
17 See note 4. 
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18 Before the date of accession (1 May 2004), the Hungarian parliament will 
adopt a new law on excise duties. 
19 The maximum rate for local business tax was 0.3 in 1991. After several modifi-
cations - 0.8 percent in 1993; 1.2 percent in 1996; 1.4 percent in 1998; 1.7 
percent in 1999 - it has been 2 percent since 2000. Besides the change occurring 
in 1996, all increases of the maximum rate are related to the increasing possi-
bilities for deduction of costs from the tax base. 
20 Some changes have been carried out over the 1990s. In the first period of the 
decade the employers' rate was 44 percent. Between 1998 and 2002 the rate was 
changed four times: in 1998 it was 39 percent (24 percent pension plus 15 
percent health care); in 1999, 33 percent (22 percent pension plus 11 percent 
health care); in 2001, 31 percent (20 percent pension plus 11 percent health 
care); finally, a further reduction to 29 percent was implemented in 2002 (18 
percent pension plus 11 percent health care). 
21 The contributions to the second pillar were initially levied at a rate of 6 percent 
of gross income, which were to have been increased to 8 percent since 2000. 
The planned increased contribution to the second pillar however has been 
postponed. The new government has reduced the rate from 2.0 to 1.5 percent 
for the first pillar and has increased to 7 percent the second pillar's one since 
2003. 
22 Since 2004 the rate for health insurance contributions is 4 percent. 
23 The present government is, however, planning to reject this form of social 
security contribution before the end of the government period (2006). 
24 Owing to a lack of confirmed data on the net operating surplus, an implicit tax 
rate for capital and business (including self-employed labor) could not be com-
puted and thus is not available. 
25 The rate, as already noted, was 3 percent until December 2003. 
26 A detailed discussion may be found in Mitra and Stern (2003). 
27 This offshore regime is contrary to the EU Code of Conduct for business taxa-
tion and has been listed as 'potentially harmful' by the OECD. 
28 The main difference with the EU 15 is the existence of three rates, which 
should be reduced to two with the lower rate set closer to 10 percent than the 
actual 5 percent and 15 percent. 
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10 Poland 
Lucia Vergano and Francesca Zantomio1 
10.1 Introduction and executive summary 
Poland, with its 312,685 km2 and 38,600,000 inhabitants, is the biggest 
economy among the EU New Members. At the end of the Second World 
War, Poland experienced a communist regime until the regime's collapse 
in 1989-90, when Poland became a democratic country. In 1997, the 
National Assembly approved its parliamentary Constitution.2 As with 
other EU New Members, Poland entered into NATO in 1999 and also 
entered de facto into the EU in 2004, as established by the Nice Treaty 
(2001) and finally agreed during the Copenhagen Summit (2002) and 
signed in Athens (2003). The local currency is the zloty (the exchange rate 
in July 2003 was ZLl = €0.2254). 
During the 1990s, the Polish economy showed a GDP average growth 
rate (4.5 percent) definitely above the EU average level (2.8 percent); 
nevertheless, recently, the unemployment rate has been growing (18 
percent in 2002). At the beginning of the 21st century, Poland experienced 
an economic slowdown: GDP growth fell to 1-1.4 percent in 2001-02. 
Recently, symptoms of recovery have been observed: GDP growth for 
2003 was 3.6 percent and, according to forecasts, it will be even higher in 
2004 (4.5-5.1 percent). At the end of the 1990s, the general government 
deficit was between 3 and 4 percent, but has grown in the last few years. 
Owing to the main features of its tax system, during the 1990s, Poland -
unlike other transition economies - has not experienced any kind of fiscal 
crisis. Altogether, the Polish tax system is not very diversified and the level 
of aggregate taxation is more stable than that of most other transition 
economies. 
In 1998, the level of total Polish fiscal revenue was about 38 percent of 
GDP, a high value with respect to some OECD countries but below the 
EU average. As for direct taxes and social contributions, the revenue does 
not reach the EU average level: as a consequence, the Polish total fiscal 
pressure is close to the average of selected New Members, but is about 5 
percent below the EU-15 average. Following the common trend of New 
Members, indirect taxes play a larger role than in the EU as a share of 
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total taxation and the opposite happens in the case of direct taxes (Mitra 
and Stem 2003). 
The Polish budget system, traditionally very centralized, has been pro-
gressively decentralized starting from the reform of local governments in 
1991-93 and then of the public administration in 1998: even though the 
principal aim of this reform was to transfer policy functions to the level of 
government, where these policies could be implemented, local govern-
ments still maintain a little autonomous power in making tax policy 
decisions and strongly depend on central government subsidies. Therefore, 
the process of delegating tax policies to regions has still to be completed, 
and will be needed even more due to the demands of EU aid funds 
systems (see Table 10.1). 
At present, the broad features of Polish main taxes, as reformed in the 
early 1990s, are not very different from the corresponding EU models, even 
though they show some distinctive peculiarities. The basis of assessment of 
the income tax, collected by the government and partially distributed to the 
local communities, includes all revenues from labor, capital, business, prop-
erty, but there is a wide and generous set of allowed deductions and 
exemptions. The corporate income is taxed on the basis of the classical 
system but, to reduce the impact of double-taxation, dividends are taxed at 
only 15 percent.3 The general VAT tax rate of 22 percent and the two 
reduced rates for certain categories of goods and services, 3 and 7 percent, 
result from the reform proposed since 1999 by national authorities, in order 
to harmonize VAT with EU requirements in view of accession. Excise 
duties are charged on consumer products, referred to as 'excisable prod-
ucts', with tax rates widely ranging from 25 to 1900 percent. The major 
Table 10.1 Fifteen years of budget consolidation and tax reforms: an essential 
calendar 
1988 Plans of tax reform 
1989 Beginning of the transition, massive reforms. The same CIT obligation 
for state owned and private companies 
1990 State budget regains its balance after the 1988-89 crisis 
1991 Public finance split into the state and local government parts. New budget 
crisis 
1992 Introduction of PIT 
1993 Turnover tax substituted by VAT and excise taxes 
1997 New constitution (60 percent public debt-to-GDP limit). Act on Rules for 
Taxation 
1998 Act on Public Finance 
1999 New reform of local governments system 
2001 Beginning of new budget crisis, the budget is unbalanced until today 
2002 Negotiations between Poland and EU are over. Final tax adjustments 
must be introduced until 2008 
2004 Massive reforms of local government finance, CIT (19 percent), PIT, 
VAT and excise duty, in order to adjust the system to the EU regulations. 
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remaining state sources of revenue are the social security contributions, 
paid by the employers, the employees and the self-employed individuals 
and which are earmarked for large extra-budgetary social security funds. 
The picture is completed by the Agricultural Property Tax, the Forestry 
Property Tax, the Real Estate Property Tax and some other minor taxes. 
As to the distribution of the fiscal burden, the main source of revenue 
arises from employed labor, followed by consumption. Implicit tax rates 
confirm for Poland that employed labor is the factor most heavily taxed, 
but it can be seen that in the recent years there has been a process of 
gradual substitution in taxation, from labor to consumption, which has also 
been a saving inducing incentive. Looking at the structure of revenue 
according to economic function, the peculiar features of Poland are the 
significant difference of taxes and contributions on employed labor from 
the EU average, being seven percentage points lower, and the higher 
share in total taxation of taxes on consumption. 
Although Poland is actually seen as one of the most successful trans-
ition economies because of its efforts to start developing those structural 
reforms needed to get closer to the EU (Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000) - such 
as the stabilization of the economy, the reorganization of the public 
finances, the implementation of an effective monetary policy, liberaliza-
tions and privatizations - unemployment has risen and investment has 
fallen, as a result of the recent economic slowdown. 
The general government deficit has widened in 2003 (6.4 percent): 
further structural expenditure reforms and a redefinition of budget prior-
ities are necessary in order to make the public debt reach the constitu-
tional and Maastricht limit of 60 percent. Entry into the EU could 
artificially decrease the deficit, due to the much more permissive method-
ology of public accounts' calculation used by the EU. The needed reforms 
of public finance expenditures are being prepared at the end of 2003. The 
main goal is to narrow the budget deficit. 
The tax reform proposals launched in 1999 by the authorities have been 
only partially enacted in 2000. In particular, the proposed changes regard-
ing the PIT, providing for a progressive reduction of the tax rates so as to 
create a tax regime inducing more job creation, have not been completely 
adopted: the current high tax rates and social security contributions 
involve a particularly high tax wedge that leads to high unemployment and 
to an oversized underground economy. Moreover, further measures need 
to be taken in order to reduce the amount of disability and sickness pen-
sions and early-retirement pensions. A new tax reform is expected for 
2004: its main outcome will be the reduction of the CIT from 27 to 19 
percent, which could improve Polish enterprises' competitiveness and 
encourage FDI inflow. In addition, entrepreneurs paying the PIT will be 
charged with only one rate equal to the CIT rate (19 percent). In 2004, 
for the first time, incomes from the stock exchange will be taxed by a 
20 percent tax. 
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Another recommended reform concerns the autonomy of a tax policy 
for local governments, which should be given the opportunity to manage 
their own tax base. This reform is needed due to the opportunity of profit-
ing from EU structural funds. To meet these requirements, a new act for 
local government finance is being prepared for 2004. 
A final relevant need is to unify different tax rates on capital incomes 
and, in order to get closer to EU requirements, to introduce charges on 
those products that are damaging the environment, such as coal, fertilizers 
and leaded gasoline. 
10.2 The structure of the system at the end of the 1990s 
A broad view at the cu"ent structure of taxes and social security 
contributions 
At the end of the 1990s, one of the main features of the Polish tax system 
was its capacity to generate a sizeable revenue on a continuous basis, so as 
to finance government spending and lower the budget deficit. Because of 
this, unlike other transition economies, Poland has not experienced any 
kind of fiscal crisis (OECD 2002). 
In 1998, the level of total fiscal revenue was about 38 percent of 
the GDP, which is high with respect to some OECD countries, but 
not compared with the EU average level (OECD 2001). This ratio of 
revenue to GDP is a legacy from the years of central planning, when high 
public spending was due, in particular, to the generous public pension 
schemes.4 
The general government revenue can be split into the main three broad 
categories of direct taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions, 
each of which respectively contributes approximately 30, 40 and again 30 
percent of total revenue (Bartoszuk and Lenain 2000), but with a tendency 
of decreasing importance of direct taxes revenues. 
Expressed as a ratio of GDP, direct taxes revenue (11 percent of GDP) 
is instead below the EU average (14 percent of the GDP): this is due to 
the low personal income tax revenue. Indirect taxes revenue amounts to 
12 percent of GDP (very close to the EU average): the VAT and excise 
duties revenues are substantially in line with that of the EU countries 
(Eurostat 2002). As for the social contributions, the revenue does not 
reach the EU average level (11 percent instead of 15 percent of GDP5), 
but is quite high if compared with the average of the OECD countries: this 
feature is partially another legacy from the communist system and is also 
shared by Hungary, the Czech Republic and several other Eastern Euro-
pean countries. 
The tax system is less diversified than in other countries: small taxes, 
such as property, inheritance or environmental fees, produce almost no 
revenue. Thus, Poland has a somewhat narrow range of tax instruments. 
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The development of the system from the early to the late 1990s 
The taxation reforms in Poland were connected with political, economic 
and cultural changes at the beginning of the transition period. The only 
common tax was a tax imposed on salaries (20 percent), which was invisi-
ble for the workers, because it was paid directly by the employers. At the 
same time, as an acute budget deficit that emerged in 1991-92 showed, the 
new tax system was necessary in order to keep the budget deficit under 
control. The old system was not able to cope with new demands and the 
tax authorities were highly inefficient in terms of tax collection. It is 
common to refer to the scope and speed of the reforms taking part in the 
years 1991-93 as a 'tax revolution' (Owsiak 2002). 
The Polish tax system has been distinguished from that of most other 
transition economies because of its stable - instead of decreasing -
revenue-to-GDP ratio: at the end of 1990s, the total fiscal revenue was 
almost the same as that at the beginning of the transition period, in 1991. 
Nevertheless, in the early years of the 1990s, the level of aggregate taxa-
tion experienced some fluctuations: from 37 percent of GDP in 1991, it 
grew to 42 percent in 1993, but then it went back again to slightly below 40 
percent in 1995, reaching a minimum of 38.5 percent in 2002. In the 
coming years, this ratio is expected to grow, in most part due to the inflow 
of EU structural funds aid. Moreover, there were some great structural 
shifts within the categories of indirect taxes (the introduction of VAT and 
excise duties in 1993, the abolishment of previous turnover tax in 1994) 
and direct taxes (personal income tax revenue started in 1992 and corpor-
ate income tax was lowered from 1992 onwards)- see Table 10.2. 
These structural changes resulted in the following developments. 
1 The gradual reduction of the load, in terms of implicit tax rates, of 
taxes and social contributions levied on employed labor from nearly 
16 percent in 1991 to about 14 percent in 1996. 
2 The rise of the tax revenue from self-employed labor from about 3 
percent of GDP in 1991 to 5 percent since 1993. 
3 The fall of the revenue from capital and business ( excluding self-
employed labor) from nearly 9 percent of GDP in 1991 to about 4.5 
percent in 1995 and after: this was mostly due to a reduction in the 
legal rates of corporate income tax. 
4 An increasing amount of taxes on transfers, because state pensions 
were taxed like other personal income. 
5 The appreciable contribution of the taxation of energy from 1994 
onwards. 
Table 10.2 Structure and development of fiscal revenue in Poland, New Members and EU 15 as a percentage of GDP, 1992-98 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
--
Poland New EU Poland New EU Poland New EU Poland New EU 
members members members members 
Direct taxes, of which 12.2 10.1 13.5 12.5 10.0 12.9 11.7 9.6 13.4 11.2 9.2 13.7 
Personal income 7.6 6.4 9.6 9.2 7.0 9.3 8.7 7.1 9.3 8.3 6.7 9.3 
Corporation income 4.6 3.6 2.3 3.2 2.9 2.4 2.9 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.5 3.0 
Indirect taxes, of which 14.6 15.6 13.4 16.1 16.5 13.7 15.6 16.9 13.7 14.4 15.5 13.9 
VAT 0.0 5.1 6.7 6.7 7.4 6.8 7.3 7.4 6.9 7.9 7.9 7.0 
Excise duties 0.0 3.4 3.4 4.0 4.2 3.5 4.0 4.1 3.4 3.9 4.1 3.5 
Others 14.6 9.3 3.3 5.4 5.0 3.4 4.2 4.9 3.4 2.7 3.6 3.5 
Total tax revenue 26.8 25.7 26.9 28.6 26.4 26.6 27.3 26.5 27.1 25.6 24.7 27.6 
Social contributions 11.3 16.1 14.5 12.0 15.7 14.9 12.4 14.3 15.3 12.2 14.2 15.0 
Employers 4.1 10.0 8.1 4.3 9.0 7.9 4.4 8.0 8.3 4.4 7.9 8.2 
Employees 4.2 5.3 4.8 4.4 5.1 5.2 4.6 4.8 5.1 4.5 4.8 5.0 
Self employed 3.1 1.8 1.6 3.3 1.6 1.8 3.3 1.5 1.9 3.3 1.6 1.9 
Total fiscal revenue 38.1 41.8 41.4 40.6 42.2 41.5 39.7 40.8 42.4 37.8 38.9 42.6 
Administrative level 
Central government 24.1 25.9 22.8 25.6 25.8 22.4 23.8 25.4 22.4 22.3 23.9 22.9 
Local government 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.2 3.5 3.4 4.0 3.4 3.7 4.0 
Social Security 11.3 12.9 14.5 12.0 12.9 14.9 12.4 11.5 15.2 12.2 11.4 14.9 
Sources: EU Commission (2000a) for Poland and selected New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2000) for EU-15 (1997 unweighted average). 
Notes 
Czech data start in 1993 and Social security is only health. 
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The apportionment of revenue among government layers 
In 1991, the public finance system was split into two parts: central and 
local governments. Local governments took over most of the revenues 
from minor taxes and also participated in CIT and to PIT (after its intro-
duction) revenues. 
Poland has inherited a very centralized budget system: still, in 2001, the 
greater part of revenues went to the state (19.1 percent of GDP) and the 
social security administrations (16 percent), but one third of the social 
security revenue goes through the central budget as appropriated alloca-
tions, subsidies and additional funds. 6 Among non-central tax revenue, 
more than half is derived from individual income tax, of which the central 
government transfers a share of 0.276 percent to the municipality of resi-
dence of the taxpayer; 5 percent of the CIT is paid by the companies regis-
tered in the area where the enterprise is run (Denek et al. 2001 ). The 
remainder comes mostly from the real estate tax levied by non-central 
government and a few minor taxes (EU Commission 2000a). 
This kind of splitting did not change much during the 1990s, but in 1998 
the authorities introduced an important reform of Polish public adminis-
tration, beginning with a process of gradual decentralization, in order to 
attribute to local governments ( Gminas, Poviats and Voivodships)7 a 
growing role in expenditure decisions. Following the principle of subsidiar-
ity, the reform has actually brought policy functions closer to the people, 
transferring them to the level of government where these policies can be 
implemented. 
Nevertheless, local governments maintain a little autonomous power in 
making tax policy decisions and a strong dependence on central govern-
ment subsidies (grants and transfers). These subsidies (special purposes 
subsidies, education subsidy, general purpose subsidy, compensation 
grants) are based on the size of the population living in each region: while 
helping local governments to cover the expenditure they are responsible 
for, they do not succeed in closing the income gap between regions (EU 
Commission 2000b ). Local governments have no power to change the 
level of main taxes (PIT, CIT, VAT, social taxes) and have limited possi-
bilities to change the rate of a few less important taxes. 
Moreover, this contrasts with the principle of attributing more powers 
to localities to implement their policy decisions and their development 
strategy. The process of decentralizing tax policies to regions is still far 
from being completed. The new reform prepared for 2004 is aiming to 
increase incomes of local governments mainly through higher participation 
in PIT and CIT revenues: Gminas will get 41.4 percent of their revenues 
from PIT, Poviats 10.6 percent from PIT and Voivodships 18.4 percent 
from CIT. 
In 1991, local governments took over 8.9 percent of public finance rev-
enues from taxes. In 1995, it was 11 percent, and in 2000 13.2 percent 
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(Misiag 2002). Their participation in revenues is rising and the tendency 
will continue after Polish accession into the EU. 
A comparison with other main New Members and the EU 
average 
It has already been shown that, in 1998, the Polish total fiscal pressure 
(about 37.8 percent of GDP) was close to the average of selected New 
Members (38.9 percent), but was about 5 percent below the EU 15 
average (42.6 percent). This spread is explained firstly by the social contri-
butions: the lower revenue from the social contributions levied on the 
employers (about half of that of the EU 15) is just partially compensated 
by the higher social contributions revenue levied on self-employed people 
(EU Commission 2000a). The same could also be said with respect to the 
New Members, but the average spread is not as large. 
In addition, the level of total taxes helps explain the difference between 
the Polish and the EU 15 tax system revenue: even if the system is more 
advanced with respect to the average of the New Members, it maintains a 
gap between direct and indirect taxes revenue that is still larger than in 
EU 15 countries. This is due to the lower revenue from the personal 
income tax, which is only partially compensated for by the higher revenue 
from VAT and excise duties. The common trend of New Members is actu-
ally that indirect taxes as a share of total taxation play a larger role than in 
the EU and the opposite happens in the case of direct taxes. 
Public finance deficit evolution in the transformation 
One of the most important problems for Poland in the coming years is the 
growing budget deficit. In the period of so-called 'shock therapy' 
(1989-91), Poland underwent dramatic budgetary problems, which were 
worsened in 1992 after the 'Russian crisis' (export decline to the Eastern 
markets). The new budgetary law introduced at the beginning of 1991 
allowed the deficit to lower, which in the best year reached 2 percent, but 
was not balanced even in the 'golden years' when GDP growth was 7 
percent. The most important weakness of the public finance system was 
the reform of pension system negligence. Neglected public finance reforms 
resulted in budgetary problems since the end of the 1990s; some costly 
reforms (pension system, health care system, educational system and the 
new administrative division) worsened the situation. Structural reforms in 
the 'old economy' (heavy industry, coal mining, iron companies) were 
postponed, due to their social and political costs (Misiag 2002). The slow-
down in the economy resulted in a lower increase in fiscal revenues, 
whereas most of the expenditures were 'fixed'. At the same time, revenues 
from privatization started to fall. New reforms are needed even more due 
to the fact that Poland in the coming years is facing external demands. 
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In 1990, the public debt was estimated at 95 percent, mostly as a con-
sequence of the foreign debt inherited from the socialist period. The 
budget was never balanced, but owing to the faster GDP growth and the 
reduction of foreign debt (Paris and London Clubs) the government debt 
was reduced to 40 percent in 2000. 
10.3 Some quantitative and institutional features of main 
taxes8 
Personal income tax - PIT (Podatek dochodowy od osob fizycznych) 
The personal income tax was introduced in the Polish tax system with the 
Tax Law of 26 July 1991 and came into force in 1992. The main beneficiary 
of the revenue is the central government, even though 27.6 percent of the 
yield is then distributed to communities where taxpayers have their place 
of residence. 
Personal income tax has to be paid by Polish citizens, who are taxable on 
their income from national sources and, in the absence of bilateral taxation 
treaties, also from foreign sources, through specific rules. It has also to be 
paid by foreigners staying in Poland for a period longer than half a year. 
The unit of taxation is optional in that it can be chosen by the individual 
taxpayer: generally each individual is taxed separately but it is also pos-
sible to apply for a joint taxation system based on the average income of a 
married couple (half of their joint income), taxed at the same rates.9 
Dependent children's income has then to be added to parents' income. 
The basis of assessment includes all revenues from labor, capital, busi-
ness, property and established incomes such as scholarships, pensions and 
benefits. 
In particular, the law lists, as income to be taxed, the following cat-
egories: 
a income from dependent services such as employment or pensions; 
b income from independent services, such as professional, intellectual, 
artistic or sports activities; 
c income from business; 
d income from specialized branches of agriculture; 
e rental income; 
f income from monetary investment and property rights; 
g income from the sale of real estate and of property rights; 
h other incomes, such as social security benefits, grant scholarships or 
others, not belonging to the other categories, unless they are exempt. 
Losses can be carried forward at one third each, against the income of 
the next three years, even though prior losses cannot increase current 
ones. One peculiar feature of the Polish tax system is the wide and 
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generous set of allowed deductions, even though recently reduced. First of 
all, for each category of income, expenses sustained to produce this 
income are deductible: in some cases, they are deductible as a fixed per-
centage of earned income (20 percent for independent activities, 50 
percent for license fees for inventions or copyright royalties) while the 
same rules regarding corporate income have to be applied to business 
income. 
Then, from the aggregate net income, it is possible to deduce further: 
a social security contributions (unless they have already been deducted 
as expenses in some category of income); 
b donations to advocate science, education, culture, religion, sports, 
ecology and charity, up to 10 or 15 percent of income;10 
c costs for training and continuing education, in connection with tax-
payer's income;11 
d cost of earning income, deducted automatically as a fixed percentage 
of 25 percent, unless the real cost of earning income can be proved to 
be higher (so that the entire real cost will be deductible); 
e expenditures on annuities, donations to corporate bodies12 which 
pursue socially worthy causes (with the upper limit of 15 or 10 percent 
of income) and expenditures on rehabilitation; 
f interest on loans for housing purposes.13 
The Polish law also provides for a large number of exemptions, the 
most important of which are: 
a income from non-specialized agricultural activities; 
b income from forestry; 
c gains from selling agricultural or forestry land for agricultural or 
forestry use; 
d social welfare benefits and benefits paid by social funds in case of acci-
dent, long illness or death; 
e income from selling of a flat or building, when proceeds are used 
within two years for the purchase of another flat or building; 
f most fringe benefits. 
Income from interests on bank accounts, if unconnected to business 
activities, and income from sale of compensation certificates and from 
interest and discount of government securities and local government 
bodies, have been taxed at 20 percent since 2002. 
Taxable income, net of income deductions, is then subject to a progres-
sive schedule with three different brackets and three marginal tax rates: in 
2002, 19 percent from 0 to ZL37,024 (corresponding to about €960014) 
with a tax credit of ZL530.08 (about €135), 30 percent from ZL37,024 
(about €9600) to ZL74,048 (about €19,200) and 40 percent above 
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ZL74,048 (about €19,200).15 It is important to observe that, because of the 
narrow income distribution, the bulk of taxpayers falls into the first 
bracket: in 1999, 94.9 percent of PIT taxpayers were in the first bracket, 3.9 
percent in the second and 1.2 in the third; in 1992 it was respectively 96.1 
percent; 3.2 percent and 0.7 percent (Misiag 2002). The present tax rates 
are lower than the previous ones (in fact, in 1996, the three marginal rates 
were 21, 33 and 45 percent) and, moreover, the purpose of the future 
aforementioned reform of PIT will be to reduce further the three rates, 
going towards a flat rate income tax.16 It must be stressed that, at the 
moment, farmers are excluded from PIT obligation, and pay Agricultural 
Property Tax, which is not connected with their real incomes. It creates 
complications for the health care system, revenues of rural minas (local 
governments) and social insurance system. 
Finally, the law provides for particular regimes, based on the payment 
of lump-sum taxes, for particular categories of taxpayers, with the aim of 
simplifying their fiscal duties: they are the 'tax card' and the 'lump sum 
income tax' on registered revenues from small businesses. 
With the tax card the taxpayer has to pay a lump sum tax that substi-
tutes his personal income tax, so that he does not have to prove with docu-
ments all his revenues and costs, to keep the register, to declare income 
received and to pay the monthly advance tax payments. This scheme is 
designed for people having small-scale production, providing particular 
kinds of services and running production activities, such as retail trade in 
groceries, door-to-door sales of commodities, catering, transportation ser-
vices, entertainment activities, home meal sales, veterinary services, free 
professional health services. The amount to be paid is a fixed amount, 
decided by the Tax Authority for each particular period;17 then the tax 
rate can be increased or reduced according to the individual situation. 
Particular preferences are designed for people running their business in 
areas with high structural unemployment. 
The lump sum income tax, based on turnover, is designed for people 
running own small businesses (small-scale entrepreneurs with turnover 
below €250,000 in the year before the current one) who do not meet 
the conditions to use the tax card. The taxpayer has to keep a simplified 
register of revenues and purchases and to hand in information about 
the amount of revenues in the first half of the year and after a year. 
People running some activities are excluded from this form of taxation: 
they are people running a pharmacy, legal services, an exchange office, 
pawnshop or services in accountancy. The particular tax rate depends 
on the activity the taxpayer runs: 3 percent on revenues from trade and 
catering, 5.5 percent on revenues from manufacturing, construction 
and cargo transport and 8.5 percent on revenues from services. Since 
2002, there are two additional rates: 17 percent for some services and 
20 percent for people running more sophisticated businesses (teachers, 
nurses, veterinary surgeons). In comparison to PIT, there are very 
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limited possibilities for deductions - mainly the sum paid as social 
contributions. 
There is also a special lump sum tax for clerics. The sum paid by them 
depends on the number of people living in the parish and the position of a 
cleric. In 2003 the minimum was ZLl00 (approximately €23) and 
maximum ZLllO0 (approximately €240). 
Corporate income tax - CIT (Podatek dochodowy od osob 
prawnych) 
The uniform income tax for legal entities - the corporate income tax (CIT) 
- was introduced in 1989, replacing two existing separate profit taxes for 
legal entities in the public and private sectors of the economy (Bartoszuk 
and Lenain 2000). This tax was first reformed in the early 1990s (Tax Law 
15 February 1992), in order to achieve the standards in force in the Euro-
pean Union countries. From 1989 to 1996, the CIT rate was 40 percent, but 
in the following years it decreased: 38 percent in 1997, 36 percent in 1998, 
34 percent in 1999, 30 percent in 2000, 28 percent in 2001 and 27 percent in 
2003. A new reform of corporate income taxation was passed into law18 
and became effective in 2000: the main purposes were to lower the tax rate 
and to broaden the tax base at the same time. A new reform is being pre-
pared for 2004. The rate will be reduced from 27 to 19 percent, but the 
number of deductions will be reduced as well. 
All legal entities Goint-stock companies, limited liability companies, state 
enterprises and cooperatives) incorporated in Poland are subject to corpor-
ate income tax on their total incomes, including income from abroad ( unlim-
ited tax obligation). All legal entities incorporated abroad (with head office 
or managing board situated abroad) are instead subject to tax only on 
income gained on Polish territory (limited tax obligation). Partnerships are 
not treated as companies19 and some institutions without legal personality -
schools, educational associations, health service bodies - are not treated as 
corporations. The exemption from tax is provided for a list of institutions: 
State Treasury, National Bank of Poland, budgetary economic units, pur-
poseful funds, international holdings, communities and units of communit-
ies. The number of bodies exempted from CIT will be limited from 2005. 
The CIT is based on the classical system, i.e. corporate income is fully 
taxed and distributed profits (dividends) are taxed once again by way of 
withholding: to reduce the impact of double-taxation, however, under the 
personal income tax, dividends are taxed at only 15 percent, but the tax 
rate will be increased in 2004 to 19 percent. The tax may be credited 
against the receiving company's tax debt. Dividends may be distributed 
only from after-tax profits. 
The tax basis is the worldwide income of the resident corporate entities, 
including the capital gains from the sale of business assets, after the deduc-
tion of the expenses sustained to obtain such income. 
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The incomes exempt from the corporate income tax are the following: 
a income from non-specialized agricultural activities and from forestry; 
b gains from the sale of agricultural and forestry land that remains used 
as such; 
c indemnities received; 
d income from foreign sources as far as provided in an international 
agreement; 
e income allocated and transferred to legal entities for charitable pur-
poses and for the furthering of science, education, health, culture, 
sports, infrastructure development and environmental protection. 
Exemptions are also granted in 17 Special Economic Zones (SEZs): 
economic entities operating in SEZs are eligible for tax allowances, prefer-
ential treatment and other benefits (Easson 1998). The income of entities 
whose investments exceed a certain threshold, characteristic of each zone, 
or investors, which create a certain number of jobs, are totally exempted 
from CIT, through a period equal to half of the period for which the zone 
has been established. After that time, the exemption of taxation is granted 
up to 50 percent of the income. Preferential treatment and other benefits 
are granted to entities not eligible for tax exemption. As a consequence of 
the tax reform enacted in 2000, no new tax exemptions will be granted in 
SEZs starting in January 2000. This issue was a subject of hard negoti-
ations between Poland and the EU for a long time: eventually, after 
Poland's entry into the EU, no preferences for companies starting their 
activity in the zones will be allowed. 
After the last reform of the capital income tax, the number of deprecia-
tion rates has been reduced to ten and investment incentives (previously 
offered in the form of investment allowances to encourage investments in 
certain sectors of activity) have been eliminated in order to broaden the 
income tax base. 
The 2003 corporate income tax rate is 27 percent, but according to the 
reform being prepared now, from 2004 it will decrease to 19 percent.20 
According to the new proposition, the same flat rate will be offered for 
enterprises now taxed under the personal income regime, but the number 
and scope of deductions available for such firms will be sharply limited. 
Value added tax - VAT (Podatek od Towarow I Using) 
The value added tax was introduced in the Polish tax system in 1993 after 
five years' preparations.21 In 1993, the turnover tax, with more than 100 
rates, was removed. Previously, the rates of turnover taxes varied, depend-
ing on the kind of purchased good (Owsiak 2002). The only beneficiary of 
the revenues is the central government. The tax is payable by natural 
persons, legal persons and organizational units ( and, with agreement of 
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the Treasury office, also branches of them) that sell or import taxable 
goods and services in Poland and that have an annual turnover which 
exceeds €10,000 (if they do not reach this sum, they are not obligated to 
register for VAT). But once they decide to be a VAT payer, that decision 
could not be changed for a period of three years. 
The basis of assessment is the compensation received for goods sup-
plied and services rendered, less the VAT; for imported goods, the tax 
base also includes excise duties and custom fees. The tax is levied at each 
stage of the production and distribution process; according to a tax-to-tax 
scheme, the input tax on purchases is deductible from the output tax. 
In addition, are also subject to VAT: 
a the donation of commodities and providing of services for advertise-
ment needs; 
b the donation of commodities and providing of services for personal 
needs of taxpayers, partners, shareholders, members of supervisory 
board and managing board, members of association, employed and 
former workers; 
c the exchange of commodities and services; 
d the donation of commodities; 
e the providing of services without payment; 
f the providing of commodities or provision of services in return for 
debts; 
g the provision of services or providing of commodities instead of 
payment. 
On the contrary, the exemptions from VAT include 
a unprocessed agricultural products, unprocessed foodstuffs; 
b financial, insurance, educational, health, art, cultural and social ser-
vices, communal services; 
c apartment rental; 
d the sale of the whole or part of a company; 
e activity in random-games; 
f illegal activity. 
People paying income tax in tax card form were exempt from VAT 
until the end of the 1990s, but this is not a rule anymore. Moreover, VAT 
does not apply to some sales in duty free zones and also agricultural pro-
duction is not subject to VAT. Currently, the general tax rate is 22 
percent, while there are two reduced rates, 3 percent (milk and dairy prod-
ucts, raw meat, poultry, fish and some of their products and folk and artis-
tic handicraft products) and 7 percent (most processed foodstuffs, most 
construction raw materials, some construction works, long distance pas-
senger transport, medicines and pharmaceuticals, articles for children) for 
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certain categories of goods and services. To exports, books, magazines, 
and basic agricultural inputs, a 0 percent rate applies. 
Since 1999, national authorities have proposed tax reforms aimed at 
harmonizing VAT with EU requirements of the Sixth Council Directive, 
in view of accession, and some changes, accepted by the parliament, 
became effective from 2000. Looking at Poland, the standard rate of 22 
percent and the reduced rate of 7 percent are well above EU require-
ments; moreover, the tax reform enacted in 2000 decrees that municipal 
services have also to be taxed with a 7 percent rate, and that construction 
materials and services have to be taxed with an increasing tax rate, set to 
22 percent since 2003, while for other goods or services (articles for chil-
dren, new residential constructions, legal services, newspapers) there will 
be transition periods towards EU requirements for social and political 
reasons. In 1993, there were three rates: standard 22 percent, reduced 7 
percent and 0 percent. In 2000, the 3 percent rate was introduced for agri-
cultural goods. For a period of time (1999) there were new 'transitional 
rates' of 2 percent, 4 percent and 12 percent; more and more goods were 
shifted from 0 percent to higher rates. In the future, only exports will be 
charged with 0 percent. At the moment there are four rates: 0 percent, 3 
percent, 7 percent and 22 percent (standard). The new Act on VAT is 
being prepared for 2004 in order to adjust the law to the EU requirements: 
the most important changes will relate to demands of intra-community 
trade regulations. In particular, they will relate to territorial scope, cat-
egories of taxpayers, and the definition of the concept of tax duties. 
According to the draft law, the VAT rates' structure will not change much. 
Excise duties (Podatek akcyzowy) 
The excise tax was introduced in 1993, with the value added tax and excise 
duty Act. The taxpayers are manufacturers and importers; the duty is to be 
paid before introducing a commodity into the market (Bartoszuk and 
Lenain 2000). The excise tax applies to the sale and exchange of excisable 
goods, as well as to importations or donations; it is not levied on exports. 
Excise duties do not apply to some sales in duty-free zones. 
If there is turnover of goods by manufacturers, the tax basis is the value 
of commodity increased by duty. For other goods, the tax basis is the 
quantity or the sales price diminished by the VAT due. 
Excise duty is charged on consumer products, referred to as 'excisable 
products', including: alcoholic beverages, tobacco, fuel, passenger cars, 
luxury electronic equipment, gambling, salt, plastic packaging, furs, cos-
metics, luxury boats, sailboats. The most revenue for the central budget 
comes from fuel, alcoholic beverages and tobacco excise taxes. 
In 2002, the tax rates ranged from 25 percent to 1900 percent. At the 
moment, there are goods in which the share of excise duty reaches 90 
percent (Ziolkowska 2002).22 According to the Polish Ministry of Finance, 
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up to 2003 the adjustment of the excise duty tax to the EU requirements 
has been almost completed. However, the most important adjustments are 
still to be made for tobacco products, for which the excise duty tax will be 
substantially increased until 2008. 
Social security contributions (Skladki na ubezpieczenia 
spoleczne) 
The contributions to the Social Insurance Office (Zaklad Ubezpieczen 
Spolecznych - ZUS) are paid by the employer (18.4 percent of gross 
wage), the employee (18.7 percent of gross wage) and self-employed indi-
viduals, who must pay both the employer and the employee contributions 
(Bartoszuk and Lenain 2000). These contributions finance the first and the 
second pillars23 of the old-age pension system, the disability pension 
regime and other social benefits. While most direct and indirect taxes are 
collected by the state to finance the general budget, the social security con-
tributions are earmarked for large extra-budgetary social security funds 
(Social Insurance Fund, Health Fund, Pension Funds). They are split into 
different accounts: old-age pension (19.52 percent), disability pension (13 
percent), health and maternity insurance (2.45 percent) and work injury 
insurance (percent rates of wage differentiated, depending on the branch). 
The exemptions are limited to a few professions and activities. 
The basis of the contributions is individual income as defined for 
income tax purposes, except for farmers, judges and prosecutors. For self-
employed persons there is a maximum base of assessment for pension and 
disability insurance which amounts to 30 average salaries as projected for 
the respective year: with respect to health, maternity and injury insurance 
there is no such maximum. 
Obligatory premiums are also due to the Labor Fund (2.45 percent of 
the payroll expenditures) to finance unemployment benefits and the active 
labor market. 
A contribution equivalent to 7.5 percent of taxable income was intro-
duced in 1999, as part of the health insurance reform, to provide financial 
resources to the newly created health funds. Employers and other 
providers of income must withhold insurance premiums and pay them 
directly to ZUS on a monthly basis: ZUS then channels these premiums to 
the National Health Fund.24 Most income sources (salaries, self-employed 
income, farmers' income, pensions and other social benefits) are subject to 
the health insurance premium, while income from financial sources (inter-
est, dividends and capital gains) is not. The health insurance premium is 
entirely deductible from personal income tax liability. 
Finally, employers must also pay contributions, treated as business 
costs, to the Wage Guarantee Fund, in order to satisfy the claims of the 
employees in the case of bankruptcy proceedings against an insolvent 
employer, a business closing down or when an employer factually ceases 
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the business and does not have the financial resources to pay off the wages 
due to his employees. 
There is a special system of social insurance for farmers, called KRUS 
(Agriculture Social Insurance Fund). Farmers pay a much lower amount 
and the fund is highly subsidized by the state (more than €3 billion per 
year). The system is abused by people running other businesses, who keep 
small farms in the agricultural areas and avoid paying much higher stan-
dard social taxes from other economic activities. 
Agricultural property tax (Podatek ronly) 
This tax obligation was imposed with the Act of 15 November 1984 as a 
property tax: currently, local governments derive a benefit from the rela-
tive revenues. The taxpayers are the owners of agricultural property 
(those who are in possession of a farmland) apart from the fact of carrying 
out farming and gaining income from it. 
The basis of assessment is the area of the farm in conversion hectares; 
that is, a conventional unit whose conversion rate is based on three objec-
tive criteria (land location, kind of land, soil quality). 
The law provides for a number of exemptions from this tax: for 
example, land used for activities different from agriculture, land of histor-
ical interest, wasteland, land with drainage systems, land along the border, 
land under lakes, running water, dams and water containers, arable land 
where the production has been ceased for three years (up to 20 percent of 
total farm land). Some specific tax exemptions are allowed; the tax rate is 
constant and depends on the purchase price of rye: the tax corresponding 
to a single conversion hectare is equivalent to the gains from 2.5 quintals 
of rye. 
Forest property tax (Podatek lesny) 
This tax was introduced in 1991, with the Taw Law of 28 September: again, 
the beneficiary is local government. This tax is very similar to the Agricul-
ture Property Tax: the taxpayer is the owner of the property, and the basis 
of assessment is the number of conversion hectares of the owned forest 
even though in this case the conversion rate depends on the three main 
species in the strand and on the classification of the strand for each 
species, as they result from the plan of arranging the forest on 1 January, 
every year. 
The tax on a single conversion hectare is equivalent to the proceeds 
from the sale of 0.2m3 of coniferous sawmill timber (the price used is that 
for the timber acquired by forest superintendence). 
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Real estate property tax (Podatek od niemchomosci) 
This subject is regulated by the law of 12 January 1999; again, beneficiaries 
of the revenues are the local governments. The tax is due by natural 
persons, legal persons and other units that own property or building struc-
tures not connected with land, that own or manage real estate or building 
structures that are National Treasury's or Communes' property, that are 
perpetual lessees of the property. 
The basis of assessment is the area covered, in square meters, of build-
ings or part of them, structures for economic activity (leaving out agricul-
ture and forestry) and land not subject to agriculture or forestry tax and 
used for activities different from agriculture or forestry. 
The law provides for numerous kinds of exemptions: for example, prop-
erty used for public purposes, property in special economic zones, prop-
erty of foreign states or International organizations, real estate exempted 
on the basis of separate legislation; the local council then has the power to 
introduce further exemptions. 
Minimum and maximum rates are defined by the decree of the Ministry 
of Finance every year and, within these boundaries, local government 
councils determine the yearly rate. 
Other minor taxes 
To the central government are also due the customs duties and the gam-
bling tax: different from the VAT revenues coming from gambling, the tax 
rate and the basis of assessment vary according to the kind of game. 
Among taxes paid to the local government, natural persons gaining a 
donation or a legacy situated on Polish territory at no cost (inheritance or 
donation) are subject to inheritance and gift taxes: the basis of assessment 
is the net market value of all property received by the beneficiary (Bar-
toszuk and Lenain 2000). Natural and legal persons that are owner of a 
motor vehicle must also pay a tax on the means of transportation, depend-
ent on the kind of motor vehicle.25 Finally, the fiscal charge payable on 
transactions is collected by the central government, but it constitutes a 
source of income for the local government (see Table 10.3). 
10.4 The fiscal burden 
The distribution of tax charge: taxation by economic functions 
and implicit tax rates26 
Generally speaking, the classification of revenues according to economic 
functions clearly shows how any factor contributes to the total amount of 
revenue: each value is given by the ratio of the total tax revenue attributed 
to that factor to a measure of total tax revenue or to GDP. 
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Table 10.3 Tax items in Poland by starting years 
Tax items Starting Revenues Apportionment of the 
years in2000 revenues (%) 
(mn zl) 
State Local governments 
Legacy and donation tax 1983 162.7 0.0 100.0 
Agricultural property tax 1984 720.8 0.0 100.0 
Personal income tax 1991 32,099.9 69.9 30.1 
Real estate property tax 1991 6644.1 0.0 100.0 
Forest property tax 1991 96.4 0.0 100.0 
Transport Vehicles Tax 1991 386.8 0.0 100.0 
Corporation income tax 1992 17,852.8 94.5 5.5 
Value added tax 1992 51,749.8 100.0 0.0 
Excise duty tax 1993 27,312.0 100.0 0.0 
Tax card income tax 1993 315.0 0.0 100.0 
Source: see text. 
By looking at Poland, we can see that the main source of revenues 
arises from employed labor, which contributed up to 14 percent of GDP in 
1998 (of which 4.7 was paid by employers and 9.3 percent was paid by the 
employees). This is not at all uncommon; in addition, an unusually high 
value characterizes consumption, which contributed up to 13 percent of 
GDP. Revenues from self-employed labor amounted to a comparatively 
high 5~1 percent of GDP, while revenu_es from capital and business, whose 
main components come from profits (2.9 percent) and real estate (1.1 
percent), amounted just to 4.2 percent of GDP. 
By looking at the same categories, but related to total revenue, and not 
to GDP as above, we can see that taxes and contributions on employed 
labor were 37.1 percent of total revenue, while taxes on consumption gave 
34 percent of total revenue; taxes and contributions on the self-employed 
and non-employed labor covered 13.4 percent of total revenue and, in the 
end, taxes on capital and business covered 11.4 percent of total revenue. 
Finally, if we consider that in Poland state pensions are taxed as personal 
income, we note that taxes on social transfers amounted to 1.6 percent of 
GDP at the end of the 1990s. 
By going now to the dynamics of revenue according to economic func-
tion, from the beginning to the end of the 1990s we observe that taxation 
of consumption increased from 9.7 percent of GDP in 1991 to about 14 
percent in 1993 and has been almost constant since then. In an opposite 
trend, the load of taxes and social contributions attributed to employed 
labor has been slightly reduced from 15.6 percent of GDP in 1991 to 14 
percent of GDP in 1998. Tax revenue from self-employed labor shows an 
increase from 3.2 percent of GDP in 1991 to 5.3 percent in 1993 and has 
remained constant since then; finally, revenue from capital and business 
(with the exclusion of self-employed labor) shows a gradual but noticeable 
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decrease from 8.6 percent of GDP in 1991 to 4.2 percent in 1998, due to 
the reduction in legal tax rates of corporate income tax (see Table 10.4). 
The implicit tax rate on an economic factor is the ratio of the total tax 
revenue attributed to that factor to the total income or cost of that factor, 
expressed as a percentage. Thus, for instance, the implicit tax rate for 
employed labor is given by the ratio of paid taxes and social contributions 
on employed labor to the compensations of employees; and so on for 
capital and final consumption.27 These tax rates show the relative weight of 
fiscal burden, which falls on every factor, irrespective of the amount of the 
tax base considered. 
The implicit tax rates for Poland confirm that employed labor is the 
most heavily taxed, at an implicit tax rate that was 32.2 percent in 1998, 
even though the dynamic of this rate shows a progressive decline from the 
early (37.3 percent in 1991) to the late 1990s. The implicit tax rate for con-
sumption was 16.3 percent in 1998 and its dynamic in the 1990s shows a 
progressive increase from a value of 11.9 percent in 1991 to one of approx-
imately 18 in 1995, followed by a very weak decrease during the sub-
sequent years. Thus, it is possible plainly to observe a process of gradual 
substitution in taxation mix, from labor to consumption, that may also be a 
saving incentive. 
Other indicators of fiscal burden 
Labor tax wedge 
Poland presents a particularly high labor tax wedge that contributes, 
together with a rigid labor market, to a low employment rate and an over-
sized underground economy. The joint impact of social security contribu-
tions and personal income taxes creates a large gap between labor costs 
and workers' disposable income. The gross average tax rate reached 42 
percent of the labor cost for the average productive worker in 1999, while 
the marginal tax rate was 45 percent (Bartoszuk and Lenain 2000). 
This is surely due to the generous pension schemes that characterize 
Polish public spending:28 on the one hand this is very important for the 
social cohesion of the country but on the other hand, considering that 
Poland spends more on pensions than on education, research and develop-
ment and public investments, it has become necessary to change this tradi-
tion. A new pension fund system was established in 1999: however, the 
reduction of the large tax wedge remains an important objective for 
Poland. 
Gini coefficient 
Historically, egalitarian countries, as the New Members were, have 
traditionally stood out for the lowest values of the Gini coefficient, 
Table 10.4 Structure and development of taxation by function and by implicit rates in Poland, New Members and EU 15, 1992-98 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
---
Poland New EU Poland New EU Poland New EU Poland New EU 
members members members members 
Economic functions 
Consumption 11.5 13.6 10.9 14.4 14.5 11.2 14.1 14.7 11.3 13.0 13.5 11.4 
Labor employed 14.7 19.7 20.6 14.7 19.4 20.7 14.3 19.0 21.4 14.0 17.9 21.2 
Labor self-employed 4.7 2.9 2.4 5.2 2.8 2.4 5.2 2.6 2.4 5.1 2.6 2.3 
Capital and business 5.9 4.3 7.2 4.6 5.0 6.8 4.4 4.3 7.1 4.2 4.5 7.5 
Implicit tax rates 
Consumption 13.8 16.3 16.2 17.9 17.4 16.5 17.6 17.8 16.7 16.3 16.6 16.8 
Labor employed 31.2 37.1 39.0 35.2 38.3 40.2 33.0 37.4 42.0 32.2 38.0 41.9 
Capital and business - - 32.2 - - 30.3 - - 30.5 - - 31.1 
Sources: EU Commission (2000a) for Poland and New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2000) for EU 15 (1997 unweighted average). 
Estonia's 1992 implicit rates and all Czech rates refer to 1993. Implicit rates for capital and business are available only for Estonia and Slovenia. 
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approximately 0.2, while the same coefficient reaches a higher value in less 
egalitarian countries, where powerful elites dominate the economy; in the 
USA, the value of the Gini coefficient has been approximately 0.4 in 
the 1990s (and it is still rising), while in most European countries it is 
around 0.3. 
Generally, it is expected for a transition economy to experience a 
sizable increase in the Gini coefficient, during the transition period: this is 
due to the pre-tax distribution of income, which becomes more unequal 
because of the shift to a market economy. The transition, and the shift to a 
market economy, is believed to cause a change in the distribution of 
income because of the privatization of public assets (that is responsible for 
changes in ownership, wages and occupational choices); the development 
of new markets in privately-provided substitutes to public services (such as 
telephones, schools, health care); and changes in the returns associated 
with different skills that is responsible, with a more flexible labor market, 
for an increase in earnings inequality. Actually, transition economies 
reported some of the largest increases (around ten percentage points) in 
Gini coefficients between the early 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Then, if conventional wisdom suggests that the pattern of sharply rising 
inequality has been nearly universal for transition economies, Poland's 
experience is in a striking contrast with this pattern: Poland's transition 
started with the 'big bang reform' of August 1989-January 1990 and, since 
then, Poland is one of the few transition economies that has experienced 
substantial growth with real GDP, which stayed 28 percent higher in 1999 
than in 1989, when the transition began. 
However, household level data (Polish Household Survey, Ministry of 
Finance) show that since then, income inequality fell slightly below a pre-
transition level (that was approximately 0.25) during 1990-92, when the 
Gini coefficient registered a value of approximately 0.23. Since this time, 
the inequality started increasing only gradually, rising just slightly above 
pre-transition levels by 1997, when it reached about 0.275. 
Poland experienced, as in other transition economies, a relevant 
increase in labor earnings inequality: the returns to education increased 
and, in particular for workers with college and high school degrees, wage 
premiums nearly doubled from 1989 to 1996. It has also been noticed 
(Sibley and Walsh 2002) that earnings inequality is higher in regions that 
are more advanced in restructuring (higher labor productivity/job realloca-
tion rates): there is a positive relationship, at the regional level, between 
earnings inequality and the stage of transition, while at the national level 
rapid growth does not seem to be associated with earnings inequality. 
A comparison with other New Members and EU 15 countries 
When compared with the EU average, the structure of revenue according 
to the economic function of Poland, shows some remarkable differences, 
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as we can see from Table 10.3. First of all, taxes on consumption have a 
higher share in total taxation than in the EU, and also with respect to New 
Members' average. Second, taxes and contributions on employed labor 
differ significantly from the EU average, being seven percentage points 
lower. This is a peculiar feature of Poland, and not a general characteristic 
of New Members. Their value for taxes and contributions on employed 
labor stays at an intermediate level between Poland and the EU average. 
As to taxes and contributions on self-employed labor, we can distinctly 
observe that the value for Poland is approximately three percentage points 
higher than the EU average and, again, this is a peculiar feature of 
Poland's tax system: contrarily, the value for the New Members is on 
average quite similar to that of EU countries. Finally, taxation on capital 
and business in Poland is close to the average of the other New Members: 
their value is three percentage points lower than the EU one. 
The implicit tax rate on consumption is quite similar in Poland, in the 
New Members and in the EU, even if in Poland it is slightly lower and was 
much lower at the beginning of the 1990s (13.8 percent in Poland, 16.3 
percent in the New Members and 16.2 in the EU in 1992). A more relevant 
difference is observable for employed labor: the Polish implicit tax rate is 
approximately ten percentage points lower than the EU one. 
10.S Tax reforms and further steps to get closer to the EU 
Macroeconomic and budget outlook 
Poland is actually one of the most successful transition economies: during 
the 1990s, it made relevant efforts to stabilize the economy, to improve the 
public finances, to run an effective monetary policy, to liberalize and pri-
vatize, and to start developing those structural reforms needed to get 
closer to the European Union (EU Commission 2000b ). 
During the decade, as inflation gradually fell, the output grew at strong 
annual rates of 6-7 percent, mostly as a consequence of the dynamism of 
the private sector - except at the end of the 1990s, when in 1998 the 
economy decelerated sharply in the wake of the Russian crisis. The object-
ives to be reached during the next decade have been envisaged as stable 
growth, inflation under control, adequate finance for the large current 
account deficit and, finally, strong efforts to consolidate public finances 
and implement structural reforms for improving public spending quality 
and reducing the excessive tax burden. In 2000, the general government 
deficit reached 3.5 percent of GDP (Eurostat 2002), primarily owing to 
deficits in social security funds, state enterprises' arrears on their social 
contributions and increased borrowing of local governments. 
The first two years of the current decade have not been easy because of 
cyclical weaknesses of the Polish economy and, as a result of the economic 
slowdown, unemployment has risen and investment has fallen. Poland 
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entered 2003 with the beginnings of a recovery supported by the growth of 
private consumption and exports (partly because of the effective deprecia-
tion of the zloty). Growth was about 3.6 percent in 2003, while, for the 
following years, due to the present large output gap, a strong recovery is 
forecast (5-5.5 percent for the middle of the decade). Price stability has 
been reached: inflation was below 2 percent at the end of 2003 (Ministry of 
Finance of Poland). 
High unemployment, along with the rising budget deficit, are the two 
most important problems of the Polish economy when entering the EU. 
The general government deficit widened in 2003 (6.4 percent), chiefly 
due to the deficits of agricultural agencies and social security funds, 
and public debt increased to about 52 percent of GDP. Thus, the strong 
need for further structural expenditure reforms is pushing to scale down 
the budget deficit to the Maastricht limit of 3 percent, to avoid the chance 
that the public debt reaches the (also constitutional) level of 60 percent, 
and, finally to rearrange budget priorities (partly in view of co-financing 
EU-financed projects)29 and to face a need to pay higher rates of foreign 
debt. 
At the end of 2003, the government announced a new strategy of 
government debt stabilization: the main part of which is a rationalization 
of social expenditures and a reduction of state administration expendi-
tures. According to many observers, it will be extremely hard to reach 
these goals, also because there is an election coming in 2005: there is a 
danger that inability to fulfill the Maastricht criteria would postpone 
Polish accession to the EMU. As for now the most probable date is 
2009-10. 
At the same time, Poland will have to cover the EU contributions 
and payments. Due to the relative centralization of the public finance, 
the government has to transfer important resources to the regions in 
order to make available their participation in the EU structural funds. In 
the coming years, Poland will face a need to pay higher rates of foreign 
debt. 
Polish accession to the EU is going to bring changes in the structure of 
public finance: according to forecast for the years 2004-06, the EU will be 
a net payer to Poland. Poland will gain resources from many EU funds and 
from the special budgetary compensation negotiated on the Copenhagen 
Summit at the end of 2002; substantial support will be directed to agricul-
ture and industry, also without state budget intermediation. According to 
the forecast of the Ministry of Finance, in 2004 Poland will get an appro-
priation of payments of €2.5 billion, paying at the same time €1.3 billion 
as a contribution: the net effect would be surplus of €1.2 billion. In 
2005-06 the surplus is forecast to be €2.1 billion and €3.6 billion, but most 
of the resources will omit the central budget and will go directly to the 
regions, agriculture and industry. The public sector revenues/GDP ratio is 
expected to grow in the years 2004-06; this fact is mostly attributable to 
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the growing value of aid funds coming from the EU. After a gradual 
decline from 41.9 percent in 1995 to 38.5 percent in 2002, total fiscal pres-
sure is expected to grow to 41 percent in 2006 (Polish Ministry of Finance 
2003). 
Recent years' and planned tax reforms 
Tax reforms have been remarkable during the last years in Poland, 
because the authorities are trying to continue replacing the old communist 
tax system, which rested on transfers from state-owned enterprises, with a 
new system suitable for a market economy: thus, in 1999, the authorities 
formulated tax reform proposals, partially enacted in 2000, designed to 
lower direct taxation and tax rates, to reduce tax allowances, to broaden 
the tax bases and to simplify the tax code. 
While the proposed changes to CIT and VAT were adopted, those 
regarding PIT were vetoed by the President; with regard to CIT, the aim 
was to lower the tax rate (from 34 percent in 1999 to 22 percent in 2004) 
and at the same time to broaden the tax base, removing tax deductions for 
companies with high investment; with regard to VAT, the aim was the 
harmonization with EU requirements (EU Sixth Council Directive) with a 
view to future accession, introducing VAT rates for products so far 
untaxed (services, starting in 2002, and agricultural products, starting in 
July 2002).30 In 2003, the CIT rate was 27 percent; at the end of 2003 new 
reform is being prepared. According to the act being prepared, CIT will be 
decreased to 19 percent from 2004 but almost all deductions and 
allowances will be removed. The same flat rate will be available for entre-
preneurs paying taxes under the PIT regime. The main purpose of this 
reform is to improve the competitiveness of Polish enterprises and to 
encourage FDI flow to Poland; in the near future it is planned to raise the 
tax rate on dividends from 15 percent to 19 percent. 
New Polish VAT Law is being prepared in order to harmonize com-
pletely Polish regulation with the EU standards. Among new regulations, 
the most important are those adjusting Polish law to the intra-community 
trade. These regulations are directly involved with the abolition of 
customs borders and they relate to the territorial scope, categories of tax-
payers, definitions of the concept of tax duty and tax eligibility in transac-
tions between EU-member states, specifying the persons obliged to pay 
VAT in intra-community transactions. According to the plans, the stan-
dard rate will stay unchanged (22 percent) as will the reduced rate (7 
percent). Until 2008, a new rate of 3 percent for unprocessed agricultural 
products should be maintained. The same rate should be applicable for 
delivery of goods and services for agricultural production ( except from 
machinery). Until 2007, the rate of 7 percent will be applicable on provi-
sion on construction, renovation and repair services. At the same time, 
certain books and magazines will be provisionally charged at 0 percent. 
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It is probable that after entering the EU the standard rate will be lowered 
and the reduced one increased. 
The planned reform for PIT was not enacted, and a progressive 
reduction of the tax rates from the current three brackets (19, 30, 40 
percent) to only two brackets of 18 and 28 percent in 2002 was abandoned. 
This plan was not enacted until 2003 and, according to the new act being 
prepared at the end of 2003, the 19-30-40 percent brackets will be 
unchanged in coming years. Most of the deductions and allowances will 
be systematically removed from the system, so that the tax base will be 
enlarged. At the same time, however, plans for the PIT rates' decrease are 
present in the political debate. Furthermore, some significant changes 
have been introduced (IBDF 2002b) under the amendments to the Indi-
vidual Income Tax Law, applying from January 2001. The withholding tax 
rate on dividends paid to residents and non-resident taxpayers was 
reduced from 20 to 15 percent and will be increased again in 2004 to 19 
percent, whereas individual income tax rates have remained unchanged, 
and the same will also be the case for 2002, 2003 and further. From 
January 2002, the level of tax exemption has been increased from 
ZL493.32 (about €128) to ZL530.08 (about €135); in addition, since 
March 2002, a 20 percent withholding tax applies to interests derived from 
bank accounts, securities issued by the state, bonds issued by local authori-
ties and income from participation to investment funds; a lot of tax deduc-
tions and tax credits for expenditures borne for purchasing land to 
construct, for constructing dwelling houses or expanding for housing pur-
poses have been reversed. 
The amendments also provide for a deduction for interests on loans 
secured by a mortgage and taken up after January 2002, up to ZL189,000 
(about €48,000) and for a 2 percent rate transfer tax, levied on capital 
transfers abroad, applying until December 2003. 
As regards VAT, from July 2001 a decree of the Ministry of Finance 
provides for a repayment, in observance of particular conditions, in favor 
of foreign enterprises, for VAT incurred in the purchase of goods and ser-
vices in Poland; from July 2001, amendments to the VAT and Excise Duty 
Law provides for a 7 percent VAT rate applying to Internet access services 
(with an exemption in favor of schools and educational facilities). 
During 2001, new rules regarding income taxation of leasing for corpor-
ate and individual taxpayers, the new law on stamp duty and the law on 
tax on civil law transactions (replacing the law of 1989) also came into 
force. When it comes to excise tax, the main change will be the reduction 
in the number of goods charged with this tax. Most of the rates of tax will 
be removed or decreased. But the most important rise is expected in the 
case of tobacco products. In 2004 it will be increased by 9.1 percent, in 
2005 by 10.4 percent and 18.9 percent in 2006 as a consequence of adjust-
ments demanded from the EU (Polish Ministry of Finance 2003). The full 
harmonization is expected for the year 2008. 
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In 2004, Poland will join the European custom union: 75 percent of rev-
enues collected on the borders with not-EU members will be redirected to 
the EU budget. As a result of Community Customs Tariff adoption, the 
effective custom duty rate is going to decrease (Pre-accession Economic 
Program 2003, Ministry of Finance, Warsaw). A new law for local govern-
ment financing is planned for 2004. Among new regulations, the most 
important is further decentralization of tasks and public funds, which 
should also result in wider participation of local governments in the public 
funds. There is also a need to link the local governments' standings with 
the macroeconomic situation. The system will be more flexible in order to 
enable local government participation in EU funds. It is also planned that 
most of the local government tasks should be financed from their own 
resources and transfers from the state budget should play an additional 
role, what is not the case at the moment. 
In recent years, a number of actions were adopted in order to improve 
the effectiveness of the tax collection system. A modern IT system was 
implemented in 2001. This system will improve co-operations among tax 
offices. In 2003, provisions of the Tax Code entered into force. 
The new regulations aim at narrowing the scope of the 'hidden 
economy' and enforcing tax collection. 
The need for further steps 
Polish tax reform certainly represents a fundamental step towards the 
modernization of the tax system, which is thus becoming more equitable 
and incentive-inducing. Nevertheless, other relevant reforms are still 
needed. First of all, a reform of personal income tax is required, in order 
to lower tax rates and thus create a tax regime more favorable to job cre-
ation. The combined effect of current high tax rates and social security 
contributions involves a particularly high tax wedge that contributes to 
high unemployment and an oversized underground economy. An import-
ant step has been taken through the introduction, in 1999, of a comprehen-
sive reform of the pension system, which is expected to make pension 
contributions more similar to saving, rather than a further tax, so as to 
stimulate the labor supply and the shifting of workers out from the under-
ground economy (Bartoszuk and Lenain 2000); however, further actions 
need to be taken in order to reduce the amount of disability and sickness 
pensions and early-retirement pensions still applying to those born before 
January 1949. 
Another recommended intervention regards the autonomy of the tax 
policy for local governments, which still rely on large financial transfers 
from central government. Local governments should be given the 
opportunity to manage their own tax bases. As to this point, an option 
could be that of a property tax based on the value (and not on the size, as 
currently arranged) of properties. However, careful supervision of local 
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governments and monitoring of possible borrowing is strongly recom-
mended in order to avoid a financial crisis and the worsening of budget 
imbalance at the central level. 
Further, in order to get closer to EU requirements, Poland should intro-
duce charges on those products that are damaging to the environment, 
such as coal, fertilizers, and leaded gasoline. Moreover, there is the neces-
sity to reform property market taxation, by bringing residential construc-
tion into the tax net (applying the standard rate is required by the Sixth 
Directive, while, as permitted under Annex H, a reduced rate could be 
applied to social housing). 
Another relevant need is to unify different tax rates on capital incomes, 
in order to reduce possible distortion in savings allocation and investments 
financing: at present, Poland has different effective tax rates on corporate 
income (according to the source of financing, the legal form of the 
investor, and the residence status of the lender) that should be aligned. 
Finally, a fundamental step is that of improving and simplifying tax 
administration, partly in view of the EU accession, making the system 
more transparent and taxpayer friendly, for example by removing the 
need to fill in a tax return for most individual taxpayers, whose taxes are 
withheld (Bartoszuk and Lenain 2000). Similar measures could help keep 
a voluntary tax discipline in the future. 
Notes 
1 A preliminary version of this chapter has been carefully revised by R. Moraw-
czynski of Krakow University of Economics, to whom we express our warmest 
thanks. L. Vergano is responsible for section 10.2 and for section 10.3 on the 
corporate income tax, the excise duties, the social security contributions and 
the other minor taxes. F. Zantomio is responsible for sections 10.4 and 10.5 and 
for section 10.3 on the personal income tax, the VAT, the agricultural property 
tax, the forestry property tax and the real estate property tax. 
2 In 1997, tax issues were regulated in the new constitution. In the same year, 
The Act on Rules for Taxation came into force: it regulates tax liabilities, tax 
information, tax proceedings, tax audits, and fiscal confidentiality. 
3 From 2004 it will be 19 percent. 
4 A new pension fund system was introduced in 1999: labor taxes have been sub-
stituted with contributions to individual pension accounts, which are a form of 
compulsory savings. 
5 The system is highly subsidized from the central budget: another 5 percent 
comes from the budget. 
6 Calculated on the basis of data from the Central Statistical Office. 
7 Powiats are basic levels of the state administration, Gmina is a basic level of 
local government, whereas V oivoidship is a mixture of both at the middle level. 
8 This section owes much to EU Commission (2000a) and IBDF (2002a). 
9 There are some typologies of income which cannot be subject to joint taxation 
between married couples: incomes from given loans, dividends on shares and 
other shares in net profits of corporations, incomes which are paid to help 
police, organs of state protection and treasury control, incomes from undis-
closed sources of revenues and from winnings in games and competitions. 
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10 In 2004 changes are expected: the percentage limit will be liquidated and 
instead of it there will be the limit of ZL350. 
11 In 2004 it will be probably liquidated. 
12 In 2004 the number of such bodies will be reduced: entities will be expected to 
be officially recognized for their social role. 
13 Not valid since 2002. 
14 The exchange rate used (2002) is ZL3.85742 for €1; in 2003 it is ZL4.5 for €1, 
due to rapid depreciation. At the end of October it is ZL4.7. 
15 Expressed in Polish currency, brackets are the same for 2003. Due to the depre-
ciation of the Zloty, in euros it would be (€1 approximately ZU.5) €8200, 
€16,500; tax credit €115. 
16 Owing to the huge deficit, PIT reduction in the coming years is not to be 
expected, in particular the flat rate system is not probable. Nevertheless, this 
issue is still discussed in the political arena. 
17 The tax authority decides every time, but in general the decision is based on the 
official tables. The amount is based on three aspects: number of employees, 
number of people living in the place, where the enterprise is run and on the 
kind of activity. 
18 In accordance with the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, taxes and 
other public contributions cannot be levied unless the appropriate statutory law 
has been passed. 
19 Partners are subject to individual taxation on their share of income. 
20 In the previous years, the CIT rates have been the following: 34 percent in 
1999; 30 percent in 2000; 28 percent in 2001 and 2002. 
21 Actually the preparation started in 1988; one of the most important obstacles 
was fear of inflation. 
22 In general, the scope of goods charged with excise duty tax is much wider com-
pared with that of other accession or EU member countries. Thus, the number 
of goods charged with excise tax will soon be decreased in order to adjust to 
EU regulation and to prepare for competition with neighboring countries 
(especially for alcoholic beverages). On the other hand, excise tax on cigarettes 
will be increased in a stepwise manner until 2008 (Ziolkowska 2002). 
23 The pension insurance is a 'three pillar system'. Pillar I: obligatory public 
system financed through the Social Security Fund (ZUS); Pillar II: obligatory 
private pillar based on private pension funds; Pillar III: all voluntary 
private pension plans, life insurance, etc. Persons born before 1949 are obliged 
to stay in Pillar I only. Persons born after 1969 should participate in Pillars I 
and II, while Pillar III is voluntary for them. Persons born between 1949 and 
1969 have the opportunity to choose one of the two systems presented above: 
once the decision is made, there is no possibility to change it (Denek et al. 
2001). 
24 Since sickness Funds were liquidated, there is only one centralized institution: 
the National Health Fund. 
25 Among the more interesting taxes there is a tax charged on the owners of dogs, 
equal to ZL37 (€8) per year (Denek et al. 2001). 
26 This section is mainly due to EU Commission (2000a). 
27 Because of the unavailability of data, it is impossible, at present, to calculate 
implicit tax rates for capital and business. 
28 The Polish population age distribution, quite similar to that of the other New 
Members, is characterized by a small share of people in retirement age: the 
dependence ratio, quite reassuringly, is about 0.18 (calculated according to 
Eurostat data for 2000 on the population structure): it means there are about 
5.4 men of working age to provide for any one old man. 
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29 It is to be noticed that there is a huge difference in the calculation of the public 
finance deficit while using Polish and ESA'95 methodologies. According to 
ESA'95 methodology, the Agricultural Market Agency and research develop-
ment units do not belong to the government sector. The second important dif-
ference is the second pillar of pension system (OFE), which according to 
ESA'95 belongs to the public system. At the moment, according to the Polish 
methodology, OFE represents the private sector and the government has to 
transfer almost ZL12 billion (€3 billion). Furthermore, the ESA system is 
based on the accrual basis, whereas Polish methodology uses the cash basis, 
which results in different attitudes to several operations. For example, tbe ESA 
system does not include projected payments (Pre-accession Economic 
Program, 2003, Ministry of Finance, Warsaw). As the result, according to the 
ESA'95, Polish public debt is much lower. According to Polish methodology, 
the public debt amounted to 47.2 percent in 2002; 51.5 percent in 2003, is fore-
cast to be 54.8 percent in 2004 and will almost reach the constitutional limit of 
60 percent in 2005. Using ESA methodology it will be 41.6 percent in 2002, 44.8 
percent in 2003 and 51.4 percent in 2005. 
30 For a more detailed description of the reform, see subsection in section 10.3 on 
VAT. 
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11 Slovenia 
Matteo Maria Galizzi and Simona Scabrosetti1 
11.1 Introduction and executive summary 
This chapter is devoted to the description of the Slovenian fiscal system. 
Among all the East European countries, Slovenia not only presents a 
social and economic structure most similar to the current EU members, 
but it has also been often considered by international comparative surveys, 
so that many data are available. 
Slovenia is a small country, covering an area of 20,273km2 (approxi-
mately half the size of Switzerland) and is populated by two million 
inhabitants. Since its foundation in 1918, Slovenia was part of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which later evolved into the 
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945. In April 1990 there were 
the first democratic elections, followed in December 1990 by a referendum 
in which 88.5 percent voted in favor of an independent state. Slovenia offi-
cially declared its independence on 25 June 1991, and on January 1992 was 
officially recognized by the EU. On 1 February 1999 there came into effect 
the association agreement with the EU: Slovenia entered the EU on 1 
May 2004. 
The local currency is the Slovene Tolar, SIT, whose exchange rate in 
November 2003 was SIT236 = €1. Slovenian GDP in 2003 was about 
€24,580 million, nearly €12,208 per capita, about 60 percent of the EU 
average (unweighted PPP values). Real GDP has grown by 3 percent in 
the last two years, sustained by robust export expansion, both to the EU -
mainly Germany, Italy, France, Austria and Croatia - and to non-EU 
markets. In 2004 there is expected to be a strong domestic demand to push 
GDP growth up to 3.7 percent. 
The unemployment rate in 2002 remained stable at 6.4 percent, while 
inflation continued to stay at relatively high levels, despite the fact it was 
expected to fall from 7.5 percent in 2002 to 4.5 percent in 2004 - according 
to the latest government estimation - and it is now a priority target by the 
Bank of Slovenia. 
Monetary policy in 2002 was tightened to some extent, leading to a 
slower growth in monetary aggregates M3. However, as a result of high 
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capital inflows, an overall large monetary expansion has put downward 
pressure on the interest rate. 
A consolidated general government deficit was reduced to 1.8 percent 
of GDP in 2002 and it is expected to reach just 1.2 percent in 2004, thus -
together with the stock of public debt constant at 40 percent of GDP -
contributing to fulfilling the Maastricht criteria (EU Commission 2003). 
The overall fiscal burden in Slovenia amounted to 40.5 percent of GDP 
in 1998 - a level that lies between the average for EU-15 and the one for 
New Members - and comprised nearly two-thirds of tax revenues and tlie 
remaining one-third by social contributions. The latest available indicator 
for the fiscal burden, referred to 2002, is slightly lower, amounting to 39.5 
percent of GDP. Tax revenue comprised mostly indirect taxes (18.9 
percent of GDP): in particular, VAT represented the largest source of 
government financing, contributing more than 22 percent to the total 
fiscal burden. As a consequence, indirect taxes and social contributions 
seem to be too high compared with the other EU countries. The dominant 
role of these two sources of fiscal revenue is in sharp contrast with the sug-
gestions by Mitra and Stern (2003), who indicate a recommended level for 
both indirect taxes and social contributions at about 10 percent of GDP 
each. 
In conclusion, economic efficiency could be improved by raising rates of 
direct taxes, especially corporate and business, and in particular on self-
employed income and on financial activities. Analysis of total taxation by 
functions, in fact, confirms that consumption and labor are by far the most 
heavily charged, while taxes on capital and business play a really marginal 
role. The same figure emerges from the analysis by Cok (2003) of average 
tax rates on active households, whose total burden from indirect taxes and 
social contributions amounted, on average, to 37.3 percent of gross income 
over a total burden of 45.8 percent. In addition, the recent proposal by the 
Slovenian government to prepare, among the others, a new law on corpor-
ate income tax seems to confirm the need to reform the fiscal system in the 
above direction. 
11.2 The structure of the system at the end of the 1990s 
A broad view at the current structure of taxes and social security 
contributions 
In 1998, the overall fiscal burden in Slovenia amounted to 40.5 percent of 
GDP, an intermediate value as compared to European averages referring 
to EU-15 and New Members. Total tax revenue accounted for 26.7, 
whereas social security contributions made up the remaining 13.8 percent. 
The structure of taxation system depicted in Table 11.1 shows that indi-
rect taxes at the end of the 1990s were the most important component of 
total tax revenue, reaching 18.9 percent of GDP. Within this largest source 
Table 11.1 Structure and development of fiscal revenue in Slovenia, New Members and EU 15 as a percentage of GDP, 1992-98 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
--
Slovenia New EU Slovenia New EU Slovenia New EU Slovenia New EU 
members members members members 
Direct taxes, of which 7.4 JO.I 13.5 7.8 10.0 12.9 7.7 9.6 13.4 7.8 9.2 13.7 
Personal income 6.8 6.4 9.6 6.9 7.0 9.3 6.8 7.1 9.3 6.6 6.7 9.3 
Corporation income 0.6 3.6 2.3 0.8 2.9 2.4 0.9 2.5 2.7 1.2 2.5 3.0 
Indirect taxes, of which 14.5 15.6 13.4 17.4 16.5 13.7 18.2 16.9 13.7 18.9 15.5 13.9 
VAT 6.8 5.1 6.7 7.8 7.4 6.8 8.4 7.4 6.9 9.1 7.9 7.0 
Excise duties 3.6 3.4 3.4 4.5 4.2 3.5 4.6 4.1 3.4 4.4 4.1 3.5 
Others 4.1 9.3 3.3 5.2 5.0 3.4 5.2 4.9 3.4 5.5 3.6 3.5 
Total tax revenue 21.9 25.7 26.9 25.2 26.4 26.6 25.9 26.5 27.1 26.7 24.7 27.6 
Social contributions 18.6 16.1 14.5 17.1 15.7 14.9 14.7 14.3 15.3 13.8 14.2 15.0 
Employers 7.6 10.0 8.1 7.4 9.0 7.9 5.2 8.0 8.3 4.4 7.9 8.2 
Employees 10.1 5.3 4.8 8.9 5.11 5.2 8.7 4.8 5.1 8.5 4.8 5.0 
Self employed 0.9 1.8 1.6 0.7 1.6 1.8 0.8 1.5 1.9 0.9 1.6 1.9 
Total fiscal revenue 40.5 41.8 41.4 42.3 42.2 41.5 40.6 40.8 42.4 40.5 38.9 42.6 
Administrative level 
Central government 18.6 25.9 22.8 21.6 25.8 22.4 22.9 25.4 22.4 23.6 23.9 22.9 
Local government 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.4 4.0 3.1 3.7 4.0 
Social Security 18.6 12.9 14.5 17.1 12.9 14.9 14.7 11.5 15.2 13.8 11.4 14.9 
Sources: EU Commission (2000a) for Slovenia and selected New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2000) for EU 15 (1997 unweighted average). 
Notes 
Czech data start in 1993 and Social security is only health. 
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of government financing, VAT played the dominant role: it contributed 
more than 22 percent to total taxation and its revenue as a percentage of 
GDP was larger than that of direct taxes. 
More specifically, direct taxes accounted for about 19 percent of total 
fiscal revenue. Thus, the share of taxation on personal income was in line 
with all selected New Members, but lower compared to the EU average. 
However, the most relevant feature concerns corporation tax whose 
revenue, in terms of percentage of GDP, exceeded 1 percent from 1997, 
being slightly higher in the following years. 
Social security contributions represented more than 34 percent of total 
taxation at the end of the 1990s. As in other EU New Members, the 
highest share is formally (or by law) charged to employees. 
As regards the splitting of total fiscal revenue by receiving administra-
tive levels, local government obtained only 3.1 percent of GDP, that is 7.8 
percent of total taxation. Central government collected instead 23.6 
percent of GDP, about 10 points more than social security institutions 
(pensions and health). 
Comparing all these figures to the benchmark case proposed by Mitra 
and Stern (2003) it may be concluded that, in Slovenia, indirect taxes and 
social security contributions are actually too high. Cutting these two head-
ings and increasing the share of direct taxes, especially on self-employed 
income, could possibly improve the economy efficiency. 
The development of the system from the early to the late 1900s 
According to theoretical literature suggestions, Slovenia started to cut 
social security contributions from 1994: the reduction was gradual but 
continuous and, in 1998, this source of fiscal revenue reached 13.8 percent 
of GDP, the lowest value, which also characterized the following year 
(Table 11.1). Among the chargeable persons, employers are the most 
advantaged: their share of social security contributions as a percentage of 
GDP fell from 7.6 percent in 1992 to 4.4 percent in 1998, whereas in the 
same period, the cut in the share charged to employees was only 1.6 per-
centage points. 
On the other hand, from the early to the late 1990s, there was a signific-
ant increase in the revenue from indirect taxes. In 1992, such taxes 
accounted for 14.5 percent of GDP against 18.9 percent in 1998. VAT real-
ized the most important rise, exceeding 9 percent of GDP, that is 22 
percent of total taxation at the end of the period. Excise duties showed 
their highest value in 1996 and then started to slightly decline. Direct taxes 
alternately rose and fell, but their changes were not too significant. In 
particular, corporate income revenue as a percentage of GDP doubled 
from 1992 to 1998, reaching only 3 percent of total taxation. Personal 
income tax was instead always around 6.7 percent of GDP. 
As a consequence of all these changes, total tax revenue rose by 
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4.8 percentage points, whereas total fiscal revenue was stable at about 40.5 
percent of GDP. 
The apportionment of revenue among government layers 
The gradual but continuous reduction of social security contributions from 
1994 and the related increase of indirect taxes also affected the distribu-
tion of fiscal revenue by levels of government. As shown in Table 11.1, 
during the 1990s there was a rise of five percentage points in central 
government resources and a symmetric fall in the social security institu-
tions (pensions and health) revenue. As a consequence, in 1998 tax 
receipts belonging to central government were more or less a quarter of 
GDP, whereas the share going to social security bodies stayed below 14 
percent. The apportionment of fiscal revenue to local government 
remained almost stable at around 3 percent of GDP. 
According to OECD (2002), in 2000 the total sub-national revenue 
accounted for 5.3 percent of GDP, and 12.4 percent of total government 
revenue. It was composed of about 59 percent by tax revenue, especially 
taxes on incomes and on property, 18 percent by non-tax revenue, such as 
surpluses of trading enterprises, property income, administrative fees and 
charges, and of over 23 percent by general or specific grants from central 
government. The sub-national budget being balanced guaranteed that the 
total current sub-national government expenditure amounted in the same 
year to 5.3 percent of GDP, mainly represented by expenses in education, 
housing, general public services, transports and recreational activities, 
while the consolidated government expenditure reached a share equal to 
the 44.1 percent of GDP. 
A comparison with other main New Members and the EU 
average 
According to the available data summarized in Table 11.1, in 1998 Slove-
nia's total fiscal pressure was at an intermediate value compared with 
European averages, whereas in the previous years, except for 1992, it was 
nearer the lower figure of selected New Members (Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia). The same can be said as concerns 
total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, social security contributions were higher 
than in the other New Members and European countries, but thanks to 
the important reduction which started in 1994, the levels became closer to 
the averages of reference. 
On the other hand, the share of direct and indirect taxes in Slovenia, as 
a percentage of GDP, showed a very different tax structure both with 
respect to New Members and to EU-15 countries. In particular, Slovenian 
direct and indirect taxes are, respectively, the lowest and the highest corn-
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pared both with those of selected New Members and with EU countries. 
This is in contrast with the suggestions of part of the economic literature 
(among the others, Mitra and Stern 2003) about a necessary reduction of 
indirect taxes financed by an increase in direct taxes. 
Slovenia total government spending in relation to GDP was around 44 
percent in 2000, a value in line with that of the existing EU-15 countries 
(45 percent) and of other New Members (40 percent). However, the 
decentralization of this expenditure was very different: in Slovenia the 
share of total sub-national spending in GDP, in 2000, was 5.3 percent, 
about two percentage points lower than the New Members' average and 
only a third compared with the EU countries' level, which stayed at 16.2 
percent. However, this is not an uncommon feature of economies in trans-
ition, such as Slovenia. 
Moreover, as concerns the composition of sub-national receipts, tax 
revenue was 15 percentage points higher, while central government grants 
were a little more than half compared with EU members' mean value. 
Sub-national authorities are given some freedom to determine their non-
tax revenue, and in Slovenia that reached 18.1 percent of total receipts, 
one of the highest level among New Members (OECD 2002). 
11.3 Some quantitative and institutional features of main 
taxes 
Personal income tax - PIT (Dohodnina) 
Individuals are subject to national income tax, property tax and inheri-
tance and gift tax. 
Individuals who have their permanent residence or usual domicile in 
Slovenia (that is who stay there at least 183 consecutive days in a calendar 
year) are residents for tax purposes. They are generally taxed on their 
worldwide income. 
Each individual is treated as a separate taxpayer: there is no taxation of 
an household as a whole. The taxable base of each source of income is 
computed separately. The net results are aggregated at the end of the year. 
The main sources of income are the personal income, which includes 
employment income, pensions, remuneration received under temporary 
contracts and state prizes and awards, the income from agriculture, given 
by the cadastral income from farmlands and woodlands, the income from 
property, as generated from profit-sharing and dividends (whose taxable 
base is the gross amount received reduced by 40 percent, as a way to miti-
gate double taxation), and from interest on loans (with the important 
exemption of interests on bank accounts and securities), the income from 
property rights, derived from copyrights, inventions, trade marks and tech-
nical innovations, irrespective of whether they are protected by law, the 
capital gains, derived from the sale of real estate, shares or other securities 
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if realized within three years after the date of subscription, and, finally, the 
profits from business and professional activities, which is computed in the 
same way as profits derived by legal entities (see the next subsection). 
Regarding the latter, note that individuals who perform independent pro-
fessional services and who have no employees may request that, instead of 
computing their profit on the basis used by private business, they deter-
mine their taxable base by making a lump-sum deduction of 40 percent 
from their gross income. 
Exempt income includes retirement bonuses and severance payments, 
part of unemployment benefits and student grants, while incentives and 
benefits provided to employees are subject to personal income tax. 
The final liability is computed after the deduction, up to a maximum 3 
percent of the tax base, of certain personal expenses - such as the ones for 
the acquisition of long-term securities issued by the Republic of Slovenia 
or by funds that are earmarked for investments in research and develop-
ment, for the acquisition and maintenance of residential buildings, for the 
purchase of medical aid, medicines, textbooks and tuition fees, for dona-
tions to non-profit organizations - and of personal allowances. Concerning 
the latter, notice that, besides allowances given to individuals with family 
responsibilities (10 percent of average annual salary allowance for the first 
child, five more percentage points for each additional child, and 10 percent 
for each adult family member without income), all taxpayers are entitled 
to a deduction from their income tax base of an amount equaling 11 
percent of the average annual salary in Slovenia. Taxpayers above 65 years 
are entitled to an additional 8 percent allowance of average annual salary. 
The final tax liability is computed by applying the tax rates (Table 11.2) 
to the aggregate taxable income. Marginal tax rates show a sharp progres-
sivity, going from 17 percent of income below €5420 up to 50 percent for 
income above €32,520. 
Corporate income tax - CIT (Dovek Od Dobicka Pravnih Oseb) 
Slovenia adopts a classical corporate income tax system: corporate profits 
are subject to taxation on profits at the company level, and then subject 
Table 11.2 Slovenian Personal Income Tax 2002 
Taxable income(€) 
Oto 5420 
from 5420 to 10,840 
from 10,840 to 16,260 
from 16,260 to 21,680 
from 21,680 to 32,520 
over32,520 









again at the shareholder level. Dividends received by resident individuals, 
however, are only taxable on 60 percent of the gross dividends received, 
while inter-company dividends are not subject to tax, provided profit tax 
has been paid by the paying company on its taxable profits. 
All legal persons, except public enterprises, non-profit organizations 
and few other exemptions (see also section 11.4) are subject to the tax. 
Resident companies are taxed on worldwide income. 
The starting point for the computation of the taxable base is the income 
reported in the profit and loss accounts, with the further qualification that 
only the expenses directly incurred on the performance of the activities 
are allowable. Several specific tax incentives aimed at encouraging invest-
ments and employment opportunities are available (see also section 11.4). 
Profit tax is levied at the rate of 25 percent. Notice that the rate has 
been recently reduced from a previous 30 percent. A business loss may be 
carried forward for five years. 
In addition to profit tax, all registered legal and natural persons who 
pay wages and salaries to individuals are obliged to pay a payroll tax on 
the gross amount of such remuneration, with a tax rate between 0 and 14.8 
percent. A special withholding tax is levied on remuneration paid to 
persons employed under temporary contracts at a rate of 25 percent. 
Value added tax - VAT (Davek Na Dodano Vrednost) 
A VAT system, based on the Sixth EC Directive, replaced the sales tax on 
1 July 1999. Taxable persons are entrepreneurs - individuals, partnerships 
and companies - whose annual turnover exceeds SITS million, approxi-
mately €21,000. The taxable amount is determined according to the Sixth 
EC Directive, and it coincides with the total consideration agreed upon 
and charged to the person receiving the goods or services. 
The standard rate is 20 percent, while a reduced rate of 8.5 percent 
applies, among other items, to basic foodstuff, medicines, hotel accommo-
dation and books. 
Environment tax and excise duty on petrol and mineral oils 
The Environment Protection Act of 1996 and the Decree on CO2 Tax of 
1996-98 established that any person who buys fossil fuels (motor or 
heating fuels) and who incinerates organic wastes has to pay €0.013 
(SIT3) on each kilogram of emitted CO2 gas. Exemptions are connected 
with the use of mineral oils. Table 11.3 summarizes the rates of the excise 
duty on petrol and mineral oils whose revenue belongs to the central 
government budget. 
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Gas oil used as motor fuel 
Gas oil used as heating fuel 
Kerosene used as motor fuel 
Kerosene used as heating fuel 
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Liquid petroleum gas used as motor fuel 
Liquid petroleum gas used as heating fuel 
Methane 
Natural gas 
Source: EU Commission (2000a). 
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Individuals, owners or users, who possess or use buildings, parts of build-
ings, apartments, garages and owners of ships with size of at least 8m (not 
used for attending activities) must pay taxes on property, whose revenue 
goes to local government. 
As regards buildings or second homes, their values depend on specific 
'points' determined yearly by municipalities and every year multiplied by 
the cost of living index. Unity tax rates are decided by the state and they 
vary from 0.15 to 1.5 percent. There are some exemptions concerning, for 
example, buildings of less than 160m2 (but not second homes), buildings 
used for agricultural purposes and cultural or historical monuments. For 
the tax payer with more than three family members living with him or her, 
the tax is decreased by 10 percent for the fourth and every additional 
member. 
An annual lump-sum tax of €110 is established for a ship with a length 
between 8-9m: this fixed amount is increased for each additional meter 
and decreased for every additional year of age of the ship. 
Social security contributions (Prispevki Za Socialno Varnost) 
Within this category there are contributions for pension and disabled 
insurance that are paid to the pension fund, contributions for medical care 
and sickness leave that go to the health fund and, finally, contributions for 
unemployment insurance and maternity leave that increase the central 
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government budget. These contributions are withheld by the employer 
and they are calculated with respect to the amount of gross wages and 
other remunerations, including benefits in kind or the profit for self-
employed persons. The rates charged to employers and employees are 
given in Table 11.4. It can immediately be seen that even if relatively high 
on employees, the rates for social security contributions are still much 
lower than the ones for EU members. 
11.4 The fiscal burden 
The distribution of tax cha-rge: taxation by economic functions 
and implicit tax rates 
Fiscal data for Slovenia, available only since independence in 1992, show 
that the total fiscal revenue as a percentage of GDP has not radically 
changed through the years, remaining at around 40 percent. On the con-
trary, it is the structure by economic function that varied rather drastically. 
Indeed, recent economic literature showed an increasing interest in classi-
fying the fiscal receipts in terms of economic function, in particular accord-
ing to consumption and production factors, in order to evaluate their 
impact on the economic incentives and choices. 
Even if a consensus methodology is still under investigation, we refer to 
a classification based on two main categories: taxes on consumption and 
taxes and contributions on the production factors, in turn divided in 
employed labor and capital and business. 
As regards consumption, taxes - namely VAT (sales tax before 1999) 
and excise duties - were raised from 14 percent of GDP in 1992 to over 16 
percent from 1994 onwards, about 40 percent of total taxation. 
On the other hand, taxation on employed labor decreased by 3.6 
percent of GDP since 1992, still ensuring half of the overall fiscal revenue 
and accounting for 20 percent of GDP. 
As for the other production factors, the total share of taxation on 
capital and business showed a significant increase during the 1990s, even if 
it represented in 1998 only 4.4 percent of GDP and less than 8 percent of 
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total taxation. In particular, while the shares of taxes on self-employed 
labor and on financial activities (shares and savings) remained stable at 
about 1.3 and 0.4 percent of GDP respectively, taxes on entrepreneurial 
activities, rents and profits almost doubled in terms of percentage of GDP, 
reaching 2.5 percent in 1998. 
About environmental taxes, their size with respect to GDP significantly 
increased, especially for energy and resources taxation, now contributing 
about 3 percent of GDP. 
The sharp increase in the importance of indirect taxation and the 
related decrease in the share of labor taxes are also confirmed by the 
analysis of the implicit tax rates. 
First, we refer to implicit tax rate (ITR) on consumption as the ratio of 
taxes on consumption and aggregate private and government consumption 
(net of government salaries). This rate increased in the 1990s as a con-
sequence of the rise in indirect taxes: in 1995 it reached the highest value 
and then it stabilized at around 21 percent (Table 11.5). 
Furthermore, the implicit tax rate on employed labor, defined as the 
ratio among taxes on employed labor and compensation of employees, 
shows that labor was the most heavily taxed factor with a rate of 38.4 
percent in 1998, although the latter was still below the highest levels 
reached in 1993 and 1994. 
Finally, it is possible to consider the ITR on capital and business, 
defined as the ratio between taxes on self-employed persons plus taxes on 
capital incomes at the numerator, and net operating surplus plus govern-
ment interest payments at the denominator, only since 1995: it slightly 
increased up to 31.2 percent. 
The overall tax burden on Slovenian households 
Up to now we have described the structures and the rates of single tax in 
isolation. However, it may be argued that what is probably more relevant 
from an individual point of view is the overall effect of the tax system on 
effective purchasing power, rather than the average or marginal tax rates 
of a single type of tax. 
Hence, it seems interesting to report the main results found by Cok 
(2003) whose analysis examines marginal and average tax rates for the 
comprehensive range of direct taxes and indirect taxes paid by Slovenian 
households. The analysis in particular, considered a sample, based on the 
Household Budget Survey, of 1860 households with at least one working 
member, employed or self-employed. Cok (2003) estimated direct taxes -
income taxes, social security contributions and payroll taxes - for indi-
vidual tax payers and added them together on a household level, and com-
puted indirect taxes - VAT, excise duties and taxes on cars - on the basis 
of Engel curves on a household level. 
Figure 11.1 represents the results found for the average tax rates, as a 
Table 11.5 Structure and development of taxation by function and by implicit rates in Slovenia, New Members and EU 15, 1992-98 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
--
Slovenia New EU Slovenia New EU Slovenia New EU Slovenia New EU 
members members members members 
Economic functions 
Consumption 13.9 13.6 10.9 16.1 14.5 11.2 16.4 14.7 11.3 16.0 13.5 11.4 
Labor employed 23.7 19.7 20.6 22.7 19.4 20.7 20.6 19.0 21.4 20.0 17.9 21.2 
Capital and business 2.9 7.2 9.6 3.5 7.8 9.2 3.6 6.9 9.5 4.4 7.1 9.8 
Implicit tax rates 
Consumption 18.4 16.3 16.2 20.9 17.4 16.5 21.2 17.8 16.7 21.0 16.6 16.8 
Labor employed 36.9 37.1 39.0 39.2 38.3 40.2 37.6 37.4 42.0 38.4 38.0 41.9 
Capital and business - - 32.2 - - 30.3 30.1 - 30.5 31.2 - 31.1 
Sources: EU Commission (2000a) for Slovenia and New Members (unweighted average); Eurostat (2000) for EU 15 (1997 unweighted average). 
Notes 
Taxation according to economic function is as a percentage of GDP. Total may stay over total fiscal revenue in Table 11.1 because of some double count-
ing. Estonia's 1992 implicit rates and all Czech rates refer to 1993. Implicit rates for capital and business are available only for Estonia and Slovenia. 
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Figure 11.1 Average tax rates(% of gross income) for Slovenian active households 
(source: Cok (2003)). 
percentage of the gross income, reported by active households, ranked in 
deciles according to the non-durable consumption per equivalent adult as 
the best measure of life-time permanent income. 
It may be noted that the average tax rate for a representative house-
hold is about 46 percent of the gross income, reaching the boundaries of 
about 40 and 51 percent respectively at the bottom and at the top of the 
ranking. 
It is interesting to observe that proper personal income tax constitutes a 
rate of only 8.2 percent of the gross income, indirect taxes amount for 10.6 
percent, while the overall effect of all the social security contributions rep-
resents by far the larger fiscal burden on the households, on average 25 
percent of the gross income. The large share of indirect taxes and social 
contributions in the total fiscal burden on Slovenian households seems also 
to be confirmed by the analysis of the marginal, direct and indirect, tax 
rates (Figure 11.2). 
The ability to attract foreign direct investments 
The Slovenian tax system presents many incentives aimed at encouraging 
investments. For instance, all the investment funds which distribute at 
least 90 percent of profits from the preceding year by 30 November of the 
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Figure 11.2 Marginal direct tax rates (% of gross income subject to tax) for 
Slovenian active households (source: Cok (2003)). 
income tax, a regime that seems to be particularly attractive for foreign 
venture capital companies. 
Moreover, specific tax incentives are available within the corporate tax 
structure. For instance, 40 percent of the amount invested by a company in 
equipment and intangible long-term assets can be deducted from the tax 
base, while up to 10 percent of the taxable income can be allocated to an 
investment reserve and deducted for tax purposes. 
Furthermore, in order to promote employment opportunities by incom-
ing firms, companies that employ a trainee or a previously unemployed 
person may decrease their taxable profit by 30 percent of his or her gross 
wages for the first year of employment. 
A comparison with other New Members and EU 15 countries3 
Table 11.5 clearly shows that, in the period 1992-98, both the share of tax-
ation on consumption and the relative implicit tax rate were well above 
the EU and the New Members' averages. 
As regards the taxation of employed labor, during the 1990s Slovenia 
always remained above the New Members' level, while approaching the 
EU average. At the same time, the Slovenian implicit rate on employed 
labor lay between the New Members and the EU average (41.9 percent in 
1998). 
Finally, the peculiar feature of tax composition for Slovenia emerges 
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considering the taxation on capital and business, whose share, as a per-
centage of GDP, was at most half of the EU average (9.8 percent in 1998) 
and even significantly below the one for New Members, despite the fact 
that the related implicit tax rate was always comparable with the EU 
average (31.1 percent). 
11.5 Tax reforms and further steps to get closer to the EU 
Macroeconomic and budget outlook 
Slovenia experienced a real GDP growth of 3 percent in 2001, a level that 
was lower than the one achieved in 2000, and which was significantly 
explained by export dynamics. In 2002, despite export growth continuing to 
be relevant, especially to non-EU markets, it was domestic demand, in 
particular investments, that retained GDP growth at 3 percent. Both 
domestic and external demand instead pushed growth to 3.4 percent in 2003 
and available forecasts say that this increase should reach 3.7 percent in 2004. 
Domestic demand was mostly constituted by investments, which - stim-
ulated by industrial restructuring, approaching EU membership and 
export growth - increased by over 4 percent in 2003. This trend should 
continue for 2004 and determine an investments growth of 5.5 percent. On 
the contrary, private consumption, constrained by moderate rises in both 
real wages and employment rate, increased by only 2.5 percent in 2003. 
Available forecasts talk about a more optimistic 3.5 percent for 2004. 
High net export growth in recent years contributed to a further sharp 
reduction in the trade deficit, from 3.3 percent of GDP in 2001 to 1 percent 
in 2002. At the same time, the services account increased as well, which led 
to a boost in the current account surplus of up to 1.8 percent of GDP in 
2002. 
Capital inflows, already strong in 2001, reached the record level of €1.5 
billion in 2002 and were constituted mainly of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), driven by privatization in the banking sector ( especially in the case 
of Nova Lubljanska Banka) and in the pharmaceutical sector. 
Because of modest production growth, industrial restructuring and the 
elimination of the government program to subsidize labor training, 
employment growth in 2003 was stagnant, while in the same year the 
unemployment rate remained stable at 6.4 percent, both being expected to 
not vary too drastically in 2004. 
Inflation, still at high levels, continued to decrease slowly from 7.5 
percent in 2002 to 6.2 percent at the beginning of 2003. In 2003, the 
Slovenian government stated that the reduction of inflation to at least 4 
percent by June 2004 is a priority target, as it announced its intention to 
enter ERM II by 1 January 2005. However, in 2003 inflation was at 6 
percent and for 2004 it is expected to fall only to 5.5 percent - rates that 
are closer to, but still well above, the EU averages. 
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The overall government budget deficit, according to EU Commission 
(2003), was sharply reduced from 2.5 percent in 2001 to 1.8 percent in 
2002, and it is expected to reach 1.2 percent in 2004. 
Recent years' and planned tax reforms 
The most significant set of fiscal reforms in Slovenia started in the 1990s. 
However, unlike in other countries with a comparable economic situation 
characterized by a fall in GDP and raised unemployment and retirement 
rates, this transitional period in Slovenia was not too dramatic, for 
instance the general government budget was always kept in balance. 
The most relevant reforms in the fiscal system after 1991 concerned the 
introduction of Value Added Tax in place of retail sales tax in 1999, its 
modifications in the following years, and the change in the retirement 
system in 1999. 
In particular, VAT was introduced according to the Sixth EC Directive 
with the original standard rate of 19 percent and reduced rate of 8 percent. 
However, from 1 January 2002, the Budget Law increased the standard 
rate up to 20 percent and the reduced rate up to 8.5 percent. Meanwhile, 
VAT administration also was modified. From 1 July 2001, three categories 
of liabilities have been identified for taxpayers according to their annual 
turnover. In addition, a new definition of foreign taxable person applied 
for the purposes of the VAT Law. 
In 2003, the Slovenian government announced a proposal to launch new 
laws in three major areas. 
First, the new law on personal income tax has almost completed the 
parliamentary debate. The main features regarding the introduction of 
taxation of personal income on a worldwide base, and of interests from 
bank deposits and securities, which are at present exempt. Furthermore, 
on one hand it abolishes some generous allowances for income from prop-
erty rights, while on the other hand it raises the threshold for exempt 
income and gives higher tax allowances for children and students. 
As regards the second proposal, the new law on corporate income tax is 
expected to reduce some investment tax allowances in order to enable the 
government to collect higher revenues from corporate profits, by still 
keeping the tax rate at 25 percent. However, as far as we know, no modifi-
cation has yet been proposed for the fiscal treatment of self-employed 
income and financial activities, which at the moment seem to play a mar-
ginal role in the overall fiscal burden. 
Finally, a comprehensive reform for health care, focusing especially on 
its financing, has been proposed, with the main objectives of inducing 
better accessibility, quality and efficiency of the services. 
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Notes 
1 We are grateful to Mitja Cok of Lubljana University for his helpful comments 
on a previous version of this chapter. The chapter is a joint product of the 
authors. However, M. M. Galizzi is particularly responsible for sections 11.3.1, 
11.3.2, 11.3.3, 11.4 and 11.5.2 and S. Scabrosetti for sections 11.1, 11.2, 11.3.4, 
11.3.5, 11.3.6 and 11.5.1. 
2 A detailed discussion may be found in Mitra and Stem (2003). 
3 A detailed discussion may be found in Mitra and Stem (2003). 
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